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This study is an exploration of direct and indirect
causation in English and certain related areas which bear on
this topic, these being, in particular, the Lexical Decomposition
Hypothesis and the preposition with in its function of marking
an object of the verb. Having stated the problem in Chapter
1, the second Chapter is a study of Fillmorean Case Grammar
with respect to the relation between Case Relations and Case
Forms. We argue that if Case Forms are to be taken as the
realisation of Case Relations in any direct, interesting
manner, then the array of cases proposed by Fillmore has to
be modified by conflating certain of his cases so that we
have four cases Absolutive, Ablative, Allative and Locative,
cases which would be consistent with the Localist Hypothesis,
the nature and origin of which is also considered.
Chapter 3 gives the main data for discussion and we
consider the types of subject, verb and object which interact
in expressions of causation and action, in particular we
show that we need to recognise direct objects which relate
to certain occurrences of with-phrases and others which
relate to to-phrases. The arguments against Lexical
Decomposition are also shown to be unconvincing. Chapter k
is a discussion of previous treatments of causation and we
suggest a grammar incorporating the Localist Hypothesis
which can account for the data at hand.
Chapter 5 is a discussion of the preposition with and
an attempt to treat this preposition within the framework
of the grammar proposed, this serving the double function
of being a further testing area for the grammar and also
helping to clarify some of the proposals of Chapter In
the concluding Chapter we suggest some extensions of the
grammar and those areas needing further study are identified.
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In Lakoff (Lakoff, 1970) we find the following sentences
cited:
1. John opened the door (7b)
2. John brought it about that the door opened (7c)
Commenting on these, Lakoff says that "most people, on first
glance, would say that 7b (our l) entails direct action as in:
3. John opened the door by turning the
doorknob (5-31)
However 7b can also indicate indirect action, as in:
4* John opened the door by increasing the air
pressure in the room to 200 atmospheres (5-32)
7c is, at first glance, usually considered as indicating
indirect action..." Ve find here two interesting, but
unexplained concepts, namely direct and indirect action.
These concepts, although used by other linguists, have
remained unexplained. One great problem is that they can
lead to ambiguity, as in the case of Lee (Lee, 1971) vho
talks of direct and indirect causation firstly in terms of
meaning and then switches to using them to refer to syn¬
tactic phenomena such as the presence versus absence of a
predicate CAUSE in the underlying structure of a sentence.
Lee does not make the distinction clear, nor does he
attempt to relate the semantic notion of direct action to
the syntactic one. Miller (Miller, 1972) suggests, with
regards to the lexical decomposition of causatives, that
"a more subtle analysis in terms of direct and indirect
causation is required." The aim of this thesis is to study
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the notions of direct and indirect causation with a view to
giving the concepts a more explicit characterisation. It
is hoped that this will enable us to follow Miller's
suggestion and contribute to the theory of lexical decom¬
position. this will also mean that we shall look more
closely at Anderson's notion of SubJunction, (Anderson,
1971b, 1976).
Evidently Lakoff is using "direct" and "indirect" to
refer to the nature of the action relating the agent and
the object or goal. In a first intuitive approach we may
distinguish several levels of directness of action. As
the most direct we have the situation in which the agent and
object are the same entity, that is we have a reflexive
action. A second level will involve an action passing from
the agent to an object, which we can call direct action,
while the third level will be "indirect" and will involve
some intermediary, which may or may not be specified. Thus
one of the areas of interest will be the means of specifying
the instrument. Further we shall also consider the types
of object of actions and also the types of agent of causal
forces and how these latter interact with instruments.
However, it is also evident from Lakoff's examples
quoted above that the terms are not being used to refer
solely to the presence of some intermediary. In the
example of direct action, the by-clause refers to an action
which is normal or typical when a door is opened, while
increasing the air pressure is not exactly a normal means
of opening doors. Thus there is a further problem
concerning the statue of direct and indirect causation:
that is, are these notions linguistic ones or are they
pragmatic? Ve shall argue that a grammar can and must deal
with direct and indirect causation on the grounds that these
concepts help to account for certain facts about paraphrase
relations between "lexical causatives" (shibatani, 1972,
1973b) and paraphrastic causatives, although we shall find
that directness and indirectness of causation is not always
given concrete manifestation in the syntax of English.
There are other problems bound up with the grammar of
causation, not least of which being the adequacy of a case
grammar analysis. Ve shall argue below that a "Localist"
view of case must be adopted (Anderson, 1971a and 1976 for
a general discussion of such an approach) by showing that
Fillmore*s proposals and grammars which are derived from them
are not observetionally adequate, and in pointing out these
adequacies it will be shown that they all bear crucially




Hie State of Case
Since the publication of Fillmore (Fillmore, 1968),
there has been an increasing interest in case as an
essential part of the description of syntactic and semantic
relations between nouns and verbs. However, this develop¬
ment has taken place in something of a theoretical vacuum,
insofar as there has been little questioning of the basic
assumptions, namely that there are such relations in
language and that there is no need for a strict means of
setting up the list of cases for any language studied. If
there is no attention paid to how the linguist is to
recognise any particular case, then the status of the notion
as a linguistic universal becomes highly suspect. Moreover,
this lack of determinacy in the notion allows a situation
in which the list of cases used for any language may be
extended as the researcher wishes while the theory gives no
means of constraining this extension. Thus, for example,
Nilsen (Nilsen, 1973) sets up a case which he calls Material,
itself a sub-category of the Instrument case, and his main
reason for doing this apparently is that nouns which appear
in this relation to the verb are [-count]. How does the
theory allow us to say whether this is a valid step?
In his review of case grammar, Fillmore, (Fillmore,
1971a) has the following to say: "..ray hope was that their
(cases) existence could be discovered and Justified by
syntactic criteria.." However, a review of the literature
shows that this task has not been undertaken by Fillmore
himself* and in this others have followed his example.
However* leaving open the question of the nature of case
and the number of cases allowed by the theory* the main trend
of researoh has been towards showing how case grammar can be
used in description with special reference to sub-
categorisation of verbs. One further problem which has not
been adequately dealt with concerns the form of represent¬
ation of cases and the related question of the status of
case as an unanalysable primitive or as a bundle of features.
m what follows we shall consider the state of case
grammars in an attempt to show that the problems of a Fill-
morean treatment bear crucially on the Localist Hypothesis.
The first section is concerned with Fillmore*s arguments
for setting up cases and whether there are other ways of
discovering and restricting the set of cases. In the second
section we shall consider the adequacy of the cases used by
Fillmore and in the third section how case should be handled
in a grammar, i.e. as an element on which other elements
may depend* as a feature on nouns as a bundle of features
or as an immediate constituent* and in the final section* we
briefly survey Localism.
2.1 Testing Cases
Consider two possible analyses of the following
sentence:
1. John smeared the wall with paint
In Fillmore (Fillmore* 1968) the prepositional phrase with
paint is analysed as an instrumental* probably on the basis
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of the preposition used, although this is not made clear in
the text. Contrasting with this. Nilsen (Nilsen, 1973)
gives this sentence as an example of one containing a
"with-Objective" occurring with a Locative. The problem
facing us is how are we to decide between these competing
proposals.
2.1.1. Fillmore
Cases were first set up by Fillmore to account for
"semantically relevant relations" which hold between the verb
and the nouns door, janitor and key in the following
sentences, (Fillmore, 1969):
2. The door will open
3. The janitor will open the door
4. The janitor will open the door with this key
5. This key will open the door
This approach seems to characterise case grammar in that it
is basically concerned with accounting for intuitions without
showing that other syntactic evidence reflects these
intuitions. Thus the emphasis is on "semantically relevant"
rather than on "syntactically relevant" relations. Certainly
reference is often made to prepositional usage but this is
more often than not used as support for an analysis already
arrived at on intuitive grounds, rather than as primary
evidence. Further, Fillmore does not make clear the
relationship between prepositional usage and semantically
relevant relations, that is basically the relation between
semantic properties and their surface realisation. Notice
that, as Starosta (Starosta, 1970) points out, this emphasis
on discovering covert relations and the treatment of* surface
realisation as secondary leads Fillmore to neglect certain
important generalisations about surface relations between
cases, for example the various uses of with.
The only point at which Fillmore gives any detailed
consideration to criteria for setting up cases comes in his
most recent case grammax' work, (Fillmore, 1971a). It is
significant that he prefaces his discussion with the following:
The whole thing (case grammar) makes sense only if
there are good reasons to believe that there is an
irreducible number of role types; if it turns out
that this number is small; if there are reasonable
principles according to which these role types can
be identified.•.
However, a survey of case grammar suggests that there is
little reason to be hopeful for any of these conditions to
be fulfilled within a Fillmorean approach. With respect to
the small number of cases, there seems to be no means of
deciding. Certainly the number of cases used by different
linguists varies and even the cases used by Fillmore himself
seems to fluctuate annually. So long as there is no basic
principle which restricts the set of cases, case grammar can
have as many or as few cases as each linguist wishes and
there is no means of knowing whether any proposed set is
the "irreducible set". Further, such a governing principle
from which the set of cases can be derived will ensure that
we are not dealing with a simple taxonomy. Finally such a
principle will allow the theory to make some testable claims
about languages: case grammar as it is at the moment
(excluding Localist Case Grammar) in effect makes no claims
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at all, since the linguist is entitled to create any new
case necessary to describe the data, so that any hypothesis
in danger of being refuted can be saved by the creation of
a new case.
With respect to the principles for the identification
of roles Fillmore's position is a little more secure, but
even these are not fully satisfactory. His first criterion
depends on the "assumption that there is in a single clause
at most one noun-phrase (which may, however, be complex)
serving a given case role." In effect this will only allow
the linguist to say of any two noun phrases that they are
in different case relations, but it will not allow us to
identify what case relations those are. This is brought
out in Fillmore's discussion of the principle (Fillmore,
op. cit.). Thus as an example he gives
6. John compelled his son to stab the usher
and he makes the following assumptions: "Suppose that one
of the case roles we INTUITIVELY RECOGNISE is that of Agent
and suppose that..we perceive agency in both what John does
and in what his son does" (Our emphasis). Given these
assumptions the one—instance—per-clause constraint allows
us to argue that the sentence is clausally complex. However,
without those first assumptions the principle is vacuous,
and moreover, without them the problem itself does not
exist, since there is nothing in the theory which will
prevent an analysis in terms of compel to stab as one verbal
unit. Alternatively it is possible to make different
assumptions: thus we could, in terms of the category Agent,
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distinguish between the Instigator Agent and the Controlled
Agent and call these different cases: thus since 6 contains
an example of both there is no reason on these grounds to
treat 6 as clausally complex. Again there is nothing in
the theory that prevents our choosing the second assumption.
The only means of rejecting it would be to show that there
is some test for Agency which both John and his son fulfil,
so that any distinction between Instigator and Controlled
Agent would be an unnecessary complication of the grammar.
The second criterion is characterised by Fillmore thus:
"..if one takes a predicator which is INTUITIVELY seen as
assigning different semantic functions to noun-phrases that
occur in specific syntactic positions with respect to it,
there should be a natural nstopping point" in any attempt
to classify these semantic functions." The principle does
not allow us to identify what functions we are dealing with
and it is difficult to see exactly how it would apply in
any instance, although the discussion following it suggests
that it is to be applied with respect to adjectives like
sad, warm, cold etc. These adjectives are treated in
relation to a third principle, (Fillmore, op. cit.) to the
effect that noun-phrases which are either brought together
in comparatives or are co-ordinated must have the same role.
This principle is used to account for the unacceptability
of the following:
7. ?John and the movie became very sad at the end
8. ?My sweater and I are both very warm
on the grounds that John and I are Experiencers while movie
10.
and sweater are Instruments. However, there is no argument
for this assumption in the literature and there are other
possible explanations for the unacceptability, for example
perhaps in terms of the animacy of the noun, or the fact
that we can say John feels sad but not *The movie feels sad
or in terms of the ambiguity of sad as either an expression
of state or of causation of a state.
Fillmore's discussion of the subject-verb relation in
the following sentences suggests that the noun itself has a
large part in helping to decide its case relation with the
verb. This is in no way meant as a criticism, but it
should be pointed out that this form of evidence needs to
be considered very carefully.
9. I am warm (Experiencer)
10. The jacket is warm (instrument)
11. Summer is warm (Time)
12. This room is warm (place)
On the basis of room being a place and summer a time
Fillmore concludes that they are in the Time and Place
relation to the predicate. However, case-assignment on the
basis of what we may call the referential status of the noun
needs to be constrained, since it easily leads to such
treatments as that proposed by Nilsen (Nilsen, 1973) who
says that
13. A hammer is an important tool
contains two Instruments, that is case is no longer treated
as a relation between noun and verb but as some property of
the item in the outside world.
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Thus Fillmore's articles on case grammar do not provide
a principled means of identifying oases. They merely allow
for the differentiation of cases. The actual definitions
of the cases themselves provide no clear means of case
assignment, and may even lead to results which conflict with
other statements of Fillmore's. Thus the Agent is defined
(Fillmore, 1971a) as the "instigator of the event."
However, this needs to be modified, perhaps, so that the
instigator is necessarily animate so that explosion cannot
be the instigator of the event in
14. The explosion broke the windows in the street
Similarly the definitions of Object and Result are confusing
and load to conflict. The Object is defined among other
things as "the ontity whose..existence is in consideration",
a definition which allows us to treat wall as Object in
15. John built the wall out of stone
since the sentence tolls us about the coming into existence
of the wall. However, Result is defined as "the entity
that comes into existence as a result of the action". With
such uncertainty about the definitions and the lack of
rigorous tests the status of case grammar is in doubt.
2.1.2. Nilsen
Nilsen (Nilsen, 1973 and see also 1972) is concerned
with the instrumental case in English and of tho five
proposed tests only two of them can in principle be used to
handle any other case if we exclude the two tests which we
have already seen proposed by Fillmore. Thus besides the
Like-Case-Conjunction constraint and the one-instance-per-clause
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constraint Nilsen discusses the Relative pronoun test, the
Use-with test and the prepositional test.
(i) Relative pronoun test
As a means of Identifying Manner and Instrumental
adverbs, questioning a sentence with how has the backing
of authority in that it has been used by traditional,
structuralist and transformationalist grammarians. Nilsen
is critical of the test in that it does not allow the
grammarian to distinguish between the two. He gives as an
example:
16. How <io porcupines kiss?
which can be answered with either With their lips
(instrumental) or Carefully (Manner adverb). This seems to
be an Incorrect approach to the problem, in that it is
basically a negative one. Thus Nilsen has some intuitions
about Instruments and Manner adverbs, namely that they
should be distinguished, but the test does not reflect this
distinction and therefore must be rejected. But the
important point is that in rejecting the test, he also
rejects its findings, namely that there is some relation
between Manner adverbs and Instruments. This fact, rather
than being evidence against the test, is an important
staxBLng-point for research, namely, given that we have some
means of recognising .Independently Instruments and Maimer
adverbs, what property (or properties) do they share?
(ii) Use^with test
This test is based on Lakoff*8 observations on the
preposition with and the verb use (Lakoff, 1968). Thus
13.
many linguists (Stine, 1968, Lambert, 1969* Morin, 1969,
Langendoean, 1970, Pam, 1970, Binkert, 1970 and see also
Walmsley 1971, Buckingham, 1973 on instrumenta Is ) consider
a noun—phrase to be in the instrumental case if it can be
the object of use and of the preposition with. Nilsen
observes , however, following Chomskv (Chomsky, 1971 and
see also KooiJ, 1971) that there are examples with use which
do not have acceptable paraphrases in with.
17a. John used his connections to further his career
b. *John furthered his career with his connections
18a. Jotn used the classroom to propagandise for his
favourite doctrines
b. *John propagandised for his favourite doctrines
with the classroom
Notice, however, that these sentences become acceptable if
we use through and in respectively. Again rather than
taking these facts as raising some interesting questions
in their own right, Nilsen uses them simply as an argument
against the validity of the test. Thus he rejects the
finding that the test identifies a certain sub-set of
instruments. That both the tests mentioned reveal something
interesting about English is shown by that fact that thsy
will both classify the same prepositional phrases as related.
Thus support for treating in the classroom as an instrumental
is the acceptability of the paraphrase in use and the
possibility of questioning with how:
19. How did John propagandise for his favourite
doctrine>? In the classroom
Notice that the answer could also be He used the classroom.
At this point 1st us pause to consider how the four
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tests mentioned so far may apply to our problem sentence
1. John smeared the wall with paint
Assume for the moment that we know from the Use-vith test
and the Relative-Pronoun teat that with a brush is an
Instrument in the following:
20. John smeared the wall with paint with a new brush
The one—instance—per—clause constraint, then, tells us that
with paint is not an instrumental, thus supporting Nilsen's
view that it is an Object (Nilsen, op. cit.). A similar
result is obtained from the Relative-Pronoun test, in that
21. How did John smear the wall? *With paint
is an ill-formed discourse. However, the Use-with test
reveals a more complex situation. Firstly a simple
paraphrase of 1 with use is odd, or at least needs some
special interpretation made of John's intentions:
22. John used paint to smear the wall (with)
Secondly, however, if an adjective modifies the noun paint
we get a more acceptable sentence and a sentence with a
prepositional phrase after smear is fully acceptable:
23a. John used red paint to smear the wall (with)
b. John used (red) paint to smear on the wall
Thus we have conflicting results which seem to suggest that
paint both is and is not an Instrument. Ve shall not
attempt to resolve this question fully, but proposals in
Chapter 5 below point to a possible solution,
(iii) Preposition test
Fillmore in several places has mentioned that when the
proposition contains on Agent, the Instrument ie marked by
15.
with, and when there is no Agent it is marked by by
(Fillmore, 1968, 1969, 1971a). The correlation of prepos¬
itions with inflectional suffixes as markers of case is a
tradition of long-standing. The traditional grammars of
the 17th and 18th centuries declined nouns with prepositions
on the analogy of the Latin declensions. Working within
the transformational model Lyons (Lyons, 1968) Langendoen
(Langendoen, 1969, 1970) and Fillmore (Fillmore, op. cit.)
besides others cited by Nilsen (Nilsen, op. cit.) have
assumed that cases in English are signalled in surface
structure by prepositions. However, as Nilsen points out,
there are problems with this in that one preposition may be
used to mark more than one case relation. On the basis
of the preposition test, assuming that Fillmore is correct
with respect to with, then we should be dealing with the
saiwe case, namely an Instrument in both sentence 1 and
2i*. John painted the wall with Bill
yet this conflicts with our intuitions and with evidence
from other tests i.e. no paraphrase with use and the
unacceptability of conjoining Bill and a new paint-brush
in the following:
25. *John painted the wall with Bill and a new
paint-brush
Thus we cannot accept Fillmore*s proposal for marking
Instruments and Agents at its face value, since firstly
with marks more than one case (at least. Locative,
Comitative and Instrumental see Buckingham, 1973» Walmsley,
1971 and Seller, 1973 the latter on mit in German which has
16.
similar functions and secondly we find examples of noun-
phrases which appear to be Instrumentals yet which are not
marked by with:
26. John went to town on his bike/in his father*s
car/by train/on foot
Nilsen makes the same mistake with the preposition test that
he makes with regard to earlier ones, namely he accepts
arguments against the test simply as arguments against the
test and not as constituting interesting facts in themselves.
To a certain extent, this invalidates Nilsen*s argument,
since it is quite conceivable that further study of the use
of with and bjr with a view to explaining their various uses
would provide a more adequate form of the Preposition test.
2.1.3. Crus e
Probably the most studied case relation, whether under
the guise of a case analysis or not, is that of Agent,
especially its relation to the Instrumental case and the
possible case Pore© (Huddleston, 1970 and Nilsen, op. cit.)
Ci*us© {Cruse, 1973) brings together various proposals about
the notion of Agent. In particular he is interested in the
relation between the occurrence of the surface lexical item
do and the presence of an Agent. He identifies three tests
based on this assumed relation. Firstly, Gruber (Gruber,
1967) uses as a test for agentivity the substitutability of
the verb by do something. However, as Cruse notes, it is
difficult to decide what part of the sentence is substituted.
Secondly, Halliday (Haliiday, 1967) classifies clauses on the
basis of their "preferred form of the corresponding
17.
"identifying clause". Thus John punched Bill is a do—clause
because its preferred identifying clause is What John did was
punch Bill as opposed to ??What happened to Bill was that he
punched JBilA, A third variant of the test is that used by
Anderson (Anderson, 1971a) where the relative acceptability
of the question-answer sequence is taken to be diagnostic:
27a. What did John do? He punched Bill on the nose
b. What happened to John? ??He punched Bill on
the nose
Cruse goes on to argue that what any form of the do-test
reveals is "not necessarily what is usually referred to by
the term *agentive«". Prom Lyons, (Lyons, 19*>8) he infers
the following characteristics as generally attributed to
Agents:
(a) the agentive/non-agentive distinction is only
relevant for animate nouns.
(b) obligatorily process verbs such as die do not
admit of an agentive interpretation.
(c) stative verbs cannot have agentive subjects.
and he provides counter-examples to show how the do-test and
these principles are in conflict. Ifrus agents must be
animate, yet in 28 if the do-test does identify Agents, then
we have an inanimate Agent:
28a. The wind blew down the tree
b. What the wind did was blow down the tree
Similarly die cannot have an Agent subject, yet 30 is
acceptable:
30a. Christ died for us
b. What Christ did was die for us
18.
Cruse suggests that rather than testing for the presence of
an Agent, this test reacts to the presence of one or more
of the following features in the sentence, volitive,
effective, initiative and agentive. We shall return to
this suggestion below (see Chapter 6). However, note that
it is difficult to assess the proposal since there is no
argument in the study of Cruse for the existence of these
features other than the simple fact that they are a taxonomy
of those cases where the do-test yields a positive result.
However, the feature volitive does seem to correspond in
some way to Gruber's second criterion for agentivity,
namely the fact that the sentence may be modified by
in order to.. (Gruber, 1967 see also Huddleston, 1970,
Lee, 1971a).
2.1.4. Lee
Lee's discussion is couched in terms of a non—case
grammar (Lee, 1971a). Thus the tests he proposes really
test for the agentivity of the verb, rather than for the
presence and identification of an Agent. He defines six
contexts which he calls "pro-agentive" i.e. allow an
agentive verb.
(a) The sentence is the object complement of command
or the infinitival object complement of persuade.
31a. John commanded Mary to leave
b. *John commanded Mary to have red hair
(b) the sentence Is object complement of causative have
32a. John was having everyone leave
b. *John was having everyone know the answer
19.
(c) an Instrument phrase can be added
(d) cleverly, enthusiastically, on purpose and similar
adverbs can be added
33a. John opened the door on purpose
b. ♦John cleverly believes Mary to be a fool
(e) in order to.. may be added
34a. John opened the door quickly in order to surprise
everyone
b. *John was tall in order to surprise everyone
(f) bjr plus a nominal!sation of the sentence can occur
in a sentence which itself is in a wpro-agentive"
context
35a. John cleverly frightened the children by opening
the door quickly
b. *john cleverly frightened the children by being
tall
Notice that the tests depend heavily on context: each of
the unacceptable sentences could be acceptable if understood
in the context of someone pretending or acting the role or
property,
2.1.5. Other tests
Any other tests for cases used by linguists seem to fall
roughly under the heading of paraphrase tests and are used
to discover either how the predicate may be paraphrased or
what, if any, preposition may occur with the noun-phrase
under analysis. Both of these forme of the test depend on
the assumptions firstly that there is a well-defined relation
between certain predicates and the cases with which they can
occur, these predicates often being underlying predicates
like BE, CAUSE, BECOME, and secondly that prepositions do
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mark case relations in well-defined ways. This latter is a
flat rejection of Nilsen's position (Nilsen, 1973» see
2.1.2. above) and claims that there are principles which
govern the use of prepositions, and which we shall see
cannot be handled directly in a Fillmorean case grammar.
The claim that there is a well-defined relation between
certain predicate types and cases is a necessary one given
that cases are relations between noun-phrases and verbs.
Although we talk of predicates and mention CAUSE, BE, BECOME,
it is not necessary to adopt the Lexical Decomposition
Hypothesis, as we could talk of stative, non-stative and
causative verbs. (on the relevance of these notions of
Fillmorean Case Grammar see Lee, 1971b.)
Notice that both of these tests for cases can only be
used successfully once we have a comparatively well developed
theory of case grammar and moreover neither of them can be
used as the basis for arguments for the existence or
necessity of a particular case. Without a more fully
developed grammar it is difficult to evaluate the status
of intuitions about cases and to decide whether and in what
way they are more important that evidence obtained from any
of the principles discussed above. Thus as one clear
example, we have the discussion of the Path case in Fillmore,
(Fillmore, 1971a). Thus Fillmore observes that "a sentence
with a path designated can contain an unlimited number of
Path expressions" and gives the example:
36, He walked down the hill across the bridge through
the pasture to the chapel
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The sentence breaks the one-instance-per-clhuse constraint,
yet it appears that Fillmore wants to preserve his intuitions
and by so doing restrict in some manner this constraint.
The model as it stands provides no means of evaluating this
approach.
Given the situation in which no case appears to have
any stronger backing than that of intuition, and in which
only sortie cases can be tested for and only then with limited
success while others e.g. Experiencer, Object, Counter-Agent
(Fillmore, 1971b) are largely ignored, the fundamentals of
case grammar seem to be uncertain. Moreover, there are
further criticisms of Fillmore*s approach and it is these
criticisms which bring us closer to an acceptable treatment
of case.
2.2 Reducing Cases
Being based essentially on intuitions, without strong
arguments to support them and their number being subject to
fluctuation (cf. the appearance and disappearance of Counter-
Agent Fillmore, 1971a, 1971b), one might expect problems
relating to the adequacy of Fillmore's proposals. The lack
of explicit discussion of case leads to a confusing situation
with regard to the relation between case and features such
as +aiximate. Thus in earlier forms of the grammar (Fillmore,
1968, 1969) this feature appears to have been used to
distinguish between Agent and Dative on one hand and Instrument
and Object on the other. The interest in case as a covert
category leads to the neglect of the ways in which this
covert category niay interact with the surface structure,
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and it is precisely this interaction which is of help in
any treatment of case. In fact it is probably this
emphasis on the covertness of case which is the most harmful
factor in Fillmore*s approach. So long as case is covert,
there is little pressure to look at surface structure.
But, insofar as there is little concern with surface
structure, Fillmore does not manage to show clearly the
relevance or necessity of case.
In this section, although I shall concentrate on
the above points, a continuing concern will be the hierarchy
of cases given in Fillmore (Fillmore, 1971a): Agent,
Experiencer, Instrument, Object, Source, Goal, Locative and
Path and Time, although the position of the latter two
cases is not clear. Object appears to be something of a
pivot point, with two different types of cases arranged
either side of it, the first three are those which in surface
structure are marked by the so-called abstract or syntactic
cases while those to the right of 0 are "local" cases,
(Hjelmslev, 1935-7, Kurylovicz, 1964, Fillmore, 1968,
Lyons, 1968, Anderson, 1971a). As the hierarchy now stands
there is little reason, other than observational adequacy,
why the order should be as given. However, we wish to
argue that the order A, E, I is dependent on a deep parallel
with S,G,L, that is in accord with the Localist Hypothesis,
(Hjelmslev, op. cit., Anderson, 1971a, 1976 among others)
A, E, I are "abstract" forms of £, G, L respectively, so that
given the order of the latter trio we can naturally predict
the order of the abstract variants.
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2.2.1. Agents and Instruments
In this section we shall consider the Agent and
Instrument cases in relation to Huddleston•s criticism and
Fillmore's reply (Huddleston, 1970, Fillmore, 1971a). Our
sole concern will be with the presentation of the problems,
their solution will be dealt with below (chapter 4 and 5).
The main force of Huddleston's argument against
Fillmore's analysis of A and I is that he allows the feature
of animacy to over-ride other facts about sentences
containing agents and instruments,
37a. John opened the door
b. The key opened the door
c. Hie wind opened the door
Fillmore (Fillmore, 1968) classes the subjects of 37b and
37c as I, apparently on the basis of their both being in¬
animate. However, as Huddleston points out, only 37b has
a corresponding sentence in which an agent may occur. In
fact, Fillmore needs to sub-categorise the I case in order
to account for this fact, granted that the animacy feature
is relevant to the A and I cases. The question to be
asked is whether this is a valid means of distinguishing
the two cases. Huddleston queries this on two accounts:
firstly why is it the animacy feature and not any other
feature which is distinctive, is this an accidental fact
or a necessary property of English, and secondly why is a
feature distinctive at all rather than the intention of the
causer?
If Fillmore is to use any feature as a means of case
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differentiation, then he should give some firm principle to
support this. Without such an argument we have no means
of Judging whether this relation between animacy and agents
is a necessary or contingent fact, and in any case it would
only be in the former situation that the test would have any
real validity and significance for our theory of language.
Fillmore must also specify where the cut-off point comes in
the hierarchy of features for nouns with regards to their
relevance for case assignment, if there is such a point.
Thus Nilsen (Nilsen, 1973) goes so far as to say that there
is no cut-off point, that all features are relevant and that
there is consequently no need for case as an autonomous
element of deep structure since it can be assigned by some
interpretive means to the bundle*of features. Nilsen does
now show clearly how such a grammar would operate, so that
it is difficult to evaluate his proposals, but certainly
he seems to be disregarding the view of case as a relation
between a verb and a noun-phrase.
Huddleston argues that animacy is a contingent feature
of the A case on the grounds that only animate beings can
act intentionally and it is this property which is relevant
to the A/l distinction, or rather what ho calls the Agent/
Force distinction. If the subject is always to be treated
as A in 37a, then the grammar needs some other means of
distinguishing between John as the performer of an intentional
action and John as the cause of an event. We argue for the
same distinction below (Chapter 4 and 5).
Fillmore makes his reply to this criticism in his most
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recent work on case grarranar (Fillmore, 1971a). He states
that "I no longer confuse selection restriction to animates
with true case-like notions", preparing the reader for
some convincing argument against Huddleston, since "the
possibility of positing some new case, say Force, seems
unnecessary". Notice that this comment brings out clearly
the major problem of Fillmore's grammar: it is possible to
posit such a case and the theory does not prevent this at
all, so that it does not restrict, on this point, the set
of possible grammars.
His first point against the Force case is that it does
not occur in contrast with either A or I, but as we shall
see below this is not strictly true. Certainly it is
difficult to assess the force of this point, since Fillmore
does not say what he would accept as an example of A and F
appearing in contrast. In fact it seems that he has
already accepted, or gone part way to accepting such a
contrast in admitting the force of Huddleston's argument
that sentences like 37a are ambiguous between the intentional
agent and force reading. Moreover, while accepting the
ambiguity and rejecting the possibility of the F case
Fillmore offers no alternative analysis in terms of his own
grammar which will capture the difference.
Hie main force of his argument, having asserted that
no third case is necessary, relates to whether we should
include those examples which Huddleston calls Forces within
the A or I case. Thus, if we conflate A and F we need
added restrictions on the grammar to restrict noun-phrases
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"representing acts of God and changes in nature" from
occurring with I, whether it be a noun-phrase or "an
instrumentally-construed by-clause" (but see below).
However, if we class F with I then such restrictions are not
necessary. He supports his case by; arguing that forces of
nature can occur in sentences which have Agents, especially
God.
However, the argument is not satisfying as he only
deals with forces of nature and acts of God and leaves out
of account noun-phrases referring to machines, computers,
rocks, trees, furniture and other immbbilia (see Bacon
1971 for a list of possible instruments in Fillmore,s sense
of the term). Secondly, in order to accept forces of
nature as instruments co-occurring with agents, we need to
make some special assumptions about the world or have some
particular knowledge about man's ability to control weather
e.g.
38. The Canadians can put out forest fires with rain
Then Fillmore's supporting argument depends on some special
assumptions, and similar special assumptions can be made in
order to accept sentences which support the claim that F
is to be classed with A, since it is possible to have Forces
in sentences with "instrumentally-construed by-clauses":
39. The North Wind killed all those who did not believe
in him by sweeping them off the cliffs
Notice that even personification is not necessary
40. Hie heavy snowstorm killed many animals by cutting
off their food-supply
which suggest that F, if it is to be conflated with anything
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should b© conflated with Agent. However, until Fillmore
gives a more detailed analysis of such sentences within a
fuller grammar, instead of a programme for such an analysis
his arguments cannot be convincingly assessed.
A further criticism of Fillmore's position depends on
the occurrence of prepositions. A brief digression is
necessary here to clarify the situation and our assumptions
with regards to the relation between Case Relations which
are elements of ••deep" structure and Case Forms which are
typically prepositions in English (see Anderson 1976 for
further discussion of CRs and CFs). Much of what follows
is dependent on the identity of prepositions and CFs and
it has some implications for Case grammar ignored by
Fillmore. We wish to suggest that this hypothesis must be
accepted and that the data which it provides is useful for
case testing, by exploring the consequences of not accepting
it. Thus if we deny that prepositions are CFs we are faced
with several problems: firstly do CRs ever have surface
manifestation and if so what is it, if not what evidence do
we have for CRs; secondly what are prepositions if not CFs,
either we assert that they are completely arbitrary in their
occurrence, which raises problems for certain cross-language
generalisations about prepositions and "case-endings", (see
below) or we accept that there is some conditioning factor
for the occurrence of prepositions, in which case we need to
search for that factor. This latter suggestion seems
highly unproductive and faces the problem of explaining the
relation in many languages between CFs and prepositions
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where the one clarifies or modifies the other. As an
example, consider Latin, where the preposition ab occurs
with the "ablative" case form to mark the noun as agent,
curn to mark the comitative and the simple inflection without
supporting preposition marks the instrument. As an example
where the case inflection clarifies the preposition rather
than vice versa as seen above, we find in occurring with
the "ablative" and accusative inflection so that in oppido
(ablative) means "in the town" while in oppidum (accusative)
means "into the town".
If we accept that there is a relation between CFs and
prepositions, we may still choose between two assumptions.
The weaker says that it is a mere accident that two CRs
which we can distinguish on other grounds can be marked by
the same preposition, e.g. b£ marking A and I for Fillmore,
while the stronger says that if two CRs can be marked by
the same preposition, there must be some motivation for it:
this is basically what Zwicky calls a Naturalness Assumption,
(Zwicky, 19^8). Thus we cannot accept identity of
preposition marking as a fact of language without attempting
some explanation and the most obvious and the strongest
form of explanation would be one in terms of some underlying
identity between the two CRs. This is interesting when
taken in conjunction with Fillmore*s assertion (Fillmore,
1968) that where the traditional grammarians took certain
facts as given and others as to be explained he wishes to
alter the priorities and explain the given and accept as
given the facts which traditional grammarians wished to
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explain. This aim would appear to correlate with Fillmore1*
adoption of the weaker hypothesis about preposition occurrence,
as he accepts as a fact that the same preposition can mark
two or even more cases. Consider, however, this distinction
between "given" and "to be explained". Is there, in fact,
any validity to such a distinction? In other words can a
linguist be content with accepting facts and not explaining
them? The only possible answer which preserves intact
the linguist*s aim of explanatory adequacy is that facts
can only be accepted as "given" with respect to some problem
and that they also, at some point, must be taken as the
"problem" to be explained. It is in failing to reverse
the order that Fillmore*s proposals have become open to
doubt.
As a general principle, then we assume that other things
being equal the stronger hypothesis is preferable a priori.
Notice further that being stronger, the hypothesis is also
more open to refutation (Popper, 1963). Thus if our theory
is to aim at explanation, we need to explain why any
preposition can mark two cases, and the easiest approach to
this is to adopt the strongest hypothesis, namely underlying
identity. In the light of this, consider the us© of by
and with and how Fillmore handles them.
The problem is that if we adopt Fillmore*s cases A and
I as they stand then we must reject or at least modify the
strong hypothesis, since both A and I can be marked by the
preposition b£. The situation becomes all the more
interesting when viewed in relation to Huddleston*s Force
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case, since it is only a sub-set of the instances of I
which can be marked with b£. Fillmore defines the I case
(Fillmore, 1971a) as the "stimulus or immediate physical
cause of an event, where by "stimulus" he could be understood
as meaning noun phrases referring to objects used as
instruments while "immediate physical cause" would refer to
acts of God etc. Certainly Akatsuka (Akatsuka, 1971)
appears to read Fillmore in this light, and argues that we
should distinguish between two types of Instrument corres¬
ponding to objects used and physical causes. Thus on the
basis of some Japanese data he sub-categorises I as Xnst^
and Xnst2. The distinction carries over into English and
is parallelled by the l/F distinction of Huddleston.
Notice that it turns out to be only those instances of Xnst^
or of F which are marked by bjr. For Fillmore marks the
Agent and the Instrument in the absence of an Agent by
while with marks the instrument when there is an Agent
present, whether it is present in surface structure or not,
(Fillmore, 1968, 1969). Thus in the following the presence
of with reflects the fact that an Agent is understood!
41a. The rats were killed by fire
b. The rats were killed with fire
If we keep A and I apart as does Fillmore, whether we sub-
categorise I or not which may itself be a dubious move,
there is still no obvious means of relating the double
function of by as A and I marker.
The above disaussion was dependent on Fillmore*s earlier
treatment, but in his most recent work on case grammar
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(Fillmore, 1971a) he rejects the assumption that bjr is
associated with the Agent NP. Instead bjr is now introduced
by the Passive transformation. The effect of the trans¬
formation is to re-rank one of the cases, either Experiencer,
Object or Goal and "put it in first position", this being
the position of the case which becomes the subject; this
re-ranking brings about a modification in the form of the
verb and the preposition b£ is associated "with the noun-
phrase that got demoted", that is b£ seems no longer to
mark a case so much as the fact that a noun-phrase has been
demoted. The suggestion is not worked out explicitly in
the text, so that it is difficult to see exactly how it will
operate and whether it is observationally adequate.
However, there is one major drawback, namely preposition
insertion no longer looks to be a unitary phenomenon. Thus
we might reject the proposal simply on the grounds that bjr
does not occur solely as the result of the passive trans¬
formation. If it did, then there might be some means
around the problem. Thus, if by-insertion is the result of
the passive transformation, then it follows that somewhere
in the derivation of the following the passive has applied:
42. John surprised everyone by arriving on time
In fact, such sentences as 42 provide support for the
existence of the p case, as the by-clause, like Huddleston*s
F and Akatsuka*s Inst2 refers to what are essentially events
whose defining property, like that of Agents, is that they
"cause" other events, unlike Enst^ marked by with which are
instrumentally involved in the action.
32.
To stun up, we have considered Huddleston*s criticism
of* Fillmore*s A and I cases, seen how Fillmore*s reply is
really no reply at all and shown that his treatment forces
us to reject the strong hypothesis about the relation
between CRs and prepositions and conceals facts about
agents and causal events which can explain the occurrence
of by. However, there is one further and final argument
against the analysis, based on the fact that an analysis
along the lines suggested above with A and F treated together
will allow a simplification in the transformational rules.
As already mentioned, the case hierarchy places E
before I, such that in post-verbal position E will precede I,
as in 42 above where E = everyone and X = by arriving on
time, while the rule of Subject-Formation will make E
subject if there is no A but there is an I, i.e. E is the
left-most case. However, this makes the wrong predictions
for Siglish (Akatsuke. (Akatsuka, op. cit. ) points out that
the situation is worse for Japanese where only a restricted
set of Instrument noun—phrases appear as the subjects of
psychological predicates). According to Fillmore,
43. The noise frightened John
has an Experiencer, John and an Instrument, the noise, but
according to the Subject—Formation rule the subject of the
sentence should be E, since this is the left-most case. In
order to account for the fact that I is the subject, Fillmore
needs a rule of Experiencer-shunting which moves it away
from its normal position. Thus I will become the left-moat
case and the victim of Subject-Formation. This rule seems
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to be highly questionable, if only because it is highly
restricted. Notice that it is a re-ranking rule, like the
Passive transformation, yet does not bring about any
modification in the form of the verb nor does it result£»g
in the marking of the demoted noun-phrase by by. This
unsatisfactory situation is removed both for English and for
Japanese if those NPs which can appear as the subject of
psychological predicates are treated as Agents or perhaps
Forces. Thus there are good grounds internal to Fillmore*s
grammar which suggest some re-analysis of Agents and
Instruments.
2.2.2. Objects, Experiencers and Goals
In this section I wish to explore the question of
whether the Object, Experiencer and Goal cases can be related
and to investigate whether, within the framework of Fillmore•»
grammar, one can account for any of the facts to be adduced
for this relationship. As suggested already cases rr,ay be
related or argued for on the grounds of intuition, preposition-
marking, implications, places of occurrence in surface
structure and we can add transformational potential.
However, intuitions can only be used as indicative of
relations, as a source of hypotheses which can then be
tested in terms of syntactic or semantic properties.
With respect to Experiencer and Object, the feature
of animacy seems to be playing the same role as it does,
whether Fillmore acknowledges it or not, when it distinguishes
between A and I. In the earlier form of case grammar,
there has only one case Dative (Fillmore, 19^>9» 19^9) where
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there are now Experiencer and Goal (Fillmore, 1971b).
Thus the indirect object of verbs of giving which in the
later version are Goals were formerly Datives as were the
animate objects of transitive verbs. Fillmore says of
Dative (Fillmore, 1971b) that he has "reanalysed it by-
spreading it around the other cases" and proceeds to define
E and 0. This seems to be symptomatic of his approach in
general: Fillmore makes an important change to his list of
cases yet leaves it largely unmotivated, so that we are
given little insight into what Fillmore sees as evidence
for cases. In fact we shall see that by retaining the old
Dative, Fillmore had an easier means of accounting for the
relations between E and G.
2.2.2.1. Da tive
In his earlier works this case was defined as "the case
of the animate being affected by the state or action identi¬
fied by the verb" (Fillmore, 1968), which leads to a
situation in which any animate noun must be either Dative
or Agent, Thus the subjects of 44 and 45 and the objects
of 46 and 47 are Datives:
44. John has a book
45. John is sad
46. Bill surprised John
47. Bill killed John
This reqxiires two different case frames for the verb die
(see Huddleston, 1970) one in which the subject is animate
and therefore Datrive and the other in which the subject is
inanimate and therefore Object
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48. John died
49. The plant died
Lehrer (Lehrer, 1970) points out a more extreme example.
Thus if the animacy feature is so significant for case
assignment, then the verb bum must take two types of object,
one D the other 0:
50a. John burned Mary
b. John burned the table
Such examples make it very clear that ouch a dependency on
features of the noun has little to do with case. As
frequently observed by Fillmore, case is a relation between
a noun-phrase and the verb and identifies the role which that
noun phrase plays in the state or event identified. Thus
we must conclude that if Mary is Dative in 50a and the table
is Object, then these two nouns play different roles in
the event of burning. (it is not significant for the
argument that burn is ambiguous between causing an object
to bum and causing a bum mark to appear on the object.)
Intuitively, there seems to be no grounds for asserting
this difference in role, since in both cases the event and
the effect of that event are the same whether the object
affected is animate or not. The only difference lies in
the fact that in one case the affected object experiences
pain. Taken to its logical conclusion, this approach to
case is likely to become merely a variant of Chomsky»s
system of selectional features (Chomsky, 19^5) Nilsen*s
work would appear to be the result of this development
(Nilsen, 1972, 1973).
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2.2.2.2. Experiencer and Goal
If there are problems with the old Dative one might
expect that the "new" cases E and G which develop out of it
would go some way to dealing with them. In fact, nothing
could apparently be further from the truth. E is the case
associated with "a genuine (?) psychological event or
mental state", G is the case of the "receiver as
destination", while 0 appears with "non-psychological verbs
which indicate a change of state" and he gives as an
example die (Fillmore, 1971a). Notice that at least we
no longer have two possible cases as the subject of this
verb .
The restriction of E to verbs of mental events and
states requires some comment. This seems to be some
reaction against defining a case in terms of noun features,
since he is now defining a case, or at least restricting
its occurrence, in terms of the verb, whereas his view of
case as a noun-verb relation suggests that some mixture of
the two would be necessary, i.e. verb and noun features.
Again this idea of verb restricting case could be taken to
extremes, such that we could have a Fact case with the
Kiparskys* factive verb (Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1971).
Consider the fact also that it seems just as acceptable
to say that someone experiences being killed just as he
experiences psychological states and processes. In fact,
in Fillmore*s recent case grammar paper (Fillmore, 1971a)
there appears to be no case to accommodate the object of
verbs like kill, since there is no longer a Dative. Since
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the verb does not denote a psychological event, the case
cannot be E, which leaves 0 as the possibility, unless
Fillmore would allow G here. Such an analysis ignores a
property of the earlier Dative treatment, namely the capturing
of the intuition that there is a relation between the object
of verbs like kill and other verbs whether psychological
or not in which someone or something is affected or operated
on. In fact there are good reasons to believe that there
is a much closer relation between G and E such that the only
difference lies in the abstractness of the two cases. Such
an approach would be consistent with a Locals.st view of case
grammar, (Hjelmslev, 1935-7, Anderson, 1971a, 1976 among
others), the basic claim being that spatial notions i.e.
Goal, Source, underly more abstract notions like Fillmore's
E or what others might call "patient" of verbs like kill.
Thus, there sewn to be intuitive arguments against
Fillmore's analysis of case, that is intuitions differ and
we suggest that evidence from prepositional usage and
positions of occurrence in surface structure will select
the Localist view rather than Fillmore's.
2.2.2,3. Prepositional usage
Leech (Leech, 1969) says that to, onto and into
respectively are the dynamic counterparts of at, on and in,
so that the occurrence of one of the dynamic prepositions
in an expression of movement implies a sentence with the
corresponding static preposition. However, we must also
take into account the preposition towards when dealing with
goals,since this dees not imply that the goal was reached.
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Thus in spatial terms (and also in abstract terms, see
below) we need to distinguish between achieved and non-
achieved goal, the one marked typically by to, the other by
towards or for as in set out for. Notice that Fillmore
does not mention this possible distinction. The problem
is, however, that to and for are not limited to what
Fillmore calls the Goal case.
(a) The preposition to marks the noun-phrase occurring
in "object" position after verbs like happen and
come and occur when they refer to psychological
events.
51- Something has happened to Dill since John last
saw him
52. The idea came/occurred to me last night
Since 52 refers to some psychological event, Fillmore should
treat to me as an underlying E, yet it is marked with a
spatial preposition. 51 i8 more interesting in that the
"thing that happened to Bill" can be either a mental event
or a physical action:
53. What happened to Bill? Some thugs broke his ribs/
His father*s death shook him badly
It does not seem to be too much of a distortion to claim
that Bill is the recipient of a mental event or physical
action, but whether one makes this claim or not, the
preposition used is still to be accounted for.
(b) do^ seems to function as the causative counter¬
part of happen and again to_ marks the object:
54. John has done something to Bill
where do something may refer to any mental or physical action,
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surprise, amaze, upaet, kill, shoot etc,
(c) to marks the object of* psychological verbs in
certain constructions such as:
55. Alsatians are frightening to many people
The examples above all deal with the types of
constructions in which tja may appear, but, as yet, no
mention has been made of for. The literature on case
grammar recognises this preposition as the marker of
Fillmore's Benefactive case (Fillmore, 1968), but there are
unresolved problems with the nature of this case (Fillmore,
1971a) which we cannot deal with here (see Chapter 5 below).
Thus in
56. John bought a book for Bill
for Bill would be a Benefactive. However, such a view
would appear to be too superficial since the sentence is,
in fact, ambiguous as to what is actually "for Bill", on
one reading it is the actual book which is for Bill, while
on the other it is the act of buying which is for Bill,
from which he is intended tc benefit. This latter inter¬
pretation is clearer if we use on behalf of. The situation
can be exemplified by the following where there are two
for-phrases, the second alternating with on behalf of;
57. John bought a book for Bill ~n hi.s sister
for
2.2.2.4. Verbal Paraphrases
We have already mentioned that one possible test for
cases is that of considering what verbal paraphrases are
possible and what implications there can be drawn from the
sentence. In his discussion of Goal, Fillmore (1971a)
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says that the indirect object of some verbs is in the Goal
case and as such note that it is marked by to, the
preposition of spatial movements
58. John gave the book to Bill
However, it is possible to "give" other things than concrete
objects such as books e.g. help, suggestion, advice, a hit,
a thrashing etc.
Anderson, (Anderson, 1971a, 1971b) suggests that the
surface verb help derives from an underlying structure which
can also surface as give help. In the same way it is not
unlikely that a similar underlying structure a derivations
could relate give a surprise/shock and the verbs surprise
and shock, similarly give a thrashing and thrash. Notice,
however, that in Fillmore's terms give a book requires a
Goal, the object of the verb surprise must be E, since it
is a psychological predicate, but is there an E with the
decomposed form give a surprise? Whatever Fillmore's
treatment of such structures, he must take into account
that here we have the same verb being used, give, for what
may appear to be different case frames, one containing 0,
the other E.
Similar evidence comes from the verbs receive and get.
These verbs seem to function as the converses of give, for
while the latter has the Source as surface subject and Goal
as indirect object, the former have the Goal as subject and
Source as indirect object.
59- John got/received a book from Bill
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In this case we need to be able to account for the para¬
phrase relationship between:
60a. John struck Bill
.,, , at the hands of _.,,b. Bill received a blow „ Bill
x rom
(see Anderson, 1971a for further examples of such para¬
phrase relations.) Get is more interesting in that it is
used more widely than receive and is widely viewed as a
variant of the bo-passive (Lakoff R, 1971). One important
point which we shall return to below is that much of the
data above could be used to support the hypothesis that at
some point in the derivation verbs have an essentially




In English and several other languages, there are two
possible passives, one with direct objects as subject, the
other with indirect objects. Thus from the structure
underlying 6la, both 6lb and 6lc can be derived:
6la. John gave the book to Mary
b. The book was given to Mary by John
c. Mary was given the book byjohn
Historically passives formed on the direct object have always
been possible in English, while the "dative" passive is of
more recent origin, while French and many other languages
do not allow it at all. Thus it seems likely that, in
Fillmore*s terms, there was a time when the passive only
applied to the 0 case and then extended to the G case.
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Notice, however, that E can also be the subject of a
passive as ins
62. Mary was frightened by John
Thus we have a situation in which one movement transformation
treats three different cases in exactly the same way, i.e.
promotes them to subject. Xtt order to capture the identity
of these cases, Ef 0, and G, for the purpose of this
transformation, Fillmore introduces a rule of Accusative-
Marking, which marks the cases under discussion aa +Acc so
that only cases so marked may be promoted to subject by
the passive transformation. Notice that this is an
arbitrary feature which disguises some deeper relation, it
does not explain why just these three cases can be passivised.
In fact, it is not the case that just these three cases
may be passivised, as the Benefactive, at least in some
dialects, may also be the subject of a passive sentence.
Fillmore (Fillmore, 1965, see also Postal, 1972) marks the
following as unacceptable:
63. Celia was bought a deathray by Lou
Fillmore (Fillmore, 1965) handles such sentences by postul¬
ating two separate rules, one of TO-Indirect Object Shift,
the other of FOR-Xndirect Object Shift and having the
passive transformation apply on the noun-phrase which
immediately follows the verb. FOR-Indirect Object Shift
applies after Passive, so that it never creates Direct
Objects which can be passivised, thus blocking 63. In
Fillmore*s case grammar, the treatment would be along
similar lines, so that Accusative-marking will apply to
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Benefactives after Passivisation. However, this treatment
ignores the fact that several dialects do not have the
restrictions that Fillmore imposes (Postal, op. cit.).
However, the fact that some dialects do distinguish between
E, 0 and G as opposed to B would provide some support for
his most recent treatment of the Benefactive case. Thus
he suggests (Fillmore, 1971a) that the Benefactive may be
the Goal case of some higher proposition containing the
predicate GIVE, so the structure of
64. John did it for Mary
could be presented as something like "John GIVE to Mary
(he did it)." In this way Accusative-Marking could apply
cyclically, firstly to E, 0 and G and then to B, thus
keeping the two classes distinct.
(b) Indirect-Object Shift
This rule we have already mentioned in the above
discussion (for a fuller discussion of the phenomenon see
also Green, 1974, Anderson, 1976). It is the rule which
makes Goals and Benefactives direct objects as in 65b and
66b which derive from 65a and 66a respectively:
65a. John sent the package to Paula
b. John sent Paula the package
66a. John caught a rabbit for Mary
b. John caught Mary a rabbit
Again a single rule treats as identical two cases which
Fillmore keeps distinct in his case list, yet has to mark
their similarity with an arbitrary feature +Acc.
A Localist treatment would involve positing some
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essential identity between Goal, Experiencer and Object,
the latter only under certain circumstances. This identity
would be framed in terms of the Goal or Aliative case.
(See Chapter 7 for further discussion of the relation between
Localist cases and Fillmore*s). However, such a case belongs
to essentially motional predications and if Fillmore*s E
is to be related to such a case, then we are faced with
possible problems with the E that appears with statives
like be sad, be happy.
This problem can best be resolved by reconsidering the
former Dative case. Thi3 could appear with both stative
and non-stative predicates, thus the indirect object of
give was originally viewed as a Dative as was the subject
of have (Fillmore, 1968, 1969). As Kilby observes (Kilby,
1972), the distinction between Locative and Dative, like
that between A and I and G and E rests essentially on the
feature of animacy, yet both L and D, for example, control
have--insertion (Fillmore, op. cit.). Since Fillmore no
longer views animacy as relevant to case assignment, there
is every reason to view the former Dative, now Experiencer
in Jolm is sad as a Locative, just as we view the
Experiencer in non-stative sentences as an Allative.
This brings out another fault in Fillmore,s method.
Xf there is an intuitively felt relationship between the
person who experiences sadness in John is sad and the one
who experiences fear in John frightened Bill, there is no
reason to embody this intuitively felt relation in terms of
the notion of case, by saying that both predicates require
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an E in their case frame. By doing so, the linguist is
using a property of the verb, something like "referring
to mental event or state" to set up relations, i.e. cases,
which hopefully will have relevance to surface structure.
Insofar as there appears to be little support for such an
identity of experiencers of states and experiencers of
events, the step taken by Fillmore seems to be unwarranted.
In attempting to study covert relations, Fillmore appears to
ad-
have progress^ too far from the surface structure which is
going to support those very covert relations and has, in
some sense, created a new concept of case, different from
the noun-verb relation with which he started.
If we do split the E case into an Allative and Locative,
this has some implications for the case hierarchy. We
gave this earlier as A,E,I,0,S,G,L. Ignoring 0 for the
moment as the one non-spatial case in a Localist Case
Grammar, in relating E and G via a case Allative, we have
taken the first step to relating the two parts of the
hierarchy in that we can account for the position of the
"abstract" case E in terms of the concrete case G. Further,
this suggests that we should be able to relate A and S and
I and L as "abstract"-concrete pairs. We can explore this
hypothesis by considering what case-marking relations there
are to be found in language, while following our main
intention of showing some facts about language which Fillmore
cannot handle.
2.2.3. Case Forms
When looking at Case Forms, there are three possible
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approaches, firstly we can look at a language synchronicslly
to see what Case Relations can be realised in the same Case
Form. Secondly we can take the diachronic approach to
see what historical relations there are between Case Forms.
Thirdly, in order to see that any such relations are not
accidental or peculiar to one particular language, we can
take the comparative view.
2.2.3.1. Intra-Language Relations
If there is a relation between A and I on the one hand
and the concrete counter-parts S and L on the other, this
is not to say that it is such that the case-marking is always
the same. Thus if with can mark both L and I, this does
not mean that JLt will do so whenever these cases occur.
The actual conditions which must be placed on prepositions
will not be considered hero, such a study lies beyond our
present scope (see Chapter 6, below); the important point
for our present discussion is that such a marking identity
exists.
(a) Synchronic
We shall not go into detail here with respect to \dlth
and tr£, as these prepositions are a minor concern of our
study in general. However, we can distinguish at least
three functions for with, Locative, Comitative and
Ins trumental;
67. The students are with the professor
68. John killed the rats with Mary
69. John killed the rats with poison
Similarly, b£ can mark the Locative and Instrumental cases
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as well as the Path and Agent.
70. John went and stood by Bill
71. John surprised Mary by turning up early
72. John passed by the church on the way to the shops
73. John was killed by Mary
The Source case can be marked by from, off (from on)
and out of, and we would also wish to claim that of is a
Source marker also, firstly on historical grounds, of and
off are reflexes of the same form and secondly on the
grounds of complementary distribution of ojT and from (see
Miller, 1972b). These prepositions can be used to mark the
corresponding abstract case, namely the Force case, but
only in certain constructions on the assumption that Force
and Agent are related.
74. John is dying of/from hunger
75. John acted from/out of anger/hatred/spite
Notice that expressions like result from, is the source of
can also mark the causal relation:
76. A great deal of bad feeling resulted from John's
actions
77. John's actions were the source of much disagreement
Thus Modem English provides a certain amount of support for
the hypothesised relation between Sources and Agents and
Locatives and Instruments.
(b ) Diachronic
As one might expect, the present situation with regards
to prepositional usage is the result of historical develop¬
ment, a development essentially of abstract uses from the
original local meaning. This suggests another property
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which ws might require a theory to have, namely to be able
to account for diachronic matters in essentially the same
way as it accounts for synchronic matters, that is, it
should account for change in prepositional usage in terms
of the same hypotheses with which it accounts for prepos¬
itional usage in the synchronic description.
with The problem with this preposition is that it, in
fact, represents two earlier forms whose different uses
became associated with one of those forms, these prepositions
being reflexes of Germanic *miSi and *wi>, both of which
originally marked location, (Graui*, 1932). The former
preposition, with the genitive case, marks movement towards,
and with the dative marks proximity and association; from
these uses develop those of accompaniment and instrument.
In Middle English further developments lead to its use as
the marker of the agent. *wi> was originally used in the
Norse influenced areas of the North (Mustanoja, i960) where
it came to be used as an equivalent of mid, the reflex of
*mi gi. Originally *wi}? meant "towards, opposite, against,
along". By the 14th century, only with is found and with
all the functions of the modern preposition besides being
used as an agent marker. As late as Shakespeare, (Green,
1914) it marks the agent and the animate intermediary,
although by this time such uses are on the wane;
78a. He did arrest me with an officer (i.e. by means
of, he had an officer..)
b. He is attended with a desperate train
Br^ndal (Brjfndal, 1950) cites examples from Irish dialects
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of English which still use with where iu modern English b£
is used, which suggests that they stabilised their pre¬
positional usage in a different manner than did Early Modern
English.
by In Old English this was a local preposition
denoting proximity or in the presence of. With verbs of
motion it had the sense of "along, through", from which
developed such uses as the marking of the material or means
used. Although instrumental and causal uses are rare in
O.E., they develop in M.E. such that, by Shakespeare's time,
the situation is that of Modern English. The development
of such abstract instrumental meanings is in keeping with
the Loealist theory of the relation between expressions
of spatial location and instrument, but one point which is
in need of clarification is the step from instrumental to
agentive uses, which as we shall see below is a common
development.
from In Germanic *fram was a preposition of separation.
"This representation of 'coming from a place' yields to that
of causality as soon as the place stands no more for the
origin of the action but becomes identical with the causer
and doer thereof." (Green, op. cit.) Mustanoja
(Mustanoja, op. cit.) suggests that the development of the
agentive function is due to its denoting the source of the
action of verbs such as give, send etc. (compare John gave
Bill a thrashing. Bill received a thrashing from John).
Although the agentive use is common in O.E. and continues
into M.E., by the 14th century, it is on the wane so that
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it is limited to marking the cause, as we have already
shown for Modern English.
of Cognate with the Latin ablative preposition ab-"from",
of had an original local sense of "from, out of" and was
used to mark the source. Although rarely found as a causal
marker in O.E., this use developed in M.E., so that by the
16th century it was the most common agentive marker with a
passive verb (Mustanoja, op. cit.). This use of of might
have influenced its development in nominalisations.
Consider the situation in P.I.E. under the analysis of
this hypothesised language as an "ergative" language (see
Knobloch, 1953» Martinet, 1962, Vaillant, 1936, Velten,
1931, 1932a, 1932b among others). The nominative of the
Classical languages would have been originally the marker
of the agent and this subsequently became the marker of
the "subject" (for a consideration of the relation between
Anderson's Ergative case and subjects see Anderson, 1976).
Similarly, in nominalisations in M.E., of marked the agent
and this form was generalised as the general "linking" form
for any noun-phrase, e.g. the ambiguity of the shooting of
the hunters can only be resolved by using the agent marker
by, just as Latin adopted ab for this agentive marking
function. Notice that in this case it would appear that
M.E. was possibly "ergative" with respect of nominalisations
(for a discussion of Modern English nominalisations with
respect to ergativity see Anderson, op. cit.).
Thus the synchronic and diachronic data from English
provide sorae support for the Localiat hypothesis and suggest
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some relations which case grammar must be able to handle.
However, it is conceivable that these relations are merely
an accidental fact about English, so that, with respect
to Linguistic Theory they have no great significance. Still
this does not mean that an analysis which treats them as
accidental is of equal status with one which treats them
as non-accidental; any grammar which captures generalis¬
ations is preferable to one which does not. However, in
the next section, we shall show that such relations are not
accidental, that they are of wide occurrence and are therefore
to be accounted for systematically in Linguistic Theory.
2.2.3.2. Inter-Language Comparisons
Adopting the same case system as Fillmore (Fillmore,
1971a), Starosta (starosta, 1970) tabulates instances from
seven languages, English, German, Japanese, Korean,
Nunggubuyu, Sora and Tsou in which two cases have the same
case realisation. From the results of this comparison,
he concludes that "the realisation of two case relations
by the same case form is not random". Of all possible
case neutralisations "more than half are rare." In fact,
it seems possible to set up chains of cases such that there
is some language which, for any pair of them, has them
neutralised in the surface structure, while languages which
neutralise two cases from different chains are very rare.
Thus the chains would be something like:
Locative-Comitative-Instrumental-Agentive
Source/Abla tive-Agentive
Goa1-Dative-Benefac t ive-Experi encer-Obj ec t/Pa ti en ■*-
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Notice that the three changes correspond to Ablative,
Locative and Allative of Localist Case Grammar (see
Anderson, 1971a, although there Loc and All are conflated
as Loc). Let us consider, then, each of these chains.
The Source-Agent identity is studied by Mustanoja
(Mustanoja, op. cit.) for English and by Green (Green,
op. cit.) for the Germanic languages in general. He shows
that all of them, at some point in their development, used
one of the prepositions *fram—"from", *af-"of", *fon(a)
German von-wfrom" or *uz as the agent marker. One form
for the Comitative and Instrumental is used in some
Philippine languages (Nilsen, op. cit.) and Starosta
(Starosta, op. cit.) cites Tibetan, Eskimo end Pashto as
non-Indo-European languages with the same identity of marking
for the two cases. Experiencer, Dative and the marker of
the infinitive are similar in Japanese, Hebrew and some
Australian languages.
For the first chain, Latin is particularly interesting,
as all four cases besides the Dative in some declensions
have the same inflectional suffix on the noun, the main
distinguishing device being the preposition used. It is
customary in grammars of Latin to divide the "ablative"
case into three categories: the ablative simple which is
marked by the preposition ex for expressions of concrete
movement and by ab_ for both concrete and abstract, i.e.
agentive; the locative, again marked by a preposition;
the instrumental. This latter case is itself further
divisible (Ernout and Thomas, 1951). Thus grammars of
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Latin mention the "instrumental", no preposition used, the
"comitative" marked by cum and the instrumental of attendant
circumstances, usually unmarked. This situation is
particularly interesting when viewed in relation to the
English preposition with (for the same parallels with the
German preposition bei see Dreike, 1973 and also Conlin,
1974 for further discussion of the Latin "instrumental"
case). Thus with has temporal/causal uses, as in;
79. With the ^Window open, John cannot work
In Latin, cum, usually translated as "with", can appear
as a causal or temporal clause marker, the difference being
marked by the use of the indicative or subjunctive being
used in the verb respectively:
80. Cum Caesar hostes vixerat, in Romam rediit
'When Caesar had conquered the enemy, he returned
to Rome'
81. Cum Caesar hostes vixisset, in Romam rediit
'Since Caesar had conquered the enemy, he returned
to Rome'
Thus, cum, a comitative marker, can mark temporal and causal
relations, but the "instrumental" case, can itself be used
in the "ablative absolute" construction to paraphrase both
80 and 81, (this construction involves putting both the
past participle and the object of the verb in the "ablative"
case, where the subject of the action must be co-referential
with the subject of the main verb);
82. Victis hostibus, in Romam Caesar rediit
conquered-abl-pl, enemy-abl.pl. Caesar returned
to Rome
That is, 82 is ambiguous just as the nearest English
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translation is ambiguous,
83. With the enemy conquered, Caesar returned to Rome
and moreover, comparable grammatical devices are used in
both constructions.
Swahili, in its use of the particle na shows the same
relations between location, instruments and agents, and,
although the evidence is to be found in the system of verbal
extensions, the same relations can be found as those in
the third chain. The particle na is derived from the
locative suffix ni_ plus the a of relationship (see Ashton,
19kk and Chapter 5 below for further discussion), thus it
has a basic locative origin. It is used in expressions
of possession:
84. Juma ana kitabu
Juina he-with book
•Juma has a book*
as a comitative marker:
85• Juma alikwenda sokoni na Khamiai
•Juma went to market with Khamisi*
and in expressions of the agent with the passive verb:
86. Chakula kilipikwa na All
•The food was cooked by Ali*
It also appears as a verbal extension, in which case it is
called the "associative" (Ashton, op. cit., Polome, 1967,
Whiteley, 1968). Thus from the root piga-"to beat" we can
form pigana-"to beat each other, fight" (compare French
se battre), from ona-"to see" onana-"to see each other,
meet". With this extension the object must also be marked
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by the particle na:
87. Jui; i alipatana na All
Juma he-past-get-with with All
• Juma got together with/agreed with All*
The verbal extension which is relevant to the relation
between Goal and Benefactive goes under the naj ie of
"prepositionaln (Ashton, op. cit.) or "oblique" (whiteley,
op. cit.) and appears as either —1— or -14-. Ashton lists
five uses of this extension.
(a) The first use is characterised as the expression
of "do to, for, or on behalf of";
8ffc. Ataharibia furaha yetu
he-will-destroy-for pleasure pref.-ours
•He will destroy our pleasure for us*
b. Mpishi alikupikia chakula
pref-cook he-past-you-cook-for food
•The cook cooked some food for you*
(b) to express motion towards but never from:
89. Mtotc alikimbilia mama wake
pref.-child he-past-run-to mother pref.-his
•The child ran off to his mother*
In most cases the difference between the extended and non-
extended forms of verbs of movement is slight, the extended
form being generally more emphatic as to the subject
reaching the goal.
(c) to express purpose;
90. Nataka kisu cha kukatia hyama
I-want pref.-knife pref.-of to-cut-for meat
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.-r , _ , . _ to cut meat with
wan e
for cutting meat with
(d) to express finality or completeness, a use compar¬
able to verbs in English which take a particle to
emphasise completion e.g. eat up, finish offt
91. Aliitupia mikebe hii mbali
he-past-them-throw-for pref.-can pref.-demonstrative
far
'He threw these cans far away*
(e) with the interrogative particle nini or enclitic
-ni, the prepositional for expresses "why?":
92. Valiliani?
you-pres-cry-for-what
'What are you crying for?' 'Why are you crying?*
Thus evidence from many languages of a relation between
local and abstract cases supports a Localist interpretation
of case relations. Given that Fillmore keeps these cases
distinct, he is going to need some extra device in order to
capture any such surface structure relations, thus complicat¬
ing the grammar. As Anderson says (Anderson, 1971a): "In
particular, the facilitation of the prediction of 'natural'
syncretisms and shifts in representation is assumed to be
evidence for a hypothesis". We have seen that Fillmore's
cases are poorly motivated by Fillmore himself and by those
who follow his lead, and that there are further problems
with regards to intuitions, identities of case form and
treatment by movement transformations and the failure to
capture an interesting generalisation about the order of
cases in the case hierarchy. Before looking further at the
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Locallst hypothesis, we shall now consider how cases are to
be represented in deep structure.
2.3. Handling Cases
Paced with the question of how to handle cases, the
first decision is whether to treat them as some element of
structure in their own right or as somehow derivative.
Adopting this latter view leads to a treatment in terms of
predicates or of rules of insertion (Kilby, 1972, Dixon,
1972, Bailey, 1970). The former point of view leads to the
further question of whether this element, case, is a feature
(or a bundle of features, Nilsen, 1973) or a constituent of
a tree representation. Whichever analysis is adopted the
grammarian is faced with the further question of whether case
is a "discrete, non-complex symbol" and if it is how can
partial similarities be shown, (Huddleston, 1970).
2.3.1. Case and Predicates
2.3.1.1. Bailey
Bailey (Bailey, 1970) provides only a partially worked
out grammar of causation and the relation between use and
the instrumental case. He begins by asserting that
Fillmore's theory of case is open to Chomsky's objections
(Chomsky, 1965) that it confuses categorial and functional
notions. The validity of this accusation is somewhat
dubious, basically because Chomsky's discussion has nothing
to do with underlying case relations but is concerned with
the notions of subject and object, which Fillmore (Fillmore,
1969) has suggested are surface structure features. If
Bailey can show that subject and object are deep structure
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relations (on this question see Anderson, 1976) and if he
can show that case relations are of the same type of entity
as subject and object, then his point may have some validity,
but until this is the case his criticism has no force.
Bailey characterises his aim as "to show that a more
abstract view of case than Fillmore*s 1968 theory can, in
fact, relate and explain the phenomena in question", the
phenomena being verbs like open and the use-ins trument
relation. However, the argument here is at fault: having
supposedly shown that Fillmore*s approach is untenable,
Bailey assumes that because another approach CAN handle the
data, then that new approach MUST be adopted. He fails to
take into account any considerations of evaluation.
Further the term "abstract" is also used in an ill-defined
way for, as we shall see, case is treated essentially by
transformational rales.
Hie grammar which Bailey proposes produces trees of
the following form:
where V is the verb, x is marked as -affectum and y as
-(-affectum, this latter also being able to dominate another
S to account for embedding. Bailey does not give any
detailed discussion of the features -(-affectum and -affectum,
but clearly they belong with notions such as Agent and
Patient, i.e. with case notions. Bailey tries to show
that trees of this form plus appropriate transformations
will account for Lakoff*s observations on use and with-phrases
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(Lakoff, 1968) "in a manner that case grammar cannot".
Notice that he does not bother to show why or how case
grammar cannot account for the data. The following structure
is given as that underlying 93a and 93b
93a, Seymour sliced the salami with a knife




The transformations which he proposes are too powerful and
unrestricted, being able to accomplish several things at
once. Thus to derive 93a, a transformation deleted CAUSE
of S^, marks knife as +Inst and moves it to sentence final
position. Agent and Instrument are both treated as if they
are to be arrived at by interpretation this structure,
the Agent is the highest NP marked as -affectum, the
Instrument is the next highest NP marked as -affectum. It
is difficult to see how, using this approach, Bailey can
handle the difference observed by Huddleston (Huddleston,
1970) between the Intentional Agent and the non-intentional
Agent, but given the unconstrained nature of his grammar
there is nothing to prevent his handling this by positing
some higher predication in the case of the intentional
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Agent. Case-marking must also remain something which is
completely arbitrary in this approach, so that the relations
which we have discussed above will remain unaccounted for.
Finally, the approach is semantically inadequate. Bailey
assumes a relation between the predicate CAUSE and the
surface element use which is unsupported, in that to obtain
93b CAUSE in is lexicalised as use and the other
predicates are lexicalised in the lexical item slice after
a mile with the same effect as Predicate-Raising has applied
(McCawley, 1968). Further there are many sentences which
have the same structure as 9k except that the NP marked
-affectum in the second predication is animate, and such
sentences do not parallel 93a and 93b j
95a. Seymour ^ to »Hce the salami
b. Seymour sliced the salami with Melvin
95a does not assert the same thing as 93b, namely that
Seymour sliced the salami, and 95b does not have an instrument¬
al with-phrase. Such facts could presumably be handled in
the semantics, but Bailey does not justify such an approach.
2.3.1.2. Kilby
Kilby (Kilby, 1972, 1973)gives a more fully worked out
approach to the treatment of case in terms of predicates,
his analysis going to the extreme of making no strong
distinction between surface forms which appear as verbs and
those which appear as case-markers, i.e. prepositions and
inflections, both deriving from the same type of deep
structure element, namely the predicate, (see Becker and
Arms, 1969 for a similar view).
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Rather than consider the grammar and analyses which
Kilby proposes in terms of this identification of verbs and
prepositions, we shall turn to the argumants which he brings
forward to support this initial assumption. As a first
negative criticism, notice thAt there is no argument to show
that any other grammar cannot account for the case system
of Russian which is his prime concern, nor that there is
no other equally adequate means of accounting for the
relationship between prepositions, cases and predicates.
The argument starts with the assertion that nthe closer
the verb approaches the status of an atomic predicate, the
closer it is in meaning to a case", which appears to be a
vague definition in the absence of a clear notion of "atomic
predicate" and case and of a means of comparing and
isolating the meanings of these entities. In clarification,
Kilby observes that kill presupposes an agent, but an agent
does not necessarily presuppose an act of killing, while the
verb do presupposes an. agent and an agent presupposes that
something is done. This provides weak support for Kilby*s
hypothesis since kill also presupposes a patient and also,
although not invariably, an instrument or manner of killing;
likewise do presupposes a patient and possibly an instrument,
while a patient or instrument presupposes that something is
done but not an act of killing. Thus we are faced with
the question of why the "atomic predicate" DO should be
connected with an agent and not a patient or instrument.
The answer to this is found in the statement that "the
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three verbs which are generally recognised as pro-verbs.
do, be and have bear an approximate resemblance to respect¬
ively erg (i.e. agent) nom and loc", these latter being
the cases proposed by Anderson (Anderson, 1971a). Without
quibbling overthe vagueness of "approximate resemblance",
a better way of stating this would be to say that the
normal subjects of do, be and have are erg, nom and loc
respectively. Thus Kilby's argument reduces to the
statement that erg and DO are to be treated as the same
underlying element because erg is the typical subject of the
surface structure reflex of DO, namely do. This appears
to leave patients and instruments in something of a limbo.
In fact, there is no support here for Kilby*s hypothesis
which selects this treatment over one which simply says
that erg is the one necessary case dependent on DO, nom is
the obligatory case with BE and Loc is the obligatory
case with HAVE and a further statement to the effect that
obligatory cases become the surface subject.
The main force of Kilby*s arguments comes from
observations on prepositions, cases and verbs. Thus he
cites Hjelmslev and Lyons (Hjelmslev, 1935* Lyons, 1968)
as examples of the numerous scholars who refer "to the common
linguistic functions of cases and prepositions, where by
cases here he means case forms. Further he notes that
prepositions and verbs have common linguistic functions,
(Brffridal, 1948, Bally, 1932, Becker and Arms, 1969). He
reformulates these observations as claims about deep
structure: the first claim is that at the level of deep
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structure the categories of case and preposition are
identical, the second is that "prepositions are verbal in
nature or vice versa." The first claim is generally-
accepted, while there is no evidence to refute the second
claim. However, if there is little to refute this claim,
this does net mean that it must be accepted. To accept
it, we must know that any similarities between prepositions
and verbs cannot be handled elsewhere in the grammar, that
this is the only possible means of handling the relationship.
In fact, it is more in keeping with the generally accepted
status of prepositions as belonging to the category of
accidence, or of minor parts of speech or of functors (see
Lyons, 1968 for discussion of the parts of speech) to reject
Kilby*s claimed identity of prepositions and verbs. Thus
while it seems acceptable to say that nouns and verbs are
elements in deep structure, prepositions are case inflections^
are surface forms which mark relations between members of the
major lexical categories, noun and verb. Claiming that
prepositions are verbal also breaks down this distinction
between lexical and relational elements, since Kilby is
also claiming that verbs are relational and he does not
support this. Thus he must show two things, firstly that
verbs are relational in the same way that prepositions are
relational and secondly that there is some sense to the term
"verbal" such that both verbs and prepositions are "verbal".
In the absence of such demonstrations his proposals are not
convincing.
If his arguments do not strongly support his claims,
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Kilby's hypothesis also has certain disadvantages in terms
of explanatory adequacy and the form of the grammar. Thus
any predication involves a relational element and two terms
which it relates, so that the deep structure of any sentence
involves a series of embedded predications. This involves
very powerful restrictions on movement and case assignment
is relegated to the transformational component, so that
the grammar is open to the same criticisms made of Fillmore,
namely that case syncretisms become accidents and not
changes which the grammar actually predicts in a straight¬
forward manner, as does Anderson's view of Localist Case
Grammar.
2.3.1.2. Dixon
Although we group Dixon's treatment of case in this
section, this is really a matter of convenience, as his
grammar is something of a hybrid. In his grammar of the
Australian language Dyirbal (Dixon, 1972), he uses what we




where NP dominated by S is "in 0 function" i.e. object and
NP dominated by VP is in "A function", i.e. is agent. Thus
the ergative case form which is attached to the NP in the A
function depends on configurational relations. However,
this is not the case for the instrumental and comitative
cases, as both are derived from dummy verbs. This non-
unitary treatment of case would be one good reason for
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rejecting this form of grammar. One further problem
concerns the fact that two dummy verbs are posited in the
i it
deep structure, yet there is a close relation between
comitative and instrumental in general, (see our discussion
of English prepositions above 2.2.3.) and in Dyirbal the
verbal affixes for the two cases are identical.
2.3.2. Case and Features
2.3.2.1. Nilsen
We have already referred to the work of Nilsen (Nilsen,
1973) when we considered the adequacy of the tests proposed
so far for cases. From this study of such tests, he
concluded that "morphological and syntactic tests are
inappropriate for determining case membership" and from the
further assumption that "case grammar has a language
independent, somantically determined base" concludes that
case assi&iment should be determined by semantic features.
He fails to realise that this approach denies any significancs
at all to cases: thus they have no syntactic or morphological
import, as shown by the tests, and they have no semantic
import since all the information relevant to case assignment
is already present in the semantic features, so that cases
are completely redundant and contribute nothing to the
grammar. Although Nilsen goes on to claim that this
approach will allow for a "criterion that can be applied
universally to all languages" he does not expand on this
statement to show exactly what such a criterion might be.
The major problem faced in trying to evaluate Nilsen's
proposals is that there are no concrete suggestions about
66.
what form the grammar might take as there are no rules or
structures and any sentence analysed merely has the nouns
marked with the appropriate case, A,E,I, F etc. However,
the very use of features must be questioned. The problem
with features is that they are very powerful devices which
can be used to encode any information and yet are in no
way constrained by the theory so that there is some means
of evaluating their use. As an example of the strange
and counter-intuitive uses to which features have been put
consider Postal's use of the feature +Doom (postal, 1970)
whose role is to carry information through a derivation
until it is needed, (see also Lakoff, 1971, 1972 on
arbitrary syntax). As they were first used in grammar
(Chomsky, 1965), features were added to nouns and verbs as
cumulative restrictions of the lexical item. However, this
is not the way in which Nilsen uses them. He gives the
following list of features: Intent, Cause, Controller,
Controlled, Animate, Concrete, Count, Source, Time, Goal
and Inalienability. Notice, however, that he omits any
discussion of the last three features.
One of the features Cause and Controller is redundant
for there is no case which is distinguished by a different
value for these features, i.e. anytiling which is +Cause
is also -(-Controller and anything -Cause is also -Controller.
As a general list, we seem to be dealing with a mixed
collection of features, but it is significant that Animate,
Concrete and Count are features on nouns for Chomsky
(Chomsky, 1965) while the other features could be correlated
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with other elements of deep structure. For example, Intent
could be viewed as a condition on whether the deep structure
has an Agent; Cause would be a constraint saying that these
cases can only occur in predications containing the predicate
CAUSE; Controlled would be a constraint which says that
such a case corresponds to the patient of some action.
When it comes to accounting for case syncretisms, we
are in a difficult position since Nilsen does not make it
clear how these bundles of features relate to surface
structure. We might suppose that a particular feature or
sub-bundle of features would require a certain surface
realisation. Thus the feature Goal could be correlated
with the preposition to and in this way we could account
for to as the marker of the concrete Goal case and the
abstract Expericancer case using Nilsen's system. Likewise
we might predict that the preposition from or out of is
correlated with the feature Source and thus in keeping with
the localist hypothesis account for their marking causation
as already shown (above P.47). However, such a prediction
is not corroborated since neither Agent nor Force have the
feature tSource, although Nilsen cites Lambert (Lambert,
1969) who equates the features Source, Cause and Ablative.
Symptomatic of the whole study is the fact that Nilsen
provides no argument against Lambei't's position.
Without a more carefully argued presentation of the
analysis of case as in some way related with a bundle of
features and some concrete suggestions as to how such a
hypothesis might be presented in a grammar, Nilsen*s ideas
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cannot claim our attention as a way of handling cases.
2.3.2.2. Starosta
Starosta (Starosta, 1972) characterises his grammar as
"lexicase", an approach in which the concept of lexical
redundancy rule plays an important role, with these rules
replacing the phrase structure rules and transformations of
other models. His main concern is the relation between
surface case forms and case relations in the deep structure
and he does not make clear the actual means of functioning
of the redundancy rules and how he conceives the full
grammar. In Fillmore (Fillmore, 1969) features are
attached to the noun, adjective and determiner in accordance
with the case-node which directly dominates them. Starosta
observes that if features can be assigned directly to lexical
items, then we can do away with the dominating case-node, and
suggests that one way of doing this would be to assign these
features by lexical redundancy rules. Thus he sees case,
like gender and case, as a feature on a noun and asserts
that "if it is Insisted that cases must be represented in
the grammar as nodes dominating nominal constituents, then
the same arguments could be used to claim that gender and
number must also be so represented." (p. 91 )• This is
an interesting claim which should be supported if we are to
accept Starosta«s conclusions about case.
In fact, there seems to be no argument at all which
supports Starosta*s position, but several which weaken it,
Fillmore (Fillmore, 1971) has attacked this hypothesis on
two grounds: firstly, since case is a relation between a
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noun and a verb, case as a feature on a noun does not
capture the essentially relational nature of case; secondly,
Fillwore claims that Starosta*s analysis forces all instances
of embedding to be treated as inetences of adjunction to a
noun. He concedes that this may be workable in the cases
such as (The event of) John's acreaming caused the accident
and (The fact) that John loves Mary amuses Bill but suggests
that there will be .problems for such sentences as X suspect
that John loves Mary. Starosta (Starosta, 1971) claims
that these objections are not serious and proceeds to
discount them with some unsupported assertions. Thus
"surface case at least is formally a feature of nouns at
some point in anyone*s analysis, sinoe it must be assumed to
be present to account for the inflections of case-inflected
nouns.." (P. 86). Moreover, treating case as a feature
of noun within nominal constituents "avoids the doubtful
practice (Fillmore, 1971a, p. 35) of treating case as a
constituent label on a par with NP, VP etc.". This last
point is a misrepresentation of Fillmore, as he himself
discounts such an analysis of case (Fillmore, 1971a), while
the first point carries no weight at all, as Starosta does
not demonstrate that it is the only one possible.
Starosta tries to avoid the second objection by saying
that the case feature of embedded sentences is carried by
the complement!aer so that no dummy head noun is required.
However, if case is a feature on nouns, this must mean that
oompleraentisers themselves are nouns in Starosta *s grammar,
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although most linguists would treat them as prepositional
in nature. In general Starosta seems to emphasise case as
an inflectional category and under—plays the cases where
case is a pre- or post-positional element in the language.
If this latter situation is taken into account it is
difficult to continue with the treatment of case as a
feature on a noun which we then find to be realised as a
separate constituent.
There are other arguments against cases as a feature
like number and gender which do not depend so much on
aspects of the grammar. Notice that Starosta is claiming
that all these function alike, but if so how are we to
explain the fact that case-marking can be done via separable
elements like pre- and post-positions or inflectional
elements or a combination of both while number and gender do
not seem to be signalled in any language exoept via
agglutinating or inflectional elements? Similarly, how
are we to explain the faot that languages like Latin where
final syllables became weak and were ultimately lost, gender
distinctions became blurred, number was marked by an
inflectional element while case-marking was retained as an
important part of the grammar and was realised by prepositions
or position within the sentence? Another difference is that
a noun is invariably of one gender if the language marks
for gender, such that we do not find a noun in one gender
in one sentence and in another in the next, while the case
of a noun is variable in Just this way. Case belongs with
the noun only insofar as it appears in relation to the verb,
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while gender is an inherent property of a noun.
The attempt to account for syncretisms is confused
and confusing, basically because Starosta seems to change
his mind part way through the paper. Initially he argues
for a series of deep case features amongst which he includes
Agent, Dative, Locative, Source, Instrument, Object, Result,
Goal and a series of surface forms such as Ergative, Dative,
Genitive, Instrumental, Nominative and Accusative (these
last two he also calls Subject and Object). The deep
cases will be neutralised in terms of the surface cases.
Thus in Latin, the deep cases Dative, Goal and Object may
be neutralised in the surface structure by the Accusative.
In fact, this explains nothing, it merely categorises and
leaves the conditioning factor unmentioned. It does not
answer the basic question, why are these three cases
neutralised by the Accusative and no others? The second
approach seems to conflict with his initial concept of case
one feature on a noun. We are told that after reading the
lecture on which the paper was based, Fillmore suggested
that relations between caseB could be captured by decompos¬
ing them into components such that Agent and Instrument share
a feature of Causation, while Object and Dative share a
Patient feature. Starosta goes on to say that "there seems
to be no way of splitting cases into components if we treat
them as nodes in deep structure, whereas if we think of them
as features of lexical items, there is no problem at all;
one simply uses shared lexical features to represent the
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shared components." (P.lll) The argument is not valid
since there is a means of splitting cases into components
and still treating them as nodes, just as Chomsky suggests
(Chomsky. 1968) that syntactic nodes are to bo represented
as matrices of distinctive features. This proposal of
Starosta»s seems to be leading towards a situation similar
to that proposed by Nilsen (Nilsen 1973 see 2.3.2.1, above)
where each case is a bundle of features, although again how
this proposal is to be formalised is left unclear; either
the case is somehow interpreted on the basis of such a
bundle of features or the case feature itself may be
further analysed as a bundle of features. However.
Starosta's point depends on the prior assumption that the
deep cases which he uses are. in fact, the correct ones,
and he does not consider the possibility that oases like
Agent. Instrument and Experiencer are not primitives. This
is the hypothesis which we shall explore in this study.
2.3»3» Case and Dependency
We have so far considered case as a predicate and as a
feature and have discounted both as unable to capture the
essentially relational character of case and to provide for
an explanation of case relationships and syncretisms. We
have also suggested that the only way in which we can
account for such relations and also avoid the problems of
definition and characterisation of cases considered in the
first section is to do a further analysis of cases proposed
by Fillmore and those who follow his ideas. Apparently
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the only form of presentation left is that of viewing cases
as nodes and following Anderson (Anderson, 1971» 1976)
Fillmore, (Fillmore, 1971) and Robinson (Robinson, 1970)
as nodes connecting verbs and nouns in a dependency model.
There are several advantages with such an approach,
besides the capturing of the relational character of case
and the characterisation of the notion "headM. Thus a
dependency tree will contain only nouns and verbs connected
via case nodes, all of which may appear as full lexical
items. Such a treatment will be in keeping with the view
of prepositions as functional elements as opposed to the
categorial status of the noun and verb as the major parts
of speech. Moreover, the form of such a tree will be
simpler than a corresponding phrase structure tree which
contains many non-terminal elements, that is, there is a
much closer relationship, if not perfect identity, between
those elements in surface structure and those elements.in
deep structure.
The deeper analysis of Fillmorean cases, we suggest,
will lead to the Localist Hypothesis. Most of the critic¬
isms made of Fillmore above bear on the relation between
local and abstract cases. Notice that allows us to give
a closer characterisation of the notion of case. Fillmore
says that it is a relation between noun phrase and verb,
but does not specify what sort of relation. The Localist
Hypothesis claims that the relation is a spatial one. In
the concluding section to this chapter we shall look more
closely at this hypothesis.
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2.4. Localist Case Grammar
2.4*1. Development
Anyone concerned with the history of the treatment of
case systems must use Hjelmslev's "La Categoric des Gas"
as the basic text (Hjelmslev, 1935). However, two things
must be borne in mind: firstly that Hjelmslev is concerned
solely with case systems and does not bring out the full
implications of the hypothesis for other areasof the
grammar and secondly for HJelmslev and the earlier Localists
cases were solely features of surface structure, there being
no concept of deep structure to which they could refer, so
that frequently features which we might wish to treat in
terms of such a distinction are viewed from a diachronic
point of view. In what follows we shall survey Localism
in terms of those scholars whom Hjelmslev omits from his
study and in terms of those areas of the grammar which
Localism bears on but which Hjelmslev does not consider.
The first, as far as historians of linguistics know, to
propose an explicitly Localist account of case systems was
a Byzantine monk. Maximum Planudes writing in the 13th
century. Robins (Robins, 1974) queries Hjelmslev »s
statement that Localism had its roots in antiquity (Hjelmslev,
1935). Hjelmslev based his assertion on Steinthal
(Steinthai, I863), but Robins suggests that the text on which
this depends is a collection of "unrelated grammatical
excerpts", so that the fact that an excerpt of Maximum
Planudes work is included gives the impression that Localism
was not original to him. In Planudes work, the theory
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arises out of an enquiry into the nature of question words
in Greek corresponding to English "whence, whither, where".
Maximum Planudes points out that these three forms can be
correlated with the three Greek oblique cases genitive,
accusative and dative respectively. He further treats the
non-spatial meanings of these cases as derived by metaphoric
transfer from one of the basic local distinctions. The
nominative case differed from the oblique cases, in that it
was not dependent on the verb while the latter were and as
such formed the elements of the verb phrase or predicate.
Hjelmslev characterises as the basic element the abstract
notion of "direction", which can be used to characterise
both local and grammatical cases in terms of source, goal
and location.
With the fading of the Byzantine Renaissance, study
within an explicitly Localist framework came to an end until
the late 18th and early 19th century when among others Bopp
and his pupil F. Wttllner re-discovered the idea, at least
according to HJelmslev. However, he does not make it
clear whether this renewal of interest was really due to
the re-discovery of the works of the Byzantine scholars,
whether Localist ideas had never completely fallen out of
currency or whether Bopp arrived at these ideas from his own
studies without external prompting.
In fact, a study of the literature shows that there
has always been an under-current of localistic ideas within
treatments of case and prepositions. Both Greek and Roman
grammarians recognised that certain of the cases could have
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local meanings; for instance, that the Greek genitive
and Latin ablative cases might express source or origin. A
more closely localist treatment of the French prepositions is
given by Condillac (in Leroy, 1947 Vo4. l). There he
claims (P. 479) that the first use of prepositions was to
mark relations between objects: nmais parce que les idtfes
abatraites, exprim£es par des noms, prennent, dans notre
imagination, presque autant de r£alit<$ que les choses ont
au dehors, elles peuvent etre consider£es comme ayant
entr'ellea des rapports &. peu pr&s semblables a ceux qui
sont entre les objets sensible*#." Thus the preposition &
marks both location and goal: Condillac relates its use
as a temporal, circumstantial and manner marker to the
former use and its dative and purpose functions to the latter.
Hjelmslev claims for Bemhardi the honour of being the
first to recognise a relation between cases and prepositions
(Hjelmslev, op. cit. p. 24). However, Bernhardt»s work
"Anfangsgrunde der Sprachwissenschaft" was published in
1805* yet, if we look no further than Harris* "Hermes"
published in 1751 we find the following: "their force and
power (i.e. cases) is exprest by two Methods, either by
Situation, or by Prepositions." However, Harris does not
follow through this identity consistently. Having treated
prepositions, he goes on to define the Nominative and
Accusative with respect to the type of verb, while the
Genitive and Dative cases are given Localistic definitions
in terms of source and goal respectively. Of the
prepositions, Harris asserts that their original use was to
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denote "Relations of Place." "They by degrees extended
themselves to Subjects incorporeal, and came to denote
Relations, as well intellectual, as local." (p. 268).
However, there is another important point in Harris* book,
namely on p. 128 he cites Gaza, and it seems likely that he
is referring to the Byzantine Theodorus Gaza whom Hjelmslev
identifies as writing ,in the Localist framework some 100
years after Maximum Planudes. Thus it seems that some form
of Localism was known from Byzantine texts in the 18th
century.
It seems unlikely that Hjelmslev would have admitted
Condillac and Harris to the ranks of Localists, since they
clearly give priority to the concrete local relations
expressed by prepositions, while Hjelmslev makes it clear that
in his conception of true Localism no such priority is
possible. In fact he characterises such an idea as an
"hypoth&se phantastique". In fact, there seems to be no
good reason for rejecting this priority of local meaning for
case relations.
Thus Bopp*s hypothesis was not necessarily something
new to 19th century studies. Localistic ideas can be found
throughout the grammatical traditions going back to ancient
Greece. Localist ideas are also found in the works of two
scholars of the 18th century at least whom Hjelmslev does
not cite, and one of those scholars himself cites as earlier
Localist. However, it was the middle of the 19th century
that saw the true Localist flowering and the fuller exploration




Like the works cited by Hjelmslev (Hjelmslev, op. cit.)
(Bopp, 1833» Wttllner, 1827, Hartung, 1831 and Pott, 1836)
Laurie*s "On the Fundamental Doctrine of Latin Syntax" is
concerned in part with the Latin case system. However,
instead of treating the ablative, as does Vttllner, in terms
of some highly complex but essentially unitary phenomenon,
Laurie makes a clear distinction between three "case ideas",
namely locative, instruniental and separative and one "case-
form" which happens to be termed in the grammars the ablative.
This is possibly the earliest statement and recognition of
the difference between case relations or Staroeta*s deep
cases and case forme or Starosta*s surface cases (Starosta,
1972 see 2.3.2.2. above).
Xn the preface, Laurie characterises his treatise as
an attempt "to unfold the psychical conditions under which
the Latin form of speech arose." Thus he appears to be
claiming some sort of perceptual or cognitive reality
underlying the expression of concrete and abstract relations
by the same spatial terms. Laurie seeks to account for
this by referring to the basis of language which is to be
found in "external nature" arid furthermore "words, whether
used to denote an existence, an affection, or a relation,
and however abstract their present use, originally denoted
(it may se£ely be assumed) only external phenomena and
external relations." (p. 8). On the basis of this, he
concludes that we may look for the primary concept behind
79.
each case in the spatial relations "subsisting between
objects in space". However, the one case which is not
susceptible to this treatment apparently is the nominative
which is used "when the existence of a thing is regarded
absolutely" (p. 7).
The primary idea of the accusative is "extension"
which may be of time or space. Once this extension is
between two objects such that there is movement from one to
the other, the goal is expressed by the accusative case.
This relation extends to the agent-patient relation, where
the accusative marks the goal of the action, but the
significant point is that for Laurie the accusative does not
depend on the verb directly but marks the relation between
subject and object. Thus "the subject and object are put
in the accusative relation", by marking the object with the
accusative case-form, when the transitive verb signifies
an act of sensation which makes the object "entirely sub¬
jacent to the subject" (p. 11).
While the accusative marks motion to a goal and
domination of the object by the subject, the dative marks
"motion towards an object not embraced" and the abstract
notion of "reference or respectivity". In these terms
Laurie can account for the dative with verbs of emotion as
in Irascor tibi which he translates as "I am angry and my
anger has reference to thee". Compare this with English
I am angry with you, where with originally had the meaning
of "against or toward". As the expression of motion
towards, the dative can also express purpose or "for the
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sake of". Compare English for discussed above and Swahili
prepositional extension 2.2.3.2.
As we have already mentioned, Laurie divides the
ablative case into three case relations, but admits that there
may be something common to them all which would account for
the syncretism, without making any definite suggestions as
to what this might be. The locative case relation is used
to mark "place where" and "time when" as in the ablative
absolute construction:
97. Regibus ejectis, consules creari coepti sunt
•When the kings had been ejected, they began to
create consuls *
The ablative-proper or "separative" case denotes separation
from, and from this basic spatial notion develop the
ablative of source:
98. Scipio nobili genere natus est
Scipio noble-abl. sort-abl. bom is
*Scipio was bom of noble stock'
and the ablative of originating power and hence the
ablative of agency:
99. Caesar a civibus Romania occisus est
Caesar from citizens-abl Roman-abl murdered is
•Caesar was murdered by Roman citizens'
Latin distinguishes the agent, with a preposition a or ajb
"from", from the cause, with no preposition:
100. Sapiens est aBiicis parvis contentus
Wise is friend-abl-pl. few-abl. content
'A wise man is content with few friends'
(i.e. are the source of content)
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Finally the instrumental case, considered as the expression
of the "position medial", expresses the means or way. From
this derive the comitative uses of the ablative case form
as well as its use in comparative expressions.
The Latin genitive indicates the "co-existent union
of subject and object" and the clearest example of this
union, Laurie claims, which is not identity or concomitance
is to be found in the possessive genitive. This case is
given the most unsatisfactory treatment in that it seems
partly to overlap with the ablative-proper. Notice that
Greek had no ablative, and that the Latin ablative—proper
coincides largely in use with the Greek genitive, Laurie
distinguishes between the objective possession as in liber
Pauli, "JFta.ul»s book" and "derivative possession", which is
used of cases where "the subject seems to flow from the
object or dependent word as a consequence or result"
(compare the ablative of originating power above)as in
fiducia sua.rum virium "confident of their strength/because
of their strength". A third type of possession is the
partitive as in magna pars militum "a large part of the
soldiers". Notice that this also has a paraphrase with
ex militibus, literally "from the soldiers" with an ablative.
Thus we have seen one attempt to give the Latin case
system a Localist interpretation, although the ablative and
genitive prove difficult. However, we have suggested that
the Localist Hypothesis does not bear solely on the case
systems of the language, but may find further support in
other areas of the grammar. The studies of Key and Gamett
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provide examples of this.
2.4.1.2. Gamett
Gamett shows himself to be a disciple of Bopp in that
he only admits two simple elements, abstract nouns and
pronouns, the latter originally denoting the relations of
place, and from these other parts of speech are derived.
Further he believes that there is a "strict analogy between
the operations of language and those of the mind" (Gamett,
1859 P» 87)- He makes it clear, however, that this
analysis is only "fully applicable to language in its
original and genuine form" (Gamett, op. cit. p. 95).
Gamett's analysis of the verb is broadly in keeping
with the general notions of his time, in that he treats the
finite verb as "a noun plus some other element". However,
he differs in his suggestions as to what the "other element"
could be. Thus, for example, among other scholars
Condillac (op. cit. p. 452) and Harris treat the "other
element" as a form of the copula. Condillac equates
je parle with je suis parlant, while Harris (Harris, op. cit.
p. 184) says "Thus take away the Assertion from the Verb
Writeth, and there remains the Participle, writing", where
by assertion he means the copula. In contrast to this
point of view, Gamett suggests that a finite verb should be
seen as a noun plus a personal pronoun in an oblique case
(i.e. not a nominative) "virtually including in it a
preposition", and it is this preposition which constitutes
the copula between the subject (the pronoun) and the
attribute (the noun). To support this view he quotes
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extensively from languages which show some formal identity
between expressions of possession and the person markings in
verbal forms.
Two of his articles aire attempts to support Bopp's
view of language in its details rather than an exposition of
the broad outlines. Bopp originally proposed that the
augment form in Greek and Sanskrit was to be identified with
the negative prefix a(n)-, so that the Greek augment fonn
of the verb "to say" would best be translated as "X say no
longer" i.e. "I said". Gamett sets out to find evidence
for the weaker form of this claim, namely that the augment
is some demonstrative particle expressing remote time or
place. This claim is similar to that made by Anderson
(Anderson, 1971a) for the relation between ablative and
negation and for the relation between ablative and expressions
of the perfect made in a later work (Anderson, 1973b). In
another article Garnett brings evidence from several, mainly
Semitic, languages that there is some identity between
expressions of the genitive case and relative pronouns.
Again modern work suggests a similar connection: compare
Matisoff (Matisoff, 1972) where several languages are cited
which show an identity between nominalisations, relative
clauses and genitives.
2.4.1.3.
Key (Key, 1874) differs from Gamett in that he does
not accept Bopp's theory in its entirety, in particular
rejecting the priority of the abstract noun. He suggests
(Key, op. cit. p. 13) that "the first development of language
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was the formation of verbs", where by verbs he means
expressions of physical actions as opposed to expressions
of feeling or emotion, which, in "the older language", are
impersonal, reflexive or passive verbs or in the perfect
tense. Such a view of the original nature of verbs, he
claims, is in keeping with his treatment of the nominative
as expressing the agent. He argues that this view of the
nominative is not in conflict with its use with passives,
since passives are derived from reflexive forms where the
nominative had originally its full agentive meaning. But
this does not explain why the nominative is used in sentences
containing a copula and adjective as in Johannus est fortis
"John is strong". Key here seems to be trying to capture
the generalisation that the subject is typically the agent,
and certainly there is morphological evidence for some
relationship between the form of the nominative and the
genitive case, which latter has agentive and causative
meaning in Latin and Greek, (see Jespersen, 1924*
Kurylowicz, 1964).
Key proposes an analysis of cases which is similar to
that of Laurie, but the main interest for our present concerns
lies in the extension of the analysis of verbal tense and
aspect, so that the whole verbal system is reduced to the
underlying spatial expressions. In fact, his view of the
present continuous seems to argue against hie initial view
of verbs (Key, op. cit. p. 145). Thus he claims that
I am writing derives from a locative expression where
writing is an abstract substantive. Other tenses he tries
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to analyse in terms of a compound formed from an abstract
noun, a preposition and a form of the copula. Thus all
perfect tenses in Latin e.g. scrips!, scripsero, seripseram
"I have written, shall have written, had written" contain
the root scrip- the suffix -s which is to be related to the
genitive or "from" case and a form of the verb "to be".
Key's analysis is similar to that given by Darrigol
(Darrigol, 1829) for Basque where the morphology is clearer,
(for a fuller discussion of Darrigol and the Localist
Hypothesis with respect to tense and aspect see Anderson,
1973b).
2.4.2. Decline
It is difficult to actually summarise, as opposed to
illustrate, the claims of Localist theory without making it
sound simplistic and trivial and somewhat divorced from the
facts of language. However, Hjelmslev's characterisation
of it as dependent on the notion of "direction" is possibly
most accurate (lljelmslev, op. cit.) However, we have seen
that this notion is not limited solely to the analysis of
case systems: the notions of source, goal and location
which derive from it can also be applied to tense and aspect.
Having no concept of deep structure in terms of which
to account for the relations which their theory recognised,
the Localists of the 19th century were obliged to talk in
terms of the development of language. This naturally Giade
their claims open to testing on the basis of the reconstructed
forms posited for Indo-European and the lack of simple
immediate confirmation required by the theorists of the 19th
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century led to the decline of the theory. Two other
factors contributed to this situation. Firstly, as
Hjelraslev points out, (Hjelmslev, op. cit.) in a Localist
view of case, the nominative is not so fully integrated into
the system as are the more obviously local cases. Moreover,
according to Hjelmslev (Hjelmslev, op. cit. p. 45) there was
a reaction against viewing all cases as being reducible to
nl*es?ace concrete ou mat^riella". This reaction took one
of two formss either one tried to remove all localist
concepts from the grammar or one split the cases into the
grammatical, i.e. the nominative, accusative and genitive
and the local case(s). However, these cannot solve any
of the problems of Localism, but do raise further problems
of their own as Hjelmslev shows (Hjelraslev, op. cit.
p. 45-61). Thus, for example, Michelsen (Michelsen, 1843)
bases his analysis on the concept of causality without
realising that this concept is itself the same as the
abstract "direction" in the Localist theory. Likewise ths
split into concrete and grammatical cases raises the problem
of syncretism, in that the accusative in Latin, which is
usually treated as a grammatical case, has a local use to
mark the goal in Paulua in oppidum venit "Paul came into
town", while the dative and ablative, which are local cases,
have grammatical uses when they express purpose or benefactive
and agentive respectively.
Hjelmslev sums up his survey of Localism in the 19th
century thus: "En conclusion la th^orie localiate... est
la seule thtforie des case et&blie jusqu*ici qui m4rite une
consideration s^rieuse." However, in terms of a theory
which recognises a distinction between deep structure and
surface structure and a corresponding distinction between
Case Relations in the former and Case Forms in the latter
we can recognise at least two forms of the Localist Hypo¬
thesis. Hie weaker form wculd be a claim about Case Forms
having recognised the Case Relations Agent, Patient,
Instrument, Source, Goal and Path the claim would be that
Agent and Source, Patient and Goal and Instrument and Path
each have the same Ca.se Form or related Case Forms. The
stronger version of the Localist Hypothesis places this
••sameness" or relation at the deep structure level, so that
it only recognises the Case Relations of Source Goal and
PaJth. Anderson's approach is a form of this latter claim
(Anderson, 1971, 1976) although the actual cases which he
recognises are different that those listed above, Abs,
Erg, Abl and Loc. The point is that we have a general
principle which restricts the set of cases, for Hjelmslev
and Anderson this being the general principle of "direction
(Hjelmslev, op. cit. Anderson, 1976). In the rest of this
study we shall consider one form of the Localist Hypothesis
in its application to an area of English syntax.
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CHAPTER 3
Preliminaries to Direct and Indirect Causation
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, the concepts of
direct and indirect causation are frequently used in the
literature, but there is little explicit comment on their
exact meaning or usefulness. In particular there is no
discussion of whether they refer to syntactic or semantic
properties or whether they are used as a cover term for some
one property of the sentence of some bundle of related
properties. One way in which to approach the problem is to
consider each of the four elements which can occur in a
causative sentence, namely the cause itself, the nature of
the verbs which we perceive as causative, the nature of the
patient or object affected and finally the properties of
those things or events which are instrumental in the action.
3.1 Agents and Forces
In Chapter 2 above we discussed briefly Huddleston*s
notions of Agent and Force and his criticism of Fillmore•»
Instrument case (Huddleston, 1970, Fillmore, 19^8 see 2.2.1.
above). We shall now further this study of the two cases
with regard to how they inter-react with expressions of
direct and indirect causation. Particular attention will be
paid to the types of noun and construction which may be
characterised as an Agent or a Force.
3*1*1. lee
Some initial support for an Agent-Force distinction
comes from the tests for agency proposed by Lee (Lee, 1971a)*
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While we understand the subjects of both 1 and 2 as causally-
involved in the action, only the subject of 1 fulfills the
conditions for agency.
1. John killed Bill
2. Hunger killed Bill
Lee gives the following as tests for the presence of an agent
in the sentence:
(a) the sentence is the object complement of the verb
command or the infinitival complement of persuade:
3. Bill commanded John to kill the enemy
*Bill commanded hunger to kill the enemy
(b) the sentence is the object complement of causative
have:
5. John was having Bill kill the enemy
6. *John was having hunger kill the enemy
(c) the sentence contains an adverb like enthusiastically,
cleverly etc.
7. John cleverly killed the enemy
8. *Hunger cleverly killed the enemy
(d) in order to.. can be added to the sentence. This
point generalises to the presence of benefactives
like for Mary
9. John killed the enemy £r°££ '° PlC"e
10. .Hunger killed the enemy Plea°e Mary
Such cases are not, on their own, of great significance
since they can all be subsumed under the generalisation that
these contexts require animate nouns, so that we would not
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be dealing with an Agent-Fore© distinction. However, there
are cases which do not seem to be open to such a simple
generalisation.
3.1.2, On certain prepositions
We noted above (2.2.3.1.) that the prepositions which
mark the Source or Ablative case can be used in certain
restricted environments to mark the Force case in English.
11. John is dying from hunger
12. The book suffers from an abundance of typographical
errors
13. John suffers from high blood pressure
14. John acted out of fear
With certain verbs like tremble, shake, stutter the pre¬
position may also be with:
15. John trembled ^t^of :f'ear
However, there do seem to be restrictions on what noun
can appear after the preposition:
16. *John is dying from Bill
17. *John acted out of Bill
18. #John trembled with Bill
18 is acceptable if Bill is given a non—causal reading, i.e.
is treated as a Comitative. Notice that a restriction here
in terms of animaoy is not going to be so easy to state.
Firstly, we do find animate nouns:
19. John suffers from an over-bearing wife
If there is an animacy restriction, it cannot be expressed
in terms of the preposition, since we find
20. John received the book from Bill
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Similarly the restriction is joot between the verb and the
animate noun simply, since we find that for can substitute
for the prepositions in 16-18 to produce acceptable
sentences. This suggests that the ungrammaticality lies
in the relation expressed by the preposition, that is it is
Forces from which people die and which lead people to act or
tremble and in these sentences we cannot interpret the
animate nouns as referring to Forces. Thus 16 becomes
acceptable if we substitute something like Bill*s
carelessness
21. John is dying of Bill's carelessness
Consider, for the moment, the prepositions which are
possible in these constructions. Firstly we find pre¬
positions of Source such as out of, from, of (see 2.2.3.1.,
2.2.3.2. above) and secondly we find prepositions of
Location with, by, through (see 2.2.3.1., 2.2.3.2. above),
yet they can all mark a causal relation between either an
event or an object and a further event. One further point
which needs to be mentioned is that in the following forms
of the sentences under discussion, for marks the benefactive
case and so is ungrammatical when the following noun cannot
be understood to refer to some entity benefiting from the
action, except in the case of suffer where it is understood
causally.
22. John is dying for
Bill
*Bill's carelessness
23. John acted for
Bill
*Bill*s carelessness




At this point it is necessary to digress in order to
consider the difference between the animate noun as Force
and a nominalisation containing that animate noun as
Force, as this distinction is frequently needed in a
discussion of causation. The following sentences, cited
by Vendler (vendler, 1967: 140) contain examples of what
Vendler calls "suppressed nominals":
28. John surprised me
29. John caused the trouble
Of these sentences Vendler says that "we sense an invitation
to complete the sentence: he surprised me or caused the
trouble by doing something" (Vendler, op. cit.: 140). That
is in both cases, it is rather some action of John*s which
is the cause of surprise or trouble. A similar situation
is found in the following:
30. The abominable snowman is a fact
where "the existence of that monster is a fact" (Vendler,
op. cit.: 140). Lee (Lee, 1971a) makes a similar point
when he characterises the difference between the two follow¬
ing sentences in terms of their relative completeness:
31. The huge boulder prevented our walking along the
path
32. John ate the soup
Thus 32 cannot be completed by a by—clause, that is one does
not eat by doing something other than eating, but 31 can be
completed by a by-clause, e.g. by blocking our way. We
return to this point below (see 3.2.).
Vendler (Vendler, op. cit.) also introduces the notion
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of "disguised nominal", which appears to be similar to that
of "suppressed nominal". These nouns can be described as
being "not verb derivatives, yet behave like nominalised
verbs; that is, they can enter container contexts without
suggesting suppressed nominals." As examples of such
nominals, we find fire, blizzards, wind, rain, which unlike
table, crystal, cow etc. "can occur, begin, end, can be
sudden or prolonged, can be watched or observed — they are,
in a word, events and not objects" (Vendler, op. cit.: 141).
Note that such nouns also correspond to what Fillmore
(Fillmore, 1968, 1971) calls Instruments and what
Huddleston (liuddleston, 1970) calls Forces.
One further point about Agents and Forces is that they
can be separated in terms of the notion of volition, as
suggested by Huddleston (Huddleston, op. cit.) Thus 33
is ambiguous
33. John broke one of the glasses
in terms of whether John did it deliberately or not.
Huddleston proposes that this can be handled in terms of
whether John is an underlying Agent or Force.
Finally our use of the terms "agent" and "force" in
what follows is to be clarified. These terms are to be
viewed as classificatory words, having no status in the
grammar as such. As already suggested (see Chapter 2),
according to Localist theory, all causes are Ablatives at
some point in the underlying structure, and "agent" and
"force" are convenient labels under Which to collect data
about causes. In what follows we shall return to further
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evidence which might support an Agent-Force distinction in
the grammar, that is two types of Ablative, or different
structures dependent on this case.
3.1.3. On get
The grammar of the verb get is complex (see Lakoff R,
1971* Kimball, 1973 among others) and we shall present here
only those aspects which are of immediate concern to the
Agent-Force distinction. Consider the following:
34. John wa® killed
got
35. John #wa® himself killed
got
En 34» get functions like a passive marker, yet the same
could not be said of 35 where its function seems more closely
related to its causative use as in
36. Although she was reluctant, John got Mary to read
a paper at the conference
Thus got is not a simple passive form, since it is acceptable
without stress on himself, while the sentence with was needs
this stress for it to be acceptable.
37. The mad scientist mis-timed the explosion and was
HIMSELF killed
The situation described by the acceptable form of 35 is one
involving some external agent who actually does the killing,
while John's role is to put himself into the situation
where the external agent can carry out this act of killing.
This situation could not aptly be described by:
38. John killed himself
This becomes clearer when we consider the following
sentences:
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39. John got himself killed by wandering around
George Square late at night
40. John got himself killed by sticking his head above
the wall so that the enemy could locate his
position
41. *John got himself killed by over-working
42. John killed himself by over-working
Notice firstly that sentences with get are more readily
interpreted as non-volitional and easily take some added
expression of the subject*s foolishness or stupidity or
carelessness, yet at the same time their acceptability is
not harmed by the addition of some adverbial which presupposes
volition. Contrasting with this the simple verb with a
reflexive is more readily interpreted as volitional,
although again acceptability is not impaired by an adverb
which negates this volition, i.e. accidentally. Again an
expression of the subject*s stupidity or carelessness
differs as to what it modifies: with the get—sentence it
modifies the action which led to the killing, while with the
reflexive and simple verb it modifies the suicide.
The distinction relevant to the above sentences seems
again to be in terms of the Agent-Force distinction. As
already noted, get presupposes some external agent or
cause, that is, in 39 and 40, the actual performer of the
act of killing is an animate being, a mugger or enemy
soldier. Xn 42 John is killed by over-working, an event or
action. Linked to this also is the difference in preferred
interpretation with respect to volition. Further the get-
sentence typically expresses indirect causation, and this
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seems to be linked to the fact that there is an external
agent, either mentioned or presupposed, and further that the
subject of the sentence does not willingly operate on the
external agent, (The situation bears comparison with
Lyons* observations on the Indo-European middle voice
(Lyons, 1968) Lakoff, R. on get-passives (Lakoff, R. 1971)
and Babcock on the Spanish reflexive (Babcock, 1970).
Further discussion of the relation between the middle voice
and passives and reflexivisation is to be found in
Anderson (Anderson, 1972).)
3.1.4. On fearing
Verbs of fear provide more support for the Agent-Force
distinction, besides giving evidence of the Source pre¬
position of used as a marker of cause, but not of the Agent
(see 3.1.2, above). However, in order to be able to
consider such verbs properly, we need, firstly, to distinguish
between expressions of state and of process.
43a, Our chihuahua was afraid of alsatians
b. Our chihuahua had a fear of alsatians
c. Our chihuahua lived in (a state of) fear of
alsatians
d. Our chihuahua was frightened of alsatians
All the sentences of 43 assert some property or state of
our chihuahua, and as expressions of inherent state cannot
occur in the progressive nor with a temporal expression which
locates the state at a point in time as opposed to some
period of time.
44. Our chihuahua was being afraid of alsatians
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45. ?0n Monday our chihuahua was afraid of alsatians
46. Our chihuahua was afraid of alsatians on Mondayt
but something must have happened to him, as he
isn*t any longer
44 only has a good reading if we assume that the dog is
pretending to be afraid of alsatians. 45 is odd because
it asserts some property at a particular day, while 46 makes
the situation clearer in that we assume that the dog was
afraid of alsatians up to and including that particular day
but is not any longer.
The verb frighten is the only one which can appear in
the progressive and in process sentences. Thus if we use
by instead of of in 43d, we can use the progressive form of
the verbs
47. Our chihuahua was being frightened by alsatians
In this case we must interpret alsatians as referring to
some identifiable group of alsatians. Compare:
48. Our chihuahua was frightened of any alsatian
49* *Our chihuahua was being frightened by any alsatian
The specificity of the cause of fear is also relevant to the
active form of the verb, so that in 48 and 49 the difference
cannot rest solely in the form of the verb:
50. Any alsatian frightened our chihuahua
51. »Any alsatian was frightening our chihuahua
One further property of the sentences is that if we expand
the cause phrase as the size of alsatians, 43a-d become
unacceptable. The important point seems to be that, while
it is reasonable to assert that an alsatian, as an entity
capable of action, is frightening, it is odd to single out
98.
some property such as size, incapable of action in itself,
as the cause of fear. Notice that with bjr such a sentence
becomes more acceptable:
52. Our chihuahua was frightened by the (very) size of
alsatians
To summarise, the features which distinguish states from
processes are (a) the occurrence of the preposition of
(b) the noil-occurrence of the progressive aspect
(c) the specificity of the causer, optional with states,
obligatory with processes.
Turning to sentences corresponding to 43 but with an
active verb, we have 53.
53. Alsatians frighten our dog
There are, as with the passive/stative form, three ways of
making this sentence unambiguous. Firstly the sentence
asserts some state or property of alsatians if the subject
NP contains any or some:
54* Any alsatian frightens our dog
Secondly the object of the verb may be marked by the
preposition to, which leads also to the use of the progressive
form of the verb:
55• Alsatians are frightening to our dog
Notice that the preposition used is to, the marker of Goal
elsewhere. Thirdly to give a non—stative reading, the verb
may be in the progressive:
56. Alsatians were frightening our dog again today
This means that we must treat the "progressive** as structur¬
ally ambiguous between the true progressive aspect and the
expression of state found in 55*
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Thus a generalisation is possible: in a stative
sentence, with the sufferer of fear as the subject, the
object of the verb can only be a Force since in 43»-d it is
impossible to find a volitional reading for the object, this
being in keeping with our discussion above (see 3*1.2.) of
expressions like die of, but if the verb is non-stative then
the object of the verb may be an Agent or a Force.
Similarly with the causer as subject of a stative verb, we
are dealing with a Force, volition does not enter into a
state, and as subject of a non—stative verb we have either a
Force or Agent depending on whether the subject is inter¬
preted as acting deliberately or not.
We can extent this by considering the following
sentences:
57a. John#s mis-shapen face is frightening to the
children
b. ejohn's mis-shapen face is deliberately frightening
the children
58a. John, with his mis-shapen face, is frightening
to the children
b. Joh?, with his mis-shapen face, is deliberately
frightening the children
59a. John is frightening to the children, with his
mis-shapen face
b. John is deliberately frightening the children,^ with
his mis-shapen face
57b is unacceptable because it introduces an inanimate object
and asserts of this that it acts deliberately, while in
58a-b, the with-phrase introduces some property of John.
However, it is difficult to get a reading in which this
phrase refers to John*s manner of frightening in 58b. 59a
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corresponds to 58a, but 59b does not show the same parallel
with 58b, as it becomes unacceptable if there is a pause
before the with-phraae. We can only interpret 59b as
containing an instrumental phrase, that is John is deliber¬
ately using his features as a means of frightening the
children. This supports the distinction between Agents and
Forces in terms of volition: in 58a and 59a we have sent¬
ences deriving from 6>Ja all of which have a Force reading,
and a rule of extraposition will account for the major
constituent break. However, in 59b, w© have an Agent
acting deliberately controlling an instrument.
3•1•5• On because of
Further support comes from the expression because of
which acts differently according to whether we are dealing
with an Agent or a Force. Consider the following paradigm
of questions, all of which should be taken to refer to the
same situations:
6o&. Why did John kill Bill?
Because of/For Mary
b. Why did John melt the ice?
6la. Why did Bill die?
♦Because of/For Mary
b. Why did the ice melt?
Xn 60 we are questioning John's reason for performing the
two actions and can use either because of or for, but in 6l
where we are questioning the cause of the death and melting
we cannot use these expressions. Notice that 6la can be
answered by because of and for, if Mary is understood as a
suppressed nominal, i.e. some property of Mary was
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responsible or alternatively if Mary is understood as the
beneficiary of the event. Thus, if 6l cannot be answered
by specifying the Agent* it can be answered by specifying
the reason or cause in the form of a sentence or nominal-
isation, that is by specifying the Force:
62a.i. Because John forgot to give him the antidote
ii. Because of John's refusal to give him the
antidote
63a.i. Because John ran out of shillings for the
gas-meter
ii. Because of John's refusal to give his last
shilling for the meter
A similar situation where because of marks the Force
and not the Agent is found if we substitute this expression
for with in 58 and 59:
64. Because of his mis-shapen face* John is frightening
to children
65. Because of his mis-shapen face* John is deliberately
frightening the children
That there is a difference is shown by the fact that it is
possible to have a paraphrase of 64 of the form:
66. John's mis-shapen face is frightening to children
that is, the mis-shapen face is causally involved in
inspiring fear in the children. However* this is not true
of 65. John's mis-shapen face does not cause the fear*
rather we can paraphrase 65 as:
67. John's mis-shapen face made John deliberately
frighten children
that is* the mis-shapen face is causally involved in that it
is the cause for John's action* not for the children's fear.
Alternatively, we might say that with a Force as subject*
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because of introduces the manner of causation, but with an
Agent, it marks the reason for the action.
The synonymy in sentences 60 and 6l between because of
and for requires some comment. We have already found
cases where the Benefactive preposition for has a causal
interpretation, in particular it marks the Force (see 3.1.2.
p. 92 above). Both expressions introduce some cause which
is external to the action of the main verb and Just as
because of has a paraphrase with make, for also has a para¬
phrase with a causal verb, namely have or get:
68. John rolldd the pastry out for Mary
69a. Mary had John roll the pastry out (for her)
b. Mary got John to roll the pastry out (for her)
The point seems to be that the desire to do something for
someone can act as the causal force behind the actual per¬
formance of the action.
3.1.6. Lee
Leo's study of by-clauses is a major source of data
bearing on the Agent-Force distinction (Lee, 1971a). His
concern is to make a distinction between two types of by-
clause, what he calls the causative and method. Lee makes
this distinction on the basis of the following character¬
istics of these clauses.
(a) The verb in a method clause must be active, whilo
that in a causative may be active but may also be
a process verb or a stative verb.
70. John amazed Mary by producing a rabbit out of a hat
(method)
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71. John amazed Mary by turning out to have red hair
(causative)
72. John amazed Mary by being 30 tall
That we are dealing with what is essentially an Agent-Force
distinction is shown by the Fact that 71 and 72 are unaccept¬
able iF we add deliberately or any other Agent selecting
adverb:
73. *John deliberately amazed Mary by turning out to
have red hair
Consider the situation also with regard to because oF:
this expression can be used in a paraphrase oF either 70 or
71s
74* John amazed Mary because he produced a rabbit out
oF a hat
75* John amazed Mary because he turned out to have red
hair
but in this case it is both oF the sentences which are
unacceptable with the adverb deliberately, that is in both
oases we are dealing with a causative. This is related to
the Fact observed above that because oF introduces Forces,
(3.1.5.)• Thus, 74 and 75 also have paraphrases with a
nominalisation as the subject:
76, John*s producing a rabbit out oF a hat amazed Mary
77. John*a turning out to have red hair amazed Mary
Thus we need to characterise 70 as ambiguous (or rather
unspeciFied) with regard to the status oF John as Agent or
not and correspondingly with regard to the status oF the
by-clause as method or causative respectively. In Fact, we
are Faced with the problem oF what is the status oF the
subject iF it is not an Agent. Lee, although he does not
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go into detail, wishes to treat it as a derived subject,
having its origin in the structure which underlies the
causative by-clause. We return to a discussion of this
question below (see Chapter 4).
(b) Causative by-clauses express reasons, while
method clauses do not. This is essentially the
point made above (p. 103 and section 3.1.5«).
78a. John deliberately amazed Mary by producing a
rabbit
b. *The reason John amazed Mary was that he produced
a rabbit
79&. John cleverly prevented our departure by lying
across the doorway
b. #The reason John cleverly prevented our departure
was that he lay across the doorway
8oa. John amazed Mary by turning out to be so tall
b. The reason John amazed Mary was that he turned
out to be so tall
81a. John prevented our departure by accidentally
falling asleep across the doorway
b. The reason John prevented our departure that
he had accidentally fallen asleep across the
doorway
We suggested above (3.1.5.) that if the subject is a Force,
then because of marks the method of causation, that is, it
is the actual causal factor involved in the event as shown
by the paraphrase with a nominal!sation as subject.
However, if the subject of the sentence is an Agent, then
because of marks the reason for the Agent«s action. It is
in terms of this distinction that we can approach the
unacceptability of 78b and 79b. In these sentences we have
the description of an event involving an Agent performing
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some action which is intended to amaze or prevent, while in
80 and 81 we have a state or event which produces an effect
but no action performed by an Agent.
We could analyse the situation in terms of the presence
of a higher predication in 78 and 79 which is not present
in 80 and 81. Thus in 80 we have a direct relation between
John's turning out to be tall and the effect which it
produces, that is the reason or cause applies directly to
the highest predication which in this case is the predication
of amazement. However, in 78, for example, we have above
the predication of amazement another predication of John's
agency, a DO-predication perhaps (we return to details
below, Chapter 4), in this case the Reason is predicated of
the highest predication, namely the DO-predication, so that
we have a sentence where the cause of amazement is predicated
of John's action. Thus reasons and causes apply to the
highest predication in the underlying structure, which
accounts for the above sentences and also the facts about
because of. Notice that it is, in fact, nothing overt in
the surface structure of 78 and 79 which makes them unaccept¬
able; it is rather a matter of knowledge of the world, that
is producing rabbits out of a hat does not normally lead to
people setting out to amaze an audience, although they nor¬
mally set out to amaze an audience by producing rabbits out
of a hat. Compare 78b and 79b with the structurally
identical but acceptable:
82a. The reason John amazed Mary was that he wanted to
show how versatile a magician he was
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b. The reason that John prevented our departure was
that he wanted to be paid the money we owed him
Thus the facts adduced by Lee to support the method-
causative by-clause distinction roveal further details of the
Agent-Force distinction.
(c) As mentioned above (p. 102), Lee (Lee, op. cit.)
wishes to derive the subject of a sentence with a
causative by-clause from a fuller proposition
which in the underlying structure is a manner
adverb, while subjects of sentences with a method
clause are generated directly in the deep subject
position. He has three arguments for such a
position.
(i) Lee notes the similarity between the grammar of verbs
like begin and that of verbs like prevent. Following
Perlmutter (Perlmutter, 1970) there are two verbs begin,
the first being transitive:
83. John enthusiastically began to work
the second being intransitive and appearing in two
constructions:
84a. The oil began to flow at noon
b. The flow of oil began at noon
This paradigm is parallelled by that of causative verbs:
83• John cleverly prevented our departure by lying
across the doorway
86a, John prevented our departure by accidentally falling
asleep
b, John's falling asleep prevented our departure
Lee concludes from this that in 83 and 83 the same
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Like-Subject constraint is operating to ensure that the
subjects of begin and prevent are coreferential with the
subjects of work and lie respectively. In 84 and 86, two
rules are operating, first Subject-Raising, which raises the
subject of the dependent clause into the subject position of
the matrix sentence, to produce the forma 82*a and 86a,
while the second raises the whole dependent clause into
subject position. Thus, ho claims, his proposals do not
complicate the grammar by requiring any new rules.
(ii) Lee's second argument depends on the possibility of a
pro-fom occurring in the causative by—clause but not in the
method clause:
87a. John deliberately prevented our departure by his
lying across the doorway
b. John prevented our departure by his falling
asleep
88a. *john assassinated the Premier by his using a gun
b. John annoyed Mary by his insisting on the point
Lee mairks 87a as ungrararaatical, but this does not seem to
be true for all speakers. According to his analysis, in
the a examples Equi-NF has applied obligatorily to delete
the lower occurrence of John, so that no pro-form can occur.
In the b sentences Subject-Raising has raised John from the
embedded sentence into subject position, so that a pro-form
may be left in the lower sentence. Certainly Lee's evidence
is inconclusive, and the situation is further complicated
by the fact that with certain verbs when a pro-form is
used the nominalisation is in the non-ing form:
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8Q&. John annoyed everyone by arriving late
b. ?John annoyed everyone by hi® arriving late
c. John annoyed everyone by hi® late arrival
90a. John showed us that he was unharmed by waving
his arm
b. ?John showed us that he was unharmed by his waving
hie arm
c. *John showed us that he was unharmed by his moving
his arm
XxdL s
d. John showed us that he was unharmed by
movements of his arm
One further point that Lee does not mention and which weakens
his case is that with (and more rarely through) can sub¬
stitute for hjr when a pro-form is used, such that the
sentence can only have the causative interpretation:
91. John prevented our departure with his
lying across the doorway
falling asleep
92. John annoyed Mary with his insistence on the point
93. John annoyed everyone with his arriving late
(iii) Lee argues that in
94- The cavern frightened Mary
cavern is not an Agent but is derived by Subject—Raising
from a causative by-clause, presumably an S with only its
subject NP specified, although Lee is not clear on this
point. This depends on his assumption that manner adverbs
and causative by-clauses have the same origin, and on this
basis, Lee predicts that no manner adverb can occur in 94
and further that one cannot question the manner in which
cavern frightens because it is not an Agent.
95* *How did the cavern frighten Mary? Suddenly/
gradually
109.
There is other evidence for the difference between
method and causative by-clauses which Lee does not mention
and which we must now make explicit. Firstly, as observed
above (p. 103), only causative clauses have a paraphrase
with a nominal!sation as subject of the sentence. Hence
we do not find 96 as a paraphrase of 97, while there is such
a relation between 98 and 99:
96. *john*s producing a rabbit out of a hat deliberately
surprised Mary
97. John deliberately surprised Mary by producing a
rabbit out of a hat
98. John*s going into hospital for a major operation
surprised everyone
99. John surprised everyone by going into hospital for
a major operation
Secondly gerunds often have a paraphrase in The fact that
and such a paraphrase can only correspond to a sentence with
a causative by-clause:
99. The fact that John went into hospital for a major
operation surprised everyone
Two points which seem to be connected concern paraphrases
in In order to and the occurrence of Benefactives (see
3.1.1.d above where we mentioned a similar correlation).
Thus if Agents appear with in order to i.e. are to be
correlated with volition as suggested above (3.1.2. and see
Ross, 1972, Dowty, 1972a 1972b among many others for a
similar position) and with method by-clauses, then it is
likely that there will be some paraphrase relation between
the two sentence types:
100. John produced a rabbit in order to amaze Mary
110.
101. John went into hospital in order to surprise
everyone
(compare with 97 and the volitional reading of 99 above).
The situation with respect to Benefactives is more complex.
If a Benefactive is present in a sentence with a by-clause,
then the subject is an Agent and we have a method clause:
102. John woke the children for Mary by turning the
radio on loud
The action described in the by-clause is here "directed"
or goal-orientated. In a sentence with a Force as subject,
i.e. a nominal!sation, then it is still possible to have a
sentence which is almost acceptable:
103. John's turning the radio on loud woke the children
for Mary
but here we are more likely to understand that the result
was accidentally of benefit to Mary.
Having set up the distinction between method and
causative by-clauses, Lee (Lee, op. cit.) uses the evidence
to consider direct and indirect causation. However, his
discussion is directed more at the nature of the verbs
involved and we shall consider this in the next section
(see 3.2.1. below).
We can now make some brief generalisations about Agents
and Forces in preparation for a more detailed discussion of
their treatment in the grammar below (Chapter 4). Agents
are to be distinguished from Forces on the basis of their
occurrence with the class of adverbs which includes
enthusiastically, cleverly, deliberatsly etc., with
expressions of purpose and with Benefactives. All these
features seem to be related to the general notion of
111.
volition, that is only Agents can perform goal-orientsted
action. Agents and Forces also differ as to their structure:
thus Agents are always animate nouns, while Forces are
either inanimate nouns of the "disguised nominal" type such
as rain, wind, storm etc., those nouns referring to events,
nominal!sat ions or finally animate nouns which may or may
not occur with a causative by-clause.
3.2. Verbs and Their Objects
In this section we shall consider the data on verb
classes, their syntax and their relations with the objects
with which they co-occur. We include the object in this
section because the verb-object relation is closer than that
between the subject and verb and is of greater relevance to
the sub-categorisation of verbs. Thus it seams more common
for a verb to be unrestricted as to the nature of the
subject i.e. causative verbs in general may take either
Agent or Force subjects (although we return to this below
3.2.2.), while there is not such a variation in the types
of object which a verb requires. We shall also find that
in studying the verb, we are moving into an area where the
notions of direct and indirect causation are more immediately
relevant. We take up, then, Lee's discussion of causation.
3*^.1. Lee on Direct and Indirect Causation
Lee gives as an example of a sentence involving indirect
causation:
104. The huge boulder prevented our walking along the
path
and making essentially the same point as Vendler (Vendler,
112.
1967 see also 3.1.2. above) when he talks of "suppressed
nominal3", Lee notes that 104 is incomplete in a way that
105 is not:
105* John ate the fish
in that 104 may be expanded by a causative by-clause, while
103 may not. The difference is essentially one of Agent
versus Force, in that in 104. it is not the boulder itself,
as a boulder, which does the preventing, but rather some
property of the boulder, e.g. its location. It is in
this sense that we might talk of "suppressed nominal", in
that part of the information is not given. Contrasting
with this, in 103 it is not some property of John which is
actually responsible for or performing the act of eating,
but John himself, no information is actually suppressed here.
However, we must consider in what way 104 really
involves indirect causation. It will be seen that Lee is
here equating indirect causation with causative by-clauses
and he clarifies the situation by going on to suggest that
it is precisely such sentences which contain the predicate
CAUSE in their underlying structure, which is to contrast
with sentences containing Agents and method by-clauses which
do not have this predicate in their underlying structure and
thus involve direct causation.
Lee lists four categories of verb which take "causative
clauses" i.e. have CAUSE in their deep structure:
(a) cause itself and its synonyms bring about, make
etc.
(b) verbs from CAUSE and a lower verb or adjective with
113.
an abstract complement: hence necessitate has
In Its deep structure the predicates CAUSE BECOME
NECESSARY, suggest has CAUSE SEEM, guarantee has
CAUSE BECOME CERTAIN.
(c) verbs from CAUSE and a lower verb with an animate
experlencer, e.g. frighten, annoy, irritate etc.
(d) verbs from CAUSE and a lower verb with an animate
experiencer and an abstract complement: persuade,
suggest, guarantee, prepare.
We can now turn to the arguments which Lee gives to
support the presence of CAUSE with indirect causatives and
its absence with direct causatives. But note that we should
be prepared to query the arguments if only because in a
later article (Lee, 1971b) he uses the same arguments to
support a case grammar type analysis.
(i) Lee notes the following sentences are not paraphrases:
106a. John killed Bill
b. John boiled the water
107&. John caused Bill to die
b. John caused the water to boil
Lee attributes this lack of paraphrase to the presence of
CAUSE in the structures underlying 107a-b and its absence
in those of 106a-b. However, there is such a paraphrase
relation, it is claimed, between sentences containing one
of the verbs listed above and the overt causative form:
108a. John's late arrival necessitated a reconsideration
of the plans
b. The box's surface suggested that it was made of
wood
114.
109a. John's late arrival caused it to be necessary
to reconsider the plans
b. The box's surface caused it to seem to be made
of wood
Notice that the argument is not a compelling one for the
presence of CAUSE in one set of sentences and not in the
other: it merely shows that there is some difference which
could alternatively be shown by the presence of DO in 106
and its absence in 107» 108 and 109 or even in terms of a
distinction between Agents and Force.
(ii) The second argument depends on the following assumption:
if element X, occurring in the surface structure, has feature
y correlated with it, then if feature Y appears correlated
with some other element of surface structure, then it is
possible that at some point in the derivation the underlying
structure of element X was present and has been incorporated
in the other surface element. Thus Lee argues that since
the surface form cause, takes an abstract subject or a
causative by-clause, then if a particular verb is the surface
representation of an underlying structure which contains
CAUSE, that verb will also take an abstract subject or a
causative by-clause. The converse of this is that any
verb which does not allow an abstract subject or a causative
by-clause cannot have CAUSE in its underlying structure.
According to this argument, boil and break are not lexical-
isations of structures containing CAUSE since they do not
allow abstract subjects, at least in Lee's dialect:
110. "John's failure to turn the burner off boiled
the water
113.
111. Hie change in molecular structure broke the
window
Lee marks 111 as unacceptable, yet some speakers of English
will accept it Just as they will accept 112 s
112. John's carelessness in not sealing the door
killed the astronauts
Evidently the situation is more complex than Lee is willing
to admit, in that the generalisation he is seeking to make
does not seem to bear any close relation to the data. Thus
as further examples, consider the following where in one
case the nominalisation as subject makes unacceptable the
sentence with kill, although 112 above is acceptable, yet in
the other a nominalisation is compatible with open or
cause to open:
113. The criminal's urging his accomplice to shoot
"killed the policeman
caused the policeman's death
114. John's increasing the air pressure
opened the door
caused the door to open
The situation might be saved if we were to allow two verbs
kill for example, one with the underlying structure KILL,
taking Agents and method by-clauses, the other with CAUSE DXE,
but this raises the problem of why two different deep
structures are lexicalised by the same lexical item and it
does not solve the problem of the difference in accept¬
ability of 113 and 112.
(iii) Lee further notes that verbs of direct causation,
i.e. lacking CAUSE, behave idiosyncratically in comparison
with verbs of direct causation. Again the argument depends
on a property of the surface form cause, namely that it
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implies the truth of its complement, i.e. if John causes
Bill to die, then it is the case that Bill dies. Indirect
causation verbs have this property as Lee predicts with his
analysis.
115a. Something about the pigs suggested to Mary that
they were stupid
b. It seems to Miary that pigs are stupid
116a. Possession of a permit guaranteed Mary that she
could enter
b. It was certain that Mary could enter
117a• Life had taught/that the world is a cruel place
b. She believed/knew that the world is a cruel place
Thus, in each case the a-sentence implies the b—sentence.
However, this is not the caae with verbs of direct causation:
118. John suggested to Mary that pigs are stupid
119. John guaranteed Mary that she could enter
120. John taught Mary that the world is a cruel place
None of these sentences necessarily imply that Mary believed
or learnt anything. The point is that, being direct
causatives under Lee*s analysis and thus having Agent
subjects, it is quite possible that either John was lying
and Mary knew this or that John did not present his case
clearly enough for Mary to grasp the point of the argument.
One point which Lee does not mention and which supports
some difference between 115-7 and 118-120 is that the latter
may take a temporal expression like for three months, while
the former may not, but we return to this below (see
3.2.4.b).
Lee's argument is not convincing on two grounds.
117.
Firstly, as noted with kill above (p. 115)» his position
requires the recognition of two different underlying
structures, both of which have the sane lexicalisation, i.e.
suggest lexicalises both SUGGEST which has an Agent subject
and CAUSE SEEM. Any treatment which leads to such a
position is weakened by the lack of generalisation involved.
The second point, however, is more damning: if sugge31
contains CAUSE because it implies seem, that is CAUSE
implies the truth of its complement, then on the basis that
kill implies that someone died, then we can argue that kill
also contains CAUSE in its underlying structure. If we
fail to make this step, then again we are failing to capture
a generalisation: in the case of suggest Lee is handling
its implications directly in its deep structure, while in
the case of kill they must be handled elsewhere in the
grammar.
Although Lee's arguments need comment and refinement
and his characterisation of direct and indirect causation
is in conflict seemingly with that of Lakoff (Lakoff, 1970),
his arguments serve to point up further the Agent-Force
distinction and suggest areas of discussion with regards to
verbs. A consideration of the difference between Lee's
and Lakoff's concepts of direct and indirect causation is
revealing. Lee's approach is basically syntactic while
Lakoff seems to be orientated more towards semantics. Lee
is primarily concerned with the relation between subject,
verb and the by-clause, where one is possible and he makes
118.
no reference to the nature of the object: thus for Lee
direct causation is a concept used of the relation between
subject and verb whore the subject is an Agent, while
indirect causation is the corresponding relation when the
subject is a Force. The difference is handled by what is
essentially a difference in syntactic structure, namely the
presence of CAUSE. Lakoff's examples suggest that the
important criterion is the relation between the verbal
action and the object. Viewing the situation in these
terms helps us to understand why the situation with regard
to the loxicalisation of structures containing CAUSE is uiore
complex than Lee presents, that is, Lee has ignored an
essential variable in such sentences, namely the nature of
the object of the verbal action.
As noted Lee's terms "direct" and "indirect" refer
essentially to syntactic phenomena, i.e. the presence of an
Agent as subject with "simplex" verbs like kill as opposed
to a complex verbal element, one of whose elements is CAUSE
with a Force as subject. The problem is whether such a
syntactic position is of real help in explaining what is a
matter of semantics. That we are dealing with an area
closely related to semantics, or at least an area which is
not captured by Lee's terms, can be seen by reconsidering
Lakoff•s initial exampies:
121. John opened the door by turning the knob
122. John caused the door to open by turning the knob
123. John opened the door by increasing the air pressure
124. John brought it about that the door opened by
increasing the air pressure
119.
In each sentence we have an Agent and a method by—clause
and thus for Lee all the sentences involve direct causation:
Lakoff, however, characterises 123 and 124 as involving
indirect causation, that is the Agent does not operate
immediately upon the object. Thus it appears to be the
nature of the by-clause which influences the judgement
of directness or indirectness, and relates to whether the
action is normally the means of opening doors and whether
the action needs to be done by the one who opens doors or
whether the action, as in 123 and 124 could open the door
without being under the control of an Agent.
Referring back to Lee^ second argument for the presence
of CAUSE with sentential subjects, we noted that under his
analysis 111 should be unacceptable:
111. The change in molecular structure broke the
window
For Lee this involves indirect causation, and is correlated
with Forces and an underlying CAUSE, whereas it would
normally be interpreted as direct causation. The situation
becomes clearer when we consider 113* The sentence with
killed is unacceptable, whereas it is acceptable with
cause, yot killed is acceptable in 112. The relevant
generalisation here seems to be in terms of intervening
agent (see Cruse, 1972) and its relation to the object, the
one factor which Lee ignores. Ill is acceptable since no
other causal factor intervenes between the change in
molecular structure and the breaking of the window, while
in 113 the criminal»s urging is not the immediate cause of
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death, rather it is his accomplice who actually kills the
policeman. Similarly in 112 John's carelessness is
directly responsible since there is no other factor. Alter¬
natively we might see the situation in terms of chains: in
111 we have only one link which involves the change in
molecular structure and the breaking of the window, while in
113 we have two links, firstly between the criminal operating
on his accomplice and secondly between the accomplice*s
action and the policeman's death.
Lee's grammar cannot account for the facts about
immediacy of action as suggested above. We need, then, a
definition of causation in terms of the relation between the
verbal action and the object and also some means of
accommodating the notion of intervening causes. This is
essentially the point made by Fillmore (Fillmore, 1971a)
when he talks of Principal causes and Immediate causes.
Thus, for Fillmore, Principal causes will be Agents and
Immediate causes will be Instruments. We shall consider
more fully later (Chapter 4) how this is to be captured in
a grammar which acknowledges Agents, Instruments and Forces
as possible categories of causal elements. Thus we may
tentatively charact»rise indirect causation as connected with
the nature of the immediate cause.
Lee's terms indirect and direct causation are also
inadequate in that they do not allow us to account
adequately for the situation described in his third argument
(see p. 116 above), namely that 118 does not imply 115b:
118. John suggested to Mary that pigs are stupid
121.
115b. It seems to Mary that pigs are stupid
Following the suggestion above of analysing sentences in
terms of primary and secondary causes, we see that 118 has a
primary cause, an Agent, John and as immediate cause an
action of suggesting, as opposed to 115as
115&. Something about the pigs suggested to Mary that
they were stupid
which has only an immediate cause, something about pigs.
The crucial factor seems to be that 118 only asserts that
the primary cause performed an act of suggesting, that is
an Agent performed some action, which does not entail that
the immediate cause had any affect on Mary, while in 115a,
in the absence of an Agent, the immediate cause does have an
affect on Mary.
Another fact which may throw light on the situation
concerns the occurrence of purpose clauses. We noted above
that Benefactives and purpose clauses occur with Agents and
method clauses (3»1«6.)« Thus as a paraphrase of
120. John taught Mary that the world is a cruel place
we have a corresponding sentence with a purpose clause:
125. John did something (in order) to teach Mary that
the world is a cruel place
However, we do not find 126 as a paraphrase of 117aj
117a. Life had taught Mary that the world is a cruel
place
jll26. Life had done something to teach Mary that the
world is a cruel place
126 can only have a good reading if it is treated as
involving a result clause. 125 exactly parallels the
situation with 120, in that both do not necessarily imply
122.
success on John's part. Thus as a generalisation, we might
say that Agents do not necessarily imply the success of the
action, while Forces do imply that success.
A final point which comes out of Lee's discussion
concerns the possibility that there is a predicate CAUSE.
We have already suggested that there may be a higher predicate
DO which is to be correlated with Agents (p. 105 and p. 11£>),
and there is then the possibility that there may be a second
predicate to be correlated with Forces. One strong possib¬
ility is that this predicate is CAUSE. Any such suggestion
will entail further discussion of and a refutation of the
arguments in the literature against Lexical Decomposition.
In what follows immediately we survey further facts about
verbs with regard to their structure, meaning and relation to
other elements of the sentence.
3.2.2. Completeness of Verbs
Before going further into the nature of causative and
active verbs, there is a further point about completeness
which needs to be clarified. Above we used "completeness"
in the sense given it by Lee, namely to refer to the
possibility that the sentence could take a further by-clause
to further specify the nature of the verbal action:
104. The boulder prevented our walking along the path
105. John ate the fish
Notice that sentence 104 which Lee gives as involving
indirect causation and an incomplete verb has what in our
terras would be a Force, namely the boulder as subject, while
105 has an Agent and is complete in Lee's terminology.
123.
However, while the notion of completeness is comparatively
clear with Forces as subject, it is more complex and
interesting with an Agent subject. Thus in 105 John is
an Agent and no completing by-clause is possible to further
clarify the nature of the action, but it is not possible
to form a generalisation on this fact such that sentences
with Agent subjects are complete, since we find such
sentences as:
127. John killed Bill by giving him an overdose of
Metatone, a tonic which contains strychnine
which has an Agent subject and a completing by-clause.
On the basis of these facts it seems that we need to
distinguish between two types of verb, those which can take
a completing by—clause and those which cannot. In the
first category will fall such verbs as kill, prevent, amaze,
surprise, teach etc. As we shall see, the important
generalisation is in terms of their possible occurrence
with Forces as subject, as opposed to those verbs which
cannot and so necessarily take only Agent subjects, such as
eat, walk, run., laugh etc., i.e. verbs of bodily movement
or "middle" verbs, (see Diffloth, 1974 for further
discussion). We shall return to the implications of this
distinction in the discussion of the forinalisation of the
grammar (see chapter 4 below). For the moment we may say
that there is no act of killing or amazing etc., which does
not involve some other action, but there is no action of
walking or running which, under normal circumstances is not
itself an act of walking or running.
12k.
3.2.3. Categories of Causative verb and their Objects
In this section we wish to survey the facts about the
"full" verb do, that is, those occurrences of the form do
which do not fall under the list of occurrences referred to
in transformational literature as "do-support" (Chomsky,
1957). There are at least three categories of verb which
can be distinguished by using the verb do, according to
whether the verb takes an object, and if it does whether the
object is marked in certain circumstances by the preposition
to or with. In fact, do_ occurring with something or the
same thing seems to function as a pro—form for the verbal
element.
Consider the following acceptable sentences:
128. John ran home and Bill did the same
129a. John put his car in the garage and Bill did the
same with his bike
b. John kicked Mary in the teeth and Bill did the
same to Marjory
Notice that 129a becomes unacceptable or at least odd if we
use to instead of with, just as 129b becomes unacceptable
if with is used instead of to. This comes out more clearly
if we consider the difference between the two questions
131. What did you do with the book?
132. What did you do to the book?
The first question presupposes that the book is still whole
and undamaged: thus the following are acceptable responses:
132a. I put it. back on the shelf
b. I gave it to Bill
whereas the second question presupposes that the book has
125.
been damaged in some way:
133a« I accidentally spilt ink over it
b. I tore it up
Thus we way set up three categories of verb: the first will
include verbs of body movement such as run, walk, cycle,
stand etc., the second, corresponding to the do with paradigm,
will include verbs of movement of an object from one concrete
location to another, put, give, hand, place, return, etc.,
and the third we can call "transitive" and will include all
those verbs which in the last section we called "incomplete",
i.e. they can take a Force as subject. Notice that we
specify concrete location for the second category since,
according to Localist Theory, the third category will also
involve movement into a state or abstract location, in this
case a location defined by the nature of the verbal action:
thus killing defines the ultimate state as being one of
death, with putting the object does not enter into the final
state in the same way, in this case it is the prepositional
phrase which defines the location.
If run, walk, etc. are verbs of body movement, and put,
give, etc. are verbs of movement of an object, in what
category do w© classify verbs like lift, shake, twitch, nod
etc., which, in opposition to verbs of the first category,
express movement of part of the body, while the latter
express movement of the whole of the body? Similarly the
verbs under discussion differ from the second category of
verbs, in that they involve movement which is in a sense
reflexive, i.e. the Agent moves part of himself. The
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important point is that, under certain circumstances, body-
part movement verbs behave in a similar way to those of the
second category.
We suggested above that verbs of the second category
are do with-verbs, that is their objects are marked, in
certain occurrences, by the preposition with. It would be
more accurate, however, to say that one of their objects is
marked by with, the other by a notional preposition like to,
onto, into. Thus with verbs of this category we find the
following paradigm, ignoring for the moment the difficulties
with the verbs give, send, hand, etc., to which we return
below (Chapter 5):
134a. John loaded the bricks onto the cart
b. John loaded the cart with bricks
135a. John planted the trees in the garden
b. John planted the garden with the trees
Thus we find the object moved marked by the preposition
with when it does not immediately follow the verb. The same
is true, by and large, with the objects of body-part movement
verbs. Thus with the verb nod we have an optional
preposition;
136. John nodded (with) his head
The major difference is that, unlike verbs like load, the
motional preposition is always present:
137a. John waved (with) his arm at Bill
b. John waved at Bill with his arm
We find a similar pattern with lash out, thrus 11 kick etc.,
133a. John lashed his fist out at Bill
127.
b. John lashed out at Bill with his fist
The status of the structure without the preposition with
is of interest in the light of Schwartz* observations on
the VP-constituent (Schwartz, 1972 and also Postal, 1974).
He notes a general tendency of all languages not to allow
any element to intervene between the verb and its direct
object, i.e. we find unacceptable the insertion of an adverb
between verb and object:
139. *John opened suddenly the door
and suggests that this is a feature of the VP-constituent.
Alternatively, we might say that this is a test for direct
objects. Thus nod and with his head do not form a
constituent, or alternatively the prepositional phrase is
not a direct object, which suggests that we are dealing
with two different structures in the following:
140a. *john nodded vigorously his head
b. John nodded his head vigorously
c. John nodded vigorously with his head
d. John nodded with his head vigorously
Marking the object which moves by a preposition like
with which elsewhere marks the Comitative, Locative and
Instrumental cases (see 2.2.3.1. and 2.2.3.2) is not
restricted to Modern English. In Old English we find a
similar construction where the dative case form is used:
141. munduin brugdon
hand-dat.pl. lash-out-they
•They lashed out with their hands*
The same construction is found in the Classical Languages,
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as pointed out by Haudry (Haudry, 1970) in his survey of the
Latin "instrumental", i.e. the case which is commonly called
the "ablative" in standard Latin grammars. Thus besides
the examples like the following, which have exact parallels
• - * o
in Modern English:
142a. Circumdedit murum urbi
around-give-past-he wall-acc city-abl
•He put a wall around the city1
b. Circumdedit urbem muro
around-give-past-he city-acc wall-abl
•He surrounded the city with a wall*
we also find sentences of the following pattern:
143• Jecit lapidibus
throw-past-be stone-abl-pl.
•He threw the stones*
although in this particular sentence, we are more likely to
assume ellipsis, in that some object or person is likely to
be the target of the throwing. However, this notion of
intended target is not necessarily present in stemere solum
tells , which Haudry translates as "spread the arms on the
ground", (telis is the ablative plural). Haudry talks of
these objects in the instrumental case as "l*objet interne"
and as "le constituant immrfdiat de ce verbe, par r^f^rence
auquel le sens du verbe se d^finit". The notion of internal
object which defines the nature of the verbal action is of
particular interest in relation to certain facts about
English, namely the paraphrase relations between such
expressions as give help, put water, put butter etc. and the
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simple verbs help, water, butter etc, where in the first
we have a verb of movement and an object which Haudry would
call internal and the second a verb based on that noun.
Anderson (Anderson, 1971a.) treats such pairs in terms of the
Subjunction of the noun to the verb, which parallels Gruber*s
notion of Incorporation (Gruber, 1965). Thus it is possible
that whatever property enables us to define such objects as
'• internal" may be of relevance to Subjunction.
One final property of the marking of the object which
moves in the Classical Languages is that it is not restricted




»It *s raining stones*
The verbs of the third category, which we can call
do to-verbs, are of interest in relation to the preposition
used, i.e. the spatial preposition to (see 2.2.2.2., 2.2.2.3.,
2.2.3.1., 2.2.3.2.). Thus we have some generalisation
possible, in that just as the recipient of the hay in the
following sentence is marked by a motional preposition:
145* John loaded the hay onto the cart
so in certain circumstances the recipient or patient of an
action can be marked by a motional preposition:
146. John thrashed Bill and Mary did the same to
Marjory
Just as hay passes from John to_ the cart, so the action of
thrashing passes from John to Bill. Thus one possibility
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is that it is the category of do to-verbs which capture the
notion of direct causation. This is suggested by Grosu
(Gcosu, 1971). Talking of the verb persuade, Grosu
observes: "This surface object captures the information that
the subject acts directly upon the object in achieving the
goal, in contradistinction with a causative verb like bring
about which does not specify who the agent operates on in
attaining his goal...." (Grosu, op. cit. : 63).
3.2.4. Middle verbs
We introduced the term "middle" above when we classified
verbs like eat, walk, rim etc. as middles. In this section
we shall look at the class of verbs which are generally
classifiod as middles in more detail, with special attention
to the use of the term and the middle voice in Indo-European
languages. Xt will be found that the middle voice, whether
marked by some inflection, a reflexive pronoun or a particle,
interacts with aspect, volition and the accomplishment-action
distinction discussed by Vendler (Vendler, 1967).
The situation with regards to the middle voice in Indo-
European and the Classical Languages is both confused and
confusing. There seems to be no complete classification
or explanation of the voice which does it full justice. A
further problem is that we need to distinguish the arguments
concerning its composition, derivation and development from
what we know of its uses and "meanings". It is now
generally accepted that originally there was no passive
voice in Indo-European, but rather a distinction between
active and middle and it was from this latter that the
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voice called passive developed (cf. Benveniste, 1966,
Kurylowicz, 1964, Gonda, i960. Hatcher, 1942, Claflin, 1927#
1929 etc.). As for the uses of the middle, while it is now
generally accepted that there is no overt relation in the
forms of the middle with a reflexive pronoun (as suggested
by Bopp, see Claflin, 1927)# it is generally agreed that the
uses and meanings of the middle are to be related to the
idea of reflexivisation, (Claflin, 1927# 1929, Benveniste,
1966), The relation with reflexives is more obvious in
the modern Romance languages, where a reflexive construction
is used both for passives and middle constructions (Ruwet
1972, Babcock, 1970).
The original observation of this relationship seems to
go back to Panini who, according to Benveniste (Benveniste,
op. cit.) (but see also Humbert, 1945# who attributes the
original mention of Panini*s terms to Vackernagel), talked
of "parasmaipada" or word for another as opposed to
"atmanepada" or word for oneself. Benveniste gives the
examples of Sanskrit yajati "he sacrifices" (in his role as
a priest) while the middle yajate means "he sacrifices for
himself". However, if we mark the middle as differing
from the active voice with regards to such a reflexive
relation, we still need to explain all the different uses
of the voice. In the main the question never arises in
the literature of whether we are dealing with a "core"
meaning for the middle to which all uses may be related or
whether, on the contrary, we are to look on it as several
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different uses which are marked the same because of some
"family resemblance". A third possibility we cannot
explore fully here is that we are dealing with something
more "syntactic" than semantic, that is the middle voice is
structurally defined in terms of clause-mates and a
condition on reflexivisation as a rule of the grammar.
Gonda (Gonda, i960) reviews the works relating to the
middle voice and points out the main deficiencies of the
theories. In the main we are dealing with a series of
differing taxonomies and as taxonomies, there is no reason
to believe that they would be able to provide an explanation
of why Indo-European should have two voices, nor why certain
verbs can occur only in the middle or active while others
occur in both voices. Often the discussion becomes one
concerned with stylistic effect and the justification of
why the middle is used instead of the active in terms of
expressiveness. This frequently leads to incompatible
views: thus, in talking of the process verbs swim, shine
etc. Gonda (Gonda op. cit.: k9) observes that their
Greek counter-parts could appear in the active or middle
voice and claims that the middle emphasised:hat "the
process was, so to say, limited to the sphere of the subject
with regard to whom it took place", yet Hatcher (Hatcher,
op. cit.) not only treats these "processes" as examples of
different classes, but suggests that verbs of motion in
the middle voice place the activity in relation to some
greater goal or purpose. We shall consider now some of the
main functions of the middle mentioned in the literature,
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with special reference to Gonda and Hatcher.
The main function enumerated In the literature Is the
"reflexive" use. Thus Greek has middle forms for the
verbs "to cut off one*s hair" and "to hang oneself".
Another verb in the active voice means "to stretch out, to
reach, hold, out, give etc.", whereas the middle means "to
stretch oneself out, to reach for, aim at, long for". This
would appear to support Hatcher*s view of the middle as in
some sense purposive. Another category, called "dynamic"
middle, comprises those verbs like swim in Greek which have
both active and middle forms. A third category, called
"Medium der Beteiligung", contains verbs which translate
into English as sneeze, belch, be furious, ashamed, be born,
melt, perish etc. (Gonda, op. cit.). Gonda suggests that
the relevant generalisation is in terms of something
happening to a person, "or takes place in the person of the
subject so as to affect him etc., without any agents being
mentioned, implied or known" (Gonda, op. cit.: k9)» Gonda,
in fact, follows the traditional practice of setting up the
taxonomy of uses, making some seemingly arbitrary choice as
to which of them is basic and then proposing that this is
the "meaning" of the middle voice. Thus on the basis of
his third category of verbs, Gonda suggests that the middle
verbs must be considered as "eventives", denoting that the
subject is in some way affected by the process, either to his
own advantage or as patient of the action and it is from this
latter that the passive voice develops.
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If Gonda*s proposals are acceptable on the basis of the
data from the Classical languages which he presents, his
hypothesis will not account for the data presented by
Hatcher (Hatcher, op. cit.). The situation in Latin is
more complex than that in other Indo-European languages,
as the middle voice has weakened leaving a vestigial
category of verbs called "deponents", (cf. Claflin, 1927*
Hatcher op. cit.) and at the same time, the history of Latin
shows the gradual development of the reflexive pronoun as
a marker of the middle voice (Hatcher op. cit. for a detailed
s tudy).
Hatcher divides verbs into two categories: firstly
those which denote "natural processes" and which typically
appear in the active voice and secondly verbs denoting
processes which are purposeful or directed towards some goal
(compare also Hill, 1969 and the verb types of Cupeno).
Hatcher says that with verbs of this second category, "no
longer is simple *activity» involved" (Hatcher, op. cit.: 15)-
This latter category of verbs will also contain verbs
describing actions which are unnatural or "induced". In
terms of these categories, consider the situation in Latin.
In the category of directed action, we find verbs of
natural phenomena, as Hatcher calls them, such as sequor
"to follow", loquor "to speak to". Verbs of emotion contrast
with the active voice when in the middle with regard to
whether the emotional state proceeds naturally out of the
subject, in which case it is active, or whether it is a
state into which the subject enters, marked by the middle,
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which parallels Gonda*s notion of eventive. Thus saevio
presents the subject as being of an angry disposition, while
irascor presents him as becoming angry. Likewise puto "to
think" is a natural faculty of the mind, contrasting with
meditor, which is "that into which one's whole self enters"
(Hatcher, op, cit.: 17). The difference corresponds
roughly to that between English think and think about.
Notice how in English the difference lies in the use of the
preposition.
The same relation between natural action and the active
voice on one hand and directed action and the middle on the
other is found also with motional verbs. Hatcher says that
with these verbs "the deponential idea of 'entering into' is
seen at its most intense". Notice also the occurrence of the
preposition in the English equivalences. Thus we find in
Latin proficiscor "to set out", aequor, "to follow after",
revertor "to turn around", orior "to rise up"s these
present the subject as involved rather than performing
according to Hatcher, a point which seems difficult to
reconcile with the idea of these being directed actions,
which links best with the view of the subject as an Agent
acting intentionally. The notion of directed action is
best seen with verbs of enjoying or profiting: utor "to use",
fruor "to enjoy" etc. Notice that these verbs, like most
middles which take an object, govern the ablative case in
Latin, and the dative case in Greek, i.e. those cases which
typically mark the instrument or, with verbs of movement of
objects or body-parts, those cases which mark the object
136.
moved.
One development of the Latin middle voice which aeerne
difficult to relate to the "eventive" meaning of this voice
recognised by Gonda is the formation of middle verbs based
on a nominal stem "referring to son© element of recognised
significance which conditions the activity of the subject.,
to represent the subject as involved in certain pursuits
or bcL^viour" (Hatcher, op. cit.: 21). Ihus we find poetor
"to be a poet, write poetry" (poeta "poet"), agriculor "to
cultivate land" (agricola "farmer"), cocionor "to be a
broker" (cocio "broker"), graecor "to live in the Greek
manner", naviculor "to sail in a small boat (navicula "small
boat").
A common element to a large number of middle verbs is
the idea of undergoing an experience, and it is from this
presumably that the passive use of the middle forms
developed. Hatcher argues that if laetor means that X
experience or go into a state of Joy, then it is a short
step to the formation of laeto which, having an active form,
means "X cause Joy". thus for verbs of natural phenomena
we find a contrast between an active and middle forms for
instance, Latin has two verbs translated into English as
"burn", the active form ardeo is used of flames while the
middle form incendor is used for example of a house which
is on fire.
Xf we consider all the different uses which scholars
have found for the middle, it is difficult to find one
generalisation which will give us a "core meaning for this
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voice. However, as already suggested, it is possible that
a more structurally based approach would be more fruitful.
One common element seems to be that the subject is the
location or goal of the action in some sense. Thus the
middle voice might be a simple marker of the identity of
reference tetween a subject and some other element in the
structure. Given a Localist treatment of aspect of the
form proposed by Anderson, (Anderson, 1973, see also Miller,
1972a on Russian) there will always be two co-referential
nouns, one the "subject" of the aspect predication and the
other the subject of the state or process predication which
can trigger the formation of the middle voice. That there
is a strong relationship between the middle voice and reflex-
ivisation cannot be denied. Vendryes (Vendryes, 1947)
tries to show that there is a formal relation between the
two not only in Latin, Greek and Sanskrit, but also in the
Celtic languages, both ancient and modern, and in the modern
Romance languages. Key (Key, 1874) cites examples showing
the same relationship from "Bohemian", Lithuanian, Swedish,
Danish and Lapp. That this is not a phenomenon restricted
to the Indo-European languages is shown by Velten (Velten,
1931) who cites Arabic, Finno-Ugrian and Turkish. Further
the idea of reflexive and the correlation between the middle
voice and the notion of the action or state being restricted
to the sphere of the subject or of the subject as location
or goal of the action ties in also with our using the term
"middle" for eat, run etc., verbs of body-movement.
Diffloth (Diffloth, 1974) makes essentially the same point:
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lie quotes from Benveniste (Benveniste* 1966) and makes
essential reference to tlie notion or the subject as
location of the process of an action in bis study of Semai
and reflexive verbs in Fronch. He notes further that such
a notion is not allowed for within the Transformational
Generative approach and we may add that it is more easily
and readily accommodated within a Localist approach to case
grammar*
The situation with respect to the middle in languages
which mark it with a reflexive pronoun presents us with a
problem* namely when are we to recognise the reflexive as
a fully functioning reflexive form and when as a middle
marker. Ruwet (Ruwet, 1972) opts for entering the middle
verbs in the lexicon with their associated reflexive
pronoun. However* this is merely a means of avoiding the
question of how to explain the middle voice and why a
reflexive pronoun is used instead of some other arbitrary
morpheme. We suggested above that the middle intoracts
with aspect and volition* We shall take up this point and
consider it in relation to Babcock*s discussion of Spanish
(Babcock* 1970) and to the brief discussion above in order
to see what light this may throw on English verbs of
movement•
(a) Babcock (Babcock* op. cit.) gives a clear presentation
of the facts about the middle voice in Spanish. The inter¬
action between the reflexive pronoun se and the notion of
starting-point of the subject's movement is of relevance.
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Tims consider the following:
147. Juan se volvio a casa
♦John returned home*
This sentence has the implication that John went home from
the place where the speaker is standing, while without the
reflexive pronoun there is no implication at all about
John*s starting-point. Similarly, if the source is overtly
marked in the sentence, then verbs of motion require se:
148a. Juan se va de Madrid
b. *Juan va de Madrid
•John left Madrid*
149a. Juan se cayo del arbol
b. *Juan cayo del arbol
♦John fell out of the tree*
Babcock notes that the grammarian Alonso refers to such uses
as "inceptive". The significant point seems to be that the
subject goes into an action or moves towards a goal, while
the sentence does not assert or necessarily imply that the
subject reaches the goal. A similar situation is found in
Modern French where s*approcher de "to approach" s♦en aller
"to leave, go away" express motion towards or away from,
while leaving it unspecified as to whether the goal is
reached or whether there is, in fact, such a goal. Accord¬
ing to Hatcher (Hatcher, op. cit.), this use of the reflexive
pronoun to mark going into a state or action was more
productive in Old French, (see also Bally, 1932: 324). A
further example of this rare aspectual use of the reflexive




b. II se meurt
where 150a would generally be translated as "He is dying"
while the second is better translated as "He is slowly
dying".
If we find what we may call an "inceptive" se in Spanish,
then we also find a "stative" Sjs. Under the heading of
"habitual mediopassive", Babeock discusses such sentences as:
151* Juan se epanta facilemente
• John frightens easily*
152. Se rasga el papel facileraente
•Paper tears easily*
153a. Se ven las montanas desde aqui
•The mountains can be seen from here*
b. Las montanas se ven desdeaqui
•The mountains are visible from here*
All of these sentences focus "on some inherent capacity of
the object" (Babcock, op. cit.: 44). She observes that
153a presupposes that there is a potential viewer, while
153b focuses on the visibility of the mountains "independently
of whether anyone sees them or not". A further general
property of Spanish appears to be that the order NP se V
usually corresponds to English Intransitive passives (cf.
frightens in 151) or "-able constructions".
Both of these uses of se have in common the fact that
the entering or location of a subject in a state is asserted
of the subject, whether the state be one of movement or
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habit. It seems that a Localist treatment similar to that
mentioned above based on Anderson's proposals (Anderson,
1973b) could handle the data and go some way to explaining
the occurrence of the reflexive pronoun. Thus the under¬
lying structure of 151 analysed in a Localist case grammar
could be paraphrased as something like "John is in a state
such that he frightens easily", where the embedded subject
surfaces as a reflexive pronoun. An analysis along similar
lines seems to be possible for Welsh passives s thus
154. Cafodd y bachgen ei rybuddio gan y dyn
Got the boy his warning by the man
•The boy was warned by the man1
where in this case we have a possessive pronoun occurs*^xs
the marker of the embedded object.
In her discussion of the Spanish verb irso "to go away"
(Babcock, op. cit.: 49) Babcock appears to be equating the
reflexive form s_e with the particle away of English. This
is interesting in the light of what was said above about
the occurrence of a preposition or particle in many of the
translations of the Latin middle verbs. That there might
be such a relation is not unexpected. Velten suggests
(Velten, 1931) that there is a close relation between aspect
and voice, specifically between the middle voice and durative
aspect, (compare Gonda'a "eventive" and "inceptive se").
Further it is known that the Germanic languages in general
continue the Indo-European trend towards marking aspect by
particles on the verb, and that English verbal compounds of
verb + particle are a reflex of this. Thus we might expect
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that there could be a relation between the use of reflexive
pronouns In the Romance languages and the particles of
English. However, the use of verb + particle as opposed to
the simple verb does not seem to carry the same aspectual
distinctions as those suggested for Spanish. Rather, the
particle seems more closely related to the notion of
completion of the action rather than to inceptives and is
also related to volition, that is the relation here seems
to be closer to Hatcher's idea of natural versus directed
action with the particle marking directed action,
(b) Fillmore, (Fillmore, 1971&)* in his discussion of
verbs of movement and verbs of manner, suggests that we need
to give the verb swim two different case frames depending
on whether it appears in such sentences as
155* John swam from noon till dusk
or
156. John swam from the beach to the buoy
In the first case we are dealing with a simple action, while
in the second we have a situation in which John intends
moving to the buoy and he does so by swimming to it, i.e.
a directed action. Notice, also, that, as remarked above,
Greek had both an active and middle for the verb Mto swim",
although it has not been possible to ascertain whether the
difference corresponded exactly to the action versus manner
of moving distinction found in English. However, we might
expect that, on the basis of our discussion of the middle
voice, there are syntactic reasons for distinguishing between
the two senses of the verb swim, specifically a reflexive
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pronoun would be possible with the manner of movement verb,
if it is a directed action. This is, in fact, the case,
although some speakers do not find the second sentence
fully acceptable:
137. *John swam himself in the lake all afternoon
138. John swam himself across the lake
Those speakers who will not accept 138 will, however,
accept the reflexive with a "more neutral" verb:
139. Get yourself back to bed this instance
The two senses of swim differ not only in the type of
locative phrase they will allow, i.e. in the lake (place
where) versus across the lake, to the buoy, (goal), but
also with regard to the type of adverb for an hour vs.
in an hour and their paraphrases in spend and take respect¬
ively (see Vendler, 1967 and further discussion below).
Fillmore suggests that the difference between the two
verbs swim can be captured by positing two different under¬
lying structures instead of having two different case
frames. The action verb swim will be the lexicalisation of
a simple predication of performing an action, while the
manner verb will lexicalise a structure like "by swimming
go" which derives from a complex predication of movement
containing a goal and manner adverb governing the verb swim
which has been incorporated into the main verb. The suggest¬
ion is of interest in relation to the observations above
concerning pairs like give help and help, which we suggested,
following Anderson (Anderson, 1971a), come from the same
underlying structure. Thus with the verb to help, we have
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a situation in which an object which moves and which under
certain circumstances could be marked by with is incorporated
into the verb (for incorporation see Gruber, 19^5 Nilsen,
1973)» while with the verb swim we have the case of an
Instrument under Fillmore's analysis i.e. "by swimming"
being incorporated into the main verb. The situations are
probably related, possibly on the grounds of the close
relation both diachronically and synchronically between
and with, both are historically locative prepositions which
have gone through the same development, i.e. locative,
comitative and instrumental uses (see 2.2.3.1. above) and
both can be used to mark location and instrumentality.
There is another similarity which depends on Haudry's
observation (Haudry, 1970) that certain objects are "le si&ge
du proces", they define the nature of the verbal action and
it is these objects which we have correlated with the
objects of do-vith-verbs, i.e. verbs like help: thus just
as the object defines the nature of giving and is
incorporated into the main verb to form help so the element
which is marked with a similar preposition is incorporated
into a movement predicate to produce the surface verb of
manner swim.
We referred above to Vendler (Vendler, 1967) and his
distinction between accomplishments and activities. This
distinction also corresponds to that noted by Fillmore
between the action verb and the manner verb. Vendler
distinguishes between the two types of verb by the following
tests:
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(i) as noted above activity verbs take for an hour
as their temporal adverb and accomplishments allow only
in an hour.
(ii) if one asserts that John stopped swimming in the
lake* then it is the case that at some point Johnwas
swimming in the lake. If, however, one asserts that John
stopped swimming across the lake, then it is the case that
John did not swim across the lake althou^i he may have been
swimming at some time.
(iii) Related to the above point is the fact that
accomplishment verbs can be the complement of the verb
finish, in the sense of "complete", while activity verbs
cannot: thus 160a is acceptable while l6ob is not:
l6oa. John finished writing the letter
b. ?John finished swimming in the lake
The important thing is that accomplishments "have a *climax*,
which has to be reached if the action is to be what it is
claimed to be" (Vendler, op. cit.: 100) and similarly "they
go on in time, but they proceed towards a terminus which
is logically necessary to their being what they are. Thus
letter-writing has a terminus, but swimming in the lake does
not."
This distinction between activity and accomplishment
also bears on our earlier discussion of the verbs like teach,
suggest, etc. (see 3.2.1. above). There we noted that
sentences like:
l6l. John taught Bill French
is vague as to whether Bill now knows French or not.
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Moreover, sentence 162a which has an animate subject (i.e.
an Agent potentially) can take for three months which marks
it as an activity, while l62b cannot so that it is an
accomplishment sentence:
l62a. John taught Mary that the world is a cruel
place for three months
b. *L±fe taught Mary that the world is a cruel
place for three months
The situation is readily explained in terms of the activity-
accomplishment distinction, in that an Agent can perform
both activities and accomplishments, i.e. John can do a
series of actions which are called "teaching French" and
he can also do something to Bill which involves the
activity of "teaching French and also Bill's learning
French, but with a Force as subject only an accomplishment
reading is possible. Thus only animate beings perform
activities, Forces do not. We could handle this situation
by extending the analysis proposed by Fillmore, such that
the accomplishment verb will always have two predications,
one of result e.g. "John is across the lake", "Bill knows
French" and one which we may term manner e.g. "John swam",
"John teaches French". Notice, that the activity reading
is more likely with the animate object marked by the pre¬
position to;
I63. John taught French to Bill
and this difference between 163 and 162a and 161 seems to
parallel the difference between:
164a. John loaded hay onto the cart
b. John loaded the cart with hay
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that is the direct object corresponding ~to the prepositional
phrase is more to be affected by the action, to be in a
state resulting from the action. We return to these verbs
below (see Chapter 5) but see also Anderson (Anderson,
1976) and Green (Green, 1974).
We have also suggested that verb + particle compounds
in English seem to be closely related to volition and
accomplishment. Bolinger (Bolinger, 1971) considers the
feature of intentionality to be a widespread property of
such phrasal verbs as opposed to their non-phrasal counter¬
parts. While the distinction is not absolute, i.e. it is
not the case that non-phrasal verbs and non-volitional and
that phrasal verbs always have this feature, in general an
intentional reading will be more likely with the phrasal
verb. Thus to think that X is not necessarily a matter of
volition, but to think about X implies conscious effort on
the subject's part. Similarly while
165a. John broke the desk
is likely to be viewed as an .accident
165b. John broke up the desk
will be viewed as an intentional act. This may be related
to the fact that the particle expresses thoroughness or
completeness which may generally be looked on as a consequence
of doing something intentionally.
Bolinger (Bolinger, op. cit.) also discusses the aspect¬
ual nature of phrasal verbs. While certain verbs do have
an iterative or durative aspect, turn out, grind out, carry
on, keep on etc., it is more common for the phrasal verb to
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emphasise the completion of* the act, shrivel up, blacken up,
follow up, gather up, yield up, close up. The important
point, however, is that phrasal verbs allow an analysis
which is in keeping with what we have suggested for verbs
of accomplishment, i.e. an analysis into two underlying
predicates, one of movement, the other of manner. Thus
chop down is possibly "cause something to become down by
chopping", throw out could be "cause something to become out
by throwing". Thus the particle may be treated as the
expression of the goal of the movement. Such an analysis
will also generalise to verbal compounds like cut open,
chop free, which could be derived from "open by cutting" and
"free by chopping", which would also help to explain why the
adjective occurs in the same positions as the particle of
phrasal verbs:
166a. John looked the reference up
b. John looked up the reference
167a. Homblower chopped free the shattered mizzen mast
b. Hornblower chopped the shattered mizzen mast free
3.2.5. DO and CAUSE
We have already suggested that we need to posit two
predicates, namely DO and CAUSE, correlated with Agent as
subject and Force as subject respectively. Discussion of
the reasons and implications of this proposal will bring to
light further facts about verbs, objects and direct and
indirect causation.
In positing two predicates we immediately reject Lee*s
proposals (Lee, 1971a) which involves treating the verb with
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Agent subjects as simplex, and the verb with Forces as
subject as the lexicalisation of the structure containing
CAUSE plus another predicate. As already shown, there are
inadequacies with his treatment on the semantic level.
Moreover, he admits himself that he cannot iccan»vt- f-ov
the intuitively felt relationship between, for example,
cause to die and kill (Lee, op. cit. : 113). In his
conclusion, Lee suggests that the problems with his analysis
may be helped if he posited a further predicate which he
represents as AGENTIZE, although he makes no more
explicit proposals. He observes that if kill is not
decomposable with an Agent subject, then he cannot explain
why all by-clauses are essentially the same. Thus without
lexical decomposition, it becomes a mere coincidence that
by occurs with method and causative by-clauses, that they
are both treated as manner adverbials and that they occur
in the same sentence positions.
If we do have two predicates DO and CAUSE, then we
might expect there to be some systematic relations between
them and the surface forms do and cause. Thus wo might
consider what facts we are associating with these predicates
and see if the same is also true of the occurring surface
forms. By setting up the predicate DO we wish to account
for the correlations between Agents, direct objects or
Patients, Benefactives and expressions of purpose. Thus v®
allow DO to take as dependent elements Agents, Patients,
Benefactives and purpose expressions while CAUSE does not.




l68a. ?John caused his horse to mount a knoll
b. John made his horse mount a knoll
that is, cause does not readily take Agents as subject;
such sentences seem to have a slightly stilted or archaic
feel about them.
(b) direct objects are marked by to (see 3.2.3. above).
Thus while it is odd to ask 169a, 169b is acceptable;
169a. *What did you __ . cause to him?
your efforts
l69b• What did you do to him?
(c) Purpose; do will allow Benefactives and purpose
expressions while cause will not.
170. John tcfuoed " '°r Mar*
However, it seems that we need to modify the claim that DO
and CAUSE take Agents and Forces respectively, since we find
such sentences as;
171a. What the bullet did was smash John's collar-bone
b. What did the bullet do to John?
Thus we find a Force occurring as the subject of the surface
verb do, which disconfirms our claim. As we shall see
below (see Chapter 4), the difference between DO and CAUSE
is better handled in terms of direct and indirect causation,
in which case the above sentences are not counter-examples
since they involve direct causation. However, we shall
need to modify the treatment of DO (see below Chapter 4)»
Of greater interest are the implications of DO and CAUSE
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for tae form of the grammar. If such a position is to be
held, then we need to show that the arguments found in the
literature against Lexical Decomposition are not valid.
In fact, we shall try to show that such arguments not only
do not refute Lexical Deconposition but, in general, are a
K,$
source of data which can be semi are strengthening and
extending the hypothesis. We shall survey the arguments
in chronological order and see what implications each might
have for our discussion of direct and indirect causation,
(a) Podor
Podor (Podor, 1970) seems to be the first to question
the general validity of the Lexical Decomposition Hypothesis
on the basis of syntactic arguments. We deal below with the
general outlines of his arguments which bear directly on our
concerns: for a discussion of his article and its more
general implications see Bedell (Bedell, 1974). Podor
raises three arguments which are "fairly decisive against
the transformational analysis of verbs like melt and kill"
(Podor, op. cit.: 437). The form of the arguments is
essentially dependent on counter-examples and the crucial
part of the argument, i.e. the careful working-out of all
the implications of the counter-examples to show that no
form of the initial hypothesis is tenable, is lacking in
each case. We wish to show that such an endeavour leads
to the conclusion that the transformational analysis is
possible and useful in the description of English.
The first argument is directed at the analysis proposed
for kill rather than melt, since it does not apply to this
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latter verb, a point which Fodor does not consider, and
depends on the do eo-tranaformation. Fodor observes,
following Lakoff (Lakoff, 1970) who first proposed the
transformational analysis, that 172a and 172b are acceptable:
172a. John caused Mary to die and it surprised me that
she did so
b. John caused Mary to die and it surprised me that
he did so
which would be expected if cause Mary to die in 162b and
to die are constituents of the deep structure which can
serve as controllers for the do so-transformation. However,
under the transformational analysis, the same two strings
will be constituents of the underlying structure and are
thus available to serve as controllers of the transformation.
However, 173a is unacceptable
173a. *John killed Mary and it surprised me that she
did so
b. John killed Mary and It surprised me that he did
so
The unacceptability of 173a. Fodor takes to be evidence that
there is no constituent to die in its underlying structure.
The argument is not fully satisfactory, since not only
does Fodor not to on to show that there is no way of saving
the hypothesis but he omits to consider the full implications
of the sentence with melt. Thus corresponding to 173a and
173b we have:
174a. John melted the glass and it surprised me that
it did so
b. John melted the glass and it surprised me that
he did, so
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Here the acceptability of l?4a suggest that there is a
constituent to melt in the underlying structure which can
serve as controller. Lakoff and Ross (Lakoff and Ross,
1972) and following then Eisenberg (Eisenberg, 1973) who
provides more data, argue that the difference in acceptability
is due to the surface structure identity of the transitive
and intransitive verb melt which makes 174a acceptable,
while 173a is xxnacceptable since die and kill differ. Thus
it is a question of recoverability of underlying structure,
with melt it is readily recovered, but this is not the case
with kill.
Fodor*s second argument depends on the non-acceptability
of sentences like 175b as opposed to the acceptable 175a:
175a. John caused the glass to melt on Sunday by heating
it on Saturday
b. *John melted the glass on Sunday by heating it on
Saturday
Under the transformational analysis both sentences have the
same underlying structure. Podor rightly observes that, to
uphold the transformationalist analysis, "something will
have to be done to prevent the transformation (i.e.
predicate-raising) from acting on 18 (our 175&) to produce
19 (our 175b)n (Podor, op. cit. : 432) and suggests that if
this is done in terms of "adverb matching", we would be
dealing with a condition on transformations which is without
precedent.
Counter-argument by appeal to the lack of precedent
within the theory is itself a dubious tactic, since it
depends on the prior assumption that the theory is not open
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to question and modification, that it is perfectly adequate.
However, if such a tactic were admissible, Fodor*s use of it
is not detrimental to Lexical Decomposition. His suggested
solution is essentially that proposed by Fillmore (Fillmore,
1971a see also Seuren, 1974). Thus in 175& we are dealing
with separate events, each of which has its own time and
place while being linked by a causal connection. "If either
of the clauses designating these two separate events has its
own time and place co-ordinates specified, by being separ¬
ately embedded to occur, the conflation is not possible"
(Fillmore, op. cit. : 50). However, conflation is possible
if "the event-chain sentence is left intact and embedded as
a whole to the higher verb which assigns location in space
and time". Thus Predicate-Raising could be blocked by only
allowing Raising of a verb into the immediately dominating
predication. The occurrence of an OCCUR-predication in
175b will block this Raising to produce the transitive
verb. We shall return to this suggestion below to see how
it can be made more precise (see Chapter k).
Fodor's third argument depends on the necessary co-
reference of the subject of an instrumental manner adverb
with some higher subject. Thus, in accord with the trans¬
formational analysis, 176a is acceptable:
176a. John caused Bill to die by swallowing his toneue
that is, the one who swallows the tongue can be either John
or Bill since both appear as subject of a sentence. However,
the transformational analysis predicts the same ambiguity
for 176b
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17^b. John killed Bill by swallowing bis tongue
and tbis is not tbe case, since only Jobn can be understood
as tbe subject of* tbe manner adverbial. From tbis, Fodor
concludes tbat Bill is not the subject of any verb in tbe
deep structure of 176b. All that it really shows is that
at the point where tbe subject of tbe manner adverb is
deleted Bill is not a subject: it does not show tbat it was
never a subject.
Fodor suggests tbat we might be able to save tbe
situation if we add a constraint to Predicate—Raising such
tbat it is blocked if tbe embedded verb is modified by an
instrumental adverb. Notice tbat such a constraint would
generalise to tbe situation described in tbe second argument
to avoid tbe necessity of introducing tbe OCOJR-predication,
tbat is, Predicate-Raising is blocked if the verb is
modified by an adverb. Ibis point Fodor fails to notice.
Fodor points out tbat such a constraint cannot be a "wholesale
prohibition against Predicate-Raising modified embedded
verbs" (Fodor, op. cit.: 436) since it would also block the
derivation of 177a from 177b:
177a. John cooked tbe meat slowly
b. Jobn caused tbe meat to cook slowly
and 177a does have tbe two readings predicted. Notice that,
in fact, tbeexample could be explained by Lakoff and Ross*
proposals (Lakoff and Ross, op. cit.), in that tbe transitive
and intransitive verbs are morphologically identical.
We can begin to give a fuller answer to Fodor•s
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counter-arguments to the Lexical Decomposition hypothesis
by referring back to the constraint on the subject of
instrumental adverbs, namely that they must be co-referential
with a higher subject. This will show also why it is that
Miller (Miller, 1972a) suggests that "a more subtle analysis
in terras of 'direct' and 'indirect* causation is required11#
This in conjunction with Lakoff and Ross* proposals will
allow us to account for the counter-examples in a mannei*
which is consonant with Fodor's own proposals and with those
of Fillmore.
In fact, to claim that the subject of an instrumental
adverbial must be co-referential with another subject is a
weak form of the constraint. We have seen that the under¬
lying subject of a method by-clause must be an Agent, just
as the subject of the higher clause is an Agent (see our
discussion of Lee above 3*1*6.). In these terms let us
look again at 176b above.
The by-clause is the method used by the Agent John and
the subject i.e. Agent of the action, of the embedded clause
is also John. Further the sentence describes direct
causation. In the corresponding decomposed form 176a, the
by-clause either marks the cause of Bill's death or it is a
true method clause. In the former case ws have two
possibilities, either John swallowed the tongue or Bill did:
in the former case the structure could also surface as
178. John's swallowing his tongue caused Bill to die
so that in this case the by-clause in 176a would be a
causative clause and would modify cause: if Bill does the
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swallowing then the by-clause is again causative but now
modifies die. In this case we have indirect causation, the
Agent subject of the matrix sentence not being co-referential
with the subject of the by—clause and thus not acting directly
on Bill. Thus again we find the noticn of intervening
Agent or Cause relevant to direct causation. Such an
intervening Agent or Cause blocks the contiguity of the two
events so that they cannot be treated as one complex event.
Likewise having different temporal or locative adverbs
blocks contiguity of events so that we have two simplex
events in 175a.
As they stand the proposals are vague and inexplicit,
but we shall be able to make more concrete suggestions whsn
we have considered the arguments which Shibatani (Shibatani,
1972, 1973a, 1973b) uses against Decomposition and a more
detailed treatment will be made in the next chapter.
However, the general trend of the above suggestions is that
Predicate-Raising should be blocked just in case the Agents
of the matrix sentence and the by-clause are not co-referential
and the temporal and locative adverbs modifying the two
events are not identical.
(b) Shibatani
Shibatani (Shibatani, 1973a) first makes some observ¬
ations on causative constructions in Japanese. He firstly
observes that in sentences like:
179. Taroo ga Ziroo o hasir-ase-ta
'Teroo caused Ziroo to run*
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180. Taroo ga Ziroo o tomar-aaae-ta
'Taroo caused Ziroo to stop*
(where -aase and -ase are the causative suffixes) the subject
of the embedded sentence must be something with its own
volition, that is essentially an Agent. Thus a sentence
with enzin "engine" or razio "radio" as subject of the
embedded sentence is unacceptable:
181. *Taroo ga •nzfn 0 tomar-sase-taB razio
*Taroo caused the on®*-ne stopradio *
However, these sentences can be acceptable if they are
understood as meaning that the Agent used some unnatural
means to stop the engine. Thus in both cases we have some
intervening entity between the Agent** causing an event and
the occurrence of the event, in the first case we have some
other Agent, in the second we have some intervening entity
between the Agent's causing an event and the occurrence of
the event, in the first case we have some other Agent, in
the second we have some non-natural method. It is interest¬
ing to note that other verbs which can appear in the embedded
sentence which would not be classified as asserting volition
of their subjects are verbs like "bloom", "rot", "shine
"die", which in the Indo-European languages were translated
as middle verbs and Shibatani characterises these verbs as
being ones whose subject "has the potential to initiate the
process", alternatively the process does not take place
outside the subject's sphere, it is located within it.
Secondly, the subject of the embedded sentence cannot
be co-referential with the subject of the higher causative:
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182. -R-Taroo ga zibun o aruk-aae-ta
•Taroo caused himself to walk1
(where zibun is the reflexive pronoun). This would be com¬
patible with our suggestion above that Predicate-Raising is
dependent on identity of the two Agents. In such circum¬
stances its application is obligatory, and 182 is unaccept¬
able since it has not applied. Thirdly, Shibatani observes
that there are two possible markers for the subject of the
embedded sentence, o and nit
183. Taroo ga Ziroo ik-ase-ta
•Taroo caused Ziroo to go'
The o-causative involves more direct, "coercive" causation
than the ni-causa tive
184. Taroo ga tegami de sizi o s-i-te Ziroo Tokyo
e ik-ase-ta
Taroo SM (by instructing him by letter) Ziroo OM
Tokyo to cause-go-past
•Taroo caused Ziroo to go to Tokyo by instrueting
him to by letter*
Thus, when the causation is indirect, as in letter-writing,
ni is the acceptable form. The reverse holds with adverbs
like "forcibly" which imply direct causation and require the
o-causative. Soga (Soga, 1970) characterises the difference
between the two causatives in terms of the intentions of the
embedded subject, which is in keeping with Shibatani•a
comment that the relevant point seems to be that in the
ni-causative the person operated on performs some action,
while in the o-causative he is "in the state of being a
patient" (Shibatani, op. cit.: 354). But, notice that again
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we have a distinct Agent in the embedded sentence and
Predicate-Raising does not apply. Moreover, if it is the
case that Predicate-Raising is blocked if the two Agents are
not co-referential, then we would expect that there will be
no sentence with a lexical causative, it3elf the result of
Predicate-Raising, where the object or Patient of the action
is marked with ni_ and this is, in fact, the case:
185. Taroo ga Ziroo
o torne-ta
'Taroo stopped Ziroo•
Shibatani concludes that the transformational analysis cannot
be accepted since restriction would be needed on the rule of
Predicate-Raising, but he does not frame these restrictions
in terms of identity of Agents, which does provide the
necessary unifying principle.
Other arguments which Shibatani brings against the
Lexical Decomposition hypothesis depend on the presence of
some ambiguity in the affixal causative (what he calls the
"productive" causative) which is not present in the corres¬
ponding "lexical"causative. The first piece of evidence
comes from the behaviour of soo su-ru "do so". Thus in 186:
186. Taroo ga Ziroo o tomar-are—ru to Flanako mo soo
s-i-ta
*When Taroo made Ziroo stop, Hanako did so too*
soo s-i-ta means either that Hanako also made Ziroo stop, or
that Hanako also stopped. A similar ambiguity, based on the
fact that there are two Agentive clauses which can function
as controller in the underlying structure, is to be found
with the following:
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187. Boku wa musuko o gakkoo ni nokor-saee-ta, Hanako mo
see su-ta
X son school at stay-cause-past
•X made my son stay at school, and so did Hanako*
188. Boku wa musuko o heya ni hair-sase-ta, suna to
Hanako mo soo su-ta
*8 made my son enter the room, and so did Hanako*
However, in sentences which contain lexical causatives like:
189. Taroo ga Ziroo o tome-ru to Hanako mo soo s—i-ta
*When Taroo stopped Ziroo. Hanako did so too*
aoo s-i-ta can only mean that Hanako stopped Ziroo also.
Likewise there is only one reading for:
190. Boku wa musuko o gakkoo ni nokos—ta. sunato Hanako
mo soo su—ta
*1 left my son at school and so did Hanako*
Shibatani says that such sentences argue against an embedded
structure in lexical causative©, since otherwise this
embedded structure would be available as the controller of
the Japanese form of the do so-transformation of English.
However, the data would be consistent with any analysis which
requires that Predicate-Raising be blocked if the two Agents
are not identical. In 186 we have two Agents and thus two
Agentive verbs and these Agents are not identical. Thus
the sentence is ambiguous since there are two underlying
Agents to which the do-so-transformation may apply.
However, in 189 there is no Agent in the embedded sentence,
thus there is also no Agentive verb and no controller for
the do-so-transformation. Since the embedded sentence doss
not contain an Agent, Predicate-Raising can apply to produce
189. This will account for the lack of ambiguity.
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Shibatani*s argument is not conclusive and the data equally
supports our suggestions in terms of identity of Agents.
A second argument depends on the syntactic properties
of the Japanese reflexive pronoun zibun which combined with
the possessive affix no means "one's own". The Japanese
reflexive must be commanded by a subject, so that there is
no-ambiguity in the following sentence:
191. Boku wa Taroo ni zibun no hon o yar-ta
•I gave Taroo my book*
There is only one subject and so only one possible owner of
the book. With affixal causatives we would expect there
to be an ambiguity with respect to the reference of zibun
if there is an embedded sentence with a subject:
192. Taroo ga Hanako o zibun no heya ni hair-ase-ta
*Taroo made Hanako go into his/her room*
Thus both Taroo and Hanako were subjects at some point so
that they could control zibun. However, with the lexical
causative corresponding to 192 then Hanako can only go into
Taroo*s room:
193. Taroo ga Hanako o zibun no heya ni ire-ta
His
•Taroo put Hanako into _ own room*r *her
From this Shibatani concludes there is no underlying sentence
in 193 which has Hanako as subject. However, the data merely
shows that at the point where reflexivisation takes place
there is 110 sentence containing Hanako as subject, it does
not show there is never such a sentence in the underlying
structure.
Shibatani constructs a similar argument based on the
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lack of ambiguity of lexical causatives with adverbials.
Thus, as one example, consider the adverb isoi-de "hastily":
194. Taroo wa Ziroo o isoi-de tomar-sase-ta
for which Shibatani pives the following translations:
195a. Taroo hastily made Ziroo stop
b. Taroo made Ziroo stop hastily
However, for the corresponding lexical causative
196. Taroo wa Ziroo o isoi-de tome-ta
•Taroo stopped Ziroo hastily*
the adverb relates to Taroo*s action and not to Ziroo*s
subsequent stopping. Again there seems to be no reason why
such facts should not be interpreted in the same way as the
other arguments which Shibatani brings against Lexical
Decomposition. Thus "hastily" is an adverb modifying an
Agentive verb, i.e. one taking an Agent as subject. Xn 194
we have two such Agentive verbs and thus a possible
ambiguity; in 196 we have only one Agentive verb and thus
only one possible element which the adverb can modify.
Further since the lower sentence does not contain an Agent,
Predicate-Raising applies automatically to produce the
lexical causative.
In a later work (Shibatani, 1973b), Shibatani takes
examples based on the same presence versus absence of
ambiguity from Korean and the same counter-arguments are
possible, namely that the relevant facts can be explained in
terms of the restriction on the rule of Predicate-Raising if
there are two non-co—referential Agents. Xn this way we
can account for the application of the rule when the Agents
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are co-referential (see example 182 above) and when there is
no Agent in the embedded sentence. Thus, there is evidence
from English and Japanese which suggests that Lexical
Decomposition can be saved from the counter-examples adduced
by Podor and Shibatani. The situation is strengthened by
the fact that this will be done in essentially the same
fashion for the examples from both languages.
A further point is that j>ur suggestion in terms of
identity of Agents would help to account for the observations
that lexical causatives and affixal or productive causatives
differ with regard to direct and indirect causation (Miller,
1972a) and with regard to proximity versus non-proximity of
the cause and effect (Fillmore, 1971a, Haas, 1973, Kastovsky,
1973). We shall return to these proposals to see how they
may be given concrete realisation in the grammar below (see
Chapter 4)»
Before finishing our discussion of Shibatani«s counter¬
arguments, two points should be made. Firstly, McCawley
(McCawley, 1972) had noted that a restriction on Predicate-
Raising in terms of non-identity of Agents would save the
rule from many of the counter-arguments. Secondly, in a
more recent work (Shibatani,1975) Shibatani notes that
making Predicate-Raising a pre-cyclic rule will also account
for his counter-arguments (for more on this position see
Newmeyer, 1974 and Aissen, 1974).
(c) Two counter-argumentsi one reply
One counter-argument which is common to much of the
opposition to Lexical Decomposition concerns the non-synonymy
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of show and cause to see in certain circumstances, a non-
synonymy which cannot be accounted for if there is the same
underlying structure for both. Haas (Haas, 1973) notes
that the following "has an air of paradox":
197. Not realising that Bill was blind, I showed him
the pictures
but it is "not nearly so bad as 1 caused him to see the
pictures" (Haas, op. cit.: 290). A similar situation holds
with the following sentences:
198. John showed hill the pictures so fast that he
couldn't see them
199. *John caused Bill to see the pictures so fast
that he couldn't see them
However, such sentences could be used to argue against the
inadequacy of the CAUSE SEE analysis of show rather than
the inadequacy of Lexical Decomposition itself. The major
point that needs to be taken into consideration is that we
need to distinguish between activities and accomplishments
(see Vendler 1967 and discussion above (3.2.4.))• Thus in
197 and 198 we are dealing with activities, and an activity
does not entail that there is any goal attained, so that
John can show pictures without any successful seeing by a
second party.
Krishnamurti (Krishnamurti, 1971) reports that Lakshiai
Bai (Lakshmi Bai, 1970) uses the same form of argument based
on facts from Indian languages: thus the following sentence
is taken to show that "feed" cannot be equated with CAUSE EAT:
200. Man© bacceko khana khilaya, phir bacca nahi khaya
•The mother fed the child, but the child did not eat*
166.
Krishnamurti replies to this argument in essentially the same
terms as used above, but instead of activity he talks of
"agent orientation" and instead of accomplishment he uses
"object orientation". Thus we can relate these facts to a
distinction which Vendler makes on independent grounds.
Thus we can distinguish between two types of structure, one
containing an activity predication and a dependent pre¬
dication of purpose, i.e. DO in order that X SEES and the
accomplishment predication which expresses a causal relation
between an activity and a result of X SEEING. We give more
concrete expression to these ideas below (see Chapter k)•
The second argument against Lexical Decomposition which
can be answered in essentially the same way is found in
Kac's paper on action and result (Kac, 1972). Notice that
Kac»s terms "action" and "result" refer to the same pheno¬
mena as activity versus accomplishment and agent versus
object orientation. In fact, Kac argues that the very fact
that we need to make this distinction constitutes a good
argument against Lexical Decomposition.
Kac begins by observing that the following sentence is
not three-ways ambiguous as claimed by Morgan and McCawley
(Morgan, 1969, McCawley, 1971)
201. John almost killed Bill
Kac claims that his informants only detect the ambiguity
between the reading on which John almost did something which
counts as an act of killing and on which John actually did
something but that act did not count as a successful killing
of Bill. The contested three-way ambiguity of 201 is used
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by Morgan and McCawley to support the presence of three
predications in the underlying structure of the sentence,
so that either CAUSE, BECOME or BE can be modified by the
adverb almost. Kac's informants do not detect the ambiguity
between the sentence where almost modifies BECOME and where
it modifies BE. However, there is still the two-way
ambiguity to be explained. Before considering Kac's
further study of this, there is a related point to be made:
some speakers do detect a three-way ambiguity, but one which
does not tally with the structure proposed, rather it better
corroborates McCawley*s modified structure (McCawley, 1972)
which contains a DO-predication above the CAUSE-predication.
Thus there are the possible readings (i) John almost did
something, (ii) John did something e.g. threw a brick at
Bill but did not affect Bill, the stone missed (iii) John
did something which did affect Bill but didnot kill him,
i.e. the stone only severely wounded him. Kjac does not
discuss such ambiguities; granted his informants did not
recognise them, but there is still the problem of what to do
about those speakers who do recognise them.
Returning to Kac«s discussion, if there is an ambiguity
in 201,then it seems to be the case that it is not always
present and it is not present at all with the verb murder:
202. John almost murdered Fred
203. John fired the bullet at Fred, coming so close
that he almost kill®d him
♦murdered
204. The bullet almost killed Fred
Of 203 Kac observes: "There is no obvious principle that
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would suggest that the presence of additional information
about premeditation, however represented, ought to affect
the scope possibilities of almost" (Kac, op. cit.: 120).
However, this is just not the case: there is an obvious
principle, based on the fact that premeditation is involved,
i.e. we have an Agent. We have already noted that with a
Force as subject a verb can only have an accomplishment
reading, while with an Agent it can have either an accomplish¬
ment or activity reading, (see 3.2.4* above). Thus with an
Agent as subject, almost can modify either the activity
predication or the accomplishment predication, but with a
Force it can only modify the accomplishment predication,
thus explaining the non-ambiguity of 204* Sentence 203
is slightly different, since here we are dealing with a
verb which requires an Agent acting intentionally:
205* *The bullet murdered Bill
206. ?John accidentally murdered Bill
Thus 203 is unacceptable with murder since it requires an
Agent and is thus an Activity or Accomplishment verb. Kac
introduces the "action-result dichotomy" (Kac, op. cit.:
121) to account for the distinction, but this, in fact,
corresponds to Vendler»s activity-accomplishment terms.
However, our analysis above differs from that of Kac»s in
characterising the distinction in terms of Agents and Forces,
which is linked to the activity-accomplishment distinction.
Kac is in favour of narking verbs in the lexicon as +Result
or +Action and "interpreting almost-V strings according to
the way in which V is specified" (Kac, op. cit.: 121).
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Notice that having only the two features, there is no
accounting for those speakers who find a three-way ambiguity
in sentences like 201.
However, the disturbing fact about Kac's paper is the
conclusion which he draws from the action-result, activity-
accomplishment distinction, since he asserts that the
ambiguity of j
207. It surprised me that John killed Bill
"has no accounting whatsoever in the cause-to—become-not—
alive analysis, since there is no element like almost whose
scope can vary". Leaving aside the question of whether
this sentence is, in fact, ambiguous between the reading
on which the surpriso is caused by John's doing such a
thing and that on which it is caused by Bill's death, an
ambiguity which some speakers do not detect, Kac's form of
argumentation is not convincing: thus while Fodor's style
of argument is argument—by-counter-examples without showing
that all the implications of the counter—example are
unacceptable, Kac's form of argument is difficulties and
counter-examples in current practice imply that the treatment
is impossible in principle. That is, while the current
proposals for the treatnent of causatives may find 207
problematical, this by no means entails that no transform¬
ational treatment of 207 is possible which gives a well-
motivated analysis. In fact, we already have the beginnings
of such a reply, since if it is the case, as Kac claims,
that the ambiguity is predicted by the action-result
analysis, then it should also be the case that the
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corresponding activity-accomplishment analysis, which is
formulatable in a transformational analysis, also predicts
the ambiguity.
There still remains the question of the difference
between a predicational analysis and the feature analysis
of Kac, that is, is it the case that they are notatioual
variants? As McCawley in his reply to Kac remarks
(McCawley, 1972) Kac makes use of features whose status in
Linguistic Theory has never been made certain. However, a
feature analysis must, by its very nature, treat as
unrelated facts the marking of the verb us optionally
+Result, the fact that it has certain characteristics all
of which it shares with the verb cause and the marking of
this latter verb as +Result. A generalisation can be
captured in a non-arbitrary fashion by removing the feature
and deriving all those verbs formerly marked as ^Result
from a structure containing CAUSE: all the characteristics
formerly attributed to +Result will now be attributed to
CAUSE.
Thus again the supposed arguments against Lexical
Decomposition are not arguments against the principle of
Lexical Decomposition. Rather they serve to show the
inadequacies of current proposals and thus serve as means of
strengthening our earlier claims. It is not the case that
Lexical Decomposition has so far been shown to be unaccept¬
able in any form.
(d) Cruse
Cruse (Cruse, 1972) makes a two-pronged attack on the
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hypothesis of Lexical Decomposition, in that firstly he
shows that there are systematic differences between "covert"
causatives i.e. kill, melt, break etc. and the "overt",;
causatives with the lexical item cause and secondly he tries
to show that the causative analysis of teach is untenable.
We shall take these two arguments in this order and show
how they are inconclusive as an attempt to refute Lexical
Decomposition.
The non-synonymy of overt and covert causatives may
not be itself an argument against Lexical Decomposition,
rather, as we have already suggested for other cases, it
may merely show that current formulations are at fault.
Cruse observes that the differences in meaning "seem to
correlate with certain semantic features carried by the
surface object of the covert causative" (Cruse, op. cit.t
521). He treats causatives in three categories. Firstly
he considers cases where the object of the causative is
agentive, as in:
208. John galloped the horse around the field
209. John marched the men round the yard
210. John worked the men hard
All these sentences involve a similar type of causation,
which involves a human being who "transmits his will to an
obedient, but independent agent" (Cruse, op. cit.: 521).
He further notes that if any of the four conditions on the
covert causative is not fulfilled, then the covert causative
is unacceptable whereas the overt causative is not:
(i) the causer must be human
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211. *The flood marched the men further north
212. The flood caused the men to march further north
(ii) the transmission of the will of the causer must be
effective
213. ?John inarched the men, who did not understand his
orders, across the yard
214. John caused the men, who did not understand his
orders, to march across the yard
(iii) the object must be obedient
215. *John galloped the horse, which was totally
unresponsive to his commands, across the field
216. John caused the horse, which was totally
unresponsive to his commands to gallop across the
field
Cruse does not note that if 215 were acceptable it would
not necessarily mean the same as 216, the former involves
John actually riding the horse while the latter does not.
(iv) the object must be an agent
217. *John flew the sparks
218. John caused the sparks to fly
Cruse characterises this first type of causation as
"causation by command".
A second type of causation, which Cruse calls "causation
by direct action", is found with verbs like move, break, mslt,
turn etc. where the surface Agent must operate directly on
the object and in terms of this he explains the unacceptability
of the covert causative with objects like reflection:
219a. *John moved the reflection
b. John caused the reflection to move
220a. *john turned the shadow
b. John caused the shadow to move
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since such entities are not susceptible to direct manipul¬
ation. He goes on to make the same point that we made
with regard to the further characterisation of direct
causation in terms of the lack of an intervening Agent.
Thus 221a and 222a are unacceptable with covert causatives
while their overt causative counter-parts are perfectly
acceptable since there is an intervening Agent:
221a, *john opened the door by persuading Bill to turn,
the handle and push
b. John brought it about that the door opened by
persuading Bill to turn the handle and push
222a. *John opened all the doors in the street by
shouting "Fire".
b. John brought it about that all the doors opened
in the street by shouting "Fire"
However, speakers of English do seem to accept 221a and 222a
if it is the case that John wished to open the door or
doors and deliberately chose this means of doing it, that
is, the action described in the by-clause must be goal-
orientated.
Cruse1s third category seems to belong rather to the
second mentioned above, but he describes it in terms of the
relation between the covert causative and the corresponding
"(surface) intransitive verbs", namely there is no single
lexical item which functions as an intransitive verb, rather
it is of the form become + Adjective, e.g. annoy-become
annoyed, anger-become angry, frighten-become frightened etc.
Again, the overt and covert causatives are not synonymous
according to Cruse:
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223a. John frightened Mary by giving her an injection
of a new drug
b. John caused Mary to become afraid by giving her
an injection of a new drug
224a. John annoyed Mary by giving her an injection of
the new drug
b. John caueed Mary to become annoyed by giving
her an injection of the new drug
The difference between 223a and 223b lies in what actually
causes the fear, in the former it is the action of giving
an injection which is the cause, while in the latter it is
the property of the drug as a fear-inducing drug which
elicits the fear. Although Cruse wishes to treat this as
an independent category on the grounds that it involves
neither "causation by command" nor "causation by direct
physical action" and should therefore be termed "causation
of emotion", two facts argue for including this type in the
category of direct action. Notice that just as 222a is
unacceptable under certain circumstances since there is an
intervening Agent, so 223a and 224a are understood as
direct causation. 222b does, however, involve an inter¬
vening Agent and is an overt causative, just as 223b and
224b are overt causatives und involve an intervening
Agent or Force, namely the drug which actually causes the
fear or annoyance. Secondly, just as 222a is acceptable
if John chooses this particular method to achieve his ends,
223a is also acceptable if we interpret it as describing
a situation in which John wishes to make Mary afraid and
chooses to do this by administering a drug with the required
properties. Thus verbs of causation of Cruse1b third
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category appear to behave just as they would if they were
verbs of the second category.
Thus, believing that he lias set up three categories of
causation. Cruse observes that we could not save Lexical
Decomposition by positing an abstract predicate CAUSE and
claiming that it differs from cause "in whatever ways are
necessary to account for the differences between overt and
covert causatives" (for a similar argument see Partee,
1971), since "our results so far have shown that at least
three distinct abstract elements CAUSE would be necessary -
to account, that is, for causation by command, causation
by direct physical action and causation of emotion".
(Cruse, op. cit.: 523-4). However, he has not shown firstly
that there are three types of causation since we have seen
that the third category belongs with the second and secondly
he has not shown that there "three distinct abstract elements
CAUSE" since all the factors which he has noted can more
easily be associated with other elements of the sentence
rather than with the predicate CAUSE itself. Thus the
second category will involve reference to the notion of
intervening Agent and the first will involve reference to
the Agent of the matrix sentence and the Agent of the
embedded fulfilling certain conditions.
One solution is suggested by the terms which Cruse uses
himself, "causation by command" and "causation by direct
physical action". Each suggest some basic predicate CAUSE
and a by-clause. Thus the first category could be handled
by positing a deep structure with at some point a by-clause
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containing order. This would be supported by the fact
that all the conditions which affect the acceptability of
the covert causatives of the first group also affect the
acceptability of the verb order. In this way we can
simplify the grammar by stating the constraints once with
respect to order, and the fact that they also hold for other
verbs will be a result of their containing order in their
underlying structure. Thus an inanimate object cannot
give an order, neither can an inanimate object receive and
orders j further for someone to obey an order he must firstly
be able to understand it and secondly be in such a position
that he will carry it out. As we might expect, then, the
following corresponding to 212, 214, 216 and 218 are
unacceptable:
212a. *The flood caused the men to march further north,
by ordering them to
214a. *john caused the men, who did not understand his
orders, to march across the yard by ordering
them to
2l6a. *Jffhn caused the men, who were being totally
unresponsive to his orders, to march across the
yard by ordering them to
218a. *John caused the sparks to fly by ordering them to
Under Cruse*s interpretation, these are merely accidental
facts about English such that the restrictions have to be
stated twice.
The first part of Cruse's paper, then, does not provide
a conclusive argument against Lexical Decomposition: the
same is also true of the second argument which purports to
show that "teach must occur as an element of deep structure".
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Cruse reaches this conclusion on the basis that his analyses
of the four verbs teach (i.e. four differing underlying
structures) "completely miss what is felt to be common to
the various meanings of teach, and furthermore, they fail
to formalise our intuition that the various meanings belong
naturally together" (Cruse, op. cit.: 528). However,
there is a second conclusion which may be drawn on the basis
of the passage quoted above, namely that the supposed four
underlying structures which Cruse argues for are themselves
inadequate.
The first verb teach, according to Cruse, has a deep
structure under the transformationalist analysis which may
be represented as 225:
225. John CAUSE ((Bill can ride a bike) BECOME)
which supposedly surfaces as
226. John taught Bill to ride a bike
although CAUSE BECOME CAN seems to be a more obvious
candidate as the underlying structure of enable. The
argument for 225 is difficult to reconstruct. His start¬
ing-point is that teach, its corresponding stative know and
the inchoative learn are polysemous. Thus 227
227. Bill knew how to ride a bike
is ambiguous and one of the readings of this sentence is
"practically synonymous" with can. Further the two readings
of 227 have different causatives:
228a. John taught Bill how to ride a bike
b. John told Bill how to ride a bike
and only 228a entails that Bill can ride a bike. He further
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relates the two meanings of know to the distinction between
"knowing how" and "knowing that". Prom this he concludes
that 225 is the deep structure of 226, a conclusion without
any clear argument. However, it becomes clearer if we
return to the activity-accomplishment distinction. 226
is ambiguous between the activity and accomplishment
reading, on the one hand John can give Bill knowledge of
how to ride a bike without Bill acquiring the skill, or
alternatively Bill can acquire the skill as a result of
John*s action. Thus we might analyse the two readings of
226 (which notice that Cruse does not explicitly acknowledge
or account for) as:
229a. John gave Bill knowledge of how to ride a bike
b. John's giving knowledge of how to ride a bike
to Bill CAUSE him to know how to ride a bike
Thus we can analyse this verb teach as having the underlying
structure GIVE KNOWLEDGE.
The second verb teach can be paraphrase^ according to
Cruse, as "inculcate a habit" which he exemplifies with
230. John taught Bill always to be polite to his
elders
230 entails that Bill learnt to be polite to his elders but
Cruse claims that itdoes not entail 231
231. Bill knew always to be polite to his elders
since this contains "an element of deliberate calculation"
(Cruse, op. cit.: 525). However, 230 also entails 232:
232. Bill was always polite to his elders
Uhfortunately this is not always the case: thus 230 can be
an activity or an accomplishment and even if John*s teaching
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was successful there are still likely to be cases where
Bill's competence in being polite is interfered with by
performance factors, so that the entailments are not absolute.
The argument depends on the lack of entailment of 231:
since 230 does not entail 231, then there can be no element
KNOW in the deep structure, or at least this appears to be
the logic of the argument. However, the argument does not
go through for a large number of speakers, in that for them
230 does entail 231 and there is no element of calculation
at all. Further the structure is inadequate in that it
does not capture the fact that in 230 John is imparting
knowledge of a skill or habit, something which is captured
by a structure like GIVE KNOWLEDGE.
The third verb teach may be paraphrased as "impart
knowledge" and Cruse gives the example
233. John taught Bill the names of the flowers
which entails
234. Bill learned the names of the flowers
235. Bill knew the names of the flowers
Notice that this is only true on the accomplishment reading
of the sentence. Cruse also observes that 234 and 235
are also entailed by 236
236. John told Bill the names of the flowers
Unfortunately it is difficult to see why he goes further
than the entailments of 233 and introduces 236 at all, since
he has already the basis for a possible structure, namely
GIVE KNOWLEDGE.
However, he proceeds, in a manner which confuses the entailment
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of a sentence with the entailments of the sentence which
expresses the first entailment, to note that while 234 Is
ambiguous between learning by bhing told, according to
Cruse, 235 is not ambiguous in this way. Cruse suggests
then that we should handle the supposed difference between
the two i.e. 233 and 236 by positing as the underlying
structure of 233
237» John CAUSE ((Bill remember the names of the
flowers) BECOME)
since 233 implies that Bill retained the knowledge, while
236 only implies "knowledge at the instant of telling".
However, if this were the case, 238 should be acceptable,
since it involves "knowledge at the instant of telling":
238. John taught Bill the names of the flowers but he
forgot them immediately
Notice further that, since Cruse does not give a structure
for tell, we cannot be certain that 237 actually is the
required structure of 233 to distinguish it from 236. the
argument as a whole is unconvincing, since Cruse omits to
take into account the activity-accomplishment distinction
and does not show precisely why we need to go beyond the
analysis of teach as GIVE KNOWLEDGE.
The fourth verb teach is to be paraphrased as "impart
a belief", as in
239. John taught Bill that honesty was the best policy
and Cruse claims that this entails that Bill came to believe
that honesty was the best policy. Again the facts contra¬
dict Cruse, in that the following are perfectly acceptable:
240. John taught Bill that honesty was the best policy,
but he laughed in his face and went out and robbed
the local Post Office
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241. John taught Bill that interpretive semantics is
bankrupt, but he did not believe him and to this
day talks of co-reference tables
In fact. Cruse*s manner of argument is at fault here.
There is no reason to talk of belief in this situation at
all. If it is the case that John accomplished an act of
teaching, then it is the case that Bill knows something and
from this it follows that Bill also believes that something
is the case: that is, to give the following
242. John CAUSE ((Bill believe that honesty is the
best policy) BECOME)
as the deep structure of 239 is to ignore the fact that
Bill knows something. The same form of argument would lead
us to the claim that:
243. John's aunt Agatha died
is ambiguous: that is, if someone is dead, then it is the
case that that person is either buried, cremated or about
to be buried or cremated. Thus we have the possibility
of four different deep structures for 243, if we use Cruse's
method of argumentation.
Thus there seems to be no reason to believe that Cruse*s
analysis of the "four" verbs teach has any validity, rather
they point to the fact that there is an element in common
to each which we may characterise in terms of the passage
of knowledge from a teacher to a learner and the actual
nature of that knowledge, a skill, habit, names of something
is not of relevance to the deep structure set up for the
verb teach.
In conclusion to this section on the predicates DO and
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CAUSE and their implications, we may say that there are no
conclusive arguments in the literature against Lexical
Decomposition and the rule of Predicate-Raising, rather the
arguments can be seen as criticisms of the current embodi¬
ments of this hypothesis and not as full arguments against
any form of the hypothesis. Thus they have served to throw
light on the causative analysis of sentences containing
overt and covert causatives. In the next chapter we shall
turn to an elaboration of the insights gained and show how
they can be captured in the grammar.
3.3. Instruments
The question of instrumentality and its expression is
too complex to deal with adequately here. Instead we shall
look briefly at certain facts relating to the occurrence,
form of and restrictions on expressions of the instrument.
The major problem of such expressions concerns the form of
the instrumental phrase and the prepositions which may
occur with it, that i*, instruments can be either nouns or
nominalisations so that a full analysis of nominalisations
is needed for a fuller understanding. Further, while the
most common prepositions of instrumentality are with and
by, if it is the case that use takes ay direct object as
Lakoff (Lakoff, 1968) suggests, then we need to account for
this relation and also for those instrumentals which do not
have a paraphrase in use and with. The conditions of the
use of with or trjr need also to be explored since, while in
general there seems to be a correlation between with and
nouns and bjr and nominalisations, certain nominalisations
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can occur with with.
3.3.1. The derivation of by-clauses
Although we have already mentioned some points about
by-clauses (see our discussion of Lee, 1971a 3.1.6. and
3.2.1. above), we have not considered explicitly their
origin in the underlying structure. There are, in fact,
two possibilities: either they are generated directly in
the deep structure or they are derived by some trans¬
formation. It is this latter view which is taken by
Vendler (Vendler, 19^7) Geis (Geis, 1974)* Dowty (Dowty,
1972) and Kastovsky (Kastovsky, 1973)» in that they wish to
derive the by-clause from the underlying sentential subject
of the CAUSE predication. Dowty, following Geis, cites
several facts about such clauses which can be given a
straight-forward accounting in the transformational analysis
but which require ad hoc restrictions if they are generated
directly in the base.
(a) Firstly by-clauses can only occur with causative verbs,
a fact which is easily explained if they derive from the
subject of the underlying CAUSE predication, but which
requires some restrictions on non-causative verbs under any
other analysis.
(b) If by-clauaes are generated in the base, then we need
some further restriction to account for the fact that if
the causative verb has a surface gerundive subject, then a
sentence with a by-clause is unacceptable:
244. *John*s teasing Mary made her angry by kissing
Janet
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Notice that under a transformational analysis by-ciause
formation will be rightward bounded (see Ross, 1967) so
that it cannot move out of the sentence which immediately
dominates the sentence in which the by-clause originated.
Thus 244 has an acceptable foroi where the by-clause is moved
to the right of the verbs
245. John's teasing Mhry by kissing Janet made her
angry
(c) The fact that the logical subject of the by-clause must
always be co-referential with the surface subject of the
sentence is a natural consequence of the transformational
analysis but requires an ad hoc restriction in the base-
generation analysis.
(d) A further restriction avoided by the transformational
analysis is the restriction which is required to prevent
the application of the passive if the sentence already
contains a by-clause:
246. John made Mary angry by teasing her
247. *Mary was made angry by John by teasing her
248. Mary was made angry by John's teasing her
Thus we must allow only one by-phrase in the sentence which
may be the passive bjr or the by-clause.
However, if there are arguments for the transformational
analysis, there are at least two arguments brought against
it by Shibatani (Shibatani, 1973a). The first argument
depends on the non-synonymy of the following sentences:
249. John's walking out caused a disturbance
250. John caused a disturbance by walking out
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Thus 249 asserts that there Is some causal relation beween
the two events and 250 asserts that John is responsible for
causing some event. Thus, if we have a simple rule of
by-clause formation, then we import into the grammar a
transformation which is not meaning-preserving. One
solution would be to have two different structures: one
which underlies 249 would have a sentential subject and the
other, underlying 250 will have a sentential subject and an
empty by-phrase into which the VP of the sentential subject
can be moved. The presence of this by-phrase will be
responsible for determining the responsibility reading.
The second argument which Shibatani brings involves
what he sees as a px'oblem in the analysis of sentences like:
251. John intentionally caused a disturbance
Shibatani observes that the adverb here must modify an
animate noun and cannot, then modify a sentential subject:
in a more straightforward maimer we might say that the
adverb requires an Agent subject and not the Force subject
. *
which is proposed in the transformational analysis of the
by-clause. Shibatani then claims that since intentionally
cannot originate in the CAUS£-predication, it must originate
in the structure underlying the by-clause i.e. the sentential
subject. All this depends on Shibatani»s prior commitment
to the analysis of the Japanese suffix sase as embodying
within it the meaning "by doing something** so that this is
posited as an element in the deep structure of sentences
containing cause in English, there being some unspecified
rule which removes it. Notice, however, that he is
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claiming that the adverb here modifies an element of deep
structure which does not appear in the surface structure,
which is, as we have seen above, one form of argumentation
for Lexical Decomposition. Assuming that Shibatani's
analysis is correct, the structure underlying 251 should also
surface as 252s
252. John * s intentionally doing something caused a
disturbance
However, 252 and 251 are not synonymous, which argues against
the transformational analysis which Shibatani has
constructed.
This is not particularly harmful for the transformational
analysis, since Shibatani*s analysis is not the only one
possible. Thus we could modify the structures proposed
above: all of the sentences under discussion 249-252 will
contain at least two predications, one being a CAUSE-
predication which is embedded in the DG-predication. For
249 the sentential subject of the lower predication is
raised directly into the subject of the DO-predication. In
the case of 250, this higher DO-predication contains the
empty by-phrase, which results in an Agent subject with a
by-clause. 251 will have the adverb intentionally present
in the DO-predication and an empty sentential subject of the
CATJSE-predication, while 252 has a sentential subject in the
CAUSE-predication and no by-phrase in the DO-predication.
These structures will preserve the transformational analysis
of by-clauses. We shall discuss the form of such a grammar
in greater detail below (see Chapter 4).
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3.3.2. bj£ versus with
As a first generalisation it seems to be the case that
with marks the instrumental with nouns and has this role
with nominalisations:
253. Seymour sliced the salami knife
w4
254. Mary beat the mixture a dirty fork
255. Bach year many people kill themselves
cigarettes
In these sentences we find with followed by a simple noun
phrase and the corresponding sentences with b£ are unaccept¬
able. However, if the instrumental phrase contains a
nominalisation, the reverse seems to be true. Thus corres¬
ponding to 253 and 255 we have 256 and 257 respectively:
JLu l 4-V>
256. Seymour sliced the salami , using a knife
by
257. Each year many people kill themselves
smoking cigarettes
237 does seem to be acceptable for some speakers with with,
Jim Miller having suggested that this is a feature of Scottish
English. That the two prepositions b£ and with are expon¬
ents of the same or at least related deep structure element
finds support in that fact that both are neutralised in the
negative by without:
258. Mary beat th. mixture without ^^wood'chef"1
Here the speaker is denying the use of the instrument.
Notice that we could analyse without as with and the suffix
out, this latter being typically a preposition associated
with movement from and not being in a place, that is
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essentially the Ablative case recognised by Anderson
(Anderson, 1971a). Thus we find evidence for the
association between negation and the Ablative case which
Anderson has proposed (Anderson, 1971a, 1972a).
If we consider this difference between bjr and with we
find that it is a rather strange situation, in that the use
of the prepositions seems to be conditioned solely by the
surface form. In fact, the situation is not so simple,
since under certain circumstances the preposition with can
appear before noiainalisations:
259» He annoys everyone with his endless moaning
To account for this we need a fuller consideration of
nominalisations and what follows can only be a brief introd¬
uction to one possible line of study.
There is now a lengthy literature on the subject of
nominalisations, but it mostly concerns their treatment in
the grammar and how they are to be derived. For our
purposes the most useful analysis is that of Vendler
(Vendler, 1967, 1968). Between the two works, Vendler
changed his terminology so that while in the earlier one he
talks of perfect and imperfect nominals in the later one he
talks of weak and strong nominals. However, these terms
do not refer to the same phenomena: while all strong
nominals are perfect, it is not the case that all perfect
nominals are strong. Similarly, while imperfect nominals
are weak, all weak nominals are not necessarily imperfect.
The difference lies in the fact that "weak" and "strong11
are used to describe morphological properties of nominals.
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while "perfectw and "imperfect" refer to their syntactic
behaviour. Vendler represents weak nominaln as V_ ^ t
that is, they are verb roots which have the nominalising
suffix -ing; strong nominals are represented as V , where
n stands for the class of suffixes 0,-ion, -ment, -al,
-ure, —th, etc. Perfect and imperfect refer to whether the
nominal acts like a noun or a verb. Thus weak nominals may
take an unmixed set of verb complements or of noun complements,
i.e. they are imperfect or perfect, and strong nominals only
allow noun complements. With imperfect nominals, then, we
find noun phrases, prepositional phrases, adverbs, negation,
passives and tense (expressed by being and having). In
contrast with these, the perfect nominal, like nouns in
general, only allows of NP, prepositional phrases and
adj ec tives. Compare:
John's winning the race, having masterfully won the
race, his not winning
*John*a refusal the offer, *Iiis suddenly death,
*his not death
John's refusal of the offer, his sudden death
Having distinguished between perfect and imperfect
nominals, Vendler (Vendler, 1967) looks at the contexts in
which they can occur. Again he recognises two types, the
first suited to imperfect nominals but being "fairly
tolerant towards perfect nominals" (Vendler, op. cit.s 139)
and the second selecting perfect nominals. Thus typically
nouns like event, process and action can be predicated of
perfect nominals, as can the adjectives sudden, slow,
gradual etc., while this is not the case with imperfect
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nominals:
260. John's singling the Marseillaise was slow
261. The German's having collapsed was a gradual
process
Thus Vendler correlates perfect nominals with events and
Imperfect nominals with facts.
Thus, if it is the case that with is the preposition
used with nouns, then we might expect that it is also used
with perfect nominals, and b£ is used with imperfect
nominals. The situation is not all that clear a*4 as
Vendler observes, English seems to be in a state of flux
with regard to its treatment of noininalisations. However,
there does seem to be some form of correlation between the
use of with and V as opposed to V , .
n ^ -xng
262a. John annoyed Mary his insistence
wi til
b. John angered Mary his refusal to listen
c. John surprised everyone his failure to see
the point y
Thus the conditioning factor on the occurrence of with and
by may be some semantic distinction between on the one hand
objects and events and on the other facts. One factor
which seems to link objects and events is that they occur
or exist in space and in time, that is they can have
location predicated of them, as opposed to facts which
cannot (Vendlar, 19^7 for more discussion).
3.3.3. use and with
The relation between use and with has been a topic of
discussion since Lakoff first discussed the relation between
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(Lakoff, 1968):
263a. Seymour sliced the salami with a knife
b. Seymour used a knife to slice the salami
Lakoff argues that, on the basis of shared selectional
restrictions and co-occurrence relations 263a and 263b have
the same deep structure, which he claims is more closely
realised in 263b. Xn the following discussion we shall
not consider Lakoff»s further distinction between purposive
and accidental with-phrases, partly because this is not of
significance for Lakoff*s position, although Kooij (Kooij,
1971) and to a lesser extent Chomsky (Chomsky, 1973) seems
to think that it is, but mainly because the distinction
which Lakoff attributes to the with-phrase is, in fact, a
property of the verb (compare also Veydt (Weydt, 1973) for
this position).
Chomsky (Chomsky, 1971) attacks Lakoff»s position on
the grounds that Lakoff does not take certain facts into
consideration and further that the assumed synonymy of
263a and 263b is not supported. Thus he points to the
differences in meaning of:
264a. John carelessly broke the window with a hammer
b. John broke the window carelessly with a hammer
265a. John carelessly used the hansaer to break the
window
b. John used the hammer carelessly to break the
window
and suggests that these differences point to a difference
in the meaning of the sentences without the adverb.
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Zwickv and Sadock, (Zwicky and Sadock, 1975) show that such
arguments have little validity. The fact that we can add
a further adverb does not prove the ambiguity of the
sentence without the adverb, rather it shows that the
s entence can be further specified, the action given a fuller
description.
Chomsky further assumes that, since Lakoff argues
that instrumental adverbs in with have a use adverb, then
it taust also be true that sentences with use have a corres¬
ponding sentence where the object of use corresponds to the
"object" of the preposition with. On this basis he can
bring the following sentences as counter-examples:
266a. John used the classroom to propagandise for his
doctrines
b. *John propagandised for his doctrines with the
classroom
267a. John used his connections to further his career
b. *John furthered his career with his connections
Some speakers do not find 267b fully unacceptable, but both
sentences become acceptable if we use through instead of
with or in the case of 266b also in. In fact, these
sentences do not constitute a counter-example to Lakoff's
position, they merely show the fallacy of Chomsky's
argument which is of the form basically, since all Xs are
Ys, then all Ys ajrtLXs.
Of more interest are the sentences which Lakoff does
not take into account and which, as Chomsky notes (Chomsky,
op. cit.) must be considered if an adequate analysis of use
and with is to be attempted. Thus Lakoff does not consider
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sentences like the following where a final preposition
occurs:
268. Seymour used the knife ^fete slice the salami with
269. John used his father's desk to write the letter on
270. John used the back wall to lean the ladder against
271. John used the old car to make his getaway in
The prepositions in 268, 269 and 271 seem to be optional,
although speakers seem to prefer the sentence with the
preposition, while 270 is unacceptable without the pre¬
position, probably because it cannot be recovered from the
sentence. Uhder Lakoff's analysis there is no means of
accounting for this preposition, which leads Chomsky to
propose 272 as a more adequate representation of the under¬
lying structure of 263a:
272. Seymour used a knife {Seymour sliced the salami
with a knife)
where the prepositional phrase occurs in the embedded
sentence and a rule will specify when the preposition can
be deleted. A further problem, which Chomsky does not note
as a problem equally for his own analysis, arises from the
fact that 263a has a second paraphrase with a by-clause
containing use:
273. Seymour sliced the salami by using the new meat-
slicer
where is optional. Thus it is difficult to explain why
the matrix sentence is lowered into the embedded sentence
to become a by-clause.
Further points to be considered concern the fact that
there is an alternative, though possibly not a full
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pcmphrase, with an iri-phrase:
274. John used the classroom in propagandising for his
doctrines
the fact that use does not itself allow an instrumental
adverb and that use has variants:
275. John ££/sot tto U.O of Bill., .lido-rule to
work out the answer
Notice also that the verb use belongs to that sub-group of
verbs which donot allow a reflexive with benofactiv©
meaning. Urns while one can find, paint, kill, break,
open etc. something for oneself
276. *John used himself a slide-rule to work the
answer out
is unacceptable. This lack of overt Benefactive may well
be linked with the fact that the Benefactivo is in some way
incorporated into the subject, and also to the occurrence
have and get in 275. A possibly more interesting
solution would depend on the relationship between Benefactives
and the expression of purpose. If these are essentially
the same in deep structure and we allow the occurrence of
only one expression of Beliefactive or purpose, then a
Benefactive cannot occur in 276 since we already have a
purpose expression in the to~phra.se.
It is useful also to compare this situation with the
Latin verb uti, translated usually as "use" but also as
"benefit from", "enjoy" as in Bona valitudine utitur "He
enjoys good health" (where bona and valitudine are in the
ablative case). Uti was a deponent verb, i.e. one of the
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residual class of middle verbs, which, as we noted above
(3.2.4.) have been related to reflexives and in general
require an object in the case usually used to mark the
instrument. Thus use may well belong: to the category of
"middle" verbs of English (3.2.2., 3*2.3. above). Like
the Latin verb, use involves the subject benefiting from the
action and its object is related to with-phrases, i.e.
Instruments. Moreover, like other middle verbs in English,
it is "complete", that is, one cannot use an instrument by
doing something other than using an instrument, use does
not allow a by-clause, and it typically takes an animate
subject, i.e. an Agent.
There is a further point about use and Instruments and
Benefactives best brought out by considering the following!
277a. John killed Bill with a knife
b. John used a knife to kill Bill
287a. John killod Bill by stabbing him with a knife
b. *John used stabbing Bill with a knife to kill him
The gap in the paradigm may well be filled by
288. John stabbed Bill with a knife (in order) to kill
him
Thus imagine a structure which has a main predication DO
containing an Agent a purpose expression and some Inetrumental
phrase which may be either a further predication or a noun.
A lower predication will be incorporated into DO to produce
a sentence like 288 while with a noun DO is lexicalised as
use. We return to suoh structures below (see Chapter 4)*
One final point before leaving the question of
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Instruments and tlxe verb use concerns the relation between
Instrumental phrases and by-clauses on the one hand and
manner adverbs on the other. Although some relationship
is generally acknowledged, there is no clear proposal
(for a review see Nilsen, 1973). However, our suggestions
above may provide some basis. Thus if Nilsen and the
scholars he cites are correct in seeing Manner Adverbas a
major category of which Instruments are a subpart, these
latter may well be definable in terms of their occurrence
as the "object11 of with or of use.
In this chapter we have reviewed the suggestions made
in the literature on the subject of subjects, verbs, objects
and instrumental phrases in causative sentences. In the
next chapter we review some of the suggestions for the
treatment of such notions in the grammar and then proceed





At several points In the preceding chapters we have
mentioned the work of J. Anderson and in what follows it will
be evident that taany of the proposals are dependent on his
work. However, there are also points of difference, which
it would be difficult to consider fully here without a more
complete discussion and extension of our own proposals.
However, we can present the main outlines of Anderson's
grammar and indicate which proposals we shall adopt and give
some reasons why we disagree with others.
The main outlines and motivations for Anderson's
grammar are to be found in a series of works (Anderson,
1971"» 1971b, 1972, 1973b), and it must be emphasised that
this is a grammar in development so that technical terms
ma> differ slightly in their use. The part of the grammar
which directly concerns us can be divided into two components,
the formation rules and the movement rules. A dependency
model is used and for a fuller discussion of the properties
of and arguments for such a model see Anderson (Anderson,
op. cit. 1976, 1977), Robinson, (Robinson, 1970), and Bartsch
ami Vermelnan (Bartsch and Vennecian, 1972). The verb is
sub-categorised with respect to the features + Locative,
+ Directional and + Stative which govern the cases which are
introduced as dependent on the verb. The base itself is
unordered, linearisation being one of the roles of the later
rules. The output of this component is a Hierarchy of
quasi-predications, which Anderson (Anderson, 1972) terms a
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"global predication". A quasi-predication is defined as
J
one which contains "at least one empty argument which has





at least one of the arguments or N2 must be "unspecified
semantically other than that it is N". There is a
constraint on global predications such that the lowest
predication cannot be a quasi-predication. In what follows
we elvail attempt to show that such structures, coupled with
the rule of Raising, allow us to handle co—reference.
The global predication is the input to the movement
rules, of which we wish to consider the four major ones.
Novice that while we term these movement rules, they are not
strictly speaking so: thus in Case Grammar there are no
movement transformations, there is only Raising, that is,
any re-ordering of elements which would be handled by a
transformation by non-case grammarians, is handled in
Localls t case gracaaar in terms of Raising into a higher
predication (see Anderson, 1976: 122-3 for discussion).
There are other rules besides those discussed below, but
these, deletion of Kxiatentials,superimposition of quantifiers
and Eachtraposttion operate within quantifier constructions
which are outside our present field of enquiry. The rules
which we shall discuss are Copying (also Raising) bubJunetion,
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V-Adjunction and Loc-Adjunction. Notice that in various
papers these last two rules have been called Abjunction
(Anderson, 1972) and Loc-Adjunction has bean called Locative
Attachment (Anderson, 1973b).
As a broad generalisation one mi^it say that V-Adjunction
and Loc-Adjnnction provide the input to Subjunction, all of
which are basically concerned with the re—ordexring of
elements prior to Lexicalisation. Copying, (also referred
to as Raising in later works see Anderson, 1976), involves
moving the semantic specification of a case into the case
dependent on a higher occurrence of V and as such is
involved with subject and object formation. V-Adjunction
and Loc-Adjunction operate cm structures of the form
V
and attach the lower V and its governing case to the higher
verb or to the Loc respectively. Thus, as an example of
V-Adjunction we have the following tree as input: (see
over). This structure is part of the structure underlying
It is possible that he likes her, tense and aspect pre¬
dications having been omitted. V-Adjunction takes the
lower V and attaches it to the higher V to produce structure
4: (see over).
While V-Adjunction seems to be a quite coranon rule,
the use of Loc-Adjunction seems to be more restricted,








He like Her possible
4.
possible He like her
progressive and inceptive aspect. Thus, omitting the
tense predication, tho relevant part of the stincture under¬













where N is tho existential and the predication predicates
©
existence of John's falling. Loc-AdJunetion applied to
this structure will attach the lover V and its governing









Both the rules of Copying (Raising) and Subjunction can
apply to this structure. Copying is the rule which assigns
the lower occurrence of "John" to the higher Abs, and, as
already mentioned, is largely responsible for re-ordering
elements. The resulting structure corresponds to John is
in the process of falling and to obtain John is falling we
need to Subjoin the lower V to the higher N to produce:
7.
John BE fall
Hie rule of Subjunction forms complex segments and in one
work (And "son, 1972) we find it referred to as Complex
Segment Formation. Such complex segments are realised in
the surface structure as one lexical item. To understand
Sub junction we need to look back at dependency trees. In
terms of dependency structures we can distinguish between
two sub-types. Adjunction trses and Subjunction tress, both
involve dependence of lower elements on higher ones but they
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differ in that Adjunction trees contain nodes which are
distinguished in precedence/order* Notice that this doe*
not mean that the trees are ordered, it simply means that
order is relevant at some point in the structure. Sub-
junction trees do not contain nodes distinguished in terms
of precedence, order is not relevant at all. Lexical
insertion, then, involves attaching some lexical item to a
Subjunction tree. A major constraint on Subjunction is that
only a contiguous dependent may be subjoined, that is, in
structure 6 Subjunction can only apply to Subjoin the lower
V to N, it cannot Subjoin to the higher V since these two
Vs are not contiguous. Alternatively only direct dependents
can subjoin and indirect dependents cannot. This rule of
Subjunction is also responsible for creating the Subjunction
tree which underlies verbs like kill, containing at least
the predicates CAUSE HIE. For further discussion see
Anderson, 1971b, 1972, 1976, 1977.
These, in broad outline, are the main mechanisms which
Andersonfs grammar calls upon. To give a detailed and well-
motivated reasoning for our rejection of some of them is
beyond the scope of our study. However, we can, at least,
give some reasons for accepting certain proposals and suggest
possible sources of arguments for the rejection of others and
sitapler proposals with which to replace them.
Let us consider firstly the rules of Adjunction.
Notice thut both take as input a structure which has a complex
subject and simplify this subject by moving it after the
verb and further it may not then be Subjoined to the verb.
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Anderson (personal communication) has suggested that this
may be a reflex of the fact that in many languages a complex
subject is avoided wherever possible, probably due to per¬
ception factors. However, if there is such an aversion for
such complex subjects, we could Just as easily assume the
reverse derivation, that is languages in their underlying
structure have basically simplex subjects and complex
non-subjects so that complex subjects are formed by some
movement rules. An alternative analysis of the progressive
in particular would conform to this. Thus while it may be
more difficult to argue for a non—subject source in sentences
like It is possible that he likes her, since we do find such
sentences with complex subjects, the position is more complex
with progressives. Thus we do not find progressives,
normally, with complex subjects.
Consider, then, structure 5 and the rule of Loc-
Adjunction. The purpose of this rule is to move the Abe on
which the lower V is dependent and attach it to the N
governed by Loc, that is, it is a purely linear movement
between sister cases of the same predication, while in
general the movement rules involve attachment to some higher
element. One might suggest that such a rule requires strong
motivation, which is lacking in the works considered. A
further point which suggests an alternative analysis may be
preferable and concerns the status of N^. Notice that, at
least in English, there is no surface structure which
corresponds directly to structure 5» that is, there is no
normal sentence like 8 which has the same meaning of 9 or 10:
20k.
8. ?The ^j°COSS of John*s falling is in existence
9. John is in the process of falling
10. John is falling
However, if N does not turn up on the surface, it does©
undergo two rules which alter its meaning, in one case it
is expressed in the surface structure by the form process
(compare 9) and in the other it has no overt realisation,
being part of a Subjunction tree. Such points do not prove
the point one way or the other, but at least they suggest
that an alternative analysis may be possible, one involving
a structure more closely resembling "John is in the process
of falling" (for such a treatment of Russian see Miller,
1970, 1972). Notice further that such an analysis would be
in keeping with a general constraint that one might impose
on any grammar, namely only move as far from surface
structure as is absolutely necessary.
However, if we differ from Anderson in not allowing
Loc-Adjunction, we do operate with the rules of Raising and
Subjunction, this latter filling the role essentially of
Predicate-Raising in transformationalist accounts of
causative constructions. A further- difference lies in the
array of cases allowed. Thus Anderson operates with four
cases, Absolutive (originally called Nominative), Ergative,
Locative and Ablative. In Chapter 2 we suggested that
Fillmore*s case array could be reduced to four cases, one
for the object that moves, one for the source, one for the
goal and one for the location or path, these also being the
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general notions of 19th century Localists (see 2.4. above).
Thus the only case which dees not differ between Anderson*®
array and ours is Abs. Anderson*s Loc will correspond to
our Loc and All. Anderson's Erg and Abl we treat as one
case, namely Abl.
4.1. A First Approach
We assume that the grammar has the same form as that
of Anderson*s, one component which contains a set of
formation rules and secondly a component which is responsib&e
for realising these structures in syntactic surface
structures, at some point, to be considered below, another
set of rules applies to give the semantic specifications of
the relevant items, semantic insertion rules. Following
Anderson, we assume that Abs is the one obligatory case which
every predication contains. Other cases will be introduced
in accord with other properties of the predicate, basically
whether it is a stative or non-stative predication.
A stative predication may be either concrete or abstract.
Within the former category we have sentences like
11. John is in town/the room
for which we assume a structure of the forms
John BE in town
In this structure we ignore questions of tense and aspect.
Thus we need a rule which will allow a stative predication
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to contain Loc. We shall not explore this further, but it
is possible that a stative predication may contain Abl
instead of Loc, that is given the relationship between
source and negation posited by Anderson (Anderson, 1971a)«
John is out of town will have town governed by Abl.
Within the category of abstract stative predications we
huvo the progressive aspect and predications of emotional
state such as:
13. John is angry/in love/in a state of depression
Anderson treats aspect in terms of the structure given above
as 5. We have already raised some queries about this
structure. There are further points which we must clarify
in developing the grammar. Firstly, is the Abs of the
higher predication specified and secondly do we need a
relative clause like structure dependent on Loc if we
adopt tho alternative suggested, that is have a structure of
the form 6 as input to the movement rules? Taking this
second point first, we must note that the relative-clause-liks
structure is a consequence of Anderson*s position that V is
never dependent directly on any other case than Abs. This
position is not made explicit as far as we have been able
to discover in any of Anderson*s works and there is, thus,
no strict argumentation for it. In face of the lack of
such evidence, we shall adopt the simpler position, namely
that Vcan be directly dependent on any case. Thus our
modified structure will be of the form 14 below.
The first question concerns the point made earxier
about the nature of semantic specification. We need to
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make one basic assumption, namely that all terms i.e. Ns
and Vs receive their semantic specification before any
movement rules apply. However, this assumption is compat¬
ible with two different views of semantic specification,
the first being that it is unconstrained, and the second
being that there are constraints which allow only certain
terms to receive a semantic specification. The first
position has certain consequences for the grammar which may
or may not be unpleasant depending on one'e view of grammar.
Consider then the structure of John is falling under the
first view:
The point is that if semantic specification, i.e. the
insertion of semantic material, is unconstrained, then there
is no means of ensuring that the Abs of the higher
predication governs a noun which is co-referential with the
Abs of the lower, that is we could not prevent structures
paraphrasable as "Fred is in the state of John fall".
Given this position, the formation rules in conjunction
with the unconstrained semantic specification rules will
produce a large number of structures which do not have
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corresponding acceptable surface structures. If one is
willing to accept such a conclusion* as the proponents Qf
the Extended Standard Theory appear to do (see for example
Jackendoff, 1972) then there is no problem. However, if
such a conclusion is unacceptable, then we need some means
of restricting semantic specification. One means of
ta ckling the problem would be to use the rule of Copying or
Raising. Raising, then, as one rule, or possibly a set of
rules, raises the semantic specification of a noun into a
higher noun and marks those nouns as co-referential. This
suggests that semantic specification be constrained such
that each actant in a sentence occurs only once or is
introduced in one position in the underlying structure and
the rule of Raising will then mark all case relations into
which it enters. Thus in the structure underlying John is
falling the semantic specification "JOhn" will only appear
once, governed by Abs of the lower predication. Raising
will then raise this specification into the Abs of the
higher predication. There are other questions which this
raises, such as the problem of which terms may be specified
and the effect this has on the lower occurrence, but we shall
return to these below when we have a more developed grammar.
Notice, however, that such a position has one interesting
consequence, namely that the formation rules and the semantic
specification rules do not provide a full semantics of a
sentence, this is only obtained after the Raising rule has
applied.
Turning to non-stative predications, we find that there
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is more immediate evidence for the range of cases which can
occur with the predicate MOVE. Thus we find sentences with
only a source or goal overt:
15&. John left London
b. John reached home
where London and home are governed by Abl and All respective¬
ly. There are also sentences with both source and goal
overt
16. John went home from his office
Thus we need to allow for both Abl and All dependent on
MOVE-predicates, and permit either both or just one of the
cases to receive a semantic specification. Finally we have
a prepositional phrase with through which can occur in such
sentences, marking the Path, as in
17a. John went through the town-center
b. John walked from the church to the pub through
the old cemetery
These raise the problem of what case governs the expression
of Path. In fact, the only case open is the Loc and there
is some evidence to support this identification of Path
with the Loc case. We pointed out in Chapter 2 (see
2.2.3.1. ; ! ove) that the prepositions with and b£ were
originally stative locative prepositions and both have
developed non-atative uses. Thus compare:
18a. The church is by the pub
b. John passed by the pub
and we find sentences parallelling these with near to. We
shall also argue that with marks both a locative in sentences
like
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19. John is with Bill
and also the instrument or Path along which the action
passes in sentences
20a. John killed Bill with his father#s gun
b. John stabbed Bill with a knife
Thus we need to allow non-stative predicates to govern four
cases, the obligatory Abs and Abl, All and Loc, where Abe
is obligatorily semantically specified and at least one of
the local cases must be also.
Turning to a sub-category of non-stative sentences,
namely the causatives we might assume that the same case
array is needed. This may well be the case, but the rest
of this chapter is devoted to exploring this. What must be
done at the moment is consider what the cases in a causative
predication might correspond to. Anderson (Anderson,
1971a) suggests a close relation between the underlying case
of the Agent and the Abl case, i.e. between his Erg and Abl,
but we have conflated these as one case Abl. We gave some
data in Chapter 2 to support the relation between Agent and
Abl (see 2.2.3.) and examples of causative sentences in
Chapter 3 also show a relation between the cause and a case
marker which may elsewhere mark the source, i.e. Abl (see
3.1.). Thus if Abl marks the Agent, then All will introduce
the Patient. Again data from Chapter 2 supports this
(2.2.2.2.-5.* 2.2.3.). This identification of Agent and
Abl and Patient and All will capture the notion of passing
over present in the terra "transitive" of traditional
grammar. However, this leaves us with Abs and Loc and the
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question of their statizs in a causative predication. Abs
is the one obligatory case and insofar as it marks the
object which moves this is the likely candidate for the
case governing that which is caused, that which the Patient
receives or suffers. This, in fact, is how Miller
(Miller, 1973) treats causative sentences. Thus as the
underlying structure of John killed Bill we might have at
least the predication;
This is only a preliminary suggestion, but it does go some
way towards capturing the relation between transitive verbs
and doing to, that is, we find sentences like:
22a. What did John do to Bill?
b. What John did to Bill was kill him
where a full transitive verb like kill seems to correspond
to do_ plus what, this latter being a form used to question
noun phrases, that is elsewhere it corresponds to NP.
23. What did you see? A book
Similarly we might look to other analytic verbs like
give a thrashing/heating/a kick in the teeth which parallel
the verbs thrash, beat, kick in the teeth and such analytic
verbal expressions contain the verb give which in a sentence
of concrete movement takes a Goal or recipient, (for a more
detailed discussion of such relations see Olsson, 1961,
2X2 •
Liefrink, 1973 unci Nilsen, 1973)« A full treatment of such
relations is outside the scope of our present study, but
we shall present some preliminary suggestions for a fuller
analysis of the situation and some possible treatment.
Finally we need to consider the possible status of Loc
in such predications. We have suggested that in non-stative
predications this case marks the Path and the notion which
most closely corresponds to this in causative predications
is the manner or instrumental expression. Thus we suggest
that the sentence
24. John killed Bill by stabbing him with a knife
may be analysed in terms of a structure which we can para¬
phrase as "Death passes from John to Bill through/by John*s
stabbing a knife into Bill". In what follows we shall
begin to explore the form of a grammar which captures these
suggestions.
b»2. A Review
A useful point to start is a re-consideration of the
suggestions and relations which were dealt with in Chapter 3
above which one would hope a grammar of causation would be
able to deal with. We shall begin by reviewing the major
points which are related to the notions of activity and
accoRiplishment before turning later to the question of direct
and indirect causation and the possible relations of such
notions to the Lexical Decomposition hypothesis.
(i) We have suggested that there are at least two predicates
DO and CAUSE which take Agents and Forces respectively, such
that Agents are necessarily animate while Forces may be
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animate or inanimate and in the case of* animate Forces we
have a derived Agent from some lower predication. (There
is the problem of how to classify machines (see Cruse, 1973*
McCawley, 1972, Shibatani, 1973a etc.) but we shall leave
this question for the moment).
(ii) There are complete and incomplete verbs which take
Agents and Forces respectively. Moreover, these seem to
correlate with the two categories of verb which we called
do with-verbs and do to-verba, so that we might identify
the former with complete verbs and the latter with incomplete
verbs on the ground that both of the.former involve essent¬
ially movement of an object (marked by with in certain
circumstances) by some Agent, while the latter two categor¬
ies, i.e. incomplete and do to-verbs are both transitive and
involve an Agent operating on some object. The complete/
incomplete distinction also bears on the distinction between
causative and method by-clauses.
(iii) Haudry (Haudry, 1970) distinguishes between internal
and external objects: the former in many languages is
marked by a locative, coinitative and/or instrumental case-
marker (see English with) and he says of it that it defines
the verbal action: the latter corresponds to the object
acted upon. Thus we can correlate internal objects with
complete verbs and external objects with incomplete verbs.
Notice that an external object is marked, according to
Haudry, by the accusative case, a case which elsewhere marks
the Goal (see English to).
(iv) Parallel to the complete/incomplete distinction, we
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have Vendler*s distinction between activities and accomplish-
ir.ents. We discussed this in relation to Fillmore*s two
verbs swim (Fillmore, 1971a). One of these is the simple
activity verb swim, while the other is the accomplishment
verb to which Fillmore assigns a structure involving a
higher predication of movement and instrumental by-clause
containing the activity verb swim, such that the surface
verb is derived by a process like Gruber#s Incorporation
(Gruber, 19^5). Alternatively we might say that the by-
clause functions in a similar way to Haudry*s inner object
and defines the verbal action, which would allow for a
relationship between this type of derivation and that found
in the parallel analytic and synthetic verbs like put butter
and butter, where it is the object which moves that is
incorporated. More overt support for such a treatment is
to be found in phrasal verbs and related structures e.g.
chop free which are accomplishment verbs and the verb is the
result of incorporating the manner constituent and the
particle or adjective denotes the resulting state, this
structure being more obvious in the related free by chopping,
(v) We suggested a relation between Benefactive and purpose
clauses and that there is no possibility of making any
strict correlation between DO and Agents and CAUSE and
Forces since we find examples where a Force appears as
subject of a transitive verb, i.e. an underlying DO.
However, it seems to be the case that while Agents and
Benefactives or purpose clauses are not mutually exclusive,
i.e. we find John did it for Mary. Forces and Benefactives
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cannot appear in the same clause.
From these suggestions we can form certain hypotheses
about the structures with which we are dealing.
(i) Firstly there is a predicate CAUSE which takes a
predicative Abl and a predicative All, i.e. cases with a
predication dependent on them. This will capture the
notion that cause i€ a relation between two events, and
may also help to solve some problems of the activity/
accomplishment distinction, since we have correlated incom¬
plete verbs taking Forces with accomplishment verbs. Thus
all accomplishment verbs may involve a CAUSE predication
at some point in their structure.
(ii) There are two predicates DO, or alternatively DO may
have two different case arrays, firstly abs—abl-all, where
Abl may have N, i.e. an Agent dependrait on it or V, i.e. a
Force and All may have an N i.e. Patient, while the second
will be Abs—Ab1—All but here Abl is necessarily governing
N, i.e. an Agent and All governs optionally N, i.e. a
Benefactive or V, i.e. a purpose expression of the form
in order to... The first of the above structures will also
correspond to the do to-verbs and the fact uiat such
transitive verbs are also accomplishment verbs suggests that
their structure contains a further CAUSE—predication,
probably dependent on the Abs.
4.2.1. CAUSE and DO
We approach the question of the status of CAUSE and DO
within the grammar by returning to the differences noted by
Lee (Lee, 1971a see 3*1.6. and 3.2.1. above) and considering
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how other linguists have dealt with this distinction and
with causatives in general.
Aijmer (Aijmer, 1972) adopts the terms direct and
indirect causation from Lee, that is he uses them to refer to
syntactic properties of sentences as opposed to the semantic
ones implicit in Lakoff's first use of them. Given the
sentence
25. John amazed Mary by producing a rabbit
which is claimed to be ambiguous between John as an Agent
d eliberately amazing .Mary and John's action of producing a




John Mary John produce a rabbit
John produce a rabbit amazed Mary
Notice that 26 requires the Like-Subject constraint so that
the subject of Sj and of are co-referential: this would
be handled in our grammar by the rule of Raising, which takes
the semantic specification of one noun and Raises lit into a
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higher one. There is also the problem of the exact si tus
of in the structures is it, in fact, an NP or should it
be a Prepositional Phrase in order to account for the
preposition by? Even if it is dominated by PP, Aijrner
gives no means of showing why only hjr is possible in this
sentence and no other preposition, nor of handling the fact
that the by-clause is a manner adverb. The derivation of
27 is more problematical. Aijmer proposes two rules:
firstly Extraposition, which moves the sentential subject
to sentence final position and secondly Subject-Raising,
which raises the subject of S2 into the now vacant subject
position of S^. The main problem is how to account for
the occurrence of by, for whether the rule of Extraposition
attaches S2 to or to the VP there is no structural
identity between this structure and 26 which will allow for
a unified analysis of by.
Dowty (Dowty, 1972) also proposes structures for
similar sentences to 25 above (see also Kastovsky 1973 who
handles such sentences in. essentially the same manner as
Dowty). Dowty posits two predicates DO and CAUSE, the
latter taking both a sentential subject and object, i.e. it
marks a relation between a causal Force and a resulting
event and the predicate DO takes an animate NP as subject
and a sentential object. One further property of DO in
Dowty*s grammar is that it denotes volition on the part of
the subject, (Ross, 1972 makes the same claim for his
predicate DO and we shall consider below the problems which
this creates for the relation between DO and the surface form
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do). Under Dowty#s analysis the structure of the two













28 is the structure which underlies what Dowty calls the
intentional interpretation of 25, while 29 underlies the non-
intentional: this intentional vs. non-intentional distinction
parallels the distinction which Lee draws between method and
causative by-clauses and the distinction drawn here between
Agent and Force as subject in the underlying structure.
The derivation of 28 proceeds as follows: firstly
the subject of S2, JOHN, is raised into where it will be
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deleted by Equi-NP-Deletion since it is co-referential rith
a higher occurrence in S^, and secondly the rule of by-
phrase formation applies. The rest of the derivation is
not dealt with explicitly but presumably successive
application of Predicate Raising will raise the predicates
AMAZED, COME ABOUT, and CAUSE into the V of S0 and a lexical
insertion rule will insert amaze for DO CAUSE COME ABOUT
AMAZED. There are two problems with this derivation, the
most important of which coneras this rule of by-phrase
fontKtion. To claim that there is such a rule is merely to
ensure that we obtain the correct surface structure.
However, without some formulation of this rule and an
exploration of the conditions under which it applies, Dowty*s
analysis reduces to the mere claim that there is a by-clause
in the surface structure and as such is as insightful as the
statement that the first word is John, the second amaze the
third Mary etc. The question which needs to be asked is
why it is a rule of by-phrase formation and not of to- for-
from- rhubarb- phrase formation, if we are going to have a
grar.T,iar which approaches explanatory adequacy. Secondly
the grammar which Dowty proposes makes the wrong claims about
the acceptability of some sentences. He notes that the rule
of Super-Equi discussed by Neubauer (Neubauer, 1972) would
delete the subject of S? before it raises. Super-Equi is an
optional rule and pronouns can appear in such positions.
For example, the rule may or may not apply in the underlying
structure of 30 which accounts for the optional pronouns
30. John thought that (his) going off by himself would
annoy Mary
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Dowty claims, then, that such pronouns are only possible
in sentences with the intentional reading. He admits that
the intuitions on this matter "are not clear" but the claim
contradicts that made by Lee (1971a). We noted above
(3.1.6.) that Lee supports his analysis with the fact that
pro-forras are possible only in causative by-clauses i.e.
non-intentional and the facts seem to support Lee rather
than Dovty on this matter, namely that a non-intentional
reading is preferred with a pronoun present in the by—clause*
Turning to the derivation of 29» the same two rules
will apply, namely Subject-Raising which raises the subject
of and attaches is to the right of the V of and
secondly by-phrase formation. Since JOHN will be the NP
immediately to the right of CAUSE, it will be moved into
surface subject position by the rule of Subject—Formation.
There is an alternative derivation for 29 in which Subject-
Raising does not apply. In this derivation the NP eligible
for Subject-Formation is the one dominating S^ so that the
surface structure will be
31. John•s producing a rabbit amazed Mary
Notice again that there is the problem of by-phrase
formation. However, added to this is the question of
lexicalisation as amaze: Predicate-Raising applied to 29
will produce CAUSE COME ABOUT AMAZED while applied to 28 it
produced DO CAUSE COME ABOUT AMAZED. Dowty does not
explain why two different structures both lexicalise as
amaze.
While we must reject the major part of Dowty«s analysis.
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there is one part which is worth preserving, namely the
treatment of CAUSE. The structure which he proposes does
allow, as he notes, for the application of Predicate-
Raising to the sentential subject of CAUSE as opposed to its
application to the sentential object which produces amaze
in the above structures. Thus consider another structure
where the sentential subject of CAUSE is something like
"John stab Bill with a knife" and the object "Bill died".
If Predicate-Raising applies in the sentential object then
we obtain the verb kill:
32. John killed Bill by stabbing him with a knife
However, it can also apply in the sentential subject to
produce
33. John stabbed Bill to death with a knife
Such an analysis parallels many sentences discussed by Green
(Green, 1970) where the verb narks the activity and the
adjective the resulting state.
Turning to the suggestions of Lee (Lee, 1971a), we are
faced with a problem, for his suggestions remain suggestions
and are not directly embodied in any structure which he
presents. The hypothesis which governs Leefs study is that
in underlying structure,only Agents can appear as the
subject HP, so that any surface structure subject which is
not an Agent must be a derived subject. In terras of this
let us consider the properties of causative and method
by-clauses which he recognises (see 3»1.6. above for more
details).
(i) method by-clauses require an activity verb, i.e. one
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which allows a subject as defined by Lee. Causative clauses
do not require an activity verb.
(ii) method clauses do not express the reason for the action
described by the main verb, while causatives do.
(iii) Xn a sentence with a method clause the subject is
generated directly in the underlying subject position, while
with a causative clause the subject is derived from a manner
adverbial which underlies the causative clause. One of the
pieces of evidence for this is the Like-Subject constraint
(see 3.1.6. for the three arguments for this given by Lee).
(iv) Sentences with method clauses do not have a paraphrase
with a nominalisation as subject while those with causatives
do .
(v) Parallelling (iv) is the fact that only causative
clauses allow a paraphrase with The fact that... as subject.
(vi) Only sentences with method clauses allow Benefactives
and expressions of purpose.
If we embody these claims in the underlying structure,
then the simplest would be the following:
34.
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that if* this element appears, then we are dealing with a
method by-clause, but if* it is absent, then it is a
causative clause.) Let us go through the points i-vi
above with respect to this structure.
(i) To account for this we need a constraint to the effect
that the verb of must be an activity verb if S0 has a
subject, a constraint which does not conform to the normal
conditions on constraints and seems to have little explan¬
atory power.
(ii) This point does not seem to be adequately accounted
for in the structure. Again the problem seems to be that
a great deal is dependent on the presence or absence of an
underlying subject.
(iii) This is embodied directly in the structure and needs
no comment.
(iv-v) Both these points are to be related in that they
involve movement of the Manner Adv constituent into Subject
position. Notice that nominal!sations and clauses intro*.
duced by The fact that.. are prevented from originating in
subject position by the constraint that this position is
reserved for Agents and this is the only reason why a
treatment which is intuitively more satisfying and one which
does not require a movement rule of the form mentioned is
not allowed.
(vi) This point again is related to the occurrence of a
subject and could in principle be handled by a constraint
which rules out structures which have a purpose clause but
no subject. Notice, however, that this is a strange
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constraint ,4n that it requires a lexical item in subject
position to select the occurrence of a major constituent*
or alternatively it requires that a purpose clause control
the insertion of a lexical item in subject position.
Whichever way the constraint is formulated, assuming that
this is, in fact, possible, we are dealing with a form of
constraint for which there is no precedent in terms of the
model with which Lee is working.
Finally we should observe that Lee is going to require
some rule which inserts the preposition b^r at some point as
a constituent of Manner Adv, and we have already commented
on the difficulties of this in our discussion of Dowty.
Thus what is the controlling factor in Lee*s structure which
will select by? However, if we leave the discussion of
Lee*s proposals at this point, then we leave untouched Us
proposals concerning direct and indirect causation, which
must, in some way, be reflected in structure 34.
As pointed out in our discussion of Lee*8 use of the
terms "direct" and "indirect" causation, he uses these
terms for essentially syntactic properties, or rather to
characterise certain properties of the underlying structure
of sentences (see 3.2.1. above). He equates indirect
causation with causative by-clauses and direct causation
with method by-clauses and further gives three arguments
which, he believes, support the claim that the predicate
CAUSE is present in the underlying structure of sentences
which contain causative by-clauses. The three arguments
depend on the non-synonymy of 35a and 35b as opposed to the
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synonymy of 36a and 36b;
35a. John killed Bill
b. John caused Bill to die
36a. John's arrival necessitated a revision of their
secondly on the unacceptability of nominalisations in
subject position with certain verbs;
37. *John's failure to turn the burner off boiled the
38. John's sudden death surprised many people
and thirdly on the idiosyncratic behaviour of certain verbs
in that they do not imply the truth of their complement.
39. John suggested to Mary that pigs are stupid
To account for Lee's suggestion, we must, therefore, modify
the structure given as 34 and the two structures underlying
40. John amazed Mary by producing a rabbit
will be the following;
plans














John produce a rabbit
S
2
Structure 41 will automatically account for the non¬
occurrence of nominalisations as subjects of sentences with
method by-clauses since in these cases there is no empty
subject node for the Manner Adv to move into. Other
difficulties which we noted with structure 34 are more
easily solved in that, for example, we can make the
occurrence of purpose clauses dependent on the nature of the
verb as opposed to the insertion of a lexical item in subject
position, that is whatever factor is involved in selecting
the verb from the category which includes amaze will also
select the possibility of a purpose expression so that a
structure with CAUSE cannot also contain such an expression*
While easing certain questions, however, the structures
will not account for the occurrence of b£ and they also
introduce their own problems. The basis of the criticism
lies in the third argument relating to the idiosyncratic
behaviour of certain verbs. Lee claims that 43a implies
44 while 43b does not:
43a. Possession of a ticket guaranteed Mary's
admission
b. John guaranteed Mary's admission
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44. It was certain that Mary could enter
That is, when we have a derived subject and an underlying
CAUSE, then the sentence implies the truth of* but with
an Agent subject and no CAUSE, this is not the case.
However, how, then, do we deal with the sentence in which the
subject fulfils all the conditions of being an Agent and the
verb still implies the truth of the complement, as in:
45. John cleverly guaranteed Mary that she could enter
the meeting by giving her a letter written by
himself
that is, the presence of the adverb cleverly shows that we
are dealing with an Agent subject and a method by-clause,
and moreover the sentence implies that Mary can enter. It
is just the truth of this implication that Lee claims
supports the analysis with CAUSE. Thus we are faced with
a problem, either the underlying structure of 45 contains
CAUSE, in which case Lee*s whole analysis lcoks shaky or we
allow the underlying verb GUARANTEE which selects a subject
to be ambiguous, which again makes Lee's proposals less than
satisfactory. The situation becomes more difficult with
verbs like kill and break, since if the truth of the
complement requires the presence of the predicate CAUSE,
then how do we deal with the fact that kill and break
always imply that someone is dead or something is broken
without positing an underlying CAUSE?
As Lee himself observes, there are inadequacies on the
semantic level, in that his structures do not account for
the intuitively felt relationship between killing and
causing to die. Related to this is the problem of
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lexical!sat ion in general. How do we account for the fact
that the verb in the surface structure of both 41 and 42 is
amazed? Why should there be any identity at all?
Similarly why does CAUSE 3EC0ME DEAD, a structure in an
indirect causation structure, lexicalise as kill, a form
which occurs in the structure underlying direct causation?
Lee mentions the possibility that there is a second predicate
corresponding to CAUSE but requiring a subject which is
lexically specified. This predicate he represents as
AGENTTZE. Further if direct and indirect causation do not
have underlying structures with decomposed verbs, i.e.
something like AGENTTZE BECOME DEAD and CAUSE BECOME DEAD
respectively, there is the further problem not only of why
by occurs in by-clauses but of why it occurs in both method
and causative by-clauses, that is the position which involves
Io S«j
two completely different structures l-oeses one possible
structural identity which could condition the occurrence of
by. As they stand, Lee's proposals are not sufficient to
describe English. There are two main reasons for this:
firstly, the hypothesis that only Agents occur in subject
position in underlying structure and secondly, the use of
the terms "direct" and "indirect causation" to refer to
syntactic properties. Arising out of this discussion and
that in Chapter 3 (see 3«2.1.), there are two hypotheses
which we shall consider, firstly that there are two predicates
DO, corresponding to Lee's AGENTIZE, and CAUSE, taking
animate NPs and sentential subjects respectively and that the
terms "direct" and "indirect causation" are to be related
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to tlie relation between the verbal action and the object
acted upon.
4.2.2. Propex*ties of DO and CAUSE
We discussed the relations between the surface forms
cause and do and the predicates CAUSE and DO in the preced¬
ing Chapter (see 3.2.5. above) and we have suggested that
CAUSE takes a predicative Abl and a predicative All (4.2.)
which will capture the intuition that the verb cause
expresses a particular type of relation between two events.
Such a treatment will also prevent structures with CAUSE
from containing a direct object or any noun denoting a
person who is acted upon. The unacceptabiiity of 4b will
thereby be accounted for:
4<>. ?What did John cause to Bill?
This claim is, in fact, the parallel of Dowty*s claim that
his predicate CAUSE requires a sentential subject and a
sentential object. It will also be a property of this
predicate that the predicative All is true: that is if
X CAUSEs Y, then it is the case that Y occurred. Although
we shall doal with this in detail below (see 4.4.2.), the
fact that CAUSE marks a relation between two events will
allow us to relate this predication to indirect causation.
As we saw in the last chapter in our discussion of Fodor
(Fodor, 1970 see 3.2.5.) indirect causation involves the
non-contoniporanoity of two events or actions.
The role of DO is more problematical. There are two
basic questions: the first one concerns the relationship
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between this predicate and all the occurrences of do. For
instance, does DO occur in the underlying structure of
sentences like:
47. Does John know the answer?
48. What these columns do is support the weight of
the roof
The second question is whether, given that do in action
sentences allows objects with various prepositions, we
recognise different underlying predicates DO or handle
these variations in some other way. There seems to be no
firm answer to the first question without some more detailed
analysis of the predicate DO itself, which is the task before
us in this Chapter. However, there is one hypothesis which
will guide our study and which may serve to exclude from
consideration sentences like 47: if CAUSE is the predicate
related to indirect causation, then it seems likely that the
corresponding predicate for direct causation is DO and on
this basis wo can exclude 47 as not involving causation at
all. We return to this question below (Chapter 6).
Ihe second question can be approached by considering
the following sentences:
49a. John ran home
b. What John did was run home
50a. John threw the book on the table
b. What John did with the book was throw it on the
table
51a. John stabbed Bill with a knife
b. What John did to Bill was stab him with a knife
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52a. John did a favour for Bill
*>. John did Sill a favour
c. What John did for Bill can never be repaid
For the moment ve can leave aside k9 a® the verb does not
have an object. The first problem concerns the relation
between 50 and 51 where the contrast lies in the with*to
alternation in the b forms, which we discussed in the
preceding chapter (see 3.2.3.). Assuming that the
subjects of these sentences i.e. John in both cases
originates as the Agent from an Abl and that the verbal
action has a structure containing DO and a nominal form
governed by Abs which is incorporated into it (we argue
for this position below what case, then can we
assign to the objects in 50 and 51? The occurrence of to
suggests that we are dealing with an underlying All and as
we shall see in the next chapter with typically marks a
case complex which contains an occurrence of Loc. There
are two ways of handling this difference. Firstly we
might set up two predicates 2X>^ and DO^t the first of
which requires an object dependent on Loc and the second
an object dependent on All. Secondly we might treat this
difference as the consequence of some other factor in the
underlying structure, for example in terms of what case is
eligible for object-hood. As a matter of principle, the
second approach is to be favoured, in that the former
merely states that there is a difference and labels it
with the sub-scripts 1 and 2, while the second involves
presupposing that there is some identifiable pattern
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behind this difference which is reducible to some deeper
regularity. We shall look for this regularity in what
follows, essentially it will involve the presence of the
case Abs marking the case All or Loc.
The second problem concerns the relation between
sentences 31 and 52. We have said that the object of 51
is governed by All and it was suggested earlier that
Benefactives and purpose expressions are also to be treated
as dependent on All. However, in this case it does appear
that we need to set up two predicates or at least to allow
structures which involve two DO predicates, one dependent
on the other. One of these DO predicates will take
direct objects expressing the person or object acted upon
or who receives the action, and the other taking objects
or predicates which express the person for whom the action
is done and who receives benefit from the action or the
reason for performing the action respectively. This is
because there are sentences which contain both an All of
the person acted upon and an All of the benefactee or
purpose and we adopt from Fillmore via Anderson the
constraint that any case can occur only once in any
predication (Fillmore, 197M Anderson, 1976)
53. John kill.d Bill to please mry
Notice that such an analysis for other languages receives
more concrete support, in that Fillmore reports (Fillmore,
1971a) that in some languages the expression of Benefactives
involves two overt predications, one involving a form like
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give and the other the predication of the action, so that
the following sentence has a form more closely parallelled
by 55»
54* John sang for Mary
55. John gave his singing to Mary
Compare also English sing for the audiMice and give, the
audience a song.
4.3. A Nominal Interlude
In this section we shall consider what evidence there
is to suggest that there is no noun/vexi> distinction in
underlying structure. The evidence is of two sorts:
firstly, those analyses of English, whether Lexicalist or
Transformationalist, which implicitly acknowledge close
relationships between nouns and verbs, and secondly,
certain morphological facts about languages which show a
close relationship, if not absolute identity, between the
two categories. Ve shall further explore the hypothesis
in respect to our development of a Localist Case Grammar.
In the transformationalist literature we find it
argued that adjectives are verbs (Lakoff, 1970), that
adjectives are noun phrases (Ross, 1969) and that there is
a class of "contentives" which contains nouns, adjectives
and verbs (Bach, 1968). Schachter, 1973) shows that these
arguments do not support the actual identity of these
categories in the underlying structure so much as they
support the Lexicalist Interpretivist position first
proposed by Chomsky (Chomsky, 1970). Thus replying to
Lakoff*s argument concerning the stativity of adjectives
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and verbs (Lakoff, 1970), Chomsky shows that nouns must
also be subdivided In an exactly parallel way in that we
find sentences with imperatives and progressive aspects
Be a hero
b. *Be a person
57&« He*s being a hero
b. *He »s being a person
Chomsky's position and that of the Lexicalists is that the
relationships between the categories noun, adjective and
verb can be captured by features.
"It is possible that the categories noun, verb,
adjective, are the reflection of a deeper feature
structure, each being a combination of features of
a more abstract sort. In this way the various
relations among the features might be expressible."
(Chomsky, op. cit.s 199)
Chomsky admits that this is speculation and needs more work
and study before it can be made explicit. This has been
carried out by Jackendoff (jackendoff, 1974) who proposes
the features +Subj, jjDbj, +Comp. Thus noun, verb,
auxiliaries and modals, quantifiers and articles are +Subj,
while prepositions, particles, adjectives and adverbs are
-Subj, +0bj distinguishes verb, auxiliary and modal,
preposition and particle from noun, quantifier and article,
adjective and adverb, which are -Obj. +Comp marks those
cagegories noun, verb, adjective and preposition which can
take some form of qualifier in their specifier! thus to
each of them we have the corresponding quantifier or
article, auxiliary or modal, particle and adverb. However,
Jackendoff does not show that there is any actual empirical
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difference between Lakoff*s position and the LvXicalist
one. In Lakoff*s work, adjectives and verbs are
distinguished according to the value of the feature +Adj
on the category symbol V, whereas in the Lexicalist the
distinction will be in terms of the value of the features
+SubJ and +Obj but here these features are not features on
a node but features which constitute a bundle forming a
node.
However, it is Chomsky's treatment of nominalisations
and his claims for the structures which are of importance
to our present concerns. In opposition to the Transform¬
ationalists , Chomsky wishes to generate nominalisations
directly in the base instead of deriving them from sent¬
ences. Chomsky does this by introducing the X-Bar
Convention, which involves rule schema of the following
form i
mm
i. X > (specifier X) (x)
ii. X > (x) (Complement)
where the symbol X may have substituted for it N, V or
Adj. Thus for the underlying structure of
58. The enemy destroyed the city
59. The enemy's destruction of the city
we have the following:
60. S
V
Spec N N Spec V V
Det N V
the enemy past destroy
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The important consequence of Chomsky's proposals is that
many rules and operations must be defined so that they
operate both on S and N. The rules which Chomsky discusses
with respect to this point are NP-preposing and Agent-
Poetposing. The Passive marker, i.e. b£ + y\ is treated
as a constituent of Comp so that it may appear in both of
the above structures: if this is the case then Agent-
Postposing applies to place the enemy after the verb so
that NP-Preposing may move the city into the now vacant
subject position, to produce the "passive" forms
62. The city was destroyed by the enemy
63. The city's destruction by the enemy
Before looking at the above structures more closely
to show their relevance to the question of noun-verb
identity, there is another claim of Chomsky's that must be
considered; namely that the subject and object relations
can be defined on S and NP. Again this shows the
similarity of S and NP, but the Important point is that in
Chomsky it remains a claim and is not substantiated.
Although, as Chomsky claims, the above structures 60 and 61
are mirrors of each other, he does not show that they mirror
each other closely enough to allow these relations to be
defined in a unitary manner.
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This tb.nK. is carried out by Jackendoff (Jn ckendoff,
1974) who shows that it entails what are from our present
point of view some interesting alterations to 60. Thus
in this structure V corresponds to PredP which governs Aux
and VP i.e. Spec V and V. An alternative analysis will
have Aux directly dependent on S, Jackendoff further
suggests that we remove the category Spec X completely
from the grammar, and proposes as the resulting structure
to replace 60
64 •
the enemy past destroy the city
Thus whereas in 60 and 61 the subject is dominated directly
by S and by the Spec N node, which latter makes the subject
look more like the auxiliary node i.e. the SpecV of the VP,
in 64 and the likewise modified 61, see 65 over, since
Spec N has been removed, the subject in both cases is the N
which is dominated by N and V. Notice that now S is
removed from the grammar and replaced
65.
the enemy's" destruction of the city
by V and we can unify the treatment of cyclic category,
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that is instead of listing NP and S as defining the domain
of the transformational cycle we can now say that anything
marked with the double bar defines the domain of the
cycle. It is also now quite clear that what distinguishes
Nouns from Verbs is the possibility of tense and aspect
occurring only with the latter* but then if these ire
treated as higher predicates as Generative semanticists
do (see HeCawley, 1971b)* the category Aux can be removed,
as can the rules introducing aspect in the VP making the
parallel between the two even closer.
Chomsky's proposals also come in for some criticism
from Stockwell et al (stockwell et al.* 1973)* criticisms
which also bear on the noun-verb relationship. They try
to refine Chomsky's structures* in particular by introducing
cases into the underlying structures* that is* they wed
the Lexicalist approach to a Fillmorean case grammar.
They point out (Stockwell et al.* op. cit.: 5) that
Chomsky's arguments depend in part on the assumption that
whether the symbol X used in the X-Bar convention was V
«■» mm
or N* the corresponding structures* whether V* N, V or N*
exhibit significant parallels. Their counter-claim reduces
to the fact that in structures 6o and 6l there are parallels*
but they are of the sort which do not admit of a straight¬
forward capturing in a Subject-Predicate analysis and that
one of the major features harming this is the presence of
Spec V* corresponding to the Aux of earlier grammars.
Related to this is the fact that in 60, the enemy stands
mm
outside the V but in the corresponding nominal isation
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the enemy's is inside the N, i.e. as Spec N it is a
constituent of N. These are essentially the points which
Jackendoff*s analysis tidies away, but it is of interest
to see what conclusions Stockwell et al. draw from them.
Stockwell et al. point out (Stockwell et al., op. cit.:
6) two further problems for a X-Bar convention in a
Subject-Predicate analysis. Given that the enemy is in the
same relation to destroy in 60 and destruction in 6l,
under the Lexicalist hypothesis embodying the Subject-
Predicate analysis, this must be attributed to configura-
tional similarities. Stockwell et al. question the
feasibility of this and observe further that it is difficult
to motivate representing in a uniform manner the requirement
that the subject of the verb destroy and the genitive
phrase with destruction must both be +Concrete. The
second problem relates to Chomsky*s treatment of passivisa-
tion and the corresponding nominalisation the city's
destruction by the enemy. In both cases Agent-Postposing
applies and then subsequently NP-Preposing. However,
this raises a problem in that while there are no passives
without subjects, i.e. NP-Preposing is obligatory with
verbs, there are nominalisa tions without genitive phrases
i.e. the destruction of the city by the enemy. They treat
this latter as the result of non-application of the Case-
placement rules.
A closer view of the relationship between nouns and
verbs is given by considering the structures which Stockwell
give to replace 60 and 6l. Notice firstly that their
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grammar embodies the claim that in the underly. ng structure
nouns may take the same array of cases as vextos, which
again makes nouns and verbs look alike. Thus the structures
they propose are the following:
66.
Spec V
destroy the city the enemy
67.
Spec N
destruction the city the enemy
Notice that the parallel here is complete between N and V,
ignoring the fact that Stockwell et al. introduce the
category NP into a structure conforming to the X-Dar
convention. Spec V here parallels Fillmore*s Proposition
(Fillmore. 1968) and Spec N allows for determiners and the
fronting of either of the two cases. There are two major
points to make. Firstly the structures parallel
Jackendoff*s in emphasising the relation and parallels
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between nouns and verbs, and similarly like Jaokendoff • s
em
in having V as the initial symbol make the structures look
as if we are dealing with a verb--dependency grammar, i.e.
one in which the nuclear element is the verb on which all
entities are dependent either directly or indirectly.
Secondly structure 66 also captures a significant point
made by Lyons, although Stockwell et al. were apparently
unaware of this. Lyons (Lyons, 1968) makes the point
that just as deictic elements such as this that, i.e. items
of the Determiner or Spec N locating the noun with respect
to the speaker, so the category of tense "relates the time
of the action, event or state of affairs referred to in the
sentence to the time of utterance. Tense is therefore a
deictic category..." (Lyons, op. cit.: 305). Thus the
role of the Specifier is to locate some entity, whether it
be located in space, Spec N, or in time, Spec V, which
seems to involve a Locallstic analysis. This point also
ties in with related suggestions of McCawley (McCawley,
1971b), Anderson, (Anderson, 1973) and Kiparsky (Kiparsley,
1968) among others, namely that tense is derived from a
higher predication or in the work of the last mentioned is
a sort of concord marker between the verb and a temporal
adverb.
4*3.1. More Concrete Arguments
Before looking in more detail at arguments for the
relationship, if not identity, of nouns and verbs, we must
pause and look more closely at what we are claiming. In
the last section we noted that Chomsky (Chomsky, op. cit.)
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wants certain transformations, i.e. Agent-Postposing and
NP-Preposing to apply to NP and S. In a dependency grammar
these will correspond to N and V, so that the claim can be
altered to state that the transformations cycle both on N
and V. Chomsky also wishes to define the notions
"subject" and "object" on S and NP, which translated into
case grammar terms in the fashion of Stockwell et al.
comes to the claim that nouns and verbs allow the same
array of cases. Similarly nouns and verbs can be given a
location, one in space, tho other in time. This, in fact,
appears to be the crucial difference between them as noted,
for example, by Key among others (Key, 1874)
"Of course, when from a verb we subtract all that
denotes person and time, we arrive at a residuum,
which one person may call an abstract substantive
and, another, a verb or symbol of an act
(Key, op. cit.: 70)
Xt seems to be the case that there is syntactic identity
between nouns and verbs in that they have essentially the
same structure and cases dependent on them in underlying
structure. If it is the case that what distinguishes
them above all is the occurrence of tense and aspect
markers with verbs and if it is the case that tense and
aspect are higher predications, then strong support for
the identity of nouns and verbs in underlying structure
would be found if it were the case that only Root
transformations applied to verbs, i.e. to those head
elements in the highest predication which will involve
tense while both Structure-Preserving nd Local transformations
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applied to both nouns and verbs, (for these no ions see
Emonds* 1976). We cannot explore this possibility fully
here* but we shall survey what evidence there is in the
literature which involves transformations and rules of
semantic interpretation cycling on NP and S.
4*3.1.1. Interpretiviat Arguments
In this section we shall review arguments for
relationships between nouns and verbs which are due to
properties of the interpret!vist descriptions of English.
The first two arguments* Reflexivisation and Complement
Subject Deletion, result from the conjunction of the
Lexicalist Hypothesis and the claim that no transformations
may refer to semantic properties of the sentence. It
follows from the latter that pronominal and reflexive forms
are to be generated directly in the base and then inter¬
preted by the sanantic rules. Similarly* there is no rule
of Complement Subject Deletion* rather there is no lexical
item inserted in the subject NP, and the symbol la
interpreted as co-referential wxth some higher NP.
According to Jackendoff•s treatment (jackendoff, 1972)
the structure of
68. John's picture of himself pleased the critics
will be something like
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John picture himself past please the critics
The interpretive rule of reflexivisation must then be
allowed to cycle on NP in order for John and himself to be
entered in the Table of Co-reference as co-referential.
That the interpretive rule of Complement Subject must also
cycle on NP is shown by a consideration of that old
sentence without which no work on linguistics is complete,
namely,
70. John is eager to please
which we may represent in the deep structure as;
71. (« John is eager ( to please)c )Q
1 2 b2 bl
On the last cycle, i.e. S^, the Complement Subject rule
will apply to mark John and as co-referential.
Corresponding to this sentence we have the derived nominal
John»s eagerness to please, which has the underlying
structure:
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Again, in order that John and Z\ can be mar, ed aa co-
referential, the Complement Subject rule must cycle on NP
or N. There is a third argument based on Interpret!vist
ideas, but involving the rule of Modal Projection, but
since it is of essentially the same form as the two above
we shall not go into it fully.
4.3.1*2• Theory neutral arguments
By a "theory neutral argument" we understand an
argument which shows a relation between nouns and verbs
whether the data is accounted for in an interpretive
grammar by means of a projection rule or a transformation
or in a transformational grammar by means of a deletion
or movement transformation. Jackendoff (jackendoff,
1971) provides one suoh argument. He is concerned with
the rules of Gapping and VP-Deletion and the constraints
placed on them. Gapping is a rule which accounts for the
following (examples taken from Jackendoff):
73. Max ate the apples and Bill the pears
74* Ivan plays the Krummhom, Bill the fluegelhorn
and Schwarat the bassethom
and VP-Deletion operates in case the verb phrases are
completely identical, always leaving behind one or more
auxiliary verbs, thus:
75. Max ate the apples and Bill did too
76. Either Ivan will write the play or Boris will
Jackendoff observes that Just as Gapping delstes material
from the middle of a phrase, we find other sentences where
the gapped material is not a verb:
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77. Bill#s win© from Franc© and Ted*s from California
cannot b© compared
Jackendoff calls this N-Gapping and suggests a parallel form
for VP-Deletion in a rule of N-Deletion which accounts for
sentences like:
73. Bill*s story about Sue may be amazing, but Max*s
is virtually incredible
We cannot discuss the details fully here, but Jackendoff shows
that there are certain factors common to Gapping and N-Gapping
on the one hand and VP-Deletion and N-Deletion on the other
which can be accounted for by adopting the X-Bar Convention
and having two rules X-Gapping and X-Deletion, where X may
be either N or V.
Akmajian has further evidence for the necessity of
cycling on S and NP based on the rule of Extraposition and
the rule of Extraposition of Prepositional Phrase (Akmajian,
1975). Extraposition is a rule which takes a sentential
subject and moves it to the right of the verb and is a
"rightward bounded" rule (Ross, 1967), so that it can only
move the S to the right of the next highest verb, that is
79a is a possible sentence while 79b is not:
79&. That it*s obvious that the world is round is not
clear
b. *That it*s obvious is not clear that the world is
round
Extraposition of Prepositional Phrasepostposes complements
from NPs:
80. A review of this book will appear shortly
81. A review will appear shortly of this book.
This rule must also be rightward bounded, as is shown by the
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following:
82a. That a review of this book infill appear shortly
is certain
b. That a review will appear shortly of this book
is certain
c. *That a review will appear shortly is certain of
this book
Thus essentially the same constraint must be placed on two
x*ulest but these two rules can be collapsed as one if we
have one rule of Extraposition which can cycle on NP and S.
4.3.1.3. Transformationalist arguments
Although the first argument is not strictly speaking
restricted to a transformationalist approach, the rules with
which we are dealing are to be found more generally in such
grammars. Both arguments are to do with the treatment of
nominalisations, and involve the derivation of action
nominalisations, that is those formed in -ing, having the
internal structure of a noun phrase and having a paraphrase
in the act of. Following Katz and Postal (Katz and Postal,
I964) we also include such constructions as:
83a. The time of John*s arrival
b. John's time of arrival
84a. The manner of John's arrival
b. John's maimer of arrival
Katz and Postal (Katz and Postal, op. cit.), Fraser (Fraser,
1970), Newmeyer (Newmeyer, 1970) and Stockwell et al.
(Stockwell et al., 1973) all adopt a similar analysis of
such nominalisations. Thus the underlying structure will
be something like:
2kS.
85. the act John drive the car)g
and the following rules apply in the order given,
OF-Insert!on, Gerund Formation, NP-Preposing, Nominalisation,
Poss-Insertion to give the following derivation:
86a. the act of (.. John drive the car)_
o o
b. the act of John driving the car
c. John act of driving the car
d. John driving of the car
•« John's driving of the car
We follow here the rules given by Newmeyer (Newtaeyer, op. cit.).
In this derivation there are two rules which interest us,
firstly NP-Preposing and secondly Nominalisation. The
effect of NP-Preposing is to take the subject of the
embedded sentence and place it before the "head" noun act.
Although he does not commit himself, Nowraeyer suggests that
this may be the same rule which Chomsky (Chomsky, 1970) and
Bowers (Bowers, 1969) propose to relate the knifing of John
8X111 John's knifing. Chomsky, also suggests that this same
rule of NP-Preposing relates the likelihood of John's
coming and John's likelihood of coming. In fact there is
every reason to believe that we are dealing with two
different rules here. Notice that the first rule of
NP—Preposing takes John which under Chomsky's analysis is
dominated by the N which also dominates knifing and proposes
it. However, in the second case, the element which moves,
namely John, is not dominated by the N which dominates












the likelihood John coming
Thus NP-Preposing is a rule which applies across clause
boundaries, as Chomsky allows, but if it is to be a rule
applying within simple sentences, as is more common in
Transformationalist approaches, then we cannot have one rule
of NP-Preposing applying to both 87 and 88. If there is to
be just one rule, then we need another rule which will move
John out of N in 88 and attach it to N. Newmeyer does not
argue explicitly for this in his 1970 paper, but he does
have an argument against Chomsky's NP-Preposing rule which
shows some problems for it. Thus while 89& does transform
to 89b, there is no reason under Chomsky's analysis why 90a
does not transform to 90b:
89a. the likelihood of John's coming
b. John's likelihood of coming
90a. the filming of John's slaying the dragon
b. ♦John's filming of slaying the dragon
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Newmeyer suggests that this can be captured in terms of
subject-embedding versus object-embedding. However, there
is another means of accounting for this and also reducing
the two rules of NP—Preposing to one which will account for
87 and 88 and their transforms. This involves the
extension of an already motivated rule, at least in the
Transformationalist literature. This rule usually goes
under the name of Raising And has the required effect of
raising a subject into a higher clause, (see Chomsky, 1973
and Postal, 1974 for the controversy over this rule).
Raising relates such strings as s
91a. John believes that Bill is a fool
b. John believes Bill to be a fool
92a. John believes that he is God's gift to women
b. John believes himself to be God's gift to women
where the reflexive form in 92b is taken by Transformation¬
alists to show that in the underlying structure himself, or
the occurrence of "John" which reflexivises, is in the same
sentence as the subject, i.e. they are clause-mates.
Raising, then, takes the subject of an embedded sentence
and moves it into the clause that immediately dominates it.
Newmeyer, (Newmeyer, 1974) has called the rule which has
the same effect but with noiuinals Boosting, that is there
is a rule which operates on structures like:
93. the manner of John's driving
and attaches the subject of driving to manner, to produce
94. *The manner of John's of driving
NP-Preposing can then apply and front John's. Notice that
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NP-Preposing here is obligatory, but there are structures
parallelling 9k where it is optional:
95a, That manner of John*s of driving carelessly about
the streets
b. That habit of John*s of refusing to concede
defeat in the face of overwhelming counter¬
examples
Thus Boosting is a parallel of Raising distinguished only
by the fact that it applies when the "head" is a noun.
Such a rule accounts also for 90b, in that if Harold is to
be in a position where NP-Preposing can apply, then Raising
must have operated to move it into the next higher sentence,
but this sentence contains the element film which is not a
Raising verb or noun.
Thus we have two rules, the first one being Raising
applying when there is a verb and tho other being Boosting
applying when there is a noun. By removing the noun-verb
distinction from the grammar we can conflate these rules as
one. Notice that this rule is not restricted to such nouns
as likelihood, manner, time etc., as it may well be at work
relating such pairs as:
96a. a man for you to watch
b. your man to watch
97a. the book for you to read
b. your book to read
Boosting, like Raising, also seems to be an optional rule
and may apply without subsequent NP-Preposing. The
important point about this rule is that it destroys the
context for Poss(essive) Formation in the lower sentence,
that is the noun moved is no longer dominated by the nheadn
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noun (compare this with Raising which prevents tense form¬
ation) and we do find structures which differ solely in the
presence versus absence of a possessive:
98a. the likelihood of John's coming
b. the likelihood of Jolm coming
The second point which we said is of interest in the
derivation of nominalisations proposed by Katz and Postal
et al, concerned the rule of Nominalisation itself. This
is a rule which replaces the nouns act or manner by the
gerund, i.e. 86c becomes 86d:
86c. John act of driving the car
d. John driving of the car
However, we must ask what the difference is between a rule
which replaces a noun with a gerund and a rule which is






that is, where the verb of the lower S has been Predicate-
Raised into the V of the higher S. Thus we have one rule
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which raises a verb into a higher verb and another which
raises a gerund, i.e. a noun, into a higher noun. Again,
removing the noun-verb distinction allows us to conflate
I '
these rules as one. Notice also that the rule of gerund
formation itself may be an artefact of the theory to ensure
that a category will only raise into a higher occurrence
of itself. However, there is good reason to doubt whether
this is, in fact, the case, and here we must turn to the rule
of Incorporation proposed by Gruber (Gruber, 19&5) end
adopted by many linguists. Thus, as we have seen, Fillmore
(Fillmore, 1971d) derives John swam across the lake from a
structure which surfaces in a less deformed state as
John moved across the lake by swirraning by means of a rule
which incorporates the by-clause into the verb. Similarly
McCawley, (McCawley, 1971a) proposes a rule which combines
nouns like hammer, nail, paste, saw with the complex
predicate BY CAUSE to produce surface verbs like to hammer,
to nail etc. (for similar proposals see further examples
in Nilsen, 1973). In this case we are dealing with the
raising of a noun into a verb, while above we had examples
of verb—verb and gerund-noun raising. By treating verbs
as a head noun plus tense marking as suggested above, we
can reduce these different rules to one single rule of
raising.
4.3*1.4* Other evidence
We mentioned above that there is also data from the
surface structure of English which supports the identity of
noun and verb in the underlying structure and this bears
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mainly on Ross's arguments for a structui'e like 99 «-s the
deep structure of The frog croaked, that is there are certain
structures in English which suggest that there is an NP
underlying each verb. Consider the following:
101a. What did John do?
b. What happened to John?
c. "What did John see?
102a. What John did was open the window
b. John saw the new film
c. John saw his own death in a dream
What is usually analysed as the surface form of a structure
like wh-something (see Stockwell et al,, 1973) but in this
case 101c and the corresponding 102b and 102c prove
difficult. In the former what quite evidently questions
a noun, i.e. what thing did John see, but in 101a and 102a,
what is put in relation with a VP, i.e. open the window.
Now we can either have two whats, one for nouns and one for
VPs or posit an NP underlying verbs.
However, besides the question of what, there is also
the phenomenon of S-Pronominalisation (see Lakoff, 1970),
which is said to operate in sentences like:
103. Goldwater won in the West, but it did not happen
in the East
In both cases, besides many others discussed by Ross (Ross,
1972) we can simplify the grammar by positing an NP under¬
lying the verb. The problem is that Ross has this NP
dominating another S and the question that we must ask is
whether there is any evidence for this other S. If, in
fact, it is the case that there is no S without tense
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marking, then there is no reason to believe in the existence
of this embedded S,since in the examples given, the tense
of the lower S must always be the same as that of the higher.
There is, therefore, no reason to believe that a structure
which we can represent as 104 could lexicalise as The frog
croaked
104. Past (g DO frog (g Past (g CROAK frog)g )g )g
1 2 3 3 2 1
Therefore it is easier to assume that there is no S involved,
but rather a simple NP dominating croak, so that we prevent
the occurrence of such unacceptable structures. Notice
that such a structure involving the predicate DO and two
NPs, one dominating the frog, the other croak could also
surface as
105. The frog gave a creak
Further support for the underlying NP of all verbs is
found in the frequency of verbs which have paired with them
a morphologically related noun. There is a highly
restricted set of verbs which may occur with these nouns to
produce verbal complexes having the same meaning as the
simple verb (for further discussion and examples see Liefrink,
1973 and Olsson, i960). Thus we find the followings
GIVE: comfort, help, an order, advice, promise, glance,
kick, shock etc.
HAVE: a smoke, wash, shave, look, chat, try, swim etc.
TAKE: a look, drive, shave, swim, drink, walk, etc.
However, if all verbs have underlying NPs, what is the
status of those verbs which occur in complex verbs? Three
different scholars all point in the same direction in this
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respect: firstly we find in the earliest works on Trans¬
formational gramraer a rule of Do-Support, which introduces
the form do_ to carry tense, aspect and person markings
(Chomsky, 1957) related to this is Lyons* suggestion
(Lyons, 1968) that BE carries the "specification of certain
distinctions...when there is no verbal element to carry
these distinctions. Finally, Jespersen, in a discussion
of complex verbs and their related simple forms, remarks of
them:
Such expressions, instead of the simple verb, are in
accord with the general tendency in Modern English to
place an insignificant (auxiliary) verb, to which the
markers of person and tense are attached, before the
really important idea.
(jespersen, 1933: 71)
All seem to suggest that these verbs are there to carry
tense and person markings. Notice that there is the
problem of why it is just these verbs, namely, bis, become,
have, make, put, give, take which are used, but such a
question deserves a thesis to itself, and we shall not
concern ourselves with it in what follows except insofar
as it may throw light on our discussion and the Localist
Hypothesis.
Thus we can see that there is good evidence to believe
that the noun-verb distinction is a surface structure
feature of English introduced on the last cycle when tense
is relevant. However, there are languages where even the
surface structure distinction is weak, if there is any
distinction at all. Thus Interpretivists claim that the
notion of Subject is defined on NP and S and in general the
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subject in an unmarked case or in a nominative case while
the subject of an NP is marked with a possessive form.
Allen (Allen, 1964) gives examples from many languages where
the subject of transitive sentences and possessors, i.e. the
subject of an NP, receive the same marking. Ihese
languages are not restricted to one Language Family or
linguistic area, so that it is not simply a question of
genetic or a real influence. Thus in Indo-European
languages, we find some relationship between the marking
of the possessor and the transitive subject in the perfect
aspect, i.e. John has a book/killed Bill. It is on the
basis of such a parallel that Georgian is said to be an
Ergative language, thus why should ihglish not be called
an Ergative language in the perfect and why should not
French and Middle English be even more of an Ergative
language given that they distinguish between the Agent as
subject or a perfective verb, avoir, to have and a non-Agent
as subject, e~tre and to be.
Languages where the identity of marking of possessor
and subject of the transitive verb is not restricted to one
aspect include Hungarian, Delaware, Yurok, Taos, Kechua,
Yawelmani (the last five being American Indian languages)
t^e Caucasian languages, fibaza, Kabardian, Unykh, Lakk,
The most commonly quoted language which shows this identity
ia Eskimo, and we take examples from Mey (Mey, 1970).
Consider the following:
i. tiguva~a »he holds it* iii. tiguva—i *he holds them*
ii. nuna-a *his land* iv. nuna-i *his lands*
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In i and iii there is no surface form corresponding to
English, he and the opposition _a~.i marks singular and plural
of the cbject. In ii and iv# there is no overt marking of
the posseesor, but the a_--i distinction appears with what
is a noun in English to mark singular and plural.
v. tiguvu—a-t *they hold it* vi. tiguva-i-t *they hold
them*
vii. nuna-a-t * their land* viii. nuna-i-t *their lands*
Third person plural is marked by attaching the suffix ^_t
to the "verbal piece", and likewise in vii and viii the
possessor plural is marked by attaching the same form to
the "nominal piece", that is, with transitive verbs and
possessed nouns, there is no overt feature which can be
used to distinguish between them, which leads Hammerich
(Hamruerich, 1936) to say that "every Eskimo verbal form has
to be considered as an original substantive". Notice,
however, that Mey uses the same data to argue for a de-
sentential source for possessives.
We find the same identity of possessor and subject of
a transitive verb when there is a full noun present in the
sentence, thus:
ix. ajuqi-p palasi akiva-a
*the catechist-relative sing, minister 0 answers*
x. ajuqi-t palasi akiva-a
*the catechist-relative pi. minister 0 answer*
xi. ajuqi-p nuna-a *catechist-relative. sing, land-sing.*
xii. ajuqi-t nuna-a-t *catechist-relative pi. l&nd-sing-
relative pi.*
Eskimo, then, serves to exemplify another point of similarity
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between nouns and verba: that is, just as subjects and
possessors may receive similar or identical markings, so
the "head" element whether noun or verb, may receive
similar or related markings# Garnett (Garnett, 1846-50),
in an episodic paper, gives examples from many languages
which exhibit this phenomenon. Thus, for example, he cites
the Coptic form ti-, meaning something like gift# By
adding the 2nd and 3rd person singular suffixes to this,
i.e. ti-f and ti-n are formed the verbal forms "you give"
and "he gives" respectively. However, if the definite
article is affixed to these forms, then the same forms are
to be interpreted as "your gift" and "his gift".
Besides taking forms corresponding to personal pronouns,
there are languages where forms corresponding to English
verbs are to be analysed as a noun plus a case ending,
where this expresses tense or aspect. Thus Garnett
(Garnett, op. cit.: 215) cites a form khoachara from a
Manchu dialect which is to be analysed as khoacha
"nourishment" and a particle meaning "for, at, to", and
which means "for nourishment". By affixing the first
person pronoun, the same form comes to mean "I shall nourish".
Anderson (Anderson, 1973b) gives many examples of languages
where tense and aspect are marked by affixing a basically
locative case element to a nominal stem.
To sum up, we have reviewed three sorts of evidence
for evidence for the identity of nouns and verbs: firstly,
there are the many rules which must be allowed to cycle on
domains defined by both noun and verb, given that verb is
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the "head" of a sentence in a verb-dependency grammar,
secondly, there are many constructions in English which
suggest that there is some nominal form underlying every
verb (for arguments for this position taken from Russian
see Miller, 1973) and thirdly, we have seen that there are
many languages in which the distinction between nouns and
verbs is either impossible to draw or is at least not so
clear-cut as it appears to be in western Indo-European
languages. Thus we shall assume in the rest of our grammar
that there is no noun-verb distinction at the deepest level,
and that this is introduced on the last cycle of the trans¬
formations when tense becomes relevant. The rest of this
study can be looked on as providing the weakest form of
support for this hypothesis if we manage to sustain it,
namely the support that comes from its being able to
account for the form and meaning of English sentences.
4.4 Grammatical Development
Following Anderson (Anderson, 1972 and 1976) we assume
that there is a set of formation rules which create hier¬
archies of predications, each corresponding to a sentence of
English. The actual form and nature of such rules we leave
for the moment returning to them briefly in the last chapter.
For the moment we are more concerned with the hierarchy of
predications and the operations which apply to them. In
the light of the last section, we further assume that a
predication will consist of a head N plus two or more cases
dependent on it, each of which governs a further N which may
itself be the head noun of a predication or the head noun of
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what will surface as a noun phrase.
The highest predication will be the tense predication,
in which the Abs will govern the aspect predication and the
Loc will introduce the tense element. The aspect predic¬
ation will contain an Abs, corresponding essentially to the
subjoct of the sentence and either Loc, Abl or All which
correspond to progressive, perfective or ingressive aspects
respectively (see Anderson, 1973)• The local case in the
aspect predication governs the predication which introduces
the pro-positional core of the sentence.
Given the hierarchy of predications, the next operation
is one of semantic specification, that is the head nouns
and certain other nouns have semantic material inserted.
We say certain other nouns since we assume that for each
actant (to use a term borrowed by Fillmore, 1970, from
Teani&re (Tesni&re, 1959)) there is only one semantic
specification, that is given a hierarchy of predications
in which there are several occurrences of Ns which are co-
referential, then only one of those Ns is semantically
specified by the rules of semantic specification. The
marking of co-referentiality is carried out by the rule of
Raising (or possibly rules of Raising). Thus Raising will
be a rule which takes the semantic specification of one
noun and enters it into the noun of a higher predication,
or alternatively marks a lower unspecified noun as co-
referential with a higher specified or unspecified noun.
Given such a rule, it is evident that we need to
impose some constraints on its operation. We could allow
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the rule to apply blind and raise any noun into any other,
but this would result in the production of many examples of
"garbage", i.e. structures which do not correspond to any
well—formed sentence of English. Thus we need some form of
constraint. Assuming that it is the governing case which
controls Raising, we could recognise two forms of this x*ule,
one which raises N into a higher N if both are governed by
the same case and one which raises N if the cases are not
identical. However, this latter rule itself will need some
restrictions and we can do this in terms of introducing the
notion of case complexes. This entails having formation
rules which produce a head N and the cases dependent on it
and then further rules which will optionally add a further
case to each of the "primary ones". Thus the non-identity
rule of Raising can be reduced to the Identity rule of
Raising in that the noun into which the semantic specific¬
ation is raised will be governed by a case complex containing
an occurrence of the case governing the lower N. Thus
Raising is a rule raising a semantic specification into a
higher N governed by case if the lower N is itself
governed by or if it is governed by Kj and occurs in
the case complex of the higher N. With respect to the
Raising rule we make one further assumption, namely that it
applies cyclically and the output of cycling on all
predications is a semantic predication.
In essence we are claiming that the relations of
dependency, the thematic relations of interpretive semantics
(see Jackendoff, 1972) and co-reference can all be defined
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on one level of the grammar and further that together they
provide all the information necessary for moving from "deep"
structure to surface syntactic structure. This entails
further that order is not relevant in the "deep" structure,
that is, there are no ordering relations between the head
N and the dependent cases: the only relevant relation is
that of dependency (see Anderson, 1976). Thus order will
solely be a property of surface structure and can be
defined in terms of the conditioning factors of dependency,
case relations and co-reference. Hence order is an
accidental property of surface structure, a mechanism used
in communication and not a necessary property of the message
itself.
With respect to the cases themselves, we have already
suggested that only four of these are necessary, Abs, Abl,
All, Loc. However, they have one property which we have
not mentioned, that is, they are hierarchically ordered in
a manner similar to that of Fillmore,s case hierarchy.
This order is Abs, Abl, All and Loc and corresponds roughly
to saying that given an operation X, it will apply to Abs
before Abl. If there is no Abs available, then it will
aPPly to Abl. If there is no Abl, it applies to All and
if no All, then it applies to Loc.
The output of the Raising rules will be a specified
semantic representation and to this will apply the
realisational rules which will be essentially Linearisation
and Lexicalisation. We shall consider the actual properties
of such rules as we develop the grammar, but of
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Lexicalisation we can say that it is essentially a set of
conditions on what bits of semantic structure can be
lexicalised as one item and further conditions on what bits
of semantic structure can actually be lexicalised. At this
point we must consider the relation between Deletion,
Pronominalisation and Lexicalisation in standard T.G. works.
Little attention lias been paid to the relationships
between the processes known as Lexicalisation, Pronominal¬
isation and Deletion in the literature of Transformational
Generative grammar, although it is the case that these
relations are more crucial in the Generative Semantics
model. All three depend on the co-reference of two items
and in fact seem to be related in terms of a hierarchy,
reflexivisation, pronominalisation and deletion, the
controlling factors being the clause-mate condition, command
relations and various control factors such as Equi-NP
deletion. With regard to Deletion, there is the further
problem of exactly what is deleted. In terms of a case
model is it the whole case and everything that it governs,
or simply the dependent noun and its dependents? There is
reason to believe that it is solely the noun: that is, for
subjects and objects at least we can account for the non¬
occurrence of prepositions in terms of general constraints
on the realisation of case relations, but with prepositional
phrases it seems that in certain cases only the noun is
deleted leaving the possibility of a preposition: such a
situation will presumably account for the prepositions
with, against and in, which occur in the following:
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106. John used the knife to cut the salami with
107. John vised the wall to lean the ladder against
108. John used the class-room as a place to propagand¬
ise in
However, in what way is Lexicalisation relevant to
these questions? Let us make the presumably unobjectionable
assumption that a grammar has a set of rules relating
semantic structures to linear structures of ordered lexical
items, that is, as already suggested, a grammar contains a
set of constraints on what semantic bits can be mapped into
lexical items. In this case we have the possibility that
we do not have a process of Deletion or of Pronominalisation,
rather we have a set of constraints on the insertion of
lexical items, Deletion being the insertion of zero or the
non-applicability of Lexicalisation, and Pronominalisations
the insertion of or lexicalisation as a pronominal form.
Hie discussion of Lexicalisation in the general
literature of Generative Semantics has involved questions
of Predicate Raising or Nominal Raising (i.e. MEAT FROM PIGS
lexicalised as pork Postal, 1970b) and the notion has not
been extended to co-reference. In fact, there are several
possible relations between these three processes;
(a) Reflexivisation and Pronominalisation apply before
Lexicalisation and mark the element for the insertion of a
reflexive or pronominal form by the Lexicalisation rules.
(b) Reflexivisation and Pronominalisation apply before
Loxicalisation and themselves insert lexical items.
(c) Lexicalisation precedes Reflexivieation and
Pronominalisation, which then apply to full lexical nouns
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and insert other lexical items.
(d) Finally there is the position proposed above and which
we adopt in what follows, namely that there is no rule of
Deletion, Pronominalisation or Reflexivisation which is not
a rule of Lexicalisation, that is they cannot be distinguished
in terms of ordering relations.
From this brief discussion of the form of the grammar,
we can now begin to build up the rules and the actual form
of the grammar as we further discuss the treatment of
direct and indirect causation.
By-clauses
Ve have suggested that the formation rules create case
complexes, which means that each case in a predication may
optionally be marked for a second case which will serve to
constrain what cases may be raised into it. There are
two possible sources for such evidence: the first source,
which is internal to the grammar, is found in the secondary
cases which are required in a complex to ensure the correct
co-reference relations and the second source lies in any
general semantic and syntactic evidence there might be for
such case complexes. Thus we shall see in the last chapter
that most of these case complexes help to define the cases
proposed by Fillmore. Ve are assuming, then, that these
case complexes are not "merely" grammatical devices for
producing the correct surface structure but have relevance
elsewhere in the grammar.
Ve shall approach this problem via Lee*s discussion of
by-clauses and the distinction drawn between Method and
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Causative clauses (Lee, 1971a and see discussion in
Chapter 3). The crucial distinction is that method clauses
always contain an active verb while causative clauses may
contain an active, eventive or stative verbs alternatively
the "underlying subject" of the method clause is always an
Agent co-referential with the "subject" of the main clause,
while this is only optionally so in causatives. Thus for
method clauses we propose the following structure as a










Predication corresponds to a predication that the entity
governed by Abs moves into a state. is an activity
predication, where Abl governs the Agent and the sentential
Abs governs the action performed: notice that we omit the
All governing the Patient of the action and the Loc.
is the causal predication where Abs governs the relation
CAUSE which passes from one event to another. Predication
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is the action predication where Abl introduces the Agent
or Source of the action, All the Patient and Loc the Path or
instrumental. Thus for the marking of co-reference by the
Raising rule, we need the Abl of to be raised into the
Abl of N-« In the case of the Abs of N, we need to mark1 4
this as co-referential with the All of N^i in order to be
able to do this, we need to mark the All of as Abs.
Similarly we need to allow Loc of N^ to be marked as Abl
so that the Abl of N2 can be raised into it to form the
by-clause. Notice that this parallels the relation proposed
by ttojcik (Vojcik, 1976) between the Instrument and the
sentential subject of the CAUSE predication. The result
of marking Loc as also Abl means that there are two
occurrences of Abl in the predication. This raises two
questions. Firstly we need some rule to ensure that the
Abl of will raise into the simple Abl of and not into
the complex Such a rule will state that the simple
case must be chosen as "host" before the complex case where
there are two available. The second question relates to
the status of the one—instance-per-clause constraint on the
occurrence of cases (see Fillmore, 1968, 1971a, Anderson,
1976). There are two ways of solving this difficulty:
firstly we can distinguish between Cases, such as Abs, Abl,
All and Loc and Case Relations which will be simple or
complex cases which are dependent on N, so that the constraint
is stated in terms of Case Relations. Thus, under such an
interpretation Abl and are different Case Relations even
Abl
though they both contain the same Case. Alternatively we
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could state the constraint in terms of "head" cases, i.e.
cases which govern a case complex. Thus there cannot be
two occurrences of any case as the "head" of two different
case complexes: again the structure under discussion does
not violete this constraint since Abl is not the "head" of
LoC
, . There does not appear to be any means of selecting
ADJL
between the two forms, so we choose the second since it does
not involve introducing any new distinction whereas the
first requires the introduction of the dichotomy between
Cases and Case Relations.
We must also allow for the Loc of to be optional.
In this case we must block the Abl of from Raising into
Abl of N^, so that the Abl of will raise to produce a
sentence with a sentential subject. Thus if Abl of is
JOHN, Abs of N3 PRODUCE A RABBIT OUT OP A HAT, Aba of
MARY and All of AMAZED, then the first derivation, where
there is a Loc, will produce
110. John amazed Mary by producing a rabbit out of a hat
and the second derivation, lacking a Loc, will produce,
111. John's producing a rabbit out of a hat amazed Mary
given also a rule of Subjunction whose role is essentially
that of Predicate Raising in Generative Semantics. (The
actual nature and restrictions on such a rule we shall
consider in more detail below. )
Turning to the structure of the causative by-clause,
the main characteristic of such clauses is that they are
not necessarily active, that is they contain no Agentive Abl.
Thus the structure of such predications will be that of
270.
in the above structure. Given a structure in which the
Abl of Ng governs a predication N^ whose Abs governs JOHN
and whose All governs TURN GREY OVER NIGHT, i.e. corres¬
ponding to John turned grey over night, we must allow the
Abs of N^ to raise into Abl of N^ and as in the earlier
T Q0
structure Abl of Ng will raise into the case complex
This means that the Abl of must also be marked as Abs
so that Abs of N^ may raise into it. Notice that this Abs
will also serve to mark this Abl as non-Agentive. Alter¬
natively, there will be no Loc in N^ and correlated with
this no Abs marking the Abl. In this case Abl of Ng can
raise into the Abl of N^. These structures will underly
112 and 113 respectively:
112. John amazed Mary by turning grey over night
113. John's turning grey over night amazed Mary
Thus we can distinguish between Agents and Forces on the one
hand which are both governed by a simple Abl, while non-
Agents which occur as subjects of such sentences are governed
by an Abl complex, i.e. a complex with Abl as the head. We
need, then, at least the following structures:
i. Abs V Abl 44Abs Abl
(John did something to Mary by doing X)
ii Abs V Abl All Loc.
Ab> Aba Abl
(John did something to Mary by J>ecoming X)
iii. Abs V Abl ff1Abs
(John's becoming X did to Mary)
If we turn for the moment to the formation rules, we
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have suggested that possibly there is an initial set that
produces a predication with simple cases, i.e. an array of
potential "head" cases and a second set which then add
cases to these potential heads. Prom our present discussion,
it seems that we can make the following points. Firstly
All appears to be marked obligatorily as Aba if the verb is
an action verb. Secondly Loc is optional and when it
does occur it has an obligatory Abl. Thirdly Abl is
optionally marked as Abs. Notice that it is only the
optional marking of Abl as Abo which suggests that there
are possibly two sets of formation rules. However, we shall
see one situation immediately below where Abs is optional
on All and in the next chapter we shall see that the marking
of Loc is optional. One final point before leaving this
brief discussion of formation rules is that such case
arrays may be relevant to the operation of formation rules
in lower predications: that is, if there is a case complex
ij0Q
, then there will be a lower predication containing Abl
ADX
and further the nature of the lower predication governed by
Abl will be determined by whether the Abl co-occurring with
Loc
the complex is narked with Abs.
Before leaving this section, we must add a further
point which involves the Agent-Force distinction and will
provide a further case array. We have observed the
ambiguity of the following sentence:
114. John amazed Mary by producing a rabbit out of a hat
in that John could be either an Agent acting intentionally
or a Force. We suggest that John's status as an Agent
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acting intentionally will only be marked by a higher
purpose predication which under one reading of 114 bas all
its elements save Abs and Abl unspecified.
We have already suggested that a purpose predication
has an Agantive Abl and an All which governs the Benefactive
or purpose expression. Howevor, it also seems likely that
such a predication will also contain a Loc which will be
responsible for introducing certain adverbials associated
with deliberately acting Agents. Thus the structure will
be something like:
115. N
\ ; \ \ \
N DO N N N
A
/ \
where Abs governs the action performed, e.g. in the case of
114 "amaze Mary by producing a rabbit out of a hat", Abl
the Agent, All the Benefactive, e.g. for Bill, or an in order
to expression or simply is unspecified, in which case we
have simply a structure which shows the goal-orientation of
the action. Hie point is that if a structure like 109 is
embedded in the Abs of 115» there will be no evidence of this
in the surface structure if neither All and Loc are unspec¬
ified. As we have already noted, such a structure is
similar to what surfaces in some languages as a Benefactive
expression, i.e. something like "Agent gives Benefactive
(Agent does something)".
One further point cone earns the Loc which appears in
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115. Tills Loc governs what surfaces as an adverbial
expression and is unmarked, i.e. a simple case. Xn the
earlier structures which we proposed Loc was the head of a
case complex and introduced Instrumentals. Thus given the
similarities and the close relation between Manner adverbials
and Xnstrumentals (see Chapter 2 and the discussion of Nilsen,
1973t 2.1.2.) we can characterise these in terms of the
common Loc and attribute the differences to the presence or
absence of another case.
Xn proposing the above structures we are making the
assumption that such a higher predication has no influence
on the actual structure of the sentence if All and Loc have
no semantic specification. Thus we must look at the rules
which operate on such structures to collect together those
elements which are lexicalised in one item.
4*4.2. Direct and Indirect Causation
The sentences which we have considered so far have been
expressions of direct causation; in Fillmore's terms, there
has been no intervening Agent. In what follows we shall
adopt Miller's suggestion (Miller, 1972a) that "a more
subtle analysis in terms of 'direct* and 'indirect'
causation is required" and that such an analysis will help
to clarify the situation with respect to lexical causativeo
such as kill and their corresponding "decomposed" forms.
Alternatively we might say that lexical causatives and
decomposed or overt causatives have the same underlying
structure except for features marking the former as direct
and the latter as indirect causation and further that the
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rule of Predicate—Raising, or to use Anderson's term,
Subjunction, is blocked if any of tbe features of indirect
causation are present in the structure. Our present task
is to reconsider the arguments against Lexical Decomposition
to see what factors block Subjunction and then to see if
these factors have any systematic relevance to the notions
of direct and indirect causation.
(a) Temporals
Podor (Fodor, 1970) argues against Lexical Decomposition
on the basis of the non-acceptability of the lexical
causative corresponding to 116& in that they should both
have the same underlying structure under this hypothesis:
llba. John caused Bill to die on Friday by stabbing
him on Thursday
b. *John killed Bill on Friday by stabbing him on
Thursday
The relevant generalisation which covers this case seems to
be that we cannot have two temporals in the structure, such
that one modifies the "killing" and the other the by-clause,
that is there must be temporal "contiguity" between the two
events. Notice that this is a factor restricted to the
field of linguistic knowledge. Xn pragmatic terms the
notion of contiguity is not relevant. Legally someone can
kill a person provided that the action leads to death
within a space of 366 days. Similarly one can kill some¬
one over a period of several days by administering poison.
Thus contiguity must be treated as a linguistic notion
referring to, in this case, the presence of one temporal
modifying the whole sentence.
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The treatment of these sentences requires, then, some
modification to the grammar in terms of where temporal
predications are introduced. We have proposed that there is
only one temporal expression in a structure, this being in
the highest predication and is responsible for the tense
marking on the verbal element. We must now loosen this
restriction somewhat, and we can do this in one of two ways:
firstly we can loosen it completely and allow tense pre¬
dications to appear anywhere in the structure, which will
lead to the generation of many "garbage" sentences, i.e.
underlying structures with no well-formed surface counter¬
part, or, secondly, we can introduce the notion of "event"
and allow only these to be governed by a tense predication.
In this case we need restrictions on the occurrence of such
tensed "events" and so far all that we know is that a
sentence must be such an "event" and that in the case under
discussion the Abl and All of the CAUSE predication must
also be governors of such structures.
Thus the underlying structure of ll6a-b can be







JOHN stab BILL BE on Thursday BILL die BE on Friday
Ths Raising rules will mark JOHN of N- as coreferential with
the Abl of N^, and BILL of N^ and N^ as coreferential with
All
Ahs*
Abl of N2 will also raise into of N^. If we
consider the development of this structure after the
application of these Raisings. Subjunction must apply on the
N^ cycle so that N^ is subjoined to N^ to form the verb die
and at least the tense specification of the Loc is sub-
Joined so that if this were a simple sentence we would have
a past tense marker on the verb. The same operation applies
to N^, but this will never surface, since its being
1 oc
coreferential with the N of the higher case complex
blocks its lexicalisation.
At this point we must consider the status of the tense
predication governing the whole structure. Presumably
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Raising will also mark this as coref©rential with one of
the lower tense Locs, either the Loc of or of N^. In
the sentence under discussion, there is no evidence that the
highest tense Loc is coreferential with the Loc of N^» so
presumably the Loc of has raised into the higher Loc.
However, this seems to contravene a general constraint on
the application of Raising and on the cycle. Thus in terms
of the Abl and All of N0, on which N does the cycle apply
first? The constraint which we need makes reference to
the case hierarchy and states that the N governed by the
case which is higher in the hierarchy is cycled on first.
Thus the constraint requires that the Loc of be co-
referential with the highest tense Loc so that the sentence
under discussion, namely 116b, is deviant because the
constraint has been ignored. However we also have an
unacceptable sentence if the constraint is upheld, i.e.
118. *John killed Bill on Friday on Thursday by
stabbing him
We can attribute the unacceptability of this to the lack of
position for the occurrence of the second tense Loc.
Further to handle this situation we need a general constraint
on Subjunction that an element cannot subjoin if it governs
a tense predication which is not co—referential with some
higher tense element. Thus 116b is unacceptable because
the constraint on the cycle has been broken and 118 is
unacceptable because it involves Subjunction of which
itself governs an element, namely Loc, which is not
coreferential with any higher element. Thus there is no
way in which a lexical causative can derive from a structure
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with two differently tensed "events", the only structure
possibly in the surface structure is an overt or decomposed
causative.
We have added to the model in three ways: firstly,
we have introduced the notion of an "event", i.e. a predic¬
ation governed by a tense predication and have specified
that the Abl and All of a CAUSE predication must govern
such "events". We shall see the further relevance of this
below (see 2*.Zi.2.c), Secondly, we have placed a constraint
on the application of the cycle, namely that Raising applies
cyclically on that predication which is governed by the
case ranked highest on the ease hierarchy before cycling
on any other predication governed by that predication. That
is, given a predication NQ, and predications , N,; and
dependent on N^, Raising applies first to that predication
governed by the highest ranked case. This ensures that a
tense Loc in an Abl predication will be marked as prefer¬
ential with the tense Loc of the sentence. Thirdly we
added a constraint on the rule of Subjunction to the effect
that a predicate cannot be subjoined if it governs an element
which is not coreferential with some higher element.
Taken together, these factors have some consequences
for the rules responsible for semantic specification. Let
us assume that semantic specification is unconstrained, in
which case we have the following possibilities. Firstly,
there is only one semantic specification of tense, i.e.
only one Loc in a structure like 117 is semantically
specified: in this case there are no difficulties, any of
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the three Locs will be specified and the Raising rule will
operate to mark all of them as coreferential. Secondly,
we can have two semantic specifications for tense, but in
this case the place of occurrence of such specifications is
crucial. If the highest Loc is specified and the Loc
dependent on also, then there are no problems: the Loc
of N0 will raise into the highest Loc and the constraint on
Subjunction will block the formation of a lexical causative.
However, if the highest Loc and the Loc of are specified,
then Loc of N. will be marked as coreferential with the
k
highest Loc and the constraint on Subjunction would not
apply. We would need, then, some other constraint to the
effect that the Loc of must be coreferential with the
Loc of the highest predication. But such a statement is
already embodied in the condition on the cycle, so that the
easiest way of preventing such a situation is to ensure
that semantic specification takes place at the "lowest"
point in the tree, i.e. in that predication on which the
cycle operates first. Thus for semantic specification we
need a notion of "lowest N in a chain of coreferential Ns"
which will be dependent on the case hierarchy. Thus Loc of
N., will always be semantically specified and that of will
optionally receive such a specification.
To what extent, then, do the above structure and the
proposed constraints help to capture the notions of direct
and indirect causation? Basically we have suggested that
direct and indirect causation are reflected in the contiguity
or non-contiguity of the causing event and the resulting
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event. One form of this contiguity is temporal. Thus
for temporal contiguity, three events must be identically
tensed; first, the event in which John docs something to
Bill, i.e. which is the action predication, secondly the
event in which John stabs Bill, which is the causing
event and finally the event in which Bill goes into some
state, i.e. which is the resulting event. Thus given
this identity of time reference, we can say that we have
essentially a simple real-world event, the sub-coiaponents
are treated as forming one event. Contrasted with this,
we have indirect causation in which the result predication
is separately tensed, that is we do not have a simple real-
world event, but two real-world events which occur at
separate times. Alternatively we could capture the differ¬
ence in terms of identity of reference versus separately
referring events, where referring is here to be related to
tense marking.
Notice that such a distinction between simultaneously
referring and separately referring has relevance to the
constraint on Predicate-Raising proposed by Seuren (Seuren,
1974a, 1974b) which makes essential reference to "non-
referential expressions", such that only entities of this
type can be raised. The difference is that we locate the
notion of "non-referential" within the notion of "an
element governing another element which is not coreferential
with some higher element", i.e. an "event" is a referential
expression and cannot Subjoin or be raised by Predicate-
Raising if its time reference is distinct from the time
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reference of other "events", For this notion we now
introduce the term Boss-case or Boss-noun; thus a Boss-
case is a case governing a Boss-noun which itself constitutes
a separately referring element* and the presence of such a
Boss-case dependent on some element will block the Sub-
junction of that element. In what follows we shall try to
show that this notion has relevance elsewhere in the grammar.
(b) By—claus es
Fodor (Fodor, op. cit.) also argues that Lexical
Decomposition is refuted by the following examples:
119a. John caused Bill to die by swallowing hie tongue
b. John killed Bill by swallowing his tongue
Thus 119a is ambiguous between John and Bill as the
swallower, accounted for by the fact that there are two
underlying subjects. If lexical causatives have the same
structure as overt causatives* then 119b should be ambiguous.
However* 119b is not ambiguous since Bill cannot be
coreferential with the deleted subject of the by-clause,
du
thus the argument is that Bill is never and subject in the
underlying structure of 119b and Lexical Decomposition is
refuted. However, Fodor*s analysis is too simplistic,
since it does not take into account whether the by-clause
is a method or causative clause. This point is crucial
since it affects the whole structure of the sentence and
thus the possibilities of co-reference. Fodor fails to
make this apparent by assigning the same structure to both:
120. (John caused (Bill to die) ) (by (^T^1 swallows
Bill's tongue)) 13
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(Fodor, op. cit.s 435,-6). That there is a difference in
structure paralleling the ambiguity of 119a can easily be
shown by moving the by-clause:
121a. John, by swallowing his tongue, caused Bill to die
b. By swallowing his tongue. John caused Bill to die
where we only have the reading with a method clause, i.e.
in which John swallowed the tongue, and the causative
reading, where Bill's tongue-swallowing is the actual cause
of death, is excluded. Thus we need, in fact, two differ¬
ent structures, one in which the by—clause is dependent on
the CAUSE predication, the other in which it is dependent
on die. In this case, the subject of the by-clause will
be deleted by the closest commanding subject, John in the
first case and Bill in the second, and we can associate
direct causation and hence Subjunction with the former and
indirect causation and the decomposed form with the latter.
The relevant structure will be the following for direct
causation, omitting tense and aspect predications and the
full structure of the lowest predications:
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If we trace through, the derivation of this sentence, we find
that it progresses as already proposed for such structures.
Thus the rules will cycle on first, this being the
"lowest" predication and JOHN will raise into the Abl of N^.
On the cycle, BILL will be raised into the All of N^,
T o (J
and on the N2 cycle, Abl will raise into There are
aspects of this structure which cannot be dealt with fully
yet. Thus, for example, what are the conditions on
Lexicalisation which block the lexicalisation of JOHN and
Bill in N^ and N^ respectively? A first approach will
involve a rule of Subject-Formation and block lexicalisation
of subjects which are not Boss-cases, but we return to such
questions below. However, it does seem that Subjunction
in this structure operates in a fairly straightforward
manner. One feature of this rule opposing it to Predicate-
Raising is that on any one cycle, two elements may be
subjoined to the governor. Thus on the N2 cycle both CAUSE
governed by Abs and DIE governed by All and neither having
a Boss-Case dependent on them will subjoin to Ng. One
possibility is that Subjunction may also be dependent on
the case specification of the governing element, that is the
Abs governing Ng may also be marked All. However, there is
no means of deciding this issue at the moment.
Another question raised by this derivation concerns
the potential cyclic operation of Lexicalisation. Thus it
is feasible that after cycling on Ng we have the subjunction
tree involving two semantic elements CAUSE MOVE and the
lexical item die, which results from the prior lexicalisation
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of DIE on an earlier cycle. This subjunction tree will,
then, lexicalise as kill. Subjunction on the cycle
subjoins Abs, governing kill and DO receives no lexical-
isation. Just as this DO is not lexicalised, so, if there
is a higher purpose predication, the DO of that predication
will also not lexicalise, so that we have a means of show¬
ing that kill is a potentially ambiguous form and further
this is not so much of an accident as it is in the case of
Dowty*s proposals and Lee*s (Dowty, 1972a, Lee, 1971) where
two different structures lexicalise as the same lexical
item. However, such a proposal may not be completely
acceptable, since cyclic lexicalisation means that DIE has
lexicalised as die, so that we have a situation in which the
predicate DO does not require any overt lexical form while
the predicate CAUSE does require that the lexical form die
is replaced by kill. We shall return to this question
below.
Thus structure 122 will underlie 119b
119b. John killed Bill by swallowing his tongue
which involves direct causation. This is shown in the
All
structure by two factors, firstly the presence of in
that is the action passes directly from John to Bill, and
secondly by the absence of separate tense Locs in and
or of an intervening Agent. The lexically decomposed form
corresponding to 119b will have a different underlying
All
structure, namely one in which the predication has no Abs«
Thus the Abs of governing BILL will not be able to raise
leaving DIE with a Boss-Case dependent on it. This will
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suffice to block lexicalisation, but we return to this
below when we have a better idea of how Subjunction is
constrained since it does appear that under certain
circumstances Subjunction could apply to such a structure
to produce 119b, that is, this sentence is potentially
ambiguous between the direct causation reading, involving




Turning now to the second reading of 119a
119a. John caused Bill to die by swallowing his tongue
which involves the by-clause modifying die, we have a
sentence involving indirect causation. Thus the structure







/ \ ' x
/ \ / ^
/ \ / \
/ 1 L !
MOVE BILL swallow BILL die
his tongue
The structure N^ underlies what surfaces as John died by
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swallowing his tongue if this were an independent predication
directly governed by aspect and tense predications, and
similarly with slightly different semantic specifications
underlies the following:
124. John died of hunger
125. John starved to death
where the prepositions of and to_ lexicalise Abl and All
respectively. Notice that the Abs of N^ cannot govern
CAUSE, as does the corresponding Abs of since this would
require the presence of kill in surface structure.
The salient features of the derivation are: on the N,4
cycle BILL is marked as coreferential with the Abs of
and similarly on the N^, although we have BILL present in
the structure, in fact this is an empty N, and as such can
raise into a semantically specified N, that is it can be
marked as coreferential with the Abs of N^. (hi the
cycle Abl will raise into Abl of N^. The crucial thing is
that now we have governing a Boss-Case, in that there is
no higher case for Abl to raise into. Thus Subjunction can
only subjoin Abs of to N^, since this Boss-case blocks
the subjunction of N^. Hence we have a lexically decomposed
structure as the only well-formed structure possible.
However, we still have problems. Firstly why does
the Abl of N, not raise into Abl of N,? We leave this fork 1
the moment and return to it below (see 4*^«2.c), Secondly,
we now have N2 governing the lexical item cause, but this
must presumably subjoin to on the cycle yet it governs
a Boss-Case which should block Subjunction. This is not
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the only case in which such a situation arises? we suggested
that in the derivation of 119b from structure corresponding
to 122 but lacking the All of may optionally subjoin
yet it also governs a Boss-Case. Similarly Subjunction
must apply when there is a higher Purpose Predication when
the subjoined element governs a Boss-Case. Thus the
sti*ucture underlying the sentence
126. John killed Bill for Mary by stabbing him with
a knife







I I /— -
Again we have an element N^, governing the Boss-Cases Abs
Loc
and but it must subjoin to the higher predicate N^.
However, there is a factor in common to this example and
that of 123» namely the Host element to which the lower
element subjoins, both subjoin to DO. Thus it is possible
that this is one of the determining factors. However, this
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would clearly involve a weakening of the constraint on
SubJunction, and should, therefore, be avoided if possible.
Xf, however, we look at the structures which result
from subjoining to in 127 and from subjoining N2 to
in 123, there is a further factor in common. Thus after
SubJunction applies to 127, we find the following cases
dependent on Nq, Abl, which will become the subject, All,
All Loc
and , that is, SubJunction does not lead to repeti-AOS ADA
tion of the same case, whether a simple or complex case.
Compare, then other cases of SubJunction. In 118, on the
cycle, cannot subjoin to N2 since governs a
Boss-Case and subsequent operations of Subjunction would
result in the presence of two non-coreferential Locs
governed by the tense predication. Thus the Boss-Case
constraint helps to ensure that there are not two occurrences
of the same case dependent on the same element. The same
situation holds for 123. Subjunction is blocked on the N2
cycle since governs the Boss-Case Abl. Again if it did
apply, we would have a resulting structure with two occurr¬
ences of Abl, one governing John, the other governing
by swallowing his tongue. However, in the same structure
Subjunction applied to Abs of does not lead to this
doubling of cases.
It is feasible to remove the Boss-Case constraint from
the grammar, but, in fact, this would lead to complications
in the form of something like a global rule. Thus we could
have a simple constraint that Subjunction must not create
an element with two occurrences of the same case dependent
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on it. This would work simply in the case of 127 and the
structures where Subjunction is not blocked. However, it
would need the grammar to be able to refer indefinitely
up the tree in the case of 123» since it is only on the
last cycle that Subjunction does lead to such doubling of
the case Loc. Alternatively, instead of having a global
condition on Subjunction. we could have a simple condition
on the output, to the effect that any sentence which has
two occurrences of the same case is deviant. However, we
reject this possibility since it seems more reasonable to
block a possible deviant structure early in its life and
allow an acceptable derivation, rather than allow the
derivation to follow through and then reject the output.
Finally consider the situation with Subjunction with
respect to 119b with the indirect reading:
119b. John killed Bill by swallowing his tongue
All
The relevant structure is 122 lacking the of N^. Here
subjoins to and again there is no doubling of cases.
However, the Host here is the predicate MOVE so that the
nature of the Host is irrelevant to the constraint on
Subjunction. Thus we can state the Boss-Case constraint
simply in terms of the subjunction of an element provided
it does not govern a Boss-Case such that there is a higher
occurrence of that case. We return below to a further
discussion of Subjunction and a tighter statement of the
constraint (see 4.4.2.e).
To what extent, then, does this analysis help us to
capture the notion of direct and indirect causation? The
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Boss-Case constraint applying to 123 reduces, in fact, to
the claim made earlier in the discussion of Lexical
Decomposition, that Subjunction or Predicate—Raising is
blocked if the subject i.e. Agent, of the action predication
is not coreferential with the Agent of the by-clause. Thus
the action described by 123 is indirect in that the main
Agent does not operate directly on Bill: Bill himself acts
as intervening Agent in that he swallows his tongue, and
this act causes his death. In the case of 122, the two
Agents are coreferential, John swallows the tongue and John
kills Bill, causes his death, so that Subjunction is
possible and we have direct causation. Notice also that
All
the presence or absence of .. also correlates with direct
ADS
and indiz*ect causation respectively.
However, in a sense, we may be mis-using the terms
"direct" and "indirect" causation. The cases discussed
so far in general clearly fall into the category of direct
causation and the fact is clearly shown in the actual
surface structure in terms of a lexical causative; we can
call these "syntactically direct causation". However, we
noticed that 119b can also be viewed as expressing indirect
causation yet is a lexical causative. Moreover, we noticed
examples in the preceding chapter where we have "syntactically
direct causation", i.e. a lexical causative, but which we
called indirect causation. Thus the following are
"semantically indirect" causative sentences:
128. John killed the astronauts by carelessly
forgetting to seal the hatch
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129. You killed my son by sending out that patrol
(To be said by a hysterical Maureen O'Hara to her estranged
husband, Colonel John Wayne, who has Just sent out their
only son, a newly arrived Lieutenant, on a mission where he
is to prove that he is a man and worthy of his father.)
The difference lies in the fact that in the underlying
(semantic) structure of such sentences the object of the
All
main verb is not governed by and further the Abl of the
AOS
action predicate, i.e. is not coreferential with the
actual causing event, there is some intervening Agent or
cause.
In fact, such a proposal is a means of capturing
Fillmore's notion of "immediate cause" (Fillmore, 1971), in
that an immediate cause will contain an expression of the
patient coreferehtial with the N governed by the of the
action predication. What, then, is the force of this
higher action predicate lacking the We would like to
suggest that one further property to be associated with DO
predications in general is the property of attributing
responsibility to the Agent. Thus in 129 Maureen O'HarjL
would be blaming John Wayne since he is responsible, and
similarly in 128 John is held responsible for the astronauts*
deaths. Thus we can distinguish between semantically
direct and indirect causation in terms of the presence or
All
absence of the .. and the non-coreference of the Abl of
Abs
the action predication with the immediate cause.
Syntactically direct and indirect causation will involve
the distinction between lexical and overt or decomposed
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causative®, such that all syntactically indirect causatives,
i.e. decomposed, will derive from sem&ntically indirect
while syntactically direct will derive from semantically
indirect or direct causatives.
(c) Another Nominal Interlude
Before extending our analysis to other counter¬
arguments to Lexical Decomposition, we wish to return to
the noun-verb distinction. We suggested above (see 4.3.)
that we should not make this distinction at the deepest
level, verbs being distinguished at surface structure in i»rm
of taking tense markings, and adopted this as a working
hypothesis to see whether a grammar couched in such terms
would be acceptable. We can now reconsider our suggestions
in the light of our proposals for the grammar to date. In
particular, it seems at first glance that the grammar will
be simpler if we do make the distinction.
If we refer back to the structure proposed for
111. John's producing a rabbit out of a hat amassed Mary
which we give here as 130:
130.
Abs
CAUSE MOVE John produce a rabbit Mary become amazed
out of a hat
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In this case we need to block the Abl of governing JOHN
from raising into the Abl of N^, since this would leave no
position open for the Abl of Ng. Rather it is this latter,
N2 which must raise into the Abl of N^. Notice further
that if it does not raise, then subjunction of N2 to is
blocked since N2 will govern a Boss-Case. The simplest
means of introducing a means of blocking this derivation
would be to introduce the noun-verb distinction and us©
this as a further constraint on Raising. Thus the Abl of
Ni will govern V and the Abl of N2 will also govern V so
that the lower Abl can raise into the higher, both of them
governing the same term V. The Abl of N^ will govern N,
however, and the raising of this into the higher Abl will
be blocked by the non-identity of the two terms they govern,
N in the lower case and V in the higher.
Blocking Raising in terms of imposing a constraint
referring to the terms governed may also be relevant to
the derivation of 122. We shall argue in the next chapter
that the object of verbs like swallow i.e. body-movement
verbs, is governed by a case containing Loc, so that in the
derivation of 122 we need to block the raising of his tongue
Loc
into the ... of N, which must be the host for the Abl of N„.Abl l <.
This again can be done in terms of generating a V dependent
Loc
Abl"
However, although it may appear that we have
reintroduced the noun-verb distinction, there is nothing
here which directly contradicts our earlier statement that
verbs are tensed nouns. In each case, what we are doing
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is ensuring that u tensed "event" is raised and not a noun,
that is in each case what in fact raises is the highest
tense predication and the predications directly or indirectly
dependent on it. In this case we are raising a verb, but a
verb which is also a tensed noun, or rather a noun which may
receive tense specification at some later point. Thus we
introduce the convention that tense predications are
governed by V. Thus while nouns no longer reign supreme
in the underlying structure, the "verbal" element is intro¬
duced in a manner consistent with our suggested correlation
between verbs and tense.
One final point concerns the fact that the distinction
also allows us to constrain the formation rules. One
immediate consequence is that if we introduce a V into a
predication, then we must do one of two things, either that
V must be further expanded by the formation rules, or we
must introduce a lower V in the structure which can raise
into it.
(d) Shibatani
We suggested in our discussion of Shibatani*s supposed
counter-examples to Lexical Decomposition that they could all
be rejected in that he fails to take into account the
possibility of a constraint on Predicate-Raising in terms
of identity of the two subjects involved. Notice that if
there were such a constraint on Sub junction in our grammar,
it would mean that Subject-Forraation applies cyclically
before Subjunction. However, so far there is no reason to
believe that Subject-Formation precedes Subjunction and we
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already have one means of blocking Subjunction, namely the
Boss-Case constraint. The question is whether this is
also relevant to the arguments which Shibatani brings to
bear based on Japanese data.
The first argument which Shibatani has against lexical
Decomposition (shibatani, 1973a) relates to the number of
restrictions which must be placed on Predicate Raising,
but we have suggested that all these restrictions reduce to
one constraint to the effect that if the governed predication
contains an Agent, then it must be coreferential with the
higher Agent or Abl or Subjunction will be blocked. Thus
the underlying structure of
131. Taroo ga Ziroo o ik-ase-ta
*Taroo caused Ziroo to go*
would be the following, ignoring the structure of the lowest
predication for the moment in its full detail:
CAU&E TAjkoO ZIROO GO MOVE
After Raising Abl of into Abl of N^, Subjunction cannot
apply on the N2 cycle to subjoin V^, governing GO, to N2
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since governs a Boss-Case. The absence of a further
All
.. in N, allows for the indirect causation. The alter-Abs 1
nation between the o-marker and the ni-marker of the object
would presumably be related to the case which dominates
ZIROO in either Abs or Abl respectively. This difference
in case would also tie in with the difference in meaning
which Shibatani notes, namely that with the u-tnarker the
causation is more forcible or direct than with the ni-marker.
Absence of Subjunction allows the predicates GO and CAUSE
to surface as lexical items. Thus Shibatani»s data from
Japanese in this respect do not form a counter-example to
Lexical Decomposition, provided we have an obligatory rule
of Subjunction constrained by the Boss-Case constraint.
Shibatani brings three other arguments against Lexical
Decomposition, all of which involve the fact that there is
some ambiguity with a certain structure with an overt
causative while there is no ambiguity with the related
lexical causative. Similarly all reduce to the fact that
with overt causatives there are two distinct Agents, whereas
with lexical causatives there is only one, a point which we
would predict given the Boss-Case constraint. The three
arguments relate to reflexives, "do so" insertion and
adverbs. The last one can easily be handled in terms of
the number of Agents in the underlying structure with which
the adverb can be associated, that is ambiguity arises if
there are two Agents with which the adverb can be associated,
but this means that the Boss-Case constraint will block
Subjunction, while there is no ambiguity with only one Agent
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and the Boss-Case will not apply. The first two, however,
are more informative about the nature and place of Lesfcical-
isation in that both involve the insertion of some
npronominal" form. The form of the argument is the same
in both cases, as is the counter-argument in terms of a
Localist view of case grammar with Lexical Decomposition.
This being so, we shall consider the argument from reflexives
only. The relevant sentences are those like the following:
133a. Taroo wa Ziroo ni zibun no huku o ki-sase—ta
•Taroo^ had Ziroo^ put on self*s^/self*s^ clothes*
b. Taroo wa Ziroo ni zibun no huku o kise-ta
♦Taroo^ put self,si/*self's^ clothes on Ziroo^*
Thus with the overt causative the reflexive pronoun zibun
can be coreferential with either of the two nouns. This is
perfectly natural since there are two predications each with
a subject and in the standard treatment of reflexivisation
in Japanese it is the subject which controls reflexivisation
of a coreferential element in an embedded sentence,
(Shibatani, 1973a, McCawley, 1975). With a lexical
causative, as we would expect, there is only one "subject"
available to control reflexivisation, the lower one having
been raised into the of the action predication, thus
allowing only one reading for the sentence.
We must now look at these sentences in a little more
detail to ascertain the relation between Raising, Subjunction
and Lexicalisation. Thus the structure of 133a would be






ZXROO "pui; on" TAROO/ZIROO•e CLOTHES
We omit also the tense and aspect predications from V,,.
Abl of N2 is marked as coreferential with Abl of N^. On
the cycle Sub junction subjoins Abs to > while





On the cycle Abs is again subjoined to produce the
CAUSE+DO
TAROO
ZIROO "put on" TAROO/ZIROO«S
CLOTHES
We assume that Subjunction involves the removal of the
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governing case and the subsequent Adjunction of the cases
governed by the subjoined element to the host, but clearly
this is an area which needs further study, although in this
case nothing crucial appears to hang on the issue. Lexical-
isation can now apply to this structure, this comprising
two components, firstly Strict Lexicalisation, or the
insertion of lexical material and secondly Linearisation,
although we do not commit ourselves to there being any
strict ordering relations between them at this point, since
we have not enough data to be able to see if they are
autonomous or if they interact in some way. Autonomous,
there would be no consequences at all for their relative
ordering, but if they interact, then their order of
application will be crucial. Certainly in terms of pronouns
in English Linearisation must precede Strict Lexicalisation,
linear order being relevant to command relations (see
Stockwell et al. 1973 for references).
Thus we need to reinterpret the standard rule of
reflexivisation in Japanese and this can be done essentially
in terms of the notion of highest ranked case on the case
hierarchy. Thus given a situation in which some case X
governs a noun such that is coreferential with some
higher noun N. itself governed by case Y, and case Y is the
J
highest ranked case in that predication, then is
lexicalised as zibun. Thus in we have which governs
TAROO or ZIROO in the possessive structure, and both of
these occur in higher predications governed by the case
which, in their respective predications, is ranked highest
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on the hierarchy. Thus both TAROO and ZIROO are Boss-
Nouns which can control reflexivisation of the lower occurr¬
ence, which will allow the potential ambiguity of sentences
like 133a.
The other point of interest concerns the deletion of
the second occurrence of TAROO. We have attached this to
N^ and assume a general rule which will block the lexical-
isation of one of two cases if those cases are identical,
governed by the same N and govern coreferential elements.
There are two other alternatives:, firstly that the "subject"
or highest ranked case is automatically blocked as a result
of Subjunction. This, however, does not really fit in
with anything else in the grammar, and will entail
Lexicalisation applying at two points. Secondly, we could
abandon the sviggestion that subjoined elements have their
dependents attached directly to the host, in which case the
two occurrences of TAROO will be in different predications
and we will need a rule which deletes the lower coreferential
case if it is (i) the highest ranked case and (ii) it is
coreferential with a case which itself is highest ranked.
For Japanese, this matter must be settled when more is
known. We return briefly to this below for English.
Notice that, in the lexicalisation of reflexives and
in the non-1exicalisation of certain elements, we have
referred to the notion of highest ranked case in a predication.
But the case identified in this way is generally called the
subject, or rather corresponds to the subject. Thus if we
are to preserve the notion of subject to identify this case
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and relate subject also to Linearisation, then we must allow
Strict Linearisation to be preceded by Linearisation, so
that "subject" can be referred to. However, it is not
clear that we need to be able to refer to "subject" at all,
rather than to the highest ranked case. Again we return
to this below (Chapter 5).
One further point concerns semantic specification and
the notion of Boss-Case. So far we have given trees with
semantic elements in them and assumed that Raising copies
the semantic specification. Thus in 135* for example,
there are two occurrences of TAROO, and to identify the
lower occurrence of any semantic specification as a non-
Boss-Case we need to refer higher in the tree. The
situation will be simplified if we modify semantic specific¬
ation so that it inserts two things under each N to be
specified, firstly a semantic specification and a variable
associated with it, e.g. (TAROO,x). Raising will now be
a copying rule which copies the semantic specification into
some higher element but leaves behind a copy of the variable.
In this way non-Boss-Cases are readily identifiable in terms
of the presence of a variable only.
Filially, before returning to the structure and
derivation of 133b, there is the question of the place of
Sub^unction. We suggested earlier that Lexicalisation may
precede Subjunction, and thus we could account for the
lexical identity of verbs like kill which may have one or
two higher DOS into which they are raised. In such terms,
the effect of Subjunction will be to subjoin lexical and
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semantic elements to a predicate. In order to preserve
this view we need Subjunction to be in the cycle with
Lexicalisation, and, in fact, to precede it, so that
Subjunction first creates a subjunction tree which can
then be lexicalised as one lexical item. This lexical item
is then available for subjunction on the next cycle.
Notice that, in any case, Subjunction could not apply at
the same time as Raising, since a seuiantically fully
specified tree is needed in order to be able to determine all
facts relating to Boss-Cases and what cases appear in each
predication. In fact, the situation in English is not so
problematical as there are many verbs which do not show
overtly a distinction between the event and causative
meaning e.g. melt, cook, break, open etc., which can be
accounted for if these are already lexical items resulting
from Lexicalisation on some earlier cycle which are then
subjoined with CAUSE to move. Thus while DO never
influences Lexicalisation CAUSE generally does but there are
exceptions, so that it will become largoly an accident of
English that certain verbs are suppletive as to their event
and causative forms. For example, Modern English kill
derives from an earlier cwellan - *cweljan where -j- was a
causative infix, the non-causative cwelan meant "die".
Thus as it now stands the grammar has the following sub¬
components: firstly Formation rules, which could equally
well be viewed as well-formedness conditions on trees,
secondly semantic specification rules inserting elements
of the form (TAR00,X), thirdly Raising rules which mark
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co-reference and produce a semantic structure and finally
xvhat we can now call Lexicalisation rules, rules of three
sorts, Subjunction. Linearisation and Strict Lexicalisation.
Although we give the rules in this order, the only ordering
relation between them to which we commit ourselves is the
npreceden relation between SubJunetion and Strict
Lexicalisation.
Ve can now return to the structure underlying 133b
which we give as 136:
136.
(TAR00,x)
(ZXR00,y) "put on" (x«s CLOTHES,z)
Abe
On the cycle Abl is raised into of V^» on the
«ka All
cycle ... is raised into .. and on the N„ cycle Abl isAbl Abs 2 '
raised into the Abl of N1* Thus when Strict Lexicalisation
applies the possessive variable x is controlled by Abl which
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is a Boss-Case and highest ranked in its predication,
highest ranked in that there is an aspect predication above
containing an Abs into which Abl has raised (we are
assuming this as we go along and so shall make no further
reference to it), thus all the conditions are met for the
lexicalisation of x as zibun. If the possessive variable
were y, i.e. coreferential with Ziroo, no reflexive form
could be inserted since y would be controlled by a Boss-Case
which is not the highest ranked case in its predication,
All
namely AjJS» so that some non-reflexive pronoun must
lexicalise y.
Notice again that we have Subjunction applying to sub¬
join to yet N^ governs a Boss-Case and the Boss-Ce.se
is distinct from all other cases so that there is no result¬
ant doubling of the same case in any predication,
(e) Cruse
Cruse argues against Lexical Decomposition on the basis
that lexical and overt causatives are not synonymous and so
cannot be derived from the same structure. However, he
concludes from this that the structures must be totally
different, the former not involving a decomposed form, while
the latter does, yet it is quite feasible and likely, as we
shall show, that the differences in structure are not so
major, and it is just these slight differences which are
sufficient to block Subjunction. We suggested in our
earlier discussion that all the restrictions on sentences
which Cruse notes are also restrictions on the verb command
or order and further that these sentences like
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137a# The general marched the men further north
b. The jockey galloped the horse down to the
•tarting-point
may have some by-clause in their structure containing
command which is never realised. There are many difficulties
with such sentences, some of which argue against such an
analysis and we shall not adopt it as there are other means
at our disposal.
Firstly, by-clauses in general are odd with such
sentences, in that in certain circumstances they are
superfluous,
138# ?The general marched the men further north by
ordering them to
giving orders to his staff
139# The jockey galloped his horse to the starting-
point by using his whip
Note that in the latter example it is not only a by-clause
which is odd, with his whip produces an equally odd sentence.
Secondly, if by-clauses are generally odd, there are still
examples, usually involving some further adverbial modifica¬
tion, which are acceptable:
140. The slave-master worked the rowers . by standing
over them with a whip
Finally the structure in general is not very productive.
Most of the verbs in question involve the manner of movement,
walk, run, march, gallop, yet other verbs of movement are
judged unacceptable in such structures, (speakers seem to
reject such sentences out of hand, they are "absolutely**
unacceptable, beyond redemption rather than being just odd
yet understandable in context):
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141- *The school-master hopped/skipped/Jumped the
boys back to the school
142. *The inefficient sergeant strolled/ambled/strutted
the men back to their barracks
With the verb run there are stranger things going on, since
the type of noun, human or not, which is the object of the
verb, is relevant:
143* The master ran the boys back to school
144* The jockey ran the horse twice round the course
With a human noun as object, the verb ismore likely to be
understood as "give a lift", while the non-human noun
selects the "make run" reading. Evidently, then, we are
dealing with a series of lexical idiosyncrasies in a
structure which may itself be idiosyncratic. The structure
is too poorly understood and discussed in the literature
for a full treatment here, but we can propose a treatment
consistent with our grammar which goes part way to capturing
what seems to be going on.
The structure which seems to underly sentences such as:
145• The foreman worked the men hard









MOVE THE MEN WORK HART
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We do not specify the full structure of N^, but it seems
that this will have at least an Abl governing (MEN,y), an
Abs governing (WORK,z) which will subjoin to DO tofbrm the
lexical verb work and a Loc introducing the manner adverb.
Thus on the cycle Abl will raise into and this will
raise on the cycle into of N, . On the N„ cycle Ablj Abs 1 2
will raise into Abl. When Lexicalisation applies there
will be no Boss—Case which can prevent the Subjunction of
to Vj and of to and so on up the structure, so that
we obtain the single lexical item work.
This structure will be sufficient to handle the four
restrictions which Cruse notes if we supplement the grammar
somewhat. The restriction that the object acted upon must
be an Agent is captured by having an obligatory Abl in
and marking semantic specifications as insex*table under Abl
or not. The restriction that the causer must be human is
handled in the same way, i.e. in terms of constraints on the
insertability of semantic specifications under Abl, if we
add to the grammar the restriction that non-human Agents or
rather Causes cannot originate under an N dependent on Abl.
Rather nouns like flood will occur under a noun dependent
on Abs in a predication which is itself governed by an Abl
and asserts that a flood occurred, in other words there
would be a V dependent on Abl of Ng. In the above structure
such a predication could not occur since Abl of governs
N and there is no other V in the structure which could
condition the formation of a tensed event. The other two
factors which Cruse notes, namely the effective transmission
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of the causer's will and the obedience of the object acted
All
upon are handled in terms of the higher .. which marks
AOS
direct action. Alternatively we could handle this in terms
of a more general area of the grammar which, following
Jackendoff (jackondoff, 1972) we could call Consistency
Conditions on semantic structures. In fact, it appears
that we should need some such device in any case to handle
the oddness of the following:
1^7a. ?John marched the men, who did not understand
his orders, across the yard
b. ?John galloped the horse, which was being
totally unresponsive to his orders, across the
yard
in that we can associate a presupposition of understanding
or obedience on the part of the object with the occurrence
All
of .. and then this understanding or obedience is deniedADS
in the accompanying relative clause in 147a~b.
Contrasting with structure 14<>» the structure under-
All
lying the overt causative will not have the A^g in Nj, so
that there is no possibility of the of raising.
Thus SubJunction of to will be blocked by the Boss-
AKfi
Case constraint, since will govern a Boss-Case
semantically specified as (MEN,y) and there will be a higher
occurrence of a Boss-Case , in the higher aspect
predication, which is specified as (FOREMEN,x), so that we
necessarily have an overt causative.
This point has reference to Keenan's discussion of
subjects (Keenan, 1974) and to Seuren's constraint on
Predicate-Raising in terms of non-referring expressions,
(Seuren, 1974a, 1974b). Keenan introduces the Functional
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Principle which applied to language involves being able to
identify the referent of the subject and then identifying
the truth of the predicate in terms of the subject referent.
Thus we could take this to mean that a predicate is referring
if it has an identifiable referring subject, which would give
us one means of recognising referring expressions, i.e.
those which according to Seuren's constraint cannot be
raised by Predicate-Raising. Further if we can identify
highest ranked case with the notion of subject, then the
Boss-Case constraint can also be related to the Functional
Principle. Thus contains a referring expression as a
subject since it has a Boss—Case which is identifiable
referentially independently. Hence, being a referring
expression it cannot subjoin. If we refer back to
structure l-k6 and the derivation where does not contain
a Boss-Case, then we find that the "subject" of the predic-
At.
ation, i.e. which is specified as (y) after raising,
cannot be identified independently, that is, we need to refer
elsewhere in the tree to identify the referent of the
subject. Hence the predicate is not a referring expression
and Subjunction can apply. Thus the Boss-Case constraint
helps to unify two different proposals.
The second type of sentence which Cruse recognises
which, with a lexical causative is not synonymous with the
corresponding overt causative is what he calls causation
by direct physical action. Thus the following are not
synonymous:
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m8a. John opened every door in the street by shouting
"Fire"
b. John caused every door in the street to open by
shouting "Fire"
148a he marks as unacceptable, although speakers will accept
it if the causer deliberately chose this means of opening
the doors. In fact, it seems that part of the difficulty
lies in the by-clause itself: firstly in that the type of
bjr-clause is crucial; thus just as 12*8a does not involve
direct physical action, neither does 1^9:
1^9. John opened every door in the street by simply
smiling sweetly at every housewife he spoke to
yet it is fully acceptable. Secondly it is not necessary
to have a by-clause in order for the sentence to be under¬
stood as involving indirect causation. Consider the
following:
150a. Hadrian built a wall across Britain along the
most defensible and shortest line available
b. Hadrian caused a wall to be built across
Britain along the most defensible and shortest
line available
We know that the situation described by 150a involves
indirect causation and that Hadrian did not actually perform
any act of building, if only because the building took 6
years and Hadrian was only in Britain for a few months
during the summer of 122 A.D., yet the sentence is perfectly
acceptable and synonymous with 150b. In fact 150a is more
acceptable than 150b, this latter appearing to be somewhat
archaic to some speakers. The issue is further complicated
by the fact that 150a is less acceptable if a by-clause is
added:
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151 • VBadrian built a wall across Britain by
ordering his governor to build it
surveying the possible lines and sending u terial
and men
In fact* that the issue is so complex and that acceptability
seems to vary from sentence to sentence suggests that we
are dealing here not with common properties which can be
assigned directly to every semantic structure, but rather
with idiosyncratic properties which may best be handled in
terms of Consistency Conditions of pragmatics, that is what
is the normal way of opening doors, building walls etc and
what are the exceptions. One feature that must be handled,
however, in a systematic fashion is the intentional!ty of
these acts, that is, it seems that all lexical causatives
involving indirect causation either attribute responsibility,
as in the case of 128 and 129 above or attribute intention¬
al! ty to the Agent.
Thus the structure of 148s and of 148b would be the
following (see over) where Nn is ths predication expressing
intention, N. is the action predication which in this case
has no since there is no direct object on which the
ADS
Agent can operate directly, i.e. the structure involves
indirect causation and the All in Ns captures the fact that
someone benefits from John's action. It is uncertain
whether this is ever semantically specified and then blocked
from lexicalisation and nothing hangs on this point here.
In principle there is nothing to block having this All marked
also as Abl so that the Abl of N,, can raise into both Abl
All
and
Aljl» which would account for the possibility of a
reflexive in certain circumstances:
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153. John opened every door in the street for himself
by shouting "Fire"
On the cycle, the Raising rule applies vacuously and on the
cycle Abl is raised into Abl of . On the N,, cycle,
Abl is raised into and on the cycle, Abl raises
into Abl and .. , raises into Loc. When LexicalisationAbl
applies, All subjoins to and lexicalises as open and on
the cycle, Abs subjoins to as does All, but here
again All governs an element which in turn governs a
Boss-Case, namely Abs governing (DOOR,y). Notice that
this subjunction does not lead to any doubling of cases,
there being no higher Boss-Case governed by Abs. For
these purposes we need to exclude the Abs governing and
that governing . This can be done in terms of
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distinguishing between non-predicative elements which have
a semantic specification of the form (specification +
variable) from predicative elements which do not receive
a specification involving a variable, so that the Boss-Case
constraint refers solely to non—predicative elements.
Notice that Subjunction must apply optionally to in
order that we can account for the synonymy of overt and
covert causatives. Thus we are in a position to give a
stricter version of Subjunction, so that Subjunction is
obligatory if the element to be subjoined governs no Boss-
Cases, it is optional if it governs Boss-Cases such that
there is no higher occurrence of those cases and is
blocked if the Boss-Case is identical with some higher case.
SUBJUNCTION
Given a structure in which N^ is directly adjoined
to N via case K , then subjoin N to N obligatorily,
y m x y
optionally if condition (a) is fulfilled and block
the subjunction if both (a) and (b) are fulfilled:
(a) governs a Boss-Noun via case
(b) there is a higher occurrence of
Before leaving the structure under discussion we must
consider what happens to V^. After Subjunction will be
governed by Abl which is the highest ranked case in its
predication if we reject our earlier suggestion that cases
dependent on subjoined elements are adjoined directly to
the host, so that we can apply a general constraint which
blocks the lexicalisation of elements dependent on the
highest ranked case in a predication provided they are not
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Boss-elements. This method is easier than what would be
entailed by adjoining dependent elements to the host, in
that this would produce a structure in which koc would
govern a Boss-element which controls the element governed
by the adjoined Abl.
Just as we can handle some of the points which Cruse
raises about direct physical action by not having an
in the action predication, so we can use the same device to
deal with his third category of "causation of emotion",
which we have already suggested reduces to causation by
direct physical action (see 3.2.5.d. above). Cruse
observes that with the overt causative a reading is more
likely on which it is some property of the drug in sentences
like:
153- John caused Mary to become annoyed by injecting
her with a new drug
which actually annoys Mary rather than John himself, i.e.
the immediate cause is the drug not John's administering the
drug.j However, he does not point out that even if the
drug is the subject of a lexical causative, then the
annoyunce-causing-property-of-the-drug reading is unlikely:
154. The drug annoyed Mary
that is some property of the drug such as being difficult
to administer annoyed Mary, rather than any annoyance-
eliciting property. this latter reading is more likely
with the overt causative:
155. The drug caused Mary to become annoyed
Compare this also with:
31%
156a. The electrode annoyed Mary
b. The electrode caused Mary to become annoyed
where in 156b it would generally be understood that the
electrode is implanted in Mary in the relevant area of the
brain. In fact, there seems to be in each case two
different types of annoyance, corresponding to:
157a• Mary was annoyed
b. Mary showed signs of annoyance but was not really
annoyed
the point being that electrodes and drugs can elicit the
signs of annoyance, fear, anger etc without speakers
actually wanting to describe that situation as involving
"natural" annoyance, fear, anger etc, i.e. in the latter
case there seems to be some conscious control. A full
discussion of this point would take us outside our present
concerns, but it is possible that an Abl in the structure
of 156a would handle this meaning difference, that is, in
the predication which we can represent as MARY BECOME
AKc
ANNOYED, MARY is governed by
A structure like 152 will handle the sentences like
153 and the related lexical causatives will simply have a
All
further
AV>s in N^. Given the rule of Sub junction as
formulated above, we can thus obtain the correct surface
structures. In the case of 153 there is no higher ADS
into which MARY, governed here by Abs, can raise, so that
we have the overt causative since the predicate ANNOY
governs a Boss-Case and there is no higher occurrence of
that case. Notice that in these circumstances, Subjunction
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is optional, so that wo could in principle have a lexical
causative with this reading of* the annoyance-cauaing-
property of the drug, which seems to be the case for some
speakers. However, the favoured reading of the lexical
causative has John's administering the drug as the
immediate cause. In this case, there is the higher
and Subjunction is here obligatory since the predicate
ANNOY does not govern a Boss-Case. Thus Cruse*s arguments
do not, in fact, constitute counter-arguments to Lexical
Decomposition, in that the facts which he brings forward,
one they are more fully discussed, can be accommodated in
a grammar which involves Lexical Decomposition and shows the
notions of direct and indirect causation to be relevant to
Sub junc tion.
Before leaving this section on indirect and direct
causation and their relation to the arguments against
Lexical Decomposition, we must return to the one argument
against the causative analysis of kill which Podor makes
and which, as yet, we have not considered in this section.
This argument involves do so insertion, in sentences like
the following:
138a. John caused the glass to melt and it surprised
me that it did so
b. John caused the glass to melt and it surprised
me that he did so




160a. John caused Mary to die and it surprised me that
she did so
b. John caused Mary to die and it surprised me that
he did so
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l6la. John killed Mary and it surprised me that ,
did so *ailt3
The point is that the acceptability of both he and it in
159 is accounted for in that there are, under the Lexical
Decomposition hypothesis, two underlying clauses to which
the do so insertion rule can apply, one with he as subject,
the other with it. By the same token, there are two
underlying clauses in l6l, one with he the other with she
as subject, but one of the derivations is blocked. Lakoff
and Ross (Lakoff and Ross, 1972) deal with the situation
in terms of the lexical identity of transitive and intrans¬
itive melt as opposed to the non-identity of the corresponding
kill and die. The same explanation will hold good for our
analysis of the situation. The point is that throughout
the derivation of 159 the intransitive verb melt preserves
its lexical identity so that the identity of the antecedent
of do so is preserved up to surface structure. However,
in the case of l6l, the antecedent, die, of do so does not
pass through to surface structure untouched.
In fact, this point has a more general application in
terms of Lexical Islands. There is now a large literature
on the Anaphoric Island Constraint, originating with Postal
(Postal, 1969) and the exceptions to the constraint (see
Watt, 1973a, 1973b, Corum, 1973 and references there).
The point is that many islands are, in fact, penetrable:
162a. Sergeant Pepper claims not to drink, but I have
seen him take one
b. Jim reviewed that book and it will appear in
Linguistic Inquiry
c. Fred is a Londoner, but I wouldn't live there
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where the anaphoric elements refer to drink, review and
London which appear in the underlying structure as nouns
before Subjunction applies# Hie point is that in terms of
Lakoff and Ross'a constraint which refers to morphological
relatedness the situation is largely accidental. However,
if we have cyclic Strict Lexicalisation, insertion of
lexical material, followed by Subjunction, we can have a
clearer understanding of %/hat is happening in these
sentences. We can say that the sentence is well-formed if
the lexical item which is the antecedent for the anaphoric
element passes through to the surface without Subjunction
having created any structure which results in loss of its
original form. Thus, taking the "proto—example" :
163. *Fred is an orphan and he misses them
as opposed to
164. Fred is a parentless child and he misses them
we can assume that at some point in it derivation 163
passes through a stage like 164, that is essentially we
have a head noun CHILD and a modifying element which has
the lexical form parentless. This occurrence of parent
serves as the antecedent for pronominalisation. If
parentless is not Subjoined to CHILD, then we obtain the
well-formed 164. However Subjunction will create the
subjunction tree with parentless subjoined to CHILD, a tree
which must be lexicalised as orphan, in which the antecedent
is lost.
Notice that the constraint must, in fact, be an output
constraint, stating roughly that a sentence is deviant if
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the lexical antecedent of a pronominal element is not
present in the surface structure. There are many problems
surrounding such sentences which we cannot go into here.
Thus, for example, Corum (Corum, op. cit.) talks in terms of
a hierarchy. There is also the question of how related the
items must be: thus compare the examples cited, where the
relatedness is comparatively direct, and examples like the
following
165a. ?Plutists are a strange breed, since it appears
not to sound shrill to them
b. *Plautists are a strange breed, since it appears
not to sound shrill to them
cited by Lakoff and Ross where the unacceptability which
they attribute to 165b is said to be due to the "less
relatedness of flautist to flute, with the following:
166. ?Fred is a Mancunian, but I wouldn*t live there
where there is little "morphological relatedness" between
Mancunian and Manchester. Thus there is a very general
pattern in English to which the supposed counter—examples
of Fodor*s belong, and insofar as there seems to be some
principle in terms of which we can account for it (even
though at this stage this is rather -primitive), then there
is no need to see the counter-argument as having much force.
k.k»3. Responsibility
We suggested above that responsibility for an action
is to be associated with the DO predication (see h»h»2.b).
We can now further explore this suggestion in the light of
our earlier discussion of cause and responsibility (see
3*3.1.). One first restriction is that the Agent must be
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Abl
governed by Abl and not by In the DO predication. This
is in accord with our analysis of
167. John surprised Mary by turning out to be so tall
as containing a non-Agent since John is dependent on the
Abl
complex ,, in the DO predication, which distinguishes itAds
from true Agents and Forces which are dependent on Abl. In
the case of 167 it is not possible to blame John for
surprising Mary, since he has no control over his rate and
degree of growth.
We discussed above (see 3.3*1.) Vendler*s observation
that the following are not synonymous (Vendler, 1967)
168a. John's walking out caused a disturbance
b. John caused a disturbance by walking out
in that 168a does not attribute responsibility to John while
168b does, implying that he is to blame for the disturbance.
The underlying structure of both sentences will be virtually
the same: namely a DO predication with a predicational
Abs and an Abl, the Abs governing a predication expressing
the causal relation between John's walking out and the
disturbance. The difference will lie solely in what is
dependent on the Abl of the DO predication: in the case of
l68a, this Abl will govern a V, which will allow the Abl
governing JOHN WALK OUT of the CAUSE predication to raise,
while in the case of l68b Abl will govern N and there will
Loc
also be a governing V which will allow for the formation
ada
of a by-clause. Thus we can associate responsibility with
a DO predication whose Abl governs N.
Shibatani (Shibatani, 1973a) uses sentences like l68a
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and 168b to argue against the transformational analysis of
by-clauses (see 3*3*1.). The first argument, as noted
above, relates to the non-synonymy of the two sentences
which we have shown can be handled in terms of the nature
and structure of the DO predication. The second argument
involves such adverbs as intentionally, accidentally etc.
in their occurrence in such sentences and can be shown to
be without force if the facts can be handled in a straight¬
forward manner in our grammar. Thus the sentence
169. John accidentally caused a disturbance
would have the structure shown in 170 (see below),
Abl of is raised into Abl of N^, and thence raised into
Abl of Ny, this latter being the higher purpose predication.
Abs subjoins to N,, and is lexicalised as cause. We could
perhaps block the subjunction of All in terms of its
governing N, but we cannot here explore this matter fully.








CAUSE MOVE (j0HN,y) (DISTURBANCE,z)
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The force of Shibatani's argument comes from his
assumption that the adverb intentionally originates in the
structure underlying by-clauses in all cases. Insofar
as we have a higher DO predication to accommodate some of
these adverbs, Shibatani,s argument has no force here. In
fact, Shibatani does not argue for such an assumption and
it is difficult to see what data he could use to support it,
as at least in sentences like 169 there is no evidence for
an underlying structure containing a structure which could
surface as a by-clause. However, if this assumption were
to be correct, then 169 should have the same meaning as 171
171. John caused a disturbance by intentionally doing
something
where there is an overt by-clause. Rather than viewing
this non-synonymy of 169 and 171 as counter-evidence to
his assumption, Shibatani claims that this is a refutation
of the transformational analysis of by-clauses. In fact,
the non-synonymy is handled neatly in our grammar by posit¬
ing a higher DO predication containing the adverb
intentionally in the structure underlying the by-clause,
that is in the relevant structure there is no N^ predication,
and the Abl of Kg governs a purpose predication, itself
governing a predication of John's doing something. The
fact that 171 may be synonymous with 172
172. John intentionally caused a disturbance by doing
something
would be handled by a higher predication NQ containing an
empty Loc, into which INTENTIONALLY may raise from the lower
purpose predication. However, allowing such a structure
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with, two Locs would also allow, in principle, two semantic
specifications and such sentences are somewhat odd:
173. ?John accidentally caused a disturbance by
deliberately walking out
This could be handled in two ways: firstly having a
constraint on the rules of semantic specification to the
effect that if the higher Loc is semantically specified,
then there can be no specification for any lower Loc, or
alternatively we allow both Locs to be specified and then
have recourse to Consistency conditions which state which
pairs of adverbs are acceptable. Thus there seems to be
something of a hierarchy: 174& seems to be better than
173 and 174b seems to be worse:
174a. John deliberately caused a disturbance by
intentionally walking out
b. *John deliberately caused a disturbance by
accidentally walking out
Although we cannot go into enough detail here to strongly
motivate either of the possibilities over the other, at
least there is in principle a means of dealing with the
sentences which is in accord with our proposals and which
does not involve any new mechanisms out of keeping with %he
form of the grammar.
One point which does arise from this discussion is
that as it stands the grammar will handle adverbs like
accidentally, carelessly etc in the same way as deliberately,
carefully etc, that is by introducing thetn under the Loc of
a purpose DO predication. This feels somewhat counter¬
intuitive and it would be better to handle them in terms of
a MOVE predication containing a Loc. Thus the structure of
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175. John accidentally caused an accident
would have a MOVE predication dependent on the aspect
predication, with an Abs governing; a structure expressing
the fact that John caused a disturbance. The adverb
accidentally would originate under the Loc of this MOVE
predication. If the Abs is not subjoined to MOVE, then
the structure would lexicalise as:
176. John's causing a disturbance happened accidentally
Again we find Loc lexicalising as bjr or as an adverbial
suffix -ly. However, the same structure would allow the
derivation of another sentence, if we allow JOHN to raise
into the Abs of the aspect predication, Abs to subjoin to
MOVE and Loc governing ACCIDENTALLY to also subjoin to MOVE
which results in its lexicalisation as happen:
177. John happened to cause a disturbance
which is synonymous with 176. Thus we can restrict the
semantic specification of Loc as DELIBERATELY or ACCIDENTALLY
and the like in terms of the presence or absence of an Abl
introducing an Agent.
4.4.4. In retrospect
In this chapter we have made some initial proposals
concerning the form of a Localist grammar and how it can
capture the notions of direct and indirect causation. The
grammar will have three components: firstly a set of
formation rules which produce a hierarchy of predications
underlying each sentence of the language and a semantic
specification sub-component. This sub-component enters
one semantic specification for each actant in the "real
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world" situation into the structure at the point which we
have called the "lowest", this being defined in terms of
the case hierarchy. Thus the "lowest" predication will
be that governed by the case which is highest on the case
hierarchy, Abs, Abl, All, Loc. This notion of "lowest"
is also relevant to the application of other rules, in that
rules cycle on the "lowest" predication first. We have
also suggested that semantic specification is also
constrained in terms of the case which governs the term to
be specified. Thus nouns will be marked as to whether
they can be inserted under Abl, i.e. can refer to Agents,
The second component of the grammar is the Raising
rule, which applies cyclically. Each semantic specification
will take the form of a variable plus a semantic content.
Raising is controlled by the governing case, that is a
terra may be raised into a higher tern if the case of the
raised term is the same as the case of the higher term or
if that higher case is a complex case in which the relevant
case occurs. Insofar as we have simple and complex cases
it is possible to find situations in which there are two
occurrences of a case, once as a simple case and once as a
component of a complex case: in this case, the lower case
is raised into the simple before the complex case if both
are unspecified. Raising leaves behind a copy of the
variable, which may be deleted or lexicalise as a pronominal
form. Raising will also allow an unspecified lower tern
to raise into some higher specified term, in which case a
copy of the variable is added under the lower term.
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The third component is responsible for Lexicalisation
and again applies cyclically. There will be three rule
types in this component, firstly the rule of Subjunction,
secondly Linearisation and thirdly Strict Lexicalisation.
Subjunction is responsible for subjoining some adjoined
term to the governing element and on a simple level is
responsible for the simultaneous realisation of two or more
semantic entities in one lexical item. Linearisation takes
the unordered structure and imposes order on it, making
essential reference to the case hierarchy. We have
suggested that a secondary effect of Linearisation is the
process of S\ibject-Formation, but this is one major point
to which we return below (see Chapter 5)» Finally Strict
Lexicalisation substitutes lexical items for Subjunction
trees.
Referring back to section ^.4.2., we summarised there
the basic suggestions relating to activity and accomplishment
sentences and related phenomena. We can now see to what
extent we have captured these points.
(i) We have three types of predication: purpose DO
which allows only an N under Abl which captures the notion
of Agent, a responsibility DO which allows for Agents,
governed solely by Abl where the term is N, Forces, governed
by Abl where the term is V and to capture the object
acted upon, and finally a CAUSE predication which takes
CAUSE as the element governed by Abs and sentential Abl and
All.
(ii) The distinction between complete and incomplete
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verbs is not explicitly covered, but insofar as the former
take Agents while the latter take Forces, we might correlate
this distinction with the presence or not of an underlying
CAUSE in that b^—clauses, which are only possible with
incomplete verbs, originate in the Abl of a CAUSE
predication.
(iii) Again the internal/external object has not been
discussed explicitly, although the sentences analysed have
involved the external object rather than the internal
object insofar as they have an object correlated with the
preposition to rather than with. Thus external objects
All
seem to be correlated with the presence of ,, and theAbs
notion of Patient of an action. Again it is possible to
see here a correlation with the underlying predication
CAUSE, in that such objects originate in the predication
governed by All of a CAUSE predication.
(iv) All the sentences discussed have been accomplish¬
ment sentences, which again correlates with CAUSE, but we
shall explore this further in the next chapter and see
that the correlation is not so direct.
The gaps which we discovered here pltts the brief
discussion of instrumentals in chapter 3 (see 3.3.) serve
to define our aims for the next chapter. As an overall
aim, we shall use chapter 5 to extend our grammar by testing
its adequacy for other areas of English and by further
refining the rules. The area of English to be studied is
to be delimited by two factors, firstly, activity sentences,
which will allow us to consider further the CAUSE predication
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and also the internal object, which, as we have noted, is
related to the preposition with and secondly our concern
with instrumentals, which will also involve the preposition
with. Thus in the next chapter we shall deal largely with
the preposition with as our main area which will be the
basis for extending the grammar.
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CHAPTER 5
The Preposition "With" and Related
Matters
3.1, A Statement of the Situation
What little there is in the literature on the pre¬
position with treated in. a transforelational generative
framework consists largely of disconnected observations, in
that it has only been considered in as far as it has bear¬
ings on other aspects of English grammar. A unified treat¬
ment of it is lacking, although we do not pretend that this
survey should fill the gap, but merely indicate its extent.
There seems to be general agreement that with is a pre¬
position that marks the Instrument, the Comitative and the
Object with certain verbs and moreover that there is a
relationship between this preposition and the verb have.
The one major thing which is missing is some explanation of
why it is associated with just these uses and no others.
Vestergaard (Vestergaard, 1973) discusses the proposal
by Fillmore (Fillmore, 1968) that in such sentences as:
la. John smeared paint on the wall
b. John smeared the wall with paint:
paint is in both cases an underlying Instrument and he argues
that it would be more reasonable to treat it as the Object.
Similarly he argues that with also marks the Object with
verbs like collide, as in
2. The ship collided with the pier
His hypothesis extends naturally to adjectival with-phrases,
such as the boy with a stick and the shelf with the books on
it. However, there are several usee which do not support
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such a straightforward hypothesis, the with of Instrumental®,
of the possessor, as in
3. The man has the book with him
of attendant circumstances
4. With the window open, X can't concentrate
of certain "reciprocal" verbs
5. John agreed with Bill
6. John identified universal quantification with and-ing
of location
7. Your keys are with your wallet
of profession or job
8. John is with the pClice
9. Mary has moved: she's with Personnel, now
Certainly there is reason to believe, as we shall see, that
with is to be related to expressions of location and, if
this is correct, then Anderson's Localist proposals provide
one means of linking many of these different uses.
Of the two more extended studies of the preposition
with, one restricts its scope to four "apparently dissimilar
environments" (Lee, 1969: 31) and the other is more concerned
to show the diversity of its uses rather than with the
possibility that there may be some unifying factor (Nilsen,
1973). Not working within a case grammar framework, Lee
views the occurrence of with as a relatively low-level
phenomenon which has no implications itself for the meaning
of the sentence. His hypothesis is that there is "a
transformation which prefixes with to subjects of English
sentences" and shows that such a transformation will account
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for the occurrence of the preposition in the following four
constructions:
10. The house with the shutters was torn down
11. With the radio playing, you can't hear the canary
12. John planted the field with corn
13. Harry put his car in the garage and Mary did the
same with hers
Notice firstly that this hypothesis leaves many of the cases
which we listed above without any explanation, unless one
is willing to alter the deep structure posited for such
sentences so that in all examples the noun marked by with
is at some point a subject and add to the grammar rules
just to account for this: such a move seems to be difficult
to justify. Moreover, such a .proposal depends on the
prior assumption that there is such an animal as a deep
structure subject, an assumption that some would question
(Fillmore, 1968, Lakoff and Ross, 1968, Anderson, 1976).
One's unease about the proposal is increased when Seuren
(Seuron, 1973) associates dative prepositions in French and
other languages with deep structure subjects which lose
their subjeet-status due to Predicate-Raising. Finally
Lee offers no reason at all why with should mark the subject
of an embedded sentence as opposed to any other preposition.
In fact, it cannot even mark all deep structure subjects:
one obvious candidate for such an environment would be the
passive, but here the original subject would have to be
marked by with and the passive would then delete this
preposition and then add by.
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If Lee restricts his study, then Nilsen goes to the
opposite extreme with an extensive list of the uses of with:
(a) possessive with
l^a. the shelf with books on it
b. the boy with red hair
(b) objective with
15a• John smeared the wall with paint
b. John supplied them with money
c. Mary has the children with her
d. John is happy with his wife
(One may well quibble with some of Nilsen»s analysis,
although since there is no reasoned basis given for many
of them, such an endeavour is unlikely to be productive.
Por instance, what reasons are there for treating her as an
Object in 15c? We might alternatively class it as a
comitative or emphasise its relation to the expression of
location, that is, the location of the children is "with
Mary". Likewise, with his wife in 15d could, with as much
justification as Nilsen gives, be viewed as a causative or
under one reading as a 1 expression of attendant circumstances,
i.e. "when he is with his wife".)
(c) comitative with
16. He is coming with his wife
(d) proximity with
17a. Your keys are with your wallet
b. The Holland Tunnel links New York with New Jersey
(With regard to 17a, compare 15c and its paraphrase
The children are with Mary.)
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(e) Extent with
18. John bought the book with £5
(f ) instrumental with, which Nilsen splits into four
categories on the basis of purely "real world" properties
19a. He built the castle with granite (material)
b. He cut the wood with a saw (tool)
c. God destroyed the village with an earthquake
(natural force)
d. He pulled the trigger with his left index finger
(body part)
(g) manner with
20a. He handed in his assignments with regularity
b. She sang with unexpected enthusiasm
Nilson makes no essplicit suggestions for the treatment
of with, seeming content with an excess of atomisation
which gives the impression that no unified treatment is
possible. His sub-categorisation seems to be completely
arbitrary and in the case of the Instrumental appears to be
based more on the classification of the real-world entity
referred to rather than on any linguistic notion of the
relation between noun and verb. It is clear from the
preceding discussion that there is a problem: either we
can arbitrarily restrict the uses of with and give a false
impression of unity or adopt a Nilsenian taxonomy which
impedes rather than helps a unified treatment.
One assumption that is basic to our treatment of the
preposition with and which also underlies our criticism
of other proposals concerning the preposition is a naturalness
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assumption (see Zwicky, 1968 for the term), namely that if
a form occurs in apparently different structures, then it is
the case that there is some element or property common to
those structures which conditions that form. This reduces
to the claim that the recognition of homonyms should be the
last resort once the hypothesis that we are dealing with the
same form has been refuted or proved to be untenable.
Without such a governing assumption, it would become difficult,
if not impossible, to say anything of consequence in
linguistics, that is, to make linguistically significant
generalisations. Thus, as a principle governing our
approach to the preposition, we assume that, however many
uses there may be for the preposition, there is some factor
common to each of them.
The hypothesis which conditions our approach, and which
has not been fully explored in the literature to date, is
that with is a marker of location, so that whenever it
occurs we can hypothesise that at some point in the
derivation the noun phrase marked by with is dependent on
Loc or some complex case governed by hoc. Notice that such
a hypothesis does allow us to sort and classify the data
according to some governing principle and the data will not
be an accidental list of uses. Any taxonomy, to be useful,
must have some overt governing principle.
In adopting the locational hypothesis for the pre¬
position, it may seem that we are prejudging the issue.
However, there are good reasons for this assumption of a
Loc-marking function for the preposition. Firstly, we
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noted in Chapter 2 that the form withf the modern reflex
of Old Norse vi>, replaced the Old English form mifli, both
of which originally marked location and derivatively
comitative relations, so that in its origins, at least,
with was a locative marker and one might expect to find
vestiges of this use in the modem language. One might
also expect to find vestiges of the second use of the Old
Norse form, namely to mark motion towards and adversative
phrases which, in Modem English, are marked by against,
compare fight against/with. Secondly, in Chapter 2, we
also noted a relation between Locative, Comitative
Instrumental and Agentive markers in many languages; given
that the Localist hypothesis claims that the abstract uses
derive from the concrete ones, even if we had no Old English
texts at all, on this basis we could hypothesise that the
abstract uses of Comitative and Instrumental with derive
from some earlier Locative function.
In claiming that with is to be viewed as a marker of
Loc in Modem English, we are, in fact, making a strong
claim: it is quite feasible that we are not dealing with
one factor conditioning all its uses, but rather with a
"family resemblance": Locative could have a factor in
common with Comitative, Comitative a factor in common with
Instrumental, and Instrumental some other factor in common
with Agentive. Moreover, we must be aware that both vi>
and migi (to a lesser extent) had adversative functions,
which could influence the matter. In fact, we find in
some languages that there is no clear and absolute
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distinction between expressions of Location, Adversative and
Goal cases. Before going further, we must make clear what
we mean by "adversative": in terms of motion we can
distinguish, between two types of movement to a place, namely
achieved and non-achieved goal, the former we shall call
Goal and the latter Adversative. Thus Benefactives, as a
sub-class of purpose expressions, will be classed as
Adversative, the for-phrase in the following would likewise
be Adversative:
21. John set out for Cupar
The fuzziness of the distinction between the three categories
is probably best seen in English. Thus t_o seems to be the
primary marker of Goal, but it also marks purpose expressions,
which we have classified as Adversatives (in fact, the
Stoke-on—Trent dialect appears to distinguish between
purpose expressions marked by /fa/ (for) and /ta/ (££.)» "the
former marks lack of success, the latter success). Sim¬
ilarly at marks Locative and also Adversative:
22a. John threw the book at Bill (compare to Bill)
b. John aimed the gun at Bill
As we noted above (2.2.3.2.), in the system of verbal
extensions, Swahili groups Goal and Benefactive together.
The Latin dative case, used as an expression of Benefactive,
i.e. Adversative, also marks the Goal of verbs of giving
and the "recipient" of verbs of emotion:
23. Irascor tibi
*1 am angry . you* (N.B. English with or at
here )
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That this may be Goal rather than Locative is shown by the
fact that when the Latin case endings decayed the pre¬
position used to supplement them was ad, "to", yet morpho¬
logically the dative case appears to be related to the
Locative case form of Indo-European,
In organising the basic data, we reject the "semantic"
approach of Nilsen and turn to the syntactic patterns in
which with occurs, these being the following:
i. HPX with NP2
ii, NP^ with NP^ Prep NP^ (where Prep may be with)
iii. NPX be with NP£
iv. NP- have NFp with NP- (where any other Locative
preposition may substitute
for with)
v, NP^ be Adj with NP^
vi. NPX V with NPg
vii. NP, V NP0 with NP,,X j
viii. with NPX, NP V (NP....)
Of these patterns, i-iv seem to be related in that they are
all essentially stateraents of location or possession, this
latter being itself a sub-type of locaticn (see Lyons, 1967#
1968, Christie, 1970 Anderson, 1971a among others) while
pattern vii covers several different semantic constructions,
at least Instrumental with and the with used after verbs
like load, spray etc. Given that we adopt the Locational
hypothesis for the preposition wj th, if patterns i-iv are
statements of location, then we have some basis for
postulating the presence of structures like those underlying
these patterns in the underlying structure of sentences of
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the patterns v-viii. Thus our first aim is to specify
the structure(s) underlying patterns i-iv and then to see
how far this will generalise to the other patterns.
5.1.1. Localism and States
We take "states" to refer to the following: concrete
location, abstract location such as emotional states,
aspectual states like the progressive, professions and Jobs
(doctor, in the army etc.) and expressions of possession
(Lyons, 1967, Anderson, 1971a). Swahili makes these
relations more overt than most modern Tndo—European languages,
in that their are all marked in essentially the same way,
and the data also bear on the uses of the preposition with.
In what follows we shall briefly present the expressions of
state and possession in Swahili (for more details on
possession see Christie, 1970) with reference especially to
the occurrence of the particle na and forms which may be
related to it.
Swahili has four locative affixes, three prefixes ku-,
pa- and mu- and the suffix -nl. Hie function of this latter
is to form a locative noun from any non-locative base: thus
nyumba and meza mean "house" and "table* respectively and
by adding the suffix -ni we obtain the forms nyumbani and
mezani which Ashton (Ashton, 19^4) translates as "to, at,
in, by, from the house/table". The role of the prefixes
is to mark concord relations and to further specify the
location, by, in part, filling the role of the actual
prepositions of English, The prefix ku- marks indefinite
location, proximity and the source and goal, pa- definite
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location and mu- within—nese or inside. By concord
relations we wean subject-verb concord as in sentences like:
24. Mwituni paiuelala watoto
"forest"+Loc Loc+perf+"sleep" PI.pref.+"child"
*In the forest there slept some children*
25. Nyumbani pana watu wengi
"house"-t-Loc Loc+"with" Pl.pref • +"person"
PI.pref.+"many"
•The house has many people in it*
Patterns like 24 where subject—verb concord is between the
verb and a locative noun are perhaps comparable to English
sentences like:
26. Hie boat sleeps seven people
although the Swahili sentence reports an actual event rather
than a potentiality. The other occurrence of concord
marking is with what Ashton calls the "a of relationship"
and the "o of reference". Thus we find:
nyumbani pa Bwana at the house of Bwana (pa+a=pa)
nyumbani mwa Bwana in the house of Bwana (mu+a-mwa)
and kwa Bwana (ku+a=kwa) without any head noun is often
used where in English we would say "at Bwana »s" (compare
French chez)« The locative prefixes combined with the "o_
of reference" are used in certain predications of location.
27• Kisu kiko mezani
ki+"knife" ki+ku+o "table"+Loc
•The knife is near the table*
where the prefix ki- is the class prefix of the noun "knife"
and there is no overt verbal element comparable to English
is.
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28. Kisu kipo mezani
*The knife is on the table*
29. Kisu kimo sandukuni
•Hie knife is in the box*
Ashton explains the "o of reference" as a means of "directing
attention to some word or words already mentioned or about
to be mentioned...", although this does not sufficiently
distinguish it from the "a of relationship". An alter¬
native to marking the noun with the locative suffix is to
use a general locative preposition, katika: thus both
katika afisi and afisini mean "in the office" and behave
alike with respect to concord.
In talking of the Svahili equivalents of copula
sentences, Ashton divides them into three categories:
identifying, descriptive and states. In identifying
expressions where the subject is first or second person, the
first or second person subject marker is used without any
overt copula element:
30. Ni mpishi 1st. sing. m+"cook" *1 am a cook*
31. TJ mpishi 2nd. sing. m+"cook" *You are a cook*
For the third person subject the form ni^ is used, which is
generally looked on as being related to the locative suffix
-ni rather than to the first person singular prefix ni—:
32. Kamisi ni mpishi "Hamisi" "in" m+"cook"
*Hami8i is a cook*
For descriptions we find either the subject prefix or ni:
thus Ashton gives 33& and 33b as alternatives with no
difference in meaning:
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33^. Hamisi yu mrefu "Hamisi" 3rd. sing. m+"tall"
b. Haraisi ni mrefu "Hamisi" "in" m+"tall"
•Haraisi is tall*
For expressions of state, i.e. essentially contingent
properties, Ashton will admit only the subject prefix:
34a. Hamisi yu dhaifu
•Hamisi is weak*
b. Sahani zi safi
•The plates are clean*
c. Sisi tu tayari
•We are ready*
The distinctions which Ashton makes are not all that clear
or systematic and it seoras to be the case that Swahili
speakers are now generalising the use of ni as a general
copulative element (see Polonte, 1967 and data given by
J, Christie in a seminar in Edinburgh support this).
Of more importance to our present question is the
relevance of these data to the parallel between concrete and
abstract states. Thus for locative sentences, we have the
fo11owing pat terns:
xii
35. Juma xx katika afisi (yu=subj. marker: pa+o=po)
yupo w '
•Juma is in the office*
36. Jvaaa yupo jeshini ("army+ni)
•Juma is in the army*
Thus we have the same structure for concrete location in an
office and abstract location "in the army". Similarly we
find:
n *
37. Mlango ^ wazi (u=subj.marker: ku+o=ko)
•The door is open*
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where a locative element appears in Swah.ili which is
missing in English. The same parallel is found for concrete
and abstract expressions like "in my house" and "in my
childhood", namely nyumbani mwangu and utotoni mwangu, where
in both cases -ni is suffixed to the noun and the concord
marker mu- is prefixed to the possessive pronoun. A second
means of expressing abstract states is exemplified by the
following:
38. Bamisi yupo katika hali ya masikitiko
"Bamisi" 3rd. sing.+pa+o "in" "state" i+a "sorrow"
'Bamisi is in a state of sorrow*
Zt is of interest to note that the hali ya structure is also
used, although rarely, as a means of expressing the pro¬
gressive aspect:
39* Bamisi alikuwa katika hali ya kusema
"H&misi" 3rd.sing.+past+"be" "in" "state" i+a
ku+ "speak"
*Hamisi was speaking*
In fact, hali ya is not obligatory in such sentences. The
form kusema is, in factv the infinitive form of the verb,
that which is given as the citation form. Like the English
infinitive, kusema can be analysed as a root -sema plus a
locative prefix ku-. The normal form of the progressive
is with the prefix na-, which may be treated as related to





Ve return to the question of na below. Thus from this
brief survey, there is some evidence that concrete location,
abstract location and progressive aspect may have the same,
or at least very similar, undexiying structures.
Further evidence comes from the expressions of possession
and the use of the form na and the related kwa (=ku+a)«
Notice that just as kwa can be analysed as a locative form
plus the "a of relationship1* so na can be analysed as the
locative element n± plus this "a of relationship". Compare,
then, the sentences given as 25 and 27 above:
25. Nyumbani pana vatu wengi
27* Kisu kiko mezani
Ve glossed the -na of pana as "with" and structures like 25
mmmmmmm rnrnammmmmm
are typically used to express possession, although here the
subject does not have the locative suffix:
41. Vatoto wana vitabu
pi.pref.+"child" pl.pref.+"with" pl.pref.+"book"
'The children have the books'
The differences are that the "subject" noun is not a
locative and the normal concord marking is placed on the
"verb", as opposed to the locative "subject" noun in 25 and
locative concord marking. Notice that in 25 with a locative
subject, it seems to be the case that the "a of relationship"
is suffixed to a locative element ni. while with a locative
object, as in 27, the "o of reference is suffixed to ku-.
Alternatively we could characterise 27 as containing a
locative element ku-. a "pronominal" form which the "o of
reference" marks as referring or as coreferential with a
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locative noun, while 25 contains a locative element ni
which is put in relationship via the "a of relationship"
with a non-locative noun, namely watu wengi. Comparing
both 25 and 27 with other sentences expressing concrete or
abstract location, we can say that they all contain a sub¬
ject with subject concord attached to some locative element,
that is we can analyse both 25 and 27 as predicating some
location or state of the subject. Further, we can go on to
give a more explicit characterisation of the difference
between the "o of reference" and the "a of relationship"
than that found in Ashton (Ashton, 1944). Firstly, as
noted, there is a structural difference, the "o of reference"
is followed by a locative noun, while the "a_ of relationship"
is followed by a non-locative noun, and secondly we can
place a literal interpretation on Ashton*s definitions: the
"o of reference"marks referential identity of the locative
•iement ku and the following noun, such that in 27 the knife
is stated to be in a place such that it is near the table,
the table is the location of the knife, a on the other hand
marks the fact that there is some relation between the
location or state referred to by ni and the object referred
to by the following non-locative noun, so that in 25 and 41
the subject is in a location or state which can be ident¬
ified by reference to "people" and "books" respectively.
Thus we need in the grammar some distinction between the
following noun actually being the location or state of the
subject, as opposed to being some distinctive element or
property of that state, with respect to which it can be
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identified. Ve shall consider this further below and try-
to show its relevance to the English preposition with (see
6.1.2.).
Yfe have suggested that the particle na can be analysed
as a locative element ni plus the "a of relationship. In
fact, the distribution of this particle is not limited to
expressions of possession. As already noted, this is also
the marker of the progressive aspect: so that an alternative
to 39 would be:
42. Hamisi alikuwa anasetna
"Hamisi" 3rd.sing.+"past"+"be" 3rd.sing. +"with"
+"speak"
«Hamisi was speaking*
Anderson, (Anderson, 1973)» cites other examples of African
languages where there is a relationship between possession
and progressive aspect. Similarly, Vise (Vise, 1975) gives
data from Colloquial Egyptian Arabic which suggests a
relation between habitual and progressive aspect and the
marker of the Instrumental case (cf. English with, comitat-
ive, possessive and instrumental). The fact that we find
such an alternation between katika and na supports our
analysis, but even if na itself were not a candidate for
treatment as a locative plus some other element, the occurr¬
ence of katika (hali ya) in progressives would be a subject
for close scrutiny in terms of the Localist view. Hali is
normally translated as "condition, circumstance, situation",
which is suggestive for the current trend in English to use
a paraphrase with situation wherever possible (for examples,
see the collection made recently by Private Eye).
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There are several other occurrences of the particle na
where a locative notion is present and which have a bearing
on the preposition with and which also provide indirect
support for a locational hypothesis for this preposition.
Pirstly na is a comitative marker:
43* Kamisi alikwenda sokoni na Junta
"Hamisi" 3rd.sing.+"past"+"go" "market"+Loc
"wi th" Junta
*Hamisi went to market with Junta'
The phrase na Junta may also appear before the verb, in which
case one has the option of using the singular subject marker
a- or the plural marker wa-. that is na functions as a
conjunction:
44* Junta na All alikwenda sokoni
>Junta went to the market with All*
45* Junta na All walikwenda sokoni
* junta and All went to the market*
The conjoining function of the particle na is shown by the
fact that it is replacing tena "again1* as the marker of
sentential conjunction*
Probably related to its comitative use is the use of na
with reciprocal or associative verbs. These are formed in
Swahili by adding the suffix -na to the verb (see Ashton,
op, cit,, Whiteley, 1968) and this verb itself may then be
followed by a na-phrase.
46, Wazee watashirikiana naye katika inahurudhio
pi.pref.+"old" pi.pref.+fut.+"share"+"with"
"with"+"him" in attendance





•They agreed with each other* (compare English
get together with)
It is generally agreed that the reciprocal meaning of the
na-extension is secondary and derives from the original
associative meaning. Notice that this situation is
parallelled by some Indo-European languages, where with
associative and reciprocal verbs an element may be affixed
which elsewhere means something like with: thus in Latin
con" (=cum) has this function as does s^. (=s) in Russian.
The particle na is not used for the Instrument: this
gap is filled by the structurally similar form kwa, analysed
as the locative prefix ku- plus the "a of relationship"•
48. Hamisi aliua Juma kwa kisu
"Hamisi" sing.pref.+"past"+"kill" "Juma" "with"
"knife"
•Hamisi killed Juma with a laiife*
Besides marking the Instrument, kwa, like English with is
used in other manner adverbials:
49* Alikwenda sokoni kwa miguu
•He went to market on/by foot* (Lit. "with feet")
50. Aliwaua kwa haraka
sing.pref,+"past"+pl.pref.+"k±ll" "with" "haste"
•He killed them hastily/in haste/with haste*
Finally kwa is also used in expressions of causation e.g.
kwa sababu ya "because of" (Lit. "with reason of")
51. Alikufa kwa baridi
sing.pref.+"past"+"die" "with" "cold"
•He died of cold*
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Finally, the marker of the Agent in passive sentences is
the particle na« in fact, kwa and na in terms of their
morphological analysis seem to be very like English with
and bjr in terms of their historical development, that is all
involve some locative element. In the same way the two
forms in the two languages are used to cover the same spread
of functions, Locative, Comitative, Associative, Agentive,
Instrumental, the only difference being that in the two
languages the forms have carved up the continuum between
Locative and Agentive in rather different manners.
Thus Swahili shows fairly clear data which corroborates
the Localist hypothesis of a relation between concrete states
and abstract ones. Further the uses of na correlate well
with those of the preposition with so that some of the facts
observed in Swahili may be relevant to English, in particular
the distinction between the "o of reference" and the "a of
relationship, where it is the latter which seems to be
related to the uses of with.
5.1.2. Location, Possession and with
Anderson (Anderson, 1973b) has suggested that one means
of accounting for the unacceptability of the progressive
aspect with stative verbs such as:
52. *John is knowing the answer
53• *John is having red hair
54. *John is being from a good family background
would be to assume that the simple predication of state is
itself dependent on the Loc of a progressive predication.
In this way we can also account for the semantic relation
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between statives and progressive*, both involving the
notion of being in a state. Urns the underlying structure
of
55* John is in town
would be 56 (see be lew)
where NQ is the progressive predication. Abs of will
raise into the higher Abs. Further, if we allow a stative
predicate like BE to subjoin to a higher stative predicate,





(JOHN1,*) BE u/n (Tb¥N,y)
of a progressive form. If non-stative predicates are
blocked from subjoining to etative predicates, then we can
account for the progressives and the occurrence of -ing as a
nominal suffix. These must remain as tentative suggestions
and cannot be explored fully here, but this will serve as a
background to our discussion of patterns i-iv (see 5.1.
above)•
Xn fact, although we talk of patterns i-iv, it would
probably be more accurate to t' lk of only two patterns iii
and iv, since i and ii respectively derive from the former
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perhaps via a rule which is similar in effect to Ross*
Whiz-Deletion (Ross, 19&7 ) such that i and ii are verbless
variants of iii and iv.
As soon as we turn to the data for with in such sentences
which we have identified most closely as locational, we find
that our hypothesis that with is a locative preposition of
the same status as in has no strong immediate support, at
least, in that 57 and 58 are not paraphrases of each other:
57. Your keys are in your wallet
58. Your keys are with your wallet
While 57 asserts identity between the location of the keys
and the wallet, i.e. the wallet is the location of the keys,
58 asserts that there is some relation between the location
of the keys and the wallet, the wallet is not exactly the
location of the keys, but it can be identified by reference
to the location of the wallet. Leech (Leech, 1969)
characterises the difference in terras of "simple" versus
"relative" position. In 57 wallet is the simple location
of the keys and in 58 it is the relative location. This
distinction may be compared with that made for Swahili by
Ashton (Ashton, op. cit.): simple location will correspond
to the "o of reference", i.e. identity between location of
keys and the location defined by wallet and relative
location will correspond to the "a of relationship".
It is possible that any difference that there may be
between simple and relative location, i.e. between in and
with could be handled simply in terms of the semantic
interpretation assigned to those prepositions. However,
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this seems to suggest a closer parallel between the
two forms than appears to be the case, that is there is
evidence that there is a difference in structure to be
assigned to 57 and 58. Notice firstly that 57 and 58
differ in that 58 is logically symmetric with 59:
59. Your wallet is with your keys
that is, if your keys are in the location defined by refer¬
ence to your wallet, then your wallet is necessarily in a
location which can be defined by reference to your keys.
However, there is no corresponding logically symmetric
form for 57:
60. *Your wallet is in your keys
Further 5® and 59 both entail 6ls
61. Your wallet and your keys are in the same place
However, while there may be these relations between these
sentences, there is no reason to posit any strict identity
of structure for them, and there is no reason for positing
something like 6l as the underlying structure of 58 and 59
and allowing some rule to delete in the same place which is
then replaced via a rule like Conjunct-Movement by moving
one of the NPs from the conjoined subject. This, besides
being rather cumbersome, will not capture directly the
fact that the with-phrase serves to identify some location
which is already known to the speaker and which he assumes
to be known to the hearer. (For a fuller discussion of
this and related matters see Dreike, 1973: the object of
the study is German bei which functions in essentially the
same way as with in many of its occurrences, and is cognate
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with English bjr. ) We shall find below that the logical
symmetry between 58 and 59 and the entailment relation
between them and 6l finds parallels in other uses of with.
Returning to Leech's discussion of with (Leech, op.
cit.) we find further support for some distinction between
the structures of 57 and 58. He notes that the difference
between the two sentences is also shown by the existence of
a paraphrase for 58 with a relative clause, although a
parallel paraphrase for 57 is difficult to find:
62. Your keys aro (at the same place) where your
wallet is
63a. Your keys are (in the same place) where your
wallet is (^57)
b. Your keys are in the place which is (identical
with) your wallet
This suggests that the difference may be captured in terms
of the presence of a relative-clause-like structure in 58.
Notice that we say "relative-clause-like" structure since
this cannot be a full relative clause: relative clauses
allow tense and the tense of the lower clause in 58 must
always be the same as th. t of the highest tense predication,
that is 64a and 64b are not synonymous :
64a, Your keys are with your old pipe
b. Your keys are (in the place) where your old pipe
used to be
To avoid the possibility of different tense markings, we
prevent the possibility of a lower tense predication
developing. We return to this below.
Support for the presence of a relative clause-like-
structure being present underlying 58 comes from ambiguities
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which some speakers detect when «.wherever that may be
is added to the sentence:
65a. Your keys are in your wallet, wherever that may be
b. Your keys are where your wallet is, wherever that
may be
c. Your keys are with your wallet, wherever that may
be
As we would expect if the structure of 65a is the same as
56, there is no ambiguity with respect to the referent of
that, it can only refer to wallet. However, there is an
ambiguity as to the referent of that in 65b and 65c. On
the preferred reading of that for 65b, it refers to the
location, i.e. where your wallet is, in other words the
referent, antecedent is the head noun of the relative
clause, but some speakers will also accept the reading on
which it refers to wallet: for 65c the preferences are
reversed, so that, on the preferred reading, that is co-
referential with wallet and, on the second reading, it is
coreferential with some non-occurring element in surface
structure. Some speakers seem to avoid the ambiguity by
using stressed it_ when reference to wallet is intended.
How, then, are we to handle these facts about simple
and relative location? As already suggested, the structure
underlying simple location will be that of 56 and relative
location will involve some added locative predication as a
relative clause modifying the N governed by Loc. Thus the
structure underlying 62 would be the following, where the
bare Loc in conditions the appearance of the tensed
predication as the relative clause, and we adopt the
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convention used in the preceding chapter of showing that we
are dealing with a sub-structure with a tense predication
as head element by using V as the head of the structure with¬




We assume that the Abs of is blocked from raising into the
Abs of Nq by the presence of a higher occurrence of Abs which
is semantically specified. Loc will raise into Loc of
to become the head of the relative clause structure, although
the full details of relative clauses are to be worked out.
Abs of raises into Aba of Np to become the "subject* of
the whole sentence. will subsequently subjoin to NQ to
produce 62. The absence of in the place can be accounted
for by having the same structure as 66 but not allowing
semantic specification of Loc of We can extend the
355.
analysis to 58 so that we have a relative-clause-like
structure dependent on the N whose governor is Loc of N^.
The difference here is that this Loc will also be marked as
Abs and there will be no tensed sub-structure dependent on
this N. Further the Loc of this sub-structure is without
any semantic specification obligatorily. Thus the structure





On the V2 cycle, Abs will raise into as will Loc, but
this being unspecified there will be no effect on the output.
Hie rest of the derivation is as in 66 with the Abs of
raising into the Abs of and subjoining to N^.
will not lexicalise, since Abs governing a variable and
being "subject'1 of the predication has no lexical form and
Loc has no semantic specification which lexicalise^. Thus
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we are claiming that with is the lexicalisation of the
T OC
complex case and such an analysis allows for the locative
origin of the preposition and also its use as a marker of the
object in that the complex also contains Abs. Thus we have
some initial suggestions for the treatment of pattern iii,
and some occurrences of pattern i can be derived from this
if there is no verbal tense-bearing element. We say some
occurrences of i because there are other occurrences where
this pattern corresponds to sentences with a possessive
reading, and we turn to these now.
If the suggestion, popular in the literature, that there
is a relationship between location and possession is to be
accepted, then there should be some relation between the
structure 66 and patterns ii and iv. Consider, then, the
following:
67. The desk has a light over it
68. The table has a book on it
69. The professor has the students with him
Following Leech (Leech, op. cit.) 67 and 68 will be related
to simple location in that the subject is the actual location
of some object, while in 69 we have a structure which is
related to 70, so 69 is to be related to 71s
70. A light is over the desk
71. The students are with the professor
In both cases, the difference is to be handled in terms of
what element is raised into the Abs of the higher aspect
predication. Fillmore (Fillmore, 1969) suggests that have
is the lexicalisation of a structure which would be more
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nearly represented as "BE WITH". However we cannot accept
such an interpretation as this would require some blocking
device to prevent the structure in 66 from surfacing with
have since this will contain BE followed immediately by
the preposition with. Instead we shall adopt Fillmore's
alternative proposal (Fillmore, 1968), that have is to be
inserted "just in case the subject is an NP which is not
from the o(bjective) case". (Compare also Lyons, 1968 for
a similar suggestion and Anderson, 1971a, 1972 etc). Thus
the underlying structure of 67 will be the following (see
below). The fact that the Loc of NQ is marked as Abs will
allow the Abs of N.^ to raise into it, and the Loc of
will raise into the j^oc* This will produce a "subject"
of Nq which is governed by a complex case containing Loc
which will condition the lexicalisation of BE as have and
t qft












(LIGHt'x) BE OVER (DESK,y)
allow for the occurrence of with when there is no tense-
bearing verbal element. Finally in terms of this structure
we need to add to the rules of Strict Lexicalisation, in that
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we have a subject in N0 which is coreferential with a lower
non-subject, i.e. the variable y governed by the Loc of N^,
where this non-subject is lexicalised as a pronoun. Thus
in terras of coreferential items we need a mile which states
that a subject will delete (i.e. block the lexicalisation
of) a lower subject and will pronorainalise a lower non-
subject.
Relative location with respect to "possessive" with
will be handled in the same way as patterns iii and iv.
Thus the structure of 69 will be:
On the Ng cycle Abs will raise into the of N^; on the
N. cycle will raise into the of N_ so that we getX Abs Loc 0
professor as final surface subject. Loc also raises into
Loc
Abjg on the N2 cycle. With respect to the derivation of 72
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JL#oc
we allowed Abs of N, to raise into ... of Nr,, and the samei Ads U
would apply in 73• However, it is possible that this is
not the most acceptable derivation. An alternative would
be, in order to avoid a specified N raising into which
is already specified, to talk here in terms of SubJunction,
that is, the presence of the Abs marking the hoc allows
subJunction of Abs. ThiG will entail altering the grammar
so that each element to which a dependent subjoins is govern¬
ed by a complex case containing a specification of which
elements subjoin. A third alternative wo&Xd be to accept
Anderson's proposal (Anderson, 1971a# 1972, etc.) that
predications can only be introduced via an Abs dependent on
N. Both these possibilities will lead to modifications in
detail of the grammar without doing any harm to its function¬
ing and will lead us from our current concerns. The choice
between the two must be made at some other place. Whatever
the details of the derivation the resulting structure before







N2 will not be lexicalised since it governs an unspecified
Loc and an Abs governing the variable x which is blocked
L/OC
from lexicalisation. Ihe variable x governed by .. willAbs
lexicalise as him, and the governing complex case as with.
BE, since its "subject" is governed by a complex case
containing Loc, will be lexicalised as have. Abs will not
be lexicalised and this we can attribute to the fact that
it contains Abs and is immediately post-verbal: the same
All
applies to all the occurrences of .. discussed in the
Abs
preceding chapter. Note that will account for the with
which occurs if there is no tense-bearing element,
the professor with the students with him.
Thus we have an analysis of patterns i-iv which shows
the relationships between the relevant forms and is in
accord with the proposals for the grammar made in the
preceding chapters in essential details. In what follows
we shall see to what extent the hypothesis that with
Toe
lexicalises a complex case of the form .. accounts for theAbs
other patterns of the use of this preposition.
5»1The Notion of "Primary"
One notion which it is useful to introduce at this point
is that of the "primary". As we noted above, the with—
phrase in predications of relative location defines the
location at which the object may be found, i.e. as the basic
element of the sentence with regard to which sops other
element is treated. In fact, this notion of primary is not
restricted to relative location as we have discussed it
above: we shall find below that it has a bearing also on
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other structures. That it is not restricted to with-
sentences can be seen if* we consider sentences containing
the same. As we noted above 58 and 59 are logically
symmetric:
58. Your keys are with your wallet
59• Your wallet is with your keys
and they differ as to which object*s location the speaker
assumes to be known to the hearer or relevant to identifying
the location of the subject. Moreover, they both entail 6l:
6l. Your wallet and your keys are in the same place
In fact, two other sentences parallelling 58 and 59 also
entail 61:
75a. Your wallet is in the same place as your keys
b. Your keys are in the same place as your wallet
which also differ in terms of the primary, i.e. the defining
element. How such relations are to be captured is uncertain
at the moment and lies outside the scope of the main topic of
this study, but such paraphrases do suggest that with may
itsolf be connected with the notion of comparison (note
compare with/to and we shall see below that in some circum¬
stances to_ also introduces a primary), that is, the location
of one object is compared with the location of the primary
and asserted to be the same. These relations also suggest
an alternative hypothesis to that proposed above for with,
although one which does not appear to generalise in quite
the same way to its other uses, namely that it is the
lexicalisation of the structure which could also surface as
in the same place as. We shall not explore this here, but
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its relevance will become clear below.
We have suggested, then, that, in sentences of the
T oc
patterns i-iv, with is the lexicalisation of ^ and marks
relative location. If we try to extend this hypothesis,
we find firstly that it is not fully consistent with the
data and secondly that the framework adopted of analysing
sentence patterns is not itself revealing. In fact, we
find semantic relations cross-cutting the syntactic patterns
established. Thus as examples of pattern v (NP be Adj with
NP) we find the following sentences:
76a. The garden is swarming with bees
b. The cart is loaded with hay
77a. John is in agreement with Bill
b. John is in sympathy with Bill
78a. John is pleased with the concert
b. John is angry with Bill
and examples of pattern vi (NP V with NP):
79a. John agrees with Bill
b. John sympathises with Bill
80a. This train connects with the Birmingham train at
Carstairs
b. Wine mixes with water
Hie point is that most of these sentences contain verbal
elements which will also occur in pattern vii (NP V NP with
NP), these latter often seeming to function as causative
counter-parts, so that semantic parallels overlap the
syntactic patterns:
81a. John loaded the cart with hay
303.
b. Bill pleased John with a (rood book
c. This road connects St. Andrews with civilisation
d. John mixed the water with the wine
Notice also that, while exhibiting different patterns, 77a
and 77b are paraphrases of 79a and 79b. In what follows
we shall first review what has been said in the literature
about these sentences containing with and show how they may
be related in the light of certain facts which have not been
taken into consideration, and then make some proposals for
their treatment which will help to further the grammar in
the light of the analyses taade in the preceding chapter.
5.2. The Data
Of the sentences given above, the most discussed type
is that exemplified by 81a. By "discussed" here we mean
taken as the object of study in its own right as opposed to
sentences like 79a» for example, containing the verb agree
which are more generally discussed in the literature within
the context of the debate about phrasal and sentential con¬
junction. Bottom on the ranking fall what we may call verbs
of emotion or relation toward someone or thing, e.g.
surprised, angry, sympathise.
5.2.1. On "Loading Hay" and Related Activities
Within this category fall several types of verb.
Generally, discussion is restricted to the causative and
stative form© of load, plant, smear, jam, gwarrn etc but for
convenience we set up the following sub-categories:
(a) causative: stock, furnish, provide, sprinkle,
wrap etc.
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(b) verbs of* process lacking an Agent: echo, run,
flow, drip etc.
82a. History echoes with the names of well-intentioned
fools
b. The streets will run with blood
(c) negative correlates of (a): empty, strip, rob,
steal, unpack etc.
(d) verbs of movement: wave, throw, lash out, nod etc.
(e) a certain class of verbs which we shall discuss
further below, the important point being that they
have a corresponding form in put/giveMu water,
butter, glaze, oil, ink (in), seed etc.
In what follows we shall concern ourselves primarily with
sentences of the causative pattern, as examples of which we
give:
83a. John loaded the hay onto the cart
b. John loaded the cart with the hay
8lj.a. John smeared the paint on the wall
b. John smeared the wall with the paint
85a. John wrapped gaily coloured paper around the gift
b. John wrapped the gift in gaily coloured paper
Following Fraser (Fraser, 1971), we shall refer to the (a)
examples as "locative" sentences in that the prepositional
phrase denotes the ultimate location or goal of the object
that moves, and the corresponding (b) sentences we shall
call "device" sentences. Although, as the evidence presented
below suggests, the prepositional phrase does not necessarily
denote a device, but we retain the term for convenience.
The arguments for and against an instrumental analysis of
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the with-phrase are given in Partee (partee, 1965). Fillmore
(Fillmore, 1968) and Vestergaard (Vestergaard, 1973) (but
see also Chomsky, 1972, S.R. Anderson, 1971, J. Anderson,
1975a, 1975b and 1976).
5.2.1.1. Arguments for the Instrumental analysis
Fillmore (Fillmore, op. cit.) claims that notionally
in sentence 83b the hay is instrumental in performing the
action and further that this view is supported by the para¬
phrase in use (see Chapter 2 for the use-with test for
instrumentals):
86. John used the hay to load the cart with
Some speakers find this sentence at best marginal and it is
certainly debatable whether this sentence is a true para¬
phrase of 83b. Syntactically it is different from a corres¬
ponding sentence with a "true" instrumental: thus in a
sentence like the following:
87. John used the knife to slice the salami with
with is optional for some speakers while for others it makes
the sentence unacceptable, but in the case of 86 with is
always obligatory, a fact which makes it look here more like
the obligatory preposition in sentences of the form:
88. John used the ladder to lean the wall against
that is, the preposition must be retained or semantic
information will be lost. Thus there is little support for
the instrumental analysis on notional and syntactic grounds,
and the same also applies for any argument from morphology.
Thus the fact that, according to Fillmore (Fillmore, 1968),
Instruments are typically expressed by with does not show
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anything conclusive about the case relation under discussion.
Such an argument would have force only if Fillmore could
show that with is not just "typically" the realisation of
Instrument but that all occurrences of with are realisations
of this case. Parallels from other languages have the same
difficulty: Hungarian and Russian use the Instrumental
case in sentences which behave in a similar fashion to the
spray-paint examples: Russian,
89a. Ivan gruzil drova na barzu
"Ivan" "Load"+past.impf. "firewood"+neut.pi,
"onto" "barge"+acc.sing
'Ivan loaded the firewood onto the barge*
b. Ivan gruzil barzu drovarai
"Ivan" "load"+past.xmpf. "barge"+acc.sing.
"firewood"+inst.pi.
*Ivan loaded the barge with firewood*
Compare also Latin, which uses the ablative case form for
instruments:
90a. Caesar circumdedit murum urbi
"Caesar" "around"+"give"+"past" "wall"+acc.sing,
"city"+abl.sine.
* Caesar put/built a wall around the city'
90b. Caesar circumdedit urbem muro
"Caesar" "around"+"give"+"past" "city"+acc.sing.
"wall"+abl,sing.
'Caesar surrounded the city with a wall*
In both languages, the case which marks the Instrumental in
the (b) examples can also be used to mark other cases, as
witness 90a where Latin ablative also marks a Locative or
Goal relation.
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5.2.1.2. Arguments against the Instrumental Analysis
If the arguments in favour of the Instrumental analysis
are not very compelling, those against it serve to resolve
the issue in aslightly more forceful fashion.
(i) A genuine Instrument can occur in which case the
sentence is acceptable although the two wijth—phrases may
sound odd:
91. John loaded the cart with the hay with a pitchfork
If both with-phraaes mark an Instrument, then we have a
case of Fillmore*s one-instance—per—clause constraint being
broken. That with a pitchfork is clearly an Instrumental
is shown by the fact that the uae-with test selects this
rather than with the hay:
92a. John used the pitchfork to load the cart with hay
b. *John used the hay to load the cart with a
pitchfork
(ii) Fillmore has a second constraint to the effect that
different cases cannot be conjoined. Thus in the following,
if we have two Instruments, then the grammar makes the wrong
prediction about granunaticality in terms of this constraint,
while, if we are dealing with different cases which have been
conjoined, then the constraint is upheld:
93. *John loaded the cart with the hay and a pitchfork
(iii) Consider the following sentences:
94a. John packed his clothes into the suitcase
b. John packed his suitcase with newspapers
95a. John unpacked his clothes (out of his suitcase)
b. John unpacked his suitcase (of his clothes)
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96a. John emptied his clothes out of his suitcase
b. John emptied his suitcase of his clothes
Under the Instrument analysis newspapers in 94b is an
Instrument and marked by with, but in this case we must
treat clothes in 95 and 96 as an Instrument if we are to
preserve a Fillmorean "conceptual" analysis and have some
rule which says that it must be marked by of since these
sentences describe the reverse of the action in 94* Alter¬
natively we can say that there is no relationship between
94 and 95 which can be captured in the underlying structure
and assign the prepositional phrases to seme other case,
which itself raises the problem of what case this might be.
Fraser, (Fraser, 1971) shows that this pattern with of
marking the object which is removed as opposed to with
marking the object added is common to many verbs. Any
analysis which proposes two different cases fails to capture
the point that in both examples we have an object that moves.
Any analysis which poses exactly the same case needs to show
why that case has two different realisations. One proposal
which we cannot consider here in detail would be that what
is common to both is a predication of movement, where the
object moved is governed by Abs, in the case of with this
Abs raises into a higher Loc, and in the case of of it
probably raises into Abl, which typically is associated
with negation i.e. not being in a state (see Anderson, 1971a).
There are, at least, two pieces of evidence that
support the view that with marks the object that moves in
these sentences, a view which is in accord with our treatment
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of the appearance of the preposition in patterns i-iv.
Notice firstly that sentences 83-5 imply the following:
97a. The hay ia loaded on the cart
b. 13a© cart is loaded with the hay
98a. The paint is smeared on the wall
b. The wall is smeared with the paint
99a. Gaily coloured paper is wrapped around the gift
b. The gift is wrapped gaily coloured paper
and further they all imply sentences without any form of
the original verb:
100a. 'Hie hay is on the cart
b. The cart has hay on it
which again supports the relationship with patterns i-iv,
in that the device sentences may be derived from a pre¬
dication of location embedded in a causative structure,
i.e. a verblesa form of 100b is the cart with hay on it. but
we return to this below (5.3. )• Under the Instrumental
analysis, these implications are completely arbitrary, for
it is not the case that sentences with "true" Instrumental*
imply a locative sentence:
101a. John broke the glass with his voice
b. *The glass has John's voice in it
102a. John killed Bill with a .45 caliber gun
b. *Bill has a .45 caliber gun in him
A second source of support comes from sentences which
are frequently compared to the load-hay type, namely
sentences involving verbs like give, aend, hand, throw etc.,
which involve transfaral of an object from one person to
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another person/object. These sentences have a locative
form:
103. John gave the book to Bill
which Fillmore (Fillmore, 1971a) analyses in terms of an
Object and Goal, book and Bill respectively (compare also
Jackendoff, 1972). However, there is a problem with these
verbs which has produced much discussion in the literature
(see Lee, 19^9, Nilsen, 1973» Green, 1974 among others in
the more recent literature and Anderson, 1976 for a dis¬
cussion of the inadequacy of the standard approach in terms
of Indirect Object or Dative Movement), namely that while
the NP and prepositional phrase can be permuted, as with
load-hay verbs, a device sentence is not produced, i.e. the
original direct object is not marked by with;
104. John gave Bill the book
(The question could, of course, be put in the reverse form:
why do sentences with load., spray etc. require the original
object to be marked by with?) Thus there seems to be some
parallel between the two cases, in that both involve some
notion of movement of an object and both allow permutation
of the NP and PP following the verb. However, there are
two other differences which serve to distinguish give and
load. Firstly, we noted above that with load the locative
and device sentences have different implications, but in the
case of give both forms, i.e. 103 and 104, imply that Bill
had the book afterwards. Hie second difference, which
apparently has not been noted before and which may be
causally involved in the situation as we shall show (5.3.
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below) is to do with the pairing of the verbal form with
a morphologically identical noun. One of the sub¬
categories of the load-hay verbs was a series of verbs,
butter, oil etc. which have corresponding forms with the
related noun as the object of the verb give or put:
105a. John put some butter on the bread
b. John buttered the bread
106a. John put some glass in the window
b. John glazed the window
107a. John gave some water to the plants
b. John watered the plants
The difference between the use of put or give seems to lie
in the fact that with the former the recipient is not
necessarily animate and does not benefit from the substance
received, while, for example, plants benefit from being
given water. The important point is that in the (a) forms
we have an object which moves and a Goal and in the (b) forms
we have no preposition. What seems to be happening can be
described in terms of something like the rule of Dative
Movement which makes the original Indirect Object the Direct
Object, i.e. thei'e is no preposition (although we shall not
adopt this analysis) and a subsequent rule of Incorporation
which incorporates the original direct object into the verb
(for the notion of Incorporation see Gruber, 1965, Nilsen,
1973 and compare also the rule of Subjunction in Anderson,
1971b where give help and help are said to differ in that
the latter has undergone Subjunction of Nora, i.e. Abs to
the verb to form the simple verbal element).
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The next question is to which category of verbs, the
give or load category, do these incorporated verbs belong?
In terms of their implications they belong with load:
108a. Hie butter is on the bread
b. The bread has some butter on it
although this may not be very strong support. However,
under certain circumstances we do find a device sentence
with these verbs:
109a. ?John buttered the broad with butter
However, if we wish to further specify what type of butter,
then we can only do this via a with-phrase:
109b. John buttered the bread with some new Danish
butter he'd just bought
c. John buttered the bread with marge
110. John watered the plants with some water contain¬
ing a new plant food
In fact, the sub-cagegorisation which we made above was
something of a device, since it seems that this situation is
common to all load-hay type verbs, even the stative ones:
that is, as far as we can see, all these verbs of the load-
hay type have some identical noun associated with them:
load, smear, swarm, echo, drip, present etc. and a paraphrase
involving give, put or be in the case of non-causative
verbs:
111. John put a load of hay on the cart
112. John put a stock of fish into the pool
113. John put a smear of paint on the wall
114. A swarm of bees is in the garden
Thus it may be the presence of what we may call for
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convenience a quantifier construction (see Jackendoff,
1972) which is causally involved in the occurrence of with
in the device sentences, where with marks the original
"quantified" noun and the "quantifier" is subjoined to the
predicate, as opposed to its absence in the case of Dative
Movement verbs. In either case, there is evidence support¬
ing the Object interpretation of the with-phrase against
the Instrumental analysis, and this may allow us to relate
such occurrences to expressions of location and possession
as discussed above. However, there are other factors to
be taken into account in a full analysis of the occurrence
of with in 3uch sentences.
5.2.1.3. Holistic vs. Partitive
Fillmore (Fillmore, 19<$8: 48) noted that the locative
and device sentences have a slight semantic difference.
Thus referring back to 83a and 83b j
83a. John loaded the hay onto the cart
b. John loaded the cart with the hay
besides implying
97a. The hay is loaded on the cart
b. The cart is loaded with hay
100a. The hay is on the cart
b. The cart has hay on it
they differ as to their implications as to the fullness of
the cart: thus 83b and 97b both imply that the cart is
full while the corresponding (a) examples merely assert the
location of the hay and say nothing about the state of the
cart, as one would expect given that the hay is subject in
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97a arid has something asserted of it while the cart fills
neither of these conditions. Notice that 100b does not
imply tho fullness of the cart, which may be related to the
absence of load. Fillmore suggests that this semantic
difference is a matter of "focussing". Thus the "fullness"-
"interpretation will be assigned if the Locative cart is
focussed in object position, while the other interpretation
is dependent on the occurrence of the hay in focussed, i.e.
object position. Chomsky (Chomsky, 1972) and following
him S.R. Anderson (Anderson S.R., 1971) has argued that this
is not a matter of surface structure as Fillmore suggests
but it is to be reflected at the level of deep structure.
As evidence for this position Chomsky adduces the following
sentences:
115&. Bees are certain to be swarming in the garden
b. Bees were believed to be swarming in the garden
116a. Xt is in the garden that bees are swarming
b. Xt is bees that are swarming in the garden
Chomsky notes that although these sentences differ in
surface structure, they share the common non-full inter¬
pretation, i.e. it is not the case that the garden is full
of bees and Chomsky claims that this is to be associated
with the occurrence of bees as deep subject.
S.R. Anderson (Anderson S.R., op. cit.) extends the
analysis and introduces the terms "holistic" and "partitive"
to cover the meanings of thedevice and locative sentences
respectively. He points out that the relevant general¬
isation for the distinction can be stated in terms of ddep
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subject for non-causative verbs and deep object for
causatives. There is another analysis which recognises
that the difference can be stated simply in terms of
subjects, i.e. if the Locative is subject, then assign a
holistic interpretation, and then the causative analysis in
terms of Predicate Raising of verbs like load will make
the subject of the embedded sentence the object of the main
verb, thus providing an argument for Lexical Decomposition,
in that we have one simple statement referring just to
subjects and not one referring to subjects and objects.
For a fuller discussion of the inadequacies of this as an
argument for a level of deep structure embodying the notions
of deep subjects and objects see Anderson (Anderson, 1975&»
1975b and 1976). Anderson claims that that data can just
as easily be handled in terms of the case frame in which
load occurs: thus the case frame for the partitive inter¬
pretation will be
V(load) Abs (hay) Loc (cart) Erg (John)
while that for the holistic interpretation will be
V(load) Abs (hay) (cart) Erg (John)
T rt A
where „ displaces Abs from object position and displaced
Abs is marked by with. We shall argue below that a
combination of both these proposals, i.e. case frame and
Lexical Decomposition, accounts for the device sentences and
relates them to other phenomena.
5.2.1.4. Accomplishment vs. Activity
There are several pieces of evidence which support the
relation posited between activity and partitive readings
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on one hand and accomplishment verbs and the holistic reading
on the other. Consider, then the tests given by Vendler
(Vendler, 1967 see also 3.2.J*.)
(i) Activity verbs allow for an hour while accomplishment
verbs allow in an hour, i.e. durative vs. non-durative
temporals.
117a• John loaded hay onto the cart for an hour
fc. ?John loaded hay onto the cart in an hour
118a, ?john loaded the cart with hay for an hour
b. John loaded the cart with hay in an hour
The test is not perfect in that the marginal acceptability
of 117b and 118a only weakly support the activity sense
and the accomplishment sense respectively. Notice that
there is, in fact, another variable to be controlled here:
thus we use the indefinite hay in the above examples, but if
we use a quantifier construction we obtain only an accomplish¬
ment sense and either reading with the definite article:
119^. *John loaded seven bales of hay onto the cart
for an hour
b. John loaded seven bales of hay onto the cart
in an hour
120a. John loaded the hay onto the cart for an hour
b. John loaded the hay onto the cart in an hour
121a. *John loaded the cart with seven bales of hay
for an hour
b. John loaded the cart with seven bales of hay in
an hour
122a. ?John loaded the cart with the hay for an hour
b. John loaded the cart with the hay in an hour
These sentences suggest that, although the opposition may
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not be absolute, the device sentence selects the accomplish¬
ment reading more readily than does the locative.
(ii) The second test relates to the differences with the
verb stop and concerns what exactly is negated by this verb.
Thus if John stops swimming in the lake, an activity, then
John did swim in the lake, the swimming comes to an end or
is negated, but if John swims across the lake, an accomplish¬
ment, then John did not swim across the lake, it is the
movement across which is negated. Consider then the
following:
123. John stopped loading hay onto the cart
124. John stopped loading the cart with hay
123 asserts that John creased putting hay onto the cart and
does not imply that John did not put any hay onto the cart.
It implies, moreover, that hay has been loaded onto the cart.
124, on the other hand, asserts that John did not load the
cart, although there may be some hay on it. Thus 123 and
124 both imply the presence of hay on the cart, but 124
does not imply that the cart is loaded with hay. Thus the
negations differ, in 123 the action is negated and in 124
it is the result which is negated. Again there is a
correlation between accomplishment and device sentences and
activity and locatives.
(iii) Accomplishment verbs can be the complement of the verb
finish
125. John finished loading hay onto the cart
126. John finished loading the cart with hay
This test is not conclusive and any difference between 125
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and 126 seems not to be related to syntactic acceptability
but to our knowledge of the world. The situation described
in 126 is more likely to be seen as one in which John*8
finishing is due to the completeness of his action, rather
than due to its being "knocking-off" time for tea or the
end of the day, while the reverse seems to be true of 125.
Thus Vendler*s tests do not seem to be in any way
conclusive, although they do give partial support for the
correlation proposed. However, there is further support
to be found in our discussion of phrasal verbs and of do with
and do to verbs (see Chapter 3 above). We adopted the
suggestion of Fillmore, (Fillmore, 1971a) that for verbs of
activity like swim we have a basic Agent-action structure,
and the related accomplishment verb is derived from a manner
expression of the form "by swimmingM, that is swim across
the lake would be derived by sub junction of the predicate of
the manner expression to the predicate of the movement pre¬
dication in which it occurs. We also equated this activity
predication with the notion of Force, so that all accomplish¬
ment verbs will have an underlying activity predication.
This will fit in with other observations that we made to
the effect that only accomplishment verbs allow Forces.
Further, insofar as we linked Forces and CAUSE predications
and Forces and accomplishment predications, then it seems
likely that we can distinguish between activity andaccomplish¬
ment verbs in terms of the absence or presence respectively
of a CAUSE predication. One further point which needs to
be made explicit now is that activity verbs also seem to
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link with do with verbs and correspondingly accomplishment
verbs with do to verbs. With this as a basis, let us now
consider locative and device sentences.
Fraser (Fraser, 1971) points to certain features of
these sentences which admit of the activity-accomplishment
distinction, without his making this fact explicit in his
discussion. He notes firstly that the adverbials which
these sentences allow differ, although what he calls
adverbials seem better classed with the particles which
appear in phrasal verb constructions, in that they denote
the resulting state. Note that phrasal verbs in general
are accomplishment verbs, as we noted above (3.2.4). Thus:
127a. John planted the garden full of trees
b. *John planted full of trees in the garden
128a. They loaded the boards one by one onto the cart
b. *They loaded the cart with boards one by one
127 can easily be handled in terms of a lower predication,
that is, corresponding to 127a there is a sentence
The garden is full of trees which can be embedded in a
causative predication, but for 127b there is no associated
*Full of trees is in the garden. In 128, the manner
adverbial shows that we are dealing with two different
verbal pieces: thus the action of loading boards can be
carried out by operating on one board in turn, while loading
carts is not usually viewed in this manner: alternatively
we can say that the difference lies in what element forms
the direct object of the verb, the location or the object
m oved.
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Similarly, particles like uj>, forming phrasal verbs,
are limited to what Fraser calls device sentences, i.e.
these which we have associated with the accomplishment
sense of the verb and containing an activity predication and
a movement predication. Under such an analysis, only the
accomplishment verb has a structure which will allow a
particle to appear, i.e. in the resulting state of the move¬
ment predication.
129a. He loaded up the cart with hay
b. *He loaded up the hay onto the cart
130a. lie splattered up the floor with water
b. *He splattered up water onto the floor
Notice that the (b) examples give a more acceptable reading
if the u£ form is given its "normal" semantic content of
movement to a higher place. Similar support for the
accomplishment sense with device sentences is provided by
the prefix over-, which, again, is limited to device
sentences s
131a. John oversupplied them with rifles
b. ??John oversupplied rifles to them
132a. John overloaded the cart with hay
b. John overloaded hay onto the cart
Thus, for someone to be overloaded or oversupplied, then it
must be the case that at some point the action of loading
or supplying reached a natural end such that someone or
thing was loaded or supplied to sufficiency.
Further support comes from the do-with and dc-to tests,
that is, we suggested that the object of activity verbs is
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marked by with, in certain circumstances and that of an
accomplishment verbs by jfco. Thus consider the following:
133a. What did John do with the hay?
He loaded it onto the cart
133b. What did John do to the hay?
i. ??He loaded it onto the cart
ii. He burnt it
where with marks the object which moves, while bo marks the
object which the speaker presupposes has been damaged.
Thus in the locative sentence it is with which is the more
normal. The judgements with respect to device sentences
are not too clear, but do point towards the distinction
being made:
134^. What did you do to the cart?
X loaded it with hay
b. What did you do with the cart?
i. ?I loaded it with hay
ii. X lent it to Fred, who drove it off
In 134^ there is a presupposition that that cart has been
affected or damaged in some way which is lacking in 134b•
The test also shows the relation between the verb load and
put a load, as suggested above, in that the latter has the
same paradigm as 134:
135. What did you do the hay?
X put a load of it on the cart
Notice that the do to question can be answered with a locative
sentence and the do with question with a device sentence,
although these seem to be more marginal.
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Vestergaard (Vestergaard, 1973) makes essentially the
same point about locative and device sentences, namely that
the latter take do to verbs, when he says of the object of
136:
136. John packed the trunk with clothes
that it is both Locative and Affected (note that he is
working within a modified Fillmorean framework, containing
the new case Affected and allowing doubling of cases). He
also suggests that the feature Affected will account for the
difference between the following:
137. The thieves stole the money from the old lady
138. The thieves robbed the old lady of her money
These two sentences behave similarly to verbs like strip
and unpack where the object that moves is marked by of in
the device sentence (see 138). For Vestergaard, the case
Affected will distinguish between the illegal transition of
money 137, as opposed to the detrimental influence of this
on the old lady, which is captured by the presence of
Affected in 138.
Before turning to other uses of with, there is a problem
with the notion of Incorporation, which we have identified
with our rule of Subjunction. Although we have not yet
looked at this rule in its application to the relation
between the verb load and put a load in any detail, there do
seem to be constraints on its use. Three things seem to
unite the members of this class of structures: firstly,
there is the presence of the verb put or give dependent on
whether the recipient benefits from the object moved,
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secondly the object moved is common and thirdly with is
used to mark the object. However, there are other verbs
which show some relation with a corresponding noun phrase
or prepositional phrase but do not show these features. The
following is only a tentative list of such verbs, and we
shall not pursue the problem much further, but merely suggest
some possible approaches as the topic is too large to discuss
here.
(i) verbs of putting some thing in a place, where the Goal
is incorporated or subjoined to the predicate: bottle, can,
case, jail etc.
(ii) verbs where the related object denotes an instrument
used to attach two things together (see McCawley, 1971a,
Green, 1972): paste, glue, rivet, nail, tape, button, etc.
(iii) a class of verbs denoting actions which aredefined
by the object used; saw, chisel, shovel, bulldoze, fiddle
(play a violin), hammer, rope, etc.
For further examples and an attempt to classify them see
Nilsen (Nilsen, 1973) and Liefrink (Liefrink, 1974). Two
points should be made: firstly one factor which unites
(ii) and (iii) is the occurrence of the preposition with
marking the incorporated object, whether it be the object
which moves or the Instrument and secondly, the treatment
in terms of Subjunction seems to be applicable to all
categories, that is the verb bottle has an underlying
structure containing a causative predication and an embedded
predication of movement into a bottle.
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5.2.2. Reciprocal and Comitative
If verbs of the load-hay type are related to the with
patterns i-iv in that with marks an object, verb® of
reciprocity and association are related to such patterns in
terms of potential logical symmetry. That is, if there is
a situation corresponding to either of 139 and 12*0.
139« John came with Bill
12*0. John collided with Bill
then it may be the case, although not necessarily so, that
the corresponding situations occurred:
12*1. Bill came with John
12*2. Bill collided with John
To complete the parallel with sentences 58, 59 and 6l we also
find
12*3. John and Bill came together
12*2*. John and Bill collided together/into each other/
with each other
58. Your keys are with your wallet
59. Your wallet is with your keys
6l. Your wallet and your keys are in the same place/
together
Most of the discussion of with in the literature centres
around the problems related to phrasal and sentential con¬
junction and the arguments for and against such a distinction.
We do not propose to survey all these discussions as this
would lead us away from our main concern in this chapter into
the problems of the treatment of each other (Dougherty, 1970,
1971, 1972*, Jackendoff, 1972, Fiengo and Lasnik, 1973,
Anderson, 1972*), the relation between conjoined and plural
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noun phrases (Dougherty, 1967 and for a fuller review of
the points relating to this see Anderson, op. cit.) and th«
major issue itself of the phrasal vs. sentential conjunction
distinction (for a review of the literature see Stockwell
et al., 1973, Dougherty, 1970, 1971, Hudson, 1970 Anderson,
op. cit.). Instead we shall siaiply consider these proposals
for the comitative use of with and its use in reciprocal or
symmetric predications like those with agree, collide etc.,
with a view to collecting and presenting the more essential
facts concerning this preposition (for the comitative use
of with in a Fillmorean case grammar see Walmsley, 1971
and in reply Buckingham, 1973).
Firstly we need to delimit the class of verbs and
adjectives with which we are dealing in this section. Hie
class of adjectives with which we are concerned are assigned
the property of being symmetric, although, as we shall see,
this is not so clear-cut as it seems and Stockwell et al.
(Stockwell et al., op. cit.) differ from the majority view
here. The class includes both adjectives and nouns;
(a) verbs: meet, collide, embrace, reason, confer, bear,
match, compare etc.
(b) adjectives and prepositional phrases; be in collision,
be friends, have in common, be in love
Xt is usual to assimilate to these verbs symmetric predicates
like
(e) be (a)like, resemble, be similar etc.
However, for a full analysis of this category of verbal
elements with the preposition with, it is necessary to take
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into account the converse of such verbal expressions:
(d) verbs: separate, divorce, dis-sociate, differ,
distinguish, etc.
(e) adjectives: be separate, be different, be far, etc.
In his discussion of such predicates, Anderson (Anderson,
1973a) also includes the concrete expressions near to,
close to, hard by, far from, distant from, apart from etc.
To these categories we must also add a second major group of
verbs, which, unlike those just mentioned, do not normally
require with, i.e. are not inherently symmetric, but do allow
a Comitative:
(f) leave, go, come, kill, etc.
Dougherty gives three reasons why such verbs should be kept
distinct (Dougherty, 1971): firstly only the non-symmetric
verbs allow both of
145a. Both of the men killed
b. ?Both of the men collided
c. ?Both of the men met
Dougherty claims that 145b and 145c are unacceptable, but
most speakers do not reject them completely. Secondly,
symmetric predicates do not allow without as the negation of
the comitative relation:
146a. John filled Bill without Fred
b. *John met without Bill
c. *John collided without Bill
That is, 146a is the negation of 148a just as the correspond¬
ing sentence 147 with verbal negation is, but the same does
not hold of 146b and 148b:
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147. John did not kill Bill with Fred
148a. John killed Bill with Fred
b. John met Bill
(Note that hore -out functions as the negating element, which
supports Anderson*s hypothesis of a relation between negation
and Abl, since elsewhere out realises Abl (Anderson, 1971a)).
Thirdly symmetric verbs donot allow along with as a variant
of the comitative expression. Both Walmsley (Walmsley,
op. cit.) and Nilsen (Nilsen, 1973) talk of along with as the
"full" form of the English comitative marker, the former
using it as a test for the Comitative case. Thus compares
149. John killed Bill along with Fred
1.50a. *John met along with Bill
b. *John collided along with Bill
In 150b and 150c the meeting and colliding must have been
with some other person not mentioned, and in both cases, to
be acceptable, Bill must be read as a "full" or true
Comitative in that he also met or collided with that person.
There is, in fact, a fourth means of distinguishing
between the with-phrase occurring with symmetric verbs and
that with symmetric verbs which is implicit in Fillmore*s
brief discussion of the Comitative (Fillmore, 1968). There
Fillmore treats this case a.s the only one which is
necessarily dependent on a Noun phrase: thus he gives as the













Pres come by he with the wife
He also assumes rules which ensure that the selectional
constraints on the noun phrase dominated by C are the same
as those of the noun phrase under A, and presumably, in the
same way, he will account for the fact that in such sentences
we are dealing with two noun phrases, both of which denote
Agents. However, this is not true of the symmetric
predicates. Thus, while in
152. John came with his wife
we have two Agents sharing the same selectional constraints
with respect to the verb, this is not necessarily the case
in the following:
153a. John agreed with Bill
In both sentences it is difficult to conceive of the entity
referred to by the with-phrase as denoting an Agent.
Further, in 153b we also have a difference in terms of the
animacy of the two nouns involved. Thus, again, we have a
b. John collided with the lamp-post
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means of distinguishing between symmetric and "comitative"
verbs.
Thore is one further general point which should be made
about the above verbs and the categories set up. In our
discussion of load-hay type verbs, we included the reverse
of the verbs and mentioned verbs like empty: in this
discussion we noted that with marks the object which moves
to or is located at a place and of is the preposition marking
the object removed. This is in accord with the Localist
hypothesis, in that with is historically a locative marker,
while of is an Ablative or movement from marker. With
symmetric verbs we find a parallel situations alternating
with with, we also find to^ after some verbs, although in
these cases it is not clear whether the two sentences are
strictly synonymous:
154. John compared the 19th century sonnet , one
of Shakespeare•s
(to seems to involve a less disinterested comparison;
consider Shakespeare»s Shall I compare thee to/?with a
summer *a day?). As a paraphrase of 153b we find a sentence
into a marker of the Allative or Goal:
155. John bumped into a lamp-post
Thus if with contrasts with of in load-hay sentences, i.e.
Loc vs. Abl, then with symmetric predicates into contrasts
with from in syw.etric sentences:
156a. John distinguished the find of coins from those
found the previous day on the basis of their age
b. John differed from his predecessors in being
more liberal
We shall consider the implications of the alternation between
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with and of and with and from below. In what follows we
shall try to identify some of the main issues in the
discussion of phrasal conjunction and add some facts which
have not been taken fully into account before, with a view
to clarifying the situation with regards to what we shall
call the comitative use of with.
5.2.2.1. VIth from NP and MP
Lakoff and Peters (Lakoff and Peters, 19^9) suggest
that there is a rule of Conjunct Movement which operates on
the structure underlying 157a to produce 157b:
157a. John and Bill agreed
b. John agreed with Bill
Ordered before this rule, there is a rule of Preposition
Adjunction which is responsible for deleting and and
substituting with, such that the presence of with is the
trigger for Conjunct Movement. The operation of Preposition
Adjunction is conditioned by the feature +special on the
verb; symmetric predicates like similar and distinct are
marked as +SP°®^1 anci +special respectively, where♦positive -positive 3 '
♦positive selects tc and -positive selects from. Opposed
to this position are Gleitman (Gleitman, 1969), Dougherty
(Dougherty, 1970, 1971) and Stockwell et al. (Stockwell
et al., 1973) who argue for the transformational analysis
of such sentences from conjoined sentences. Ve cannot
evaluate all the arguments here, we shall concentrate on
those which crucially involve with.
Two points which are of major importance for our
discussion are Lakoff and Peters» arguments from selectional
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restrictions and their basic assumption that 157a and 157b
are synonymous. The basic problem with both questions lies
in the restricted set of data which Lakoff and Peters deal
with. Thus they claim (Lakoff and Peters, op. cit.: 125)
that "the selectional restrictions between the main verb and
the noun phrase that appears as superficial subject are
identical to the selectional restrictions on the object of
the prepositions (i.e. with* to, from)". This, they claim,
is an automatic consequence of their analysis and therefore
supports it, but we queried this point above in our dis¬
cussion of Fillmore's proposals, in that one of the means
of distinguishing between comitatives and symmetries was in
terms of identity or not of selectional restrictions. We
can now turn to a more detailed analysis. Consider the
following examples:
158a. *The steamer and the pier collided
b. The steamer collided with the pier
159a. *John and the lamp-post embraced
b. John embraced the lamp-post
l60a. *John and Bill's suggestion agreed
b. John agreed with Bill's suggestion
l6la. *Rich food and John's stomach don't agree
b. Rich food does not agree with John's stomach
c. *John's stomach does not agree with rich food
In fact, we obtain unacceptable, or at least odd, sentences
in all cases if we reverse the order of the noun phrases
as in l6ic. Thus firstly, Lakoff and Peters' claim is
patently incorrect with regard to selectional restrictions,
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toilless we acknowledge that we are dealing here with
different verbs which just happen to have the same surface
form, which save their claim but at the expense of creating
another context in which with occurs.
The unacceptability of the (a) examples given above is
also relevant to the second point, namely the assumed
synonymy of 157a, 157b and 162:
lb2. Bill agreed with John
It seems that Lakoff and Peters place too much emphasis on
their claim that 163 and 164 entail each other:
163. John drank a glass of beer with Bill
164. Bill drank a glass of beer with John
This claimed entailment does not generalise to all verbs,
and it is doubtful whether it is true in all circumstances
of 163 and 164. Thus if Bill is at the bar and John walks
in, then 163 is the more likely, while 164 is more likely
if it is John who is already at the bar. Another inter¬
pretation would involve who actually brought the drinks.
Thus 165
165. Have a drink with me
is an invitation to consume a drink which the speaker will
purchase, but 166
166. 1*11 have a drink with you
is either a statement that the speaker will buy his own
drink or a non-normal request for the addressee to buy the
speaker a drink. Compare:
167. Tight-fisted John will drink with anyone, but
no-one drinks with him
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The difference seems to be best described in terms of the
notion wo introduced above of "primary" (5.1.3.)» that is with
introduces the primary and this is given a particular inter¬
pretation depending on the particular situation.
There are further points which show the non-synonymy
of the sentence with a conjoined subject NP and of the
associated sentence with a with-phrase. The comments of
Langendoen (Langendoen, 19^9) suggest that he is glossing
over a difference in meaning: he says of the sentences
l68a. The steamer and the tanker collided
b. The steamer collided with the tanker
that they have "essentially the same meaning", and the
important word here is "essentially". When we distinguished
between inherently symmetric predicates and optionally
symmetric ones or "coraitative" ones (5.2.2.), we noted that
in sentences with with we are not necessarily dealing with
two NPs in the same case relation to the verb. Thus, if
John agrees with Bill, then it is the case that John does
s omething, he takes a conscious decision: however. Bill
would not be generally taken as having any Agentive role in
the situation, that is, it would be an ill-formed discourse,
or at least one with a particular effect, if we answered
the question What did Bill do? by the assertion that John
agreed with him. Similarly with regard to 158a and 158b
above, Vestergaard (Vestergaard, op. cit.) observes that
pier is interpreted as the object affected,the patient of
the action, as is shown by the acceptability of giving 158b
as the reply to What happened to the pier? Thus, the
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"essentially the same meaning" of 168a and lo8b is the
collision, but the difference is more important than
Langendoen allows, in that it involves the question of
whether there is any Agent-Patient relation between the two
nouns: in l68b the tanker suffers the collision and the
steamer is responsible, while in 168a we have a more neutral
form in that either both are responsible and both suffer or
the speaker does not wish to attribute blame to either.
Again, the notion of primary seems to be involved. Thus we
may sum up by saying that, with a sentence containing a
conjoined NP subject we have an unmarked form, but, with a
with-phrase, the notion of primary enters, the full semantic
import of this being related to the verb, with some it marks
who was there first, who bought the drinks, or who suffered
and was also the stationary objects basically we are dealing
with the object with respect to which some action happened
and which functions as one of the identifying markers of that
action. This parallels the situation found in patterns i-iv,
where with marks the object defining the state or location.
Further evidence is available which supports the non-
synonymy of the conjoined NP subject and the with—phrase
variant. Andrews (Andrews, 1971 but see also the discussion
in Anderson, 1973a) uses for fun as a test and Fillmore
(Fillmore, 1972) uses the adverb willingly. However, the
situation is clearer possibly and more overt syntactically
with the expression of his/their own accord. Thus if the
following are not synonymous, as Fillmore and Andrews
suggest:
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169a. John willingly agreed with Bill
b. John and Bill willingly agreed
the lack of synonymy of the following is reflected in the
vingrammaticality of the second sentence:
l?Oa. John agreed with Bill of his own accord
b. *John and Bill agreed of his own accord
which only becomes acceptable with a possessive pronoun in
the plural. But this raises problems: the deep structure
of 170a would presumably be "John and Bill agreed of John
and Bill's own accord", such that the first occurrence of
"John and Bill" pronominal!ses the second. Consider,
however, the alternative derivation: Prcnominalisation
cannot apply before Conjunct Movement as this would produce
the unacceptable
171. *John agreed with Bill of their own accord
Thus Preposition Adjunction and Conjunct Movement apply
before Pronominalisation to produce the string
172. John agreed with Bill of John and Bill's own accord
but to produce the acceptable 170a we need a rule which
either pronominalises "John and Bill" as his or deletes
"Bill" to ensure that the subject and his are coreferential.
Needless to say, there is no such rule discussed in the
literature. Thus, there are more sound reasons for
rejecting Lakoff and Peters' proposals for the treatment
of conjoined NPs and the derivation of with. However,
we would also claim that any treatment which involves the
insertion by some transformation of a preposition is also
inadequate, since it implicitly claims that any form could
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appear, with is Just an accident. In this respect,
Lakoff and Peters* proposals are equally inadequate; the
use of the features +special and +positive do not help in
that they are said to be "arbitrarily chosen". However,
we shall try to show that the occurrence of the preposition
is not an arbitrary matter.
Before leaving this section, we must also note that
the arguments against Lakoff and Peters also provide arguments
against Fillmore*s derivation which is essentially the
reverse, i.e. conjoined NPs are derived by attaching some
NP which originates under a Comitative case to the subject
NP. The only way to save Fillmore*s approach would be to
allow doubly marked cases, as does Localist case grammar
(see Anderson, 1975a and 1976 for some proposals for a
Fillmorean grammar of this form and Schanks, 1972). Thus
the NP dominated by Comitative could be attached to the
subject if the Cornitative was also marked for the same case
relation as the subject.
5.2.2.2. A Prepositional Mixture: to_t from, with, between
and and
We mentioned above the occurrence of with, to and from
and the inadequacy of Lakoff and Peters proposals: the
question which now needs to be asked is why these prepositions
and no others, or for that matter why prepositions at all
and not rhubarb, custard and pudding. The answer to this
question is given by Anderson (Anderson, 1973& ) and forms
another argument for a Localist treatment of case, i.e. w©
are dealing with a parallel between concrete and abstract
location.
397.
Thus in expressions of concrete location we have near,
close, hard (by), which, using Lakoff and Peters system,
would be +positive, i.e. select to and apart, distant and
a great distance which would, correspondingly, be -positive.
Thus we have the trio of notions, "at somewhere", associated
with Loc, "near somewhere" associated with All, i.e. the
preposition to_ and "far from somewhere", associated with
Abl, i.e. from, where Abl is also the negative of Loc (see
Anderson, 1971a). Moreover, besides these stative
expressions we have non-stative verbs like meet, join,
separate, which may or may not be causative, but which
under certain circumstances exhibit prepositional occurrences
similar to that for stative verbs and adjectives.
173a, The Rhine and the Mosel meet at this point
b. John and Bill met
174a, The Rhine and the Mosel join at this point
b. Mary joined the two pieces of cloth
c. John managed to join the wing of the model to
the fuselage
175a, The road for Glasgow separates from the road to
Stirling here
b. John separated Roger and Fred
The verbs and adjectives mentioned so far are essent¬
ially concrete, but they do have corresponding abstract
verbs. Thus, Anderson observes that separate is also a
partial synonym of the abstract "topological" verb divorce,
and similarly the concrete local verb join appears in the
expression join in wedlock, which Anderson suggests has a
structure which elsewhere lexicalises as marry (Anderson,
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op. cit.). Thus a Localist grammar will treat such verbal
expressions as related and handle the differences between
to and from in terms of the cases All and Abl in the under-*
lying structure, and in so doing will handle such facts in
terms of general properties of the grammar and not as
accidental facts associated with particular verbs via
certain arbitrarily chosen features in Lakoff and Peters*
manner.
How, then, are with and between relevant to this? The
preposition between is of importance since it is essentially
a means of neutralising the notion of direction implicit in
a sentence which contains a non—stative verb with an All
and Abl • Thus
176. The river flows from Leek to Trentham through some
of the worst Industrial landscape in Britain
177* The train runs from Birmingham to Carstairs, where
you change
In each case the from-phrase marks the point of origin, the
starting-point. A river can only flow between two towns
if the river separates them, and this is a general property
of stative expressions:
178. The town lies between two ranges of hills
In the case of non-stative expressions, generally between
marks a two-way movement:
179. On Wednesdays, the train runs between here and
Upper Neasby-under-Dene
The full neutralising force of between is only seen with
reference to symmetric predicates and here again we need to
make use of the notion of "primary". In such sentences,
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the primary does not refer to the location which is assumed
to be known or relevant to the situation, but to that which
is in some sense more important, more stable, of greater
authority etc. Compare:
180a. The new bridge connects the island to the
mainland
b. The new bridge connects the mainland to the
island
181a. The fireman connected the hose to the fire-engine
b. The fireman connected the fire-engine to the hose
182a, John Joined the wheel to the axle
b. John Joined the axle to the wheel
183a. John is distantly related to the Potheringays
b. The Fotheringaya are distantly related to John
184a. John associated with an unsavoury crowd of
lay-abouts
b. An unsavoury crowd of lay-abouts associated with
John
In each of these sentences the (a) version is the more normal
and we need to make some special assumptions when dealing
with the (b) versions: for example, islands are usually
dependent on the mainland, but if Anglesey invades Britain
and becomes the seat of government, then 180b is more
likely. Notice that such sentences show that verbs which
are normally called symmetric are not necessarily so under
all circumstances. There are other syntactic peculiarities
of between which we shall consider below, but for the moment
notice that between is restricted in its occurrence with verbs:
185. ?The new bridge will connect between the island
and the mainland
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186. *John joined between the axle and the wheel
This could be explained in terms of the lack of necessity
to mark the case relations between the verb and the following
noun. However, in the following sentences with a nominal
related to the verbs above, a preposition is needed to mark
that relation:
187. This bridge is the only connection between the
island and the mainland
188. The join between John1* toupee and remaining hair
is only too obvious
189. The relation between the two events is difficult
to show
190. There is no similarity at all between the two
things
The role then of between is to neutralise the primary, just
as in the case of 168a above the use of and in the conjoined
NP subject may be used to be diplomatic about who was
responsible for the collision.
Turning to with, we see again that it is used like t£
to mark the primary. The concept is somewhat difficult to
pin down in terms of a concrete definition and seems only
capable, at the moment, of an extensive definition: thus it
is the object defining a place, the person who buys the
drinks or who was at a point first, the stationary object
affected, that which has greater authority. However, it
does appear to carespond to something basic in our experience
of language. Consider your reaction if instead of writing,
for example, "We agree with Anderson that..." we consistently
wrote "Anderson agrees with us that...". Yet this primary-
marking function of with is not always clear and consistent,
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especially with the verb collaborate:
191. John collaborated with Mary in a study of verbal
extensions
In this sentence most speakers will not assign either John
or Mary to the primary function: but there seem to be two
wajrs of clarifying the situation so that we obtain a clear
reading with Mary as jprimary, firstly by embedding 191 as in:
192. Mary P®^sua<ie<i j0hn to collaborate with her ingot
writing the paper
It may be objected that this has something to do with the
coreference of the object of with and the subject of the
causative, but the prepositional phrase is interpreted as
the primary even without this coreference:
193* Bill persuaded John to collaborate with Mazy
Here Mary must have been working on some topic before John
was persuaded to participate in that work. The second test
does not work for all speakers, and involves adding a
possessive pronoun to study.
194. John collaborated with Mary in study of
verbal extensions
As already stated and is the neutralising form when
between is blocked from marking the case relation. Thus
if with marks the primary in the following:
195. John agreed with Bill
196. John left with Bill
197. John is related to Bill
198. John conferred with Bill
the corresponding sentences are vague or unspecified with
conjoined NPs:
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199» John and Bill agreed
200. John and Bill left together
201. John and Bill are related
202. John and Bill conferred
Thus in the case of 195 Bill must have said something with
which John could agree, but in the corresponding 199 we do
not know who proposed the idea. In 198 John must have gone
to Bill for advice, while 202 is unspecified as to the
initiator of the conference. The same also holds of con¬
joined object NPs with those verbs which allow them:
203a. The.Urometer matched John against ^ Mad Man of
Borneo witl1
b. The promoter matched John and the Mad Man of
Borneo
204a. John identified and-ing with universal
quantification
b. John identified and-ing and universal
quantification
205&. John compared Bill's results with those obtained
by Mary
b. John compared Bill's results and those obtained
by Mary
(204& and 204b are modified forms of a sentence occurring
in Anderson, 1976b and it is of interest to note that
Anderson chooses the conjoined NP form, thus presumably
being neutral as to the structural priority of the two.)
5.2.2.3. More on between
We can make some tert&tive proposals for the treatment
of symmetric predicates along the lines of Anderson's paper
(Anderson, 1973a), Thus agreement or likeness will be a
relation or event which passes from John to Bill, where it
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is the noun governed by Abl which is raised and made the
surface subject. With expressions of difference or dis¬
similarity, the All will be made subject and the Abl remain¬
ing dependent on the predicate will account for the occurr¬
ence of from. This will parallel our analysis of CAUSE
predications in the preceding chapter, which we treated in
terras of an Abs governing CAUSE and an Abl and All governing
the causal event and the result respectively, that is just
as agreement and similarity is from one person to another
and is also between people, so causation is a relation
passing from one event to another and we can also say that
there is a causal relation between two events.
In fact, it is difficult to keep the discussion of
between separate from several other important points
connected with conjunction, with and the relation of each
other to reflexives. The first point concerns the
restrictions on the occurrence of between.
5*2.2.3.1. Verb with and vs. Nominal with between
The first thing to note is that most of the reciprocal
verbs have a corresponding nominal form: meeting, join/
joining, marriage, match, collision, association, comparison,
conference, similarity, difference, resemblance etc.
All these forms allow between and conjoined NPs besides of
and conjoined NPs:
206. The meeting ^®twoen John and Bill failed to live
up to expectations
But, as already noted, in the corresponding verbal forms,
between is unacceptable:
404.
207. Th© join(ing) between the two pieces of wood was
imperfect
208. *John joined between tbe two pieces of wood
imperfectly
However, there are other facts about these nominalisations
with between. Compare the following:
209a* There was a collision between a steamer and a tug
b. A steamer was in collision with a tug
c. A steamer had a collision with a tug
210a. There was a conference between the heads of
department
b. John was in conference with Bill
c. John had a conference with Bill
211a. There is some similarity between John and Bill
b. John is similar to Bill
c. John has some similarity to Bill
These sets of sentences suggest that we should have a
structure similar to those proposed above (5*2.1.) for
location and possession and that between is the marker of Loc
when this Loc governs a conjunction of NPs and is itself
governed by one of a certain set of nominalisations. But
we return to this below.
5*2.2.3.2. each other and reflexivisation
In the literature, there is much discussion of sentences
like the following:
212, 100 soldiers shot two students
213a. 100 soldiers each shot two students
b. A group of 100 soldiers shot two students
(see Lakoff, 1970, Partee, 1971* Anderson, 1974 for discussion
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and references) 213a and 213b have been distinguished on
the basis of a feature +joint, such that .on the +joint
reading, i.e. 213b, only two students are shot, while on
the -joint reading 200 students are shot. These two
sentences have been looked on as means of distinguishing
between the two readings of 212 which is claimed to be
ambiguous between the +joint and -joint readings. However,
it seems that there has been no mention of the disambiguating
function of the between-phrase which also giv es a +joint
interpretation:
214a. Between them, 100 soldiers shot two students
b. 100 soldiers, between them shot two students
We wish to compare this situation with each other.
It has frequently been noted that some languages have
a reflexive element with reciprocal verbs (cf. French,
ae battre "to fight (each other)", se r^unir "to join",
se mettre d»accord "to agree", for Russian see Miller,
1971). However, English does not seem to allow reflexives
in reciprocal sentences, preferring each other, yet, as is
seen in Dougherty and Jackendoff (Dougherty, 1970,
Jackendoff, 1972), each other is governed by a simple
sentence condition similar to that fcr true reflexives.
However, we do, in fact, find sentences with reciprocal
meaning which do contain reflexive forms. Certainly the
following is unacceptable:
215. *John and Bill agreed with themselves
as a paraphrase of
216. John and Bill agreed with each other
406.
but if we change the preposition, then a reflexive is
possible, but this preposition must be between or amongst,
this latter being better with more than two NPs conjoined:
217. John, Bill and Mary agreed , themselves
that they should go amongst
Notioe that each other, replacing the reflexive, is at best
marginally acceptable, if not totally unacceptable for some
speakers.
One way in which we might account for these facts would
be to posit a structure for 217 which, at the point where
Reflexivisation occurs, has the conjoined NPs John, Bill and
Mary occurring both in subject ,position and as "object1* of
the preposition between. Ve might then allow each other
to be that form of the reflexive pronoun which occurs when
the coreferential NP is object of the preposition with as
opposed to the "true" reflexive pronoun after between.
Alternatively, we could treat each other as a derived
construction via a rule like Bach—Hopping (Dougherty, 1970),
or finally as a constituent generated in the base like
Jackendoff (jackendoff, 1972). A full evaluation of these
proposals is outside the concerns of our present interests,
but we can make some observations which are also relevant
to with.
Lakoff and Peters (Lakoff and Peters, op. cit.) restrict
their comments on the prepositional phrase with each other
to a footnote and claim that under their analysis this is
redundant in sentences like:
218. John and Bill are similar to each other
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since the underlying structure of this would contain two
conjoined sentences with the conjoined NPs John and Bill
differing in order in each. Conjunct Movement would apply
to each of the sentences to produce a structure for each
which, in fact, corresponds to what Gleitman (Gleitman,
1969), Postal (Postal, 1972a) and Stockwell et al.
(Stockwell et al., 1973) suggest lies under reciprocal
sentences, namely something which we can represent ass
219. John is similar to Bill and Bill is similar to
John
Notice that such an analysis, whether enploying Conjunct
Movement or not, does not provide any means of accounting
for the occurrence of each other nor for synonymous, though
neglected, one another as opposed to, for example, Harmony
Hair-spray (i.e. John and Bill are similar to Harmony
Hair-spray, but synonymous with 218). the one point in
favour of Lakoff and Peters* approach would be that it is
not victim to the argument against sentential derivation
which Langendoen makes (Langendoen, 19^9). Langendoen
argues against Gleitman*s treatment, in which all conjoined
NPs are derived from sentential conjunction, on the basis
that the rule which deletes the preposition plus each other
to derive 220 from 218
220. John and Bill are similar
must depend on whether the verb is symmetric or not, since
the deletion is optional with symmetric predicates while it
is impossible with non-symmetric predicates: that is, the
prepositional phrase cannot be deleted from 221 without
altering its meaning:
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221. John and Bill listened to each other
For Lakoff and Peters, however, the sentences have different
origins, 221 deriving from what would surface otherwise as
222. John listened to Bill and Bill listened to John
and the variant of 221 without the prepositional phrase,
i.e. 223
223. John and Bill listened
would derive from 224
224. John listened and Bill listened.
One further fact which must be taken into account in
any full discussion of the treatment of each other and also
one another concerns the status of the structure with the
preposition splitting the two elements:
225a. John and Bill agreed one with the other
b. John and Bill agreed one with the other
Notice that the definite article must appear, else the
sentence is unacceptable, but the problem is to decide
firstly if each with the other is to be related to each other
in a systematic fashion or whether the occurrence of each
and other in both is an accident of language and secondly,
if they are related, what is the order of derivation, i.e.
is there a rule moving each into the prepositional phrase
or a rule moving it out of that constituent (for a fuller
discussion see Dougherty, 1970, 1971, Jackendoff, 1972,
Lasnik and Fiengo, 1973).
One final point before leaving this section concerns
whether each other is, in fact, redundant, as Lakoff and
Peters assume. Certainly there is some evidence to suggest
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that this is not the case in all circumstances. Compare:
226a. The two old ladies agreed that Glencora should
marry
b. The two old ladies agreed with each other that
Glencora should marry
227a. John and Mary embraced
b. John and Mary embraced each other
Some speakers appear to find a difference in meaning between
the (a) and (b) examples which could be captured in terms of
a joint versus reciprocal distinction. 226a is neutral as
to who was the primary, that is, it is of no interest to the
speaker who was the primary, who first put fox-ward the
proposal, the agreement is the essential fact. Alternatively,
there may be no primary at all, that is we are dealing with a
verb agree which means "come to an agreement". This would
be jin keeping with the general suggestion that with a joint
interpretation there is only one action (see Hudson, 1970,
McCnwley, 1968, Stockwell et al., 1973). In 226b, however,
there are two primaries and associated with this two actions,
in that each of the old ladies believes that Glencora should
marry and in articulating this idea they find that they are
in agreement. Similarly in 227a and 227b, in the one there
is a mutual embrace, while in 227b there is a reciprocal
embrace or two separate actions of embracing. If, in fact,
this difference is systematic, then the fact that in the
(b) sentences two actions or primaries are understood could
be captured in a grammar which derives them from conjoined
sentences, as does Lakoff and Peters analysis, as opposed
to the simply sentence origin of the (a) sentences, assigning
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a derived status to each other*
5.2.2,4. together
Lakoff and Peters (Lakoff and Peters, op. cit.) claim
that together and both mark phrasal and sentential
conjunction respectively. However, Stockwell et al.
(Stockwell et al., op. cit.) suggest that together cannot
be related in such a straightforward manner to phrasal
conjunction, i.e. it is not, as Lakoff and Peters imply, a
marker of phrasal conjunction only, or we would not be able
to deal with sentences such as;
228. John, Bill and Mary died together
in which we have separate events, i.e. deaths, and the
important point is that they occur at the same point in time
and space. Notice that there is a relation here between
time and location which is in keeping with the Localist
hypothesis (see Anderson, 1971«)• Hudson (Hudson, 1970)
also observes that together is more closely related to the
notion of "at the same time", rather than to phrasal
conjunction. In fact, this would possibly be better stated
as at the same time and place. Thus 228 would be odd if
John, Bill and Mary died at the same place but at fortnightly
intervals, although it is not quite so odd to say:
229. ?John and his wife died together, though they were
miles apart
It seems likely that it is the notion of simultaneity which
underlies the use of together to mark phrasal conjunction,
and it is this notion of sameness of time or place which is
worth further study in that it again ties in which some of
the points about the use of with which we mentioned in our
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discussion of patterns i-iv above, just as does the notion
of primary.
Anderson (Anderson, 1973a) points out some facts about
together which do not iiranediately support a relation between
this particle and the notion of sameness. However, it is
possible to show that these observations do not allow the
straightforward correlation which he makes. Considers
230a. John joined the wheel to the axle
b. John joined the wheel and the axle together
231a. Hie Rhine flows into the Mosel at this point
b. The Rhine and the Mosel flow together at this
point
Anderson notes that a to-phrase and together are in
complementary distribution in these sentences and that this
latter form appears to contain the preposition to. He
suggests that together is a deletable to-phrase where the
following NP is a reciprocal, so that it is equivalent to
to each other. However, such a simple equation of the two
may not be possible. As Anderson observes, there are
sentences where together is unnatural, while each other is
not:
232a. ?The Rhine and the Mosel meet together at this
point
b. The Rhine and the Mosel meet each other at this
point
This would follow from the fact that to each other is also
unacceptable in 232a. However, there are still further
cases where there is no possibility of a to-phrase, but
together is perfectly possible:
233&. John and Bill died together
2*12.
233b. John and Bill left together
although it does seem in general that true symmetric verbs
which take the preposition with are odd with together:
232*a. ?John and Bill collaborated together
b. ?John and Bill agreed together
Finally there are some sentences where we find a to-phrase
which is a reciprocal but in which together is unacceptable
or at least changes the meaning:
235a. John and Bill are similar to each other
b. *John and Bill are similar together
236a. John and Bill ran into each other in the shop
b. ?John and Bill ran together in the shop
However, if there is some doubt about the conclusion's
of Anderson, we find support for the relation between
together and the notion of sameness from the history of
English and from other languages. Historically together
derives from the preposition to_ and the reconstructed form
♦gaduri, which is the locative or instrumental case form of
a nominalisation of the verb which underlies Modem English
to gather and which originally meant "join, unite, put
together", that is, together originally was closely related
to something like in unison, in conjunction and notice that
both of these forms take a with-phrase, as also does the form
together itself.
The relation with sameness is more evident in other
languages. Thus Latin used a form simul where we night use
together, a form which elsewhere can be translated as "at
the same time" (cf. English sircultaneous). Modem French
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ensemble "together" derives from Latin simul with a locative
preposition prefixed* German uses the form zusammen or
beiaammen, with the prefixes zu- and bei— ("to" and "at"
or "with" respectively) prefixed to a form which is related
to English same and probably related also to the verb
sammeln "to collect". The same root is also used in
Danish to translate English together, namely sammen and its
relation with the notion of sameness is shown in other
compounds : thus samtidig and sains teds mean "at the same
time" and "in the same place" respectively and aam- functions
as a verbal prefix similar to English co- (cf. coreference.
co-occurrence. from Latin cum "with"). Miller (Miller.
1971) remarks that in Russian vmeste s translates English
together with, where s is the marker of phrasal conjunction,
v- occurs elsewhere as a preposition meaning "in" and meste
means "place". That this relation is not limited to Indo-
European languages is shown by the fact that Swahili has a
form pataoja usually translated as together which can be
analysed as the locative prefix pa- prefixed to the form
mbja which means "one". Moreover, this is followed in
certain constructions with the particle na, which as we saw
above (5.1.1.) closely parallels English with.
Besides historical and comparative support, we find
further evidence in certain parallels between together and
the notion of sameness in constructions in liiglish. We
have already touched on the relations between the following:
237a. Your keys are with your wallet
b. Yovir wallet is with your keys
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237c. Your wallet is in the same place as your keys
d. Your keys are in the same place as your wallet
e. Your wallet and your keys are in the same place
However, we also find corresponding sentences with
together (with) substituting for in the same place (as):
238a, Your wallet is together with your keys
b. Your keys are together with your wallet
c. Your keys and your wallet are together
These are all sentences of concrete location, but it is
possible to find parallel sentences with abstract location,
where with occurs:
239a. John is with Bill in this matter
b. Bill is with John in this matter
o. John and Bill are in the same frame of mind in
this matter
d. John and Bill are together in this matter
Notice that the in-phr&se also parallels other facts which
we have observed, in particular the occurrence of a
nominalisation in
240a. John is in agreement with Bill
b. John is in conference with Bill
Further we find sentences with past participles substituting
for the in-phrase but under a Localist analysis the former
will in any case be derived from the latter.
241. The cart is loaded with hay
Thus we see that there is a generalisation possible in terms
of two features with respect to the preposition with;
firstly, an object is located in concrete or abstract space
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and secondly this location is defined with respect to some
other object which we have called the primary. We shall
now turn to the third category of uses of the preposition
with, namely with attitudinal verbs.
5.2.3. Attitudinal Verbs
Within this category we include sympathise, be surprised,
be hateful, be in love, be disgusted, be pleased, be familiar,
be content, be happy, be strict, be good, be angry etc. We
might also include other expressions which seem to be closer
in meaning to something like "act in a certain way towards
something1*, that is such expressions as be careful, be
respectful, etc. In fact this category may well be more
heterogeneous than the list suggests. Notice that Lakoff
and Peters (Lakoff and Peters, op. cit.) group be in love
in the category of reciprocals and certainly there is much
in common between some of the verbals which we discussed in
the last section and these attitudinal verbs: notice that,
in particular, both are essentially expressions of relations
of some form which pass from one person to another.
Let us, for a moment, consider what we have said about
with and the other prepositions which occur in the structures
discussed. Por the load-hay type of sentence, the object
which moves towards a location is marked by wit h in device
sentences and has no prepositional marking in the locative
sentence and correspondingly we have of and the absence of
marking in the reverse of such sentences, i.e. movement
away from. Por the reciprocals and comitatives we have
with and more rarely to, which does suggest some possible
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relation here between with and the Goal case, i.e. All, and
for the negatives we have only the preposition from, where
from is more clearly a marker of Abl than the of which occurs
in the reverse of load-hay type verbs.
Turning to the attitudinal verbs, we find a much closer
relation between the notion of movement and the preposition
with, in particular with appears to mark a Goal:
242a. John sympathised with Bill
b. John gave Bill his sympathy
c. John was sympathetic towards Bill
243a. John, is in love with Mary
b. John*a love for Mary knows no bounds
Compare these withj
244a. John set out for London, but dropped dead on the
way
b. John threw the ball towards Bill, but it dropped
short
in which the prepositions for and towards mark a Goal which
is not reached, what we have called the Adversative.
However, if with appears to be in relation to Goal-marking
prepositions, seemingly in contrast with the locative function
that we have recognised before, this apparent ambiguity of
function is not restricted to it alone. Thus at is clearly
a locative preposition, yet it still marks the Adversative in
certain restricted sentences with the verbs aim, throw, kick,
strike etc. Further can also be used with some verbs
of attitude:
245**. John is angry Bill
b. John was surprised at Bill
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There do not seem to be any clear examples of negative
forms correlating with these verbs of attitude in the same
way that there are for other verbs which take with. Possible
candidates would be jealous of, envious of, distrustful of,
afraid of, but such a classification depends more on the
preposition oif and its correlation with Abl than on any
semantic criterion, since it is difficult to conceive of an
attitude which would, in some way, fulfil the role of being
a negative in this category.
We pointed out above that be careful with may be a
member of this category. However, there are further problems
with this sub-category. Consider the following:
246. John is happy with his wife
247. John is pleased with Bill
248. The alsatian is good with children
249. John is strict with his pupils
Most speakers will detect some ambiguity in these sentences
to a greater of lesser extent. On one reading the with-
phrase has a temporal reference, i.e. "when he is with...",
where we have a locative with as in patterns i-iv. On the
other reading, 246 and 22*7 differ from 248 and 22*9 in that
in the former for John to be happy or pleased does not entail
necessarily that John is in the presence of the goal of that
emotion, while in the latter, if, for example, the alsatian
is to be good with children, he must be in their presence,
and for John to be strict he must, in some way, be operating
on the children. This difference between being in the
person*s presence or not seems to serve as a means of
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distinguishing between the two sub-categories of attitudinal
verb, on the basis, that "true" attitudinal verbs do not
involve the physical presence of the object, while the second
category of verbs do involve necessarily such presence.
Notice that with "true" attitudinal verbs, the nature of
the noun in the with-phrase affects the possibility of an
ambiguous sentence: if the noun is animate and concrete,
then we can have either the temporal or attitudinal reading,
but if the noun is abstract, then only the latter reading
is possible:
250. John is happy with the sonnet he wrote this
morning
251• John was pleased with the rehearsal he had last
night
If we posit an embedded temporal predication with animate
nouns, then we would be able to predict that 250 and 251
have only one possible reading on the basis of the unaccept-
ability of the corresponding:
252. *John is happy when he is with the sonnet he
wrote this morning
253. *John was happy when he was with the rehearsal
he had last night
There appears to be reason for removing from the
category of attitudinal verbs be careful, be respectful,
be strict, be good etc. on the basis that the with-phrase
is a temporal/locative expression. However, there are
other uses which can best be treated as variants of the with
which occurs after do. Thus instead of the simple with-
phrase, after be careful, be strict etc. after these verbs
we also find in dealing with which may be the full form of
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the with-phrase. Alternatively we might have a Purpose
predication whose Loc governs an expression of the form
"John BE careful" which a do-with type predication embedded
in it. Subjunction will subjoin the form be, the lexical—
isation of BE, to the higher DO, so that the surface verb
will be be, although it has the properties of an agentive
verb.
We shall now look at the with occurring after "true"
attitudinal verbs more closely. There is little discussion
of these verbs in the literature, although many are aware
of the problems they present. Lakoff (Lakoff, 1970) lists
amuse, surprise, please and satisfy as verbs which undergo
the rule Flip, that is given a structure which would other¬
wise surface as
254. What John did amused me
having a sentential subject and an animate object, Flip may
apply with a similar affect to the passive transformation,
moving the subject into a following prepositional phrase and
the object into the vacant subject position to form 255
255. I 'was amused at what he did
The analysis is not of great service to our present interests,
since it gives no means of accounting for the prepositions
at, towards, with which occur after these verbal elements,
but it does show that Lakoff does not see 255 as simply an
alternative to the passive with by. However, it is the close
parallel with the passive with makes it unsatisfactory, besides
the lack of motivation for the preposition. Thus 254 is
causative and the passive derived from it is non—stative,
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256a, but 255 derived by Flip is stative, this being shown
by the progressive aspect test:
256a. John was being amused by Bill
b. *John was .being amused at Bill
(For more on the rule of Flip and Flip-perception verbs in
general see Rogers, 1972.)
Anderson (Anderson, 1971a) also mentions these verbals
and suggests that we need to distinguish between adjectival
and non-adjectival forms of such predicates, which in some
cases may be homophonous, pleased, perturbed, annoyed, or
distinct glad, angry, grateful, and further that only the
non-adjectival form allows what he calls the Ergative re-
categorisation mile. This is a rule which introduces Erg
with respect to such case elements and is responsible for
the appearance of b£ with verbal forms, that is, Anderson
is making the distinction between stative, i.e. adjectival
and non-stative, i.e. non-adjectival forms. Although the
discussion is not so explicit on this point, it appears that
the case which is realised by the prepositions at, for,
towards, with after such verbal elements is Nom (which
corresponds to Anderson's more recent usage of Abs).
However, data which we present below suggest that the
relevant case is probably All (which, in any case, for
Anderson is a variant of Loc if the V also governs Abl).
Stockwell et al. (stockwell et al., 1973) is of less
use since their analyses are neither consistent nor supported
by any form of argumentation. There is no explicit reference
to these verbs and the use of with and what information there
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ia comes from examples of case frames in the body of the
text and in the sample lexicon. However, this is where the
problem lies, since where the case frame for a particular
verb is given in the text and in the lexicon, then they are
not necessarily in agreement. This is a consequence of
their approach and of a non-Localist case grammar in general,
since, having no notion of how many cases there are nor of
whether there is a well-defined set, there is no firm basis
which can be followed rigorously to decide the case structure
of any sentence. At least the Localist hypothesis allows
hypotheses to be formed about the relations between
particular case relations and case forms which can be tested
for their adequacy. The other failing with Stockwell et al.
is that there is no, or at least very little, regularity in
prepositional usage. Both points can be illustrated with
attitudinal verbs. Thus, for example, on p. 48, it is
claimed that the x/ith-phrase and the at-phrase of the
following nominalisations:
257a. The familiarity of the conductor with the music
b. The amusement of ,the crowd at John*s antics
represent underlying Neutral cases (the equivalent of
Fillmore*s Objective and Anderson*s present Abs). Elsewhere
with represents an Instrument and a_t a Locative. Possibly
by analogy with the above examples, on p. 58, although
given as an example of the varied uses of the preposition
by, the prepositional phrase of:
257c. He was surprised by the news
is claimed also to represent a Neutral, but we have already
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suggested that there is no basis for such a close analogy
between 257a and 257c. Looking now in the lexicon, we find
a discrepancy: note firstly that surprised is not listed
so that we cannot check this verb, but the entries for
amused, amusement and annoyed are all marked by the feature
+Prep Ins a_t, that is the Instrument case is realised by
with, which contradicts their earlier statement, while
familiar is marked consistently with the text as +Prep Neut
with. In view of the uncertainty and lack of motivation
of the proposals, we shall not consider further Stockweil
et al.
The fullest discussion in the literature that we have
found relating to attitudinal verbs is that of Postal
(Postal, 1971). Postal treats these verbs in his discussion
of the rule of Psych-Movement. This rule is similar to the
fule of Flip dealt with by Lakoff (Lakoff, op. cit.) in that
it carries out the same sort of operation but it takes a
different structure as input. In fact, Postal is less
committed as to the structure of the input string than is
Lakoff: Lakoff assumes that the structure underlying:
255. I was amused at what Bill did
would otherwise surface as
254. What John did amused me
while Postal simply states that the underlying nominal-
verbal relations in 255 are the same as in
258, What John did was amusing to me
Notice that Postal relates 255 to a different structure,
being aware of the difference between 255 and the corresponding
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Flip-form in terras of the stativity of the verbal elements
involved. Thus he states that in the following we should
not confuse the (a) forms with the passive forms found in
the (b) examples.
259a. John was surprised Bill
a "C
b. John was surprised by Bill
260a. John was disgusted Bill
b. John was disgusted by Bill
26la. John was horrified Bill('s proposals)a t
b. John was horrified by Bill(*s proposals)
Firstly the (a) examples describe a state and not an event
as in the (b) examples. Correlated with this is a fact
also mentioned by Jespersen (jespersen, 1933) and taken up
also by Olsson (olsson, 1961),namely that the (a) forms
allow modifiers of degree:
262a. I was most/very surprised at that
b. *1 was most/very surprised by that
(although it seems that most speakers do not feel that 262b
is completely unacceptable, while some see nothing wrong with
it at all). This relates, in fact, with Anderson's
distinction between adjectival and non-adjectival forms of
the predicates. Postal also cites evidence from Chapin
(Chapin, 19^7) namely that the (a) examples do not allow an
instrumental, while true passives will:
263a. Irma was amused by Jerry with a harmonica solo
b. *Irma was amused at Jerry with a harmonica solo
The validity of Postal's third piece of evidence seems
to be doubtful for some speakers since they do not detect
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the unacceptability on which it depends: postal claims
that the selectional restrictions for the (a) and (b) forms
differ and give3 the following examples (postal*s unaccept¬
ability judgements marked):
264a« X was mystified by Harry
b. *1 was mystified at Harry
265a. I was nauseated by Harry
b. *1 was nauseated at Harry
A fourth piece of evidence concerns the restricted accept¬
ability of the sentences where passivisation and reflexiv-
isation occur in the "same minimal clause":
266a. Charley stabbed himself
b. *Charley was stabbed by himself
where 266b is only acceptable with the emphatic stress on
himself* Thus if the (a) forms are, in fact, passives,
then the following 3hould only be acceptable, likewise, with
emphatic stress on the reflexive, but this is not the case:
267. John was surprised at himself
268, John was disgusted with himself
Although the point is not crucial to our discussion,
it is worth noting that, as Postal points out, agree which
we have treated as a symmetric verb can also behave like a
Psych-Movement verb:
269a. The store agreed to my request
b. My request was agreeable to the store
Further support for the non-passive nature of the (a)
forms comes from the fact that there are other verbal
expressions which seem to be seniantically related or at least
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in the same semantic class, e.g. sympathise, be angry, yet
they will not allow a by—phrase nor are they passive in form.
Moreover, sympathise, like many of the symmetric and comit-
ativc verbs, has a related nominal form and also an adject¬
ival form which take with and towards, be in sympathy with
and be sympathetic towards.
There are two problems which we must consider: firstly,
is there any difference between being surprised at and
surprised with something and secondly what exactly is the
relation between with and other prepositions which occur
after attitudinal verbs. The fact that a_t and with are not
normally interchangeable may lead us to expect some difference
between the two in these constructions. However, any such
difference is difficult to detect. Thus, we might
distinguish them in terms of surprise being directed at
someone as opposed to its being located with someone, retain¬
ing the locative nature of with. However, not only is it
difficult to conceive of locating surprise at someone, it is
also difficult to motivate retaining the locative nature of
with and not of at, for just as at can have the function of
marking the Adversative, at least with some symmetric
predicates, with also seems to mark a Goal or is in relation
with prepositions which elsewhere mark Goal or Adversative.
With regard to the second question, although there is
not strong syntactic evidence for the position, most of the
evidence being negative, it seems possible that this use of
with to mark Adversetives is a reflex of the Adversative
function of the Old Norse preposition vi>. To claim that
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there is no strong evidence is not to say that there is no
evidence at all. Firstly, the very history of the pre¬
position shows that the suggestion is not immediately unten¬
able. Further indirect support comes from the treatment of
these verbs in two other Indo-European languages: in Latin,
the dative case, which was a case of movement with verbs of
giving and in certain examples like the following:
270, It caelo
♦It raises towards heaven1
and also the case of the Benefactive, was used after the
verb irascor "to be angry"; Russian uses the form serdit«s.1a
na+accusative to express be angry* where na+accusative else¬
where expresses movement onto.
As already mentioned, there was evidence with other
verbs of a relation between with and the marker of Adversative.
Notice that with also alternates with the adversative pre¬
position against after the verbs fight and match; in fact,
this alternation is given in some works on Middle English
prepositional usage as a possible reason for the fusion of
the forms mid and vi> to produce Modern English with.
Finally there is some semantic support in that all the verbs
are concerned with the subject's attitude or emotional
response to someone or something, and notice that we talk of
attitude to^ things.
Using these facts as a basis, we can now try to extend
our discussion of patterns i-iv into other areas of the use
of with which help to further specify the form and the
functioning of the grammar developed in the preceding chapter.
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For our purposes, the most fruitful area will be the load-hay
type of verb, and to a lesser extent the symmetric and
cornitative uses of with. Little will be said in detail
about attitudinal verbs.
Before leaving this section, however, we must point
out that we have not discussed the with which we might call
temporal and which appears in such sentences as the following:
271a. With the radio on, John cannot concentrate
b. With the window open, John's papers got wet
Lee (Lee, 1971) discusses the restrictions on this structure,
and Dreike (Dreike, 1973) discusses the same structure found
with the preposition bei in German. We have already pointed
out that it is similar to the use of the Latin preposition
cum in temporal clauses, this preposition having comitative,
temporal and causative uses, often translated as with.
One strong possibility is that all these temporal uses of
with are simple extensions of patterns i-iv and are related
to the notion of sameness, that is, there is a temporal
comitative relation between, for example, the radio's being
on and John's being unable to work, just as there is a
concrete iocational comitative relation between keys and
wallet in
272, Your keys are with your wallet
Any causal overtones to the sentence, then, may be a function
of pragmatics. This use of with is not directly relevant
to the extension of the grammar needed at the conclusion of
the preceding chapter and we simply assume that it can be
related to patterns i-iv.
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5.3. CAUSE and Types of Object
This section of our study will be concerned with the
extension of the grammar to account for the use of with in
the device variant of the load-hay type sentences. In
concentrating on the grammar of the sentence:
273. John loaded the cart with hay
we shall make some proposals for the treatment of internal
and external objects, complete and incomplete verbs and
activity and accomplishment verbs: that is, those questions
which were not fully answered in the preceding chapter. We
can, in fact, group these into two classes: activities,
internal objects and complete verbs can be correlated with
each other just as accomplishments, external objects and
incomplete verbs. Activities are not goal-orientated,
since they do not normally involve a well-defined point of
completion, but they do involve some object which is moved
and are complete in that they do not require any other
activity. For example, one does not normally walk by doing
some other activity. On the other hand, accomplishments
are goal-orientated, do involve an object which is acted
upon and is external to the action, and do involve some other
activity. For instance, someone kills a person by perform¬
ing some other action such as stabbing or throwing an electric
fire into a bath-tub already occupied by the victim.
It seems likely, then, that of the pair 273 and 274:
274. John loaded, hay onto the cart
it is the latter which is the more basic, being an activity
with an internal object and a complete verb, while 273 is
2*2? •
to be derived from it in some way: it has an external
object acted upon, the cart, it is an accomplishment
sentence in that the object ends up in some well-defined
state, i.e. loaded, and the verb is incomplete, carts are
loaded by loading something onto them. We shall begin,
then, by looking at the structure of 274. One first
approximation would be 275 (see below).
Here is an activity predication and N^ is the pre¬
dication of movement. Notice that Abl of N0 is semantically
specified as (jOHN,y): this, in fact, is not crucial to
our proposals and isnot a necessary property of the structure.
However, it might help to account for the fact that 274 is
not so acceptable if the source is specified.
275.
(LOAD OF HAY,x) MOVE (jOHN.y) (CART,z)
276. ?John loaded the hay from the barn onto the cart
There are three questions which we must pose of atx-ucture
275s firstly, is the All of adequate, secondly, how do
we obtain the surface verb load and thirdly how does this
structure help with the preposition with?
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5.3.1. Goals
We have already briefly introduced the distinction
between point reached and point towards which movement is
directed, Goal and Adversative respectively, corresponding
to the distinction between towards, at and for and to^ and onto
and into. One point which helps to distinguish the two
categories is the compound nature of the latter group in
general. There are two further facts which suggest that
it is more advisable to treat Adversative as the basic case
All
All and Goal as some more complex form, an underlying .
JjOC
The first evidence comes from some otservations made by
Anderson (Anderson, 1976a) on ambiguities in sentences like:
277. The sheriff of Nottingham jailed Robin Hood for
four years
The first observation is due to McCawley (McCawley, 1971a)
who points out that 277 is ambiguous: on the preferred
reading for four years specifies the period of Robin Hood*s
incarceration, and thus provides evidence for the presence
of such a predication in the underlying structure. The
second reading would be that on which the sheriff kept
putting Robin in jail and our hero repeatedly escaped over
a period of four years. Anderson uses this ambiguity as
support for a complex case with Goals, since we find this
ambiguity with such cases, but not in sentences with
unattained goals or what we call Adversatives:
278a. He went to London for 5 hours
b. He went towards London for 5 hours
In 278a the subject was actually in London for the length of
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time specified, but in 278b the travelling towards London
lasted for 5 hours.
The second piece of evidence comes from the relation
between the two types of goal and the activity vs.
accomplishment distinction. In fact, it appears that we
cannot make the clear and simple correlation between
accomplishments and the presence of an underlying CAUSE
predication, rathe# sentences with such underlying
structures form a sub-set of accomplishment sentences. As
Mittwoch (Mittwoch, 1971) points out, the fact that an action
can be completed is not solely related to the type of direct
object, which is probably the more commonly discussed area,
that is direct objects which are definite correlate with
completion and indefinites with non-completion:
279a. John ate the apples *for five hours/in five hours
b. John ate apples for five hours/*in five huurs
but on other factors also, one of these being the difference
between Goal, or the point reached, and Adversative, the
point aimed for:
280a. John carried the cases towards /*to the station
for 5 minutes
b. John carried the cases *towards/to the station
in 5 minutes
This relation between Goal and Accomplishment verbs is
natural in tha.t accomplishment in Localist terms will involve
some object being in some final state, which will be encoded
All
in the Loc of the complex case
qc which we have proposed.
The interaction between definite direct objects and
Goals is interesting in the locative sentences like those
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under discussion. Thus with an indefinite object a
locative sentence can be either an activity or an accomplish¬
ment :
281. John loaded hay on :o the cart in/for 5 hours
while a definite object prefers an accomplishment readings
282. John loaded the hay onto the cart in/? for 5 hours
The situation is clearer with a quantifier construction:
283. John loaded SGJGn of the hay onto the cart
in/*for 5 hours
The interaction between Goals and accomplishments is
of greater relevance than at first glance, since the Sub-
junction of Abs to N2 in 275 to form the verb load is
All
dependent on there being a Loc governed by N2« Thus if we
have only All, Sub'junction must be blocked or we obtain the
unacceptable 284b:
284a. John loaded the hay onto the cart
b. *John loaded the hay towards the cart
Sentences with All in N? seem to have the movement predication
realised by carry, bear, or move.
One final point concerns the treatment of Abl in N0.
If we mark All as also Loc to show that it is the Goal case,
the location actually reached, then it seems reasonable that
we should also treat Abl as also marked as Loc. In each
case this Loc will be interpreted as marking the fact that
the object moved was actually at that point. Notice also
that the presence of Loc on this Abl will also suffice to
distinguish Source from Agent and Force.
5.3.2. Load and with
We must now turn to a consideration of the exact
433.
structure of* the Abs in N_^ of 275» i.e. the governor of
LOAD OF HAY. The simplest structure would involve treating
the of-phrase as dependent on Abl in keeping with Anderson's
analysis of quantifier constructions, (Anderson, 1973c and
see also Miller, 1972b). However, to preserve the general¬
isation that with lexicalises we shall handle the of—
1 Abs
phrase as an underlying Abs and follow Schwartz (Schwartz,
1972) in treating of, not only as a realisation of Abl in
certain circumstances, but as the neutralisation of a case
dependent on N, that is any N dependent on another N will
require of unless other factors influence the matter. The
view of the underlying case as Abs generalises to other
cases. While load of hay does seem to be related to
quantifier construction, the same cannot be 3aid of what
must underly the verb and the with-phrase in the following:
285a. John stocked the pool with fish (a stock of fish)
b. John oiled the bike with 3—in—one oil (oil of
3-in-one oil)
c. John buttered the bread with some new French
butter (butter of some new French butter)
These seem to be more closely related to appositional
structures. In fact, Schwartz relates the generalisation
of of to its use in appositional constructions: thus
the city, London becomes the city of London. Thus we
assume that a fuller structure for would be:
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I i ' I I
(LOAD,x) OF (HAYfz) MOVE (jOHN.y) (CART,w)
Where, then, do we place the higher Loc into which Aba
governing (HAY,z) raises to allow for the occurrence of with?
What evidence is there for such a Loc?
We need to approach these questions from a discussion
of verbs of movement in general. In Chapter 3, with
respect to these verbs, we briefly mentioned the middle
verbs of the classical Indo-European languages. The common
factor to such verbs is that there seems to be some notion
of reflexive inherent in them. Indeed in some languages
the reflexiveness is overt in the morphology. Thus the
action is usually subject-orientated: either the action
takes place within the subject, laetor "rejoice", irascor
"be angary", incendor "be on fire" etc. or it is in some way
of benefit to the subject utor "use", fruor "benefit from".
A further common factor is the frequency with which comment¬
ators on these verbs talk of locating the action in the
subject or at least in his "sphere of interest" (Bally, 1926).
Thus Gonda (Gonda, i960):
"...the process was, so to say, limited to the sphere
of the subject with regard to whom it took place."
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Benveniste (Benveniste, 1966)
"Banc le moyen...le verbe indique un proces dont le
sujet est le sie^e: le sujet est interieur au proces."
"le sujet est le lieu du proces."
Diffloth (Diffloth, 1974) shows that Semai and French have
a category of middle verbs with respect to body movements.
Essentially with such verbs in both languages, the subject
is not a true Agent and the object is not a true Goal.
Further it is not possible to have an Instrument with such
verbs. He follows Dowty (Dowty, 1971a, 1972b) in suggest¬
ing that the structure underlying such, verbs of movement
has no CAUSE predication, and distinguishes between sentences
with body movement verbs which have Actors as subject and no
CAUSE predication and sentences with CAUSE predications and
Agents as subjects. Notice that the same distinction will
allow for the absence of Instruments with Actors, since there
is no CAUSE predication in which they could originate, (for
suggestions along these lines see below and see also Wojcik
1976 for a similar derivation of Instrumentals). Notice,
also, that Diffloth makes use of the notion of location of
the action as a distinguishing property of body movement
verbs,
Thus, if middle verbs have a subject which can be inter¬
preted as the location of the action, then in that group of
verbs which take an object, that object is marked with the
ablative case in Latin, a case which we have seen bears some
relation with the English preposition with. We also
mentioned above (3.2.3.) the verbs in Old English which took
436.
an object in the dative case and the verbs of Modern English
related to them semantically which take a with-phrase;
287- John waved at Bill with his damaged hand
Haudry discusses similar verbs in Latin (Hiaudry, 1970 and
see above 3.2.3.). He claims that the perlative case i.e.
the original case underlying the Latin instrumental case
(what i3 normally called the ablative case form) originally
expressed "across" or "through" with verbs of movement and
"between" or "among" or "in the interior" with stative verbs
(note that this parallels our use of Loc: with stative
verbs it means interior or location, we have also related
it to between when the primary is neutralised and with non—
stative verbs it marks the Path and Instrument). In terms
of this he suggests that the instrumental case in Latin can
be used to mark the "objet effectu^" as opposed to the
"objet affect^" marked by the accusative case. He
"clarifies" the use of the instrumental and what he means by
"objet effectu^" with the following terms: "l»objet
d£plac£" i.e. moved, "le si&ge du proems", "1*objet premier
du verbe", "le constituant immrfdiat de ce verbe, par
r£f£rence auquel le sens du verbe se d^finit", "l*objet
imm£diat du proems, son point d*application, son si&ge".
Two points are of interest: firstly, Haudry is insistent
on the object moved being the location of the movement,
i.e. if X moves object Y, then the movement is actually
located in Y: all of which implies a strongly Localist
view of the world; to exist, every object mu3t be in a
place, movement can be viewed as an object and therefore must
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be located. The second point is that the object defines
the action of the verb: this could correspond to or be
captured by the rule of Subjunction, that is, the relation
between moving a load, putting a stock of fish putting a
smear of paint somewhere etc. is such that it can be
realised in one lexical item, the type of action is defined
by the object moved. This generalises to instrumental
verbs: thus doing something with a hammer, typically,
involves an action of hammering. Before exploring this
possibility further, however, we must consider whether
there is evidence in English for movement being located in
the object that moves.
Thi3 notion is rarely given overt, clear expression
in English. We do find sentences like the following:
288. John has little movement his arm
in
meaning something like "John cannot move his arm very much".
However, there are other examples where the meaning of the
sentence is closer to the assertion that the object moved;
289a. There has Ibeen a change in temperature
b. The temperature has changed
290a. There has been a rise in temperature
b. The temperature has risen
291a. There has been a significant movement in the
situation
b. The situation has moved significantly
Notice that this notion of locating movement with respect
to the object moved forms a parallel to a situation which
has not been discussed overtly in Localist writings. Thus
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if* an object is in movement, then movement is in the object:
if a person is in a state, one may also locate that state
in the person by saying that he has that property. If
someone goes into a state, then it is generally the case that
something happened to him. The verb get is of interest
here: its basic meaning appears to be Mreceiven,
292. John got a book
but if a book comes to John, then John also goes into a
state, so we also find get used as an inchoative:
293. John got tired/angry/bitter
The situation with Abl is less clear and cannot be explored
fully here, but there does seem to be a relation between
perfective aspect, i.e. someone is from some action
(Anderson, 1973b) and the Agent. Thus Georgian is an
ergative language in the perfect tense only: in some
classical Xndo-European languages the subject of a perfect
tense verb is marked by the genitive (see Allen, 1964) and,
probably of more interest, in French and earlier forms of
English the auxiliary of perfect tense with a transitive
verb is avoir and have, as opposed to some form of the verb
etre or be with intransitive \erbs: perhaps English and
French are more ergative than linguists admit (for the
ergativity of English nominalisations see Anderson, 1976).
Thus the final version of the structure underlying 274
will be 294 (see over). We have already modified the rule
of Subjunction so that N cannot subjoin if it governs a
Boss-Case. The relation is not perfect, but this has a
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bearing on Seuren*a constraint on Predicate-Raising in
terms of referential expressions and Keenants Functional
Principle (Seuren, 1974b, Keenan, 1974 see Chapter 4 above
also). Keenan gives a procedure for evaluating a Functional
Expression or understanding its reference. This crucially
involves independent identification of the reference of the
argument in that expression. Thus, he gives as an example
the Functional Expression the inside of the bottle, which
has a function the inside and the argument of the bottle.
To identify the reference of the whole, we need to know the
reference of the argument. We may modify this to a
general statement that any N which has an argument dependent
on it which is a Boss-Case is referential. Thus, in the
above structure LOAD is referential until it no longer
governs a Boss-Case. Once it governs a variable, LOAD is
no longer referential and may subjoin.
We say that the relationship is not perfect, in that
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Keenan identifies arguments of noun phrases such as
the inside of the bottle with the subject of verbs, but we
cannot generalise the criterion for Referential Expressions
to verbs in this way in our grammar, since, as we have seen
above in Chapter 4» it is not always the presence of a
subject, i.e. highest ranked case on the case hierarchy
which is a Boss-Case which blocks Subjunction, and alter¬
natively we do find cases where the subject is a Boss-Case
and the predicate subjoins. In fact, with predicates, the
relevant notion for defining Referential Expressions would
be Boss-Noun governed by a case which occurs higher in the
structure. The absence of a perfect relationship is not
crucial, but the fact that there seems to be some parallel
between the two proposals lends some support to our own.
Consider, then, the derivation of 294. Abs, governing
HAY will raise into On the N2 cycle, will raise
into Abl. With respect to Lexicalisation, Abs, governing
LOAD will subjoin to Ng» which in turn subjoins to to
produce the verb load. All variables w will be blocked
from lexicalisation since they are in the scope of the
"subject" John governed by the highest case in the case
Abs
hierarchy, namely ^ of the aspect predication. This will
produce a structure with and dependent on N, and weLoc Abs 1
now need to modify the rule of Linearisation. Thus just as
any case with Abs as the governing element is made the
subject, i.e. of the aspect predication, we can assume
that the presence of Abs is also crucial for identifying the
"object" of the sentence: thus we propose that the object
441.
is to be identified with that complex case containing Abs
whose governing case is highest ranked on the case hierarchy.
In the case of 294 governing hay is the only case
fulfilling the condition of containing Abs, and so is made
the object. We also assume that it is the presence of Abs
which governs non-lexicalisation of the case relation.
This derivation will produce the sentence under discussion,
namely 274:
274* John loaded hay onto the cart
The identification of objects with the presence of Abs will
also account for the relation between subjects of embedded
sentences and objects of transitive verbs. Thus taking the
example of
295. John killed Bill
in terms of our proposals in the preceding chapter, Bill is
All
governed by and so is the object of the verb and also
appears in a lower predication as a variable governed by Abs,
i.e. the "subject" of the predication of dying.
There is an alternative derivation for 294 which
involves not raising the Abs governing HAY into the higher
LoC
.« . This would allow the Abs governing LOAD to raise into
ADS
this higher case and since this would then be a Referential
Expression, i.e. governing a Boss-Case Subjunction is blocked.
This will be responsible for the sentence:
296. John put a load of hay onto the cart
We are assuming here that DO-i-MOVE is lexicalised as put in
the absence of All. We noted above that with the verb give
the recipient benefits or is affected by the object received.
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Thus we give water to plants butwe do not give loads of hay
onto carts. Ve can handle this situation by making use of
a general property of the case All, namely that it is the
case of purpose or benefit. Thus the structure for 297.
297* John gave some water to the plants
would be the following:
• I I
I 1 1 1
(WATER,x) MOVE (jOHN.y) (PLANTS,z)
We add one further specification to the rule of Raising, to
the effect that if there is a complex case, then the governed
or dominated case, i.e. Abs in the situation of must at
ADS
some point govern Raising. Thus the only well-formed
derivation will be one in which Abs of N„ raises into ^fC.d Abs
Abl All
Loc and Loc of N2 will also raise into Abl and All respect-
TaQ
ively of N, and Linearisation will place 77 in post-verbalX ADS
position. Notice that if Abs of N^ did not raise then it
would subjoin to N^ to produce the unacceptable:
299. *john watered to the plants
We can now begin to extend this analysis to other
sentence types. Notice firstly that the presence of All in
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All
N_ as opposed to after Subjunction applies to N0 of 2942 LOC 2
will account for the fact that we have the preposition to_
with give and the forms on(to), in(to) with put. Thus we
must now extend the grammar to account for device sentences,
and since we have assigned a structure to 297# we must also
consider how to handle Dative Movement, that is the supposed
rule which derives the following from 297:
300. John gave the plants some water
by inverting the direct and indirect objects and deleting
the preposition from the latter. We shall see that the
answer to this last question will, with a slight modification,
provide a means of handling device sentences, thus showing
the parallels between the two sentence types and their
differences.
A full discussion of Dative Movement is to be found in
Green (Green, 1974) and a further discussion and demonstration
that the existence of such a rule is doubtful is given by
Anderson (Anderson, 1976a). Here we can only take Anderson»s
findings and show how they can be accommodated in our grammar.
The important difference between the standard Dative Movement
solution and that proposed by Anderson reflects differences
in the grammar. In the standard transformational generative
view, given that there is only one level of embedding in both
297 and 300, different orderings require a special rule to
re-order elements. If this re-ordering rule is also
correlated with a change in meaning, as, in fact, Dative
Movement is in certain circumstances (see Green, op. cit.),
then we supposedly might have an argument against the
hkh*
Standard Theory and in favour of th® Extended Standard
Theory. However, allowing several levels of embedding and
quasi-predications allows re—ordering to be handled by the
Raising rule, and this will quite naturally be associated
with different underlying structures and hence with
potentially different meanings. The crucial point in
Anderson's proposed treatment of 300 is that all the
relevant facts concerned with Dative Movement can be handled
by positing a further predication in the structure of 300 as
opposed to 297. This will be a Receive-predlcation in
Anderson's terms. The effect of this predication will be
to add to the meaning of the structure the fact that the
object dependent on Abs of this predication receives the
benefits of the action or event in the lower predication
and that it went into a state defined by that action or




1 1 1 1
(WATER,x) MOVE (jOHN,y) (PLANTS,z)
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In the above structure and all that it governs corresponds
to structure 294» N2 corresponds to Anderson*s Receive-
predication, i.e. the fact that something went into a state
and shows that some Agent operated on some Patient. The
derivation proceeds as follows» on the cycle, Abs raises
into Abl raises into Abl and f11 into of N0.Abs Loc All 4
Notice that in principle there is nothing to stop us having
a further All in N„ into which raises and which sub-3 Loc
AJja
sequently raises into . On the cycle Abl again raises
into Abl and on the N2 cycle raises into the of N^.
We must now turn to a final consideration of the notions
of subject and object and highest ranked case. We suggested
that this latter was relevant to the selection of subjects,
and that objects are related to the case Abs. However, it
is possible to unify subjects amid objects in terms of the
common property of presence of Abs. This situation
parallels that in Anderson»s grammar (Anderson, 1971a) where
Nom plays a "grammatical" role in the selection of subjects
and objects. Thus we can eliminate the notions of subject
and object from the grammar completely and refer instead to
the presence of Abs. Thus the "subject" of the sentence
will always be that Abs which appears in the aspect pred¬
ication, but this Abs may itself be marked by some other
case. The object is defined by reference to the highest
ranked case on the hierarchy which is also marked as Abs.
Thus subject and object in our grammar are, in fact converses,
in the one we have Abs marked by the highest nanked case, i.e.
and in the other highest ranked case marked by Abs,,? •K J 'Abs
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Such an approach, making use of information already present
in the grammar, removes the necessity of marking the relevant
cases in some way as subject or object or even deleting the
case of the subject and object as does Anderson (Anderson,
1971a, 1976). In the one approach we are importing
arbitrary markers for information already present, in the
other we are deleting potentially relevant information, that
All
is, if we delete .. from N, since it governs the nounAbs x
phrase which is the object, then we are loosing the factor
which we have suggested is responsible for the lexicalisation
of MOVE as give and not put, namely the All.
We assume, then, that we simply have the rules of
Lexicalisation, so that one sub-set of these rules, namely
the rules of Strict Lexicalisation, will refer to case
complexes with Abs as the governing case, which we could call
Abs-K or "subjects", and case complexes with Abs as the
governed case, which we could call K-Abs or "objects".
Notice that in referring to the presence of Abs as the crucial
property we are rejecting the claim of Relational Grammar
(Postal and Perlmutter, forthcoming), in that we are claiming
that subject and object are not notions of Linguistic Theory
and are not necessary properties of Language or of linguistic
descriptions. We may use the terms as a convenient way of
referring to other phenomena, but this is a convention and
not necessarily part of the theory, these are not primitives
of the theory as are the cases.
Thus, consider how the rules of Lexicalis&tion apply to
*hl All
301. On the and and
L<jc are not lexicalised, being
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coreferential with a "subject" and "object" respectively.
On the cycle, Abs subjoins to N^» Abl is blocked from
T o C
lexicalising and fulfils the condition for being
selected as "object", so that there is no prepositional
realisation of the case and the dependent noun is Iscicalised
as water. On the N„ cycle, subjoins and ^!?? is blocked
<c LOC AXX
from lexicalising. Subjunction applies again on the
All
cycle and Abl is not lexicalised. Aba is selected as
"object" of the verb which means that its governed noun is
placed in post-verbal position and the case itself is
blocked from lexicalisation. Notice that, in each application
T GC
of Subjunction, is carried along and on the N^ cycle it
is ordered in sentence-final position, that fact that it was
"object" of the N^ predication accounting for the fact that
there is no preposition in the final form of the sentence,
namely 300. Notice that there is an alternative
T Q/>
derivation in which .. subjoins to N0 to produce the verb
ADS J
water, although it is also possible that in the underlying
structure of the sentence with the verb water, there is no
Aba of N^ so that it is the Abs of N^ governing the N water
which subjoins to produce the verb.
How, then do we account for the device sentence
parallelling 274:
274* John loaded hay onto the cart
273* John loaded the cart with hay
The only difference between the underlying structure of 273
T A (>
and 300 will be the presence of Aba in the former dependent
on N^ and its absence in the latter. Thus the structure
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In tbe derivation of this sentence we make essential use of
the constraint to the effect that a case marking some other
case must at some point control Raising. Thus, on the N.
cycle, and raise into Abl and -^!?s respectively andLOO LOG AXX
the Abs governing LOAD and Abs raises into
Loc
On the N,Abs* w" "3
cycle, Abl raises into Abl and this time the Abs governing
Loc
HAY raises into the .. of N, , this being the only way ofADS X
ensuring a well-formed derivation. if the !£?oi n3
Loc
raises into the .. of N, under identity of Loc, then Abs willADS X
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not have controlled Raising. We have the same result if,
on the cycle, Aba governing HAY raises into ^<>c since
then there is no Abs which can raise into the of N]_.
The rest of the derivation follows that of 301, except that
on the N_ cycle governing LOAD can subjoin to N_ since
j Ads j
it now governs a variable and not a Boss-Case. This will
produce the verb load and the Loc Qf u, will lexicalise as
Abs L
with. We can associate the holistic interpretation of
device sentences with the presence of N2,
We are now in a position to characterise the difference
between internal and external objec±s and complete and
incomplete verbs. External objects of a verb will be those
which are governed by they function as the Goal or
ADS
recipient of the action, while internal objects will be
those governed by being typically the object which
moves and the actual location of that movement. Complete
and incomplete verbs pair with internal and external objects
respectively, and one of the major factors seems to be the
presence of a CAUSE predication. Complete and incomplete
verbs differ in the possibility of the occurrence of a
by-ciause describing the manner of performing the action,
and these by-clauses we have associated with the raising of
the Abl of a CAUSE predication into Thus, if we were
to make the presence of a CAUSE predication the defining
factor for incomplete verbs, then 274» 300 and 273 would
be complete verbs, but, in fact, only 300 does not allow a
by-clause, while being fully acceptable.
303&* John loaded the cart with hay by switching on
the machines
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303b. John loaded hay onto the cart by switching on
the machine
c. ?John gave the plants some water by opening the
valve
This suggests that there may be a CAUSE predication in the
underlying structure of such sentences or that we should
find some alternative source for by-clauses. We return to
this question briefly below.
In fact, we obtain a better definition of complete
verbs in terms of the presence of only an internal object
but even this is not absolute. The only true complete
verbs will be those which describe body movement, and there
seems, then, to be a hierarchy of preference. Locative
sentences seem to prefer complete verbs, which in our terms
seems to correlate with the presence of only one DO predic-
T oc
ation and that one containing _: device sentences whichADS
contain two DO predications come next on the hierarchy and
seem to be neutral between complete and incomplete verbs,
while true incomplete verbs have an underlying structure
which contains two DO predications, the lower one of which
occurs in a CAUSE predication.
Although we cannot explore the possibilities fully here,
we might be able to extend the relation between by-clauses
and CAUSE predications to instrumental with. We observed
above that in device sentences the with-phrase does not
identify a "true" instrumental and this fact we could
associate with the absence of a CAUSE predication, that is
all "true" instruments originate in the Abl-predication
of a CAUSE predication.
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Our proposals for the treatment of locative and device
sentences also allow us to make clearer the nature of CAUSE
predications. In principle we could have allowed locative
sentences to be basic and then derive device sentences from
them via au added CAUSE predication: that is, we could
paraphrase the underlying structure of a device sentence like
John loaded the cart with hay in terms like "John did some¬
thing to the cart such that his loading hay onto it caused
it to become full/loaded with hay". However, this brings
the time factor into play. Ve stated above that CAUSE
relates to events, both of which can have different time
elements. Thus a treatment of device sentences in terms of
a CAUSE predication makes the prediction that we are dealing
with two different events and further that these events
could be temporally distinct, that is, a sentence like 304
should be acceptable:
304. *John loaded the cart with hay this afternoon by
loading hay onto it this morning
The fact that .it is not acceptable suggests that we shohld
block the possibility of a CAUSE predication occurring in
the underlying structure of device sentences. However, one
point which comes out of this discussion is that it may be
possible to give an alternative treatment of all the
sentences analysed in Chapter 4» one in which there is no
CAUSE predication at all in lexical causative verbs. Thus,
for example, the structure of
305. John killed Bill by swallowing his tongue




(BXLL.x) MOVE John swallow (DEAD.y)
his tongue
Hie derivation is straightforwards on the cycle Abl
governing JOHN raises into Abl, on the N2 cycle Abs raises
. . All _ . Abl . .„ Locinto
Abo and Loc into Ahl- DEAD subjoins to which in
turn subjoins to to lexicalise as kill. Certainly such
a derivation would work and would lead to other modifications
in the grammar, some of which are not fully acceptable.
The major problem would be that under our first analysis
the grammar shows directly the relationship between lexical
and decomposed causatives in terras of similar underlying
structures, while under the second proposal any such
relationship would have to be handled elsewhere in the
grammar by some specific rules to that effect.
this problem leads on to a second in terms of lexical-
isation: notice that the second .proposal does not allow any
lexical relation between a surface element cause and lexical
causatives, that is, it must treat as a mysterious accident
of language the fact that, in some languages, Japanese being
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on© (see Shibatani, 1973a), forms which behave as lexical
causatives contain an element which is related to the surface
realisation of CAUSE (i.e. the suffix -ase in Japanese).
This must remain an accident since there is no occurrence
of CAUSE in the underlying structure.
A second problem involves the effect of DO on lexical—
isation: thus in 306 we find DO+DEAD lexicalising as kill,
whereas the DO of the purpose predication, assuming that
there is one there, has no effect on lexicalisation, that
is, in this respect, we have two types of DO: tinder our
first analysis only CAUSE has an effect on lexicalisation,
while no occurrence of DO can be of influence in the matter.
We do not claim that these points argue absolutely against
the second analysis, rather they show that the first
analysis is, at this stage, preferable in the light of the
present state of analysis. Thus, we assume that CAUSE
occurs in the underlying structures of all causative verbs
which allow of an analysis into two distinct events.
One point which is clarified by structure 306,
however, is the occurrence of by-clauses in 303* Thus,
those b^Tclauses may well originate as the £b| which could
potentially occur in the Ng predication in structures like
302, that is, we are dealing with a structure underlying
303a which we could paraphrase as "The cart moved from
John's switching on the machine to a state defined by John's
loading hay onto the cart".
One final point before leaving the topic of CAUSE
relates to Japanese and a possible interpretation of a
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structure in English. So far we have not had a structure
in which the Abl of the Abl-predication in a CAUSE pre¬
dication is coreferential with the Abs in the All-predication
which would read as some Agent's doing something caused that
Agent to do something else. In the light of our discussion
of CAUSE and its necessarily referring to two events, it is
uncertain whether such a structure would be possible.
However, consider a structure like 307.
We suggest that such a structure might underly
308. John swam (himself) to the raft
is the predication of swimming where Abs subjoins to
to finally produce the verb swim. This seems to be the
minimum required to handle such both movement verbs, but we
cannot discuss this question fully here. On the Abs,
All and Abl subjoin to Ng. Notice that himself is optional
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here, but the interesting thing is that the conditions for
lexicalisation as a reflexive form here are exactly the same
as those proposed for Japanese, namely the case which is
highest on the case hierarchy governs a coreferential N
which itself is highest on the case hierarchy, i.e. subjects
reflexivise subjects. Thus it seems that no Clause Mate
Condition is necessary for reflexivisation in English, at
least in this case: further study may lead to a revision of
the matter. The other point is that it is difficult to
interpret CAUSE as a tz*ue causative element here, rather,
it is closer to a notion of "enable" that is swimming
enabled John to go to the raft. Xt is of interest here,
however, to note that, in Japanese, the surface element
corresponding to English cause can also mean "allow" or
"enable" (Shibatani, op. cit.). This analysis is only
tentative, in that it may be that with such verbs as swim,
like locative and device sentences, there is no CAUSE pre-
dication. Certainly we need further study of CAUSE to
establish under what conditions we must allow for such a
predication.j The principle of temporal simultaneity pro¬
posed for excluding this predication from device sentences
would also exclude it from 308•
In fact, this discussion leads to a more general question
of importance which is not really posed in works cast within
the Chomskyan paradigm (where we place Localist Case grammar),
namely, how do we know what the underlying structure is?
The question is not so crucial for those grammars which do
not have a rich underlying structure, for example, those of
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the Standard Theory: but the richer we allow our structures
to be, in terms of* layers of embedding of sentences or of
dependency of predications, then the more crucial it becomes
to motivate the structures proposed, rather1 than relying on
the fact that they "work"• Thus, while proponents of
Extended Standard Theory with a "poor" underlying structure
restrict the grammar by imposing constraints on rules
(Chomsky, 1973. 1975). Localist Case grammar, having few
rules which correspond to transformations or interpretation
rules, must restrict the "richness" of the base, by having
a small set of possible predications and restrictions on
their organisation into hierarchies of predications. We
shall make some tentative suggestions on this subject in
the final chapter.
However, such restrictions on the type of underlying
structure will not wholly suffice in the case of the CAUSE
predication: what we need here relates to the question of
semantic adequacy, that is, is the structure assigned to a
particular sentence sufficient to capture the meaning of
that sentence? This is a question which is generally
ignored by followers of the Chomskyan paradigm and is of
great importance to those who make explicit claims about
incorporating semantics into their descriptions. Thus,
if, like many of the Generative Semanticists, a linguist is
going to claim that, in positing some abstract element in
the deep structure to account for some syntactic fact of
distribution, one is moving "closer to the semantics"
(Postal, 1970b), then we must have some clear idea of what
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the semantics is like, that is, these abstract elements
must meet conditions of semantic adequacy besides allowing
the derivation of the required surface structure. Yet it
is clear to see why the question is not asked: it is
difficult to see what a solution would look like: how do
we argue or test for the semantic adequacy of a structure?
In concrete terms, do we need a CAUSE predication in the
underlying structure of device sentences on purely semantic
grounds? In terms of obtaining the correct surface
structure via a set of rules of general applicability, we
can either have the CAUSE predication or not. Only the
semantics can solve the question, and we are, at the
moment, unable to approach this question.
5*4. Briefly on other with-phrases
In section 5.3. we discussed the CAUSE predication and
its relation to activity and accomplishment sentences and
to internal and externalobjects, the areas which we delimited
as the scope of this chapter in the conclusion to the
preceding chapter. We also mentioned some of the problems
which remain relating to this predication. Certainly
there are many areas of the grammar which need to be extended
further and we do not suggest that £>ur proposals so far are
fully adequate: they exist as a framework in which certain
questions find a solution and which may serve to guide other
studies.
However, in section 5«2. we covered most of the uses
of the preposition with, without making any proposals for
its treatment in our grammar. In this last section we shall
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make some tentative analyses of three of these sentence
types. This has three main aimsj firstly to show that
with deserves a much more extended study than is possible
here, secondly to show how the grammar may work (and may not
work) for this area of English and thirdly to serve as a
basis for discussion of further problems related to those
involved with CAUSE predications, namely the goal of further
studies which are necessary.
The three uses which we shall be concerned with are
Reciprocal, i.e. with symmetric verbs, the Comitative and
the use after verbs of emotion. We split Reciprocal and
Comitative since we need different structures for them.
Notice also that the Comitative use of with appears to be
historically prior to the Reciprocal (Mustanoja, i960).
Thus the sentences considered will be:
309. John agreed with Bill
310. John left with Bill
311. John is angry with Bill
Sentence 309 has the related sentence:
312. There was an agreement between John and Bill
and we have associated the preposition between with the
neutralisation of Source and Goal, that is, as a means of
not specifying which of the NPs denotes the primary. Thus
a strong possibility is that we have a structure involving
a MOVE predication underlying 309, with Abs governing
AGREEMENT, Abl, JOHN and A|4,, BILL. BILL will be identified
as the primary, i.e. the element with respect to which the
agreement is identified, on the basis of being governed by
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AtUt just as A\Jt selects the primary in the following, i.e.
is realised by the preposition to:
313a. John joined the wing to the fuselage
b. John is related to Bill




Aba I Abl All
\ ; \ \N • N N
1 I 1 '
1 I 1 1
(AGREEMENT,x) MOVE (jOHN,y) (BILL,w)
to AGREEMENT and then to Abe of N.^ will produce 309» except
that there is no account of why with lexicaliees All.
Notice that we assume that it is an All, on the basis that
there is no reason to assume an added Loc in terms of its
surface manifestation and that this also is a means of
capturing abstract movement of things like relations,
agreements, and, as we shall see below, emotions.
There is an alternative solution, however, which
involves the argument from the related form with between.
Thus we suggested above that between may be the lexical-
isation of Loc when conjoined nouns are dependent on it in
certain predications. Thus N2 might be a simple stative
predication in the above structure, with Abs governing
AGREEMENT and a simple LOC governing BILL, the Abl of N^
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being specified as JOHN, In such a structure, with would
lexicalise Loc, which would make it look more like the
involved and we turn to these below.
Leaving, for the moment, the question of deciding
between 314 nnd the alternative just given, what is the
structure of 310? We know that there are two Agents
involved, John and Bill, and further that John performed
some act of leaving which can be defined with respect to
the act of leaving done by Bill, i.e. John was in the same
act of leaving as Bill, just as in
315. Your keys are with your wallet
involves two types of entity being in the same place.










Abs of raises into of N2» Abl subjoins to which
h6l.
brings about the lexicalisation of as leave.
subjoins to N2, and N2 to N^. In this case we find that
Abl
with lexicalises .. , thus making it possible that it is the
• Abs
presence of Abs on any case except All which is responsible
for the lexicalisation of that complex case as with.
The structure for 311» again, fails to produce a
Loc
Abs
underlying the preposition with. Thus if we can identify
317. John is angry at Bill
with 311, such that at and with are alternative realisations
of the same case then we can argue from ajt to the presence
of All in the underlying structure. Notice, firstly, that
at does not seem to mark an achieved goal, that is, with
verbs of movement it marks the Adversative, the object aimed
at but not necessarily attained, which suggests that it
lexicalises All besides the Loc of stative predications.
Thus it is possible that with predicates like be angry, at
and with are alternative lsxicalisations of All, the
structure being that in 318:
318. N,
(ANGER,x) MOVE (jOHN,y) (BILL,w)
Abs
Abl raises into
Abl» and Abs subjoins to N2 to lexicalise
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as angry. Again, as in 314» with lexicalises All.
There are many possible conclusions to be drawn from
these brief proposals. Amongst the more unacceptable in
the light of the brevity of the discussion would be that
Localist Case grammar cannot handle the preposition with,
but put in a more acceptable form we could say that, at the
moment, this appears to be the case, in that some further
factors than just case relations seem to condition the
appearance of with. Alternatively we might reject the
proposals so far for the treatment of with as the lexical-
T OC
isation of Aba# claiming that with lexicalises only one
case and that so far in this study we have not found
exactly what case that might be. However, whatever the
actual situation might be, it is clear that more must be
done about this preposition to achieve a satisfactory
description. Immediate questions concern the possible
synonymy of angry at and angry with and the relation between
the prepositions between and with which would clarify the
situation concerning 309 and 311• This latter question
also bears on the one raised at the end of the last section,
namely how do we know what the underlying structure of a
sentence should be? The grammar may provide two different
structures which will produce the same structure, as in the
case of 309» but does this mean that the sentence is
ambiguous? Certainly such a situation may not be totally
unacceptable for device sentences, but it is not clear
whether this could be the case for 309.
Another approach to the problems surrounding with
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would be to preserve both hypotheses adopted so far, namely
that there is only one case underlying this preposition and
ToC
that that is Abs» It just happens that we have not looked
closely enough at the data to find the correct structures.
Unfortunately, without some strong constraints on the form
of underlying structures, there is, at the moment nothing
specific to prevent any structure being proposed which will
T qC
contain
Aba and produce the required surface structure.
Again, we return to the question of semantic adequacy as
one means of constraining such structures.
The most neutral position at the moment and the one
which is potentially the most fruitful in terms of further
research would be to accept things as they are, that is,
X oc
with lexicalises the case .« as its basic role but can also
Abs
lexicalise other cases. The task, then, is to search for
the other factors which condition the lexicalisation of
cases. There are two possible approaches to this question:
firstly we can make the assumption that these factors concern
surface structure targets, that is, in the absence of other
factors, English has a preferred structure in which a second
object to the verb is introduced by the preposition with.
There are two possible reasons for doubting the usefulness
of this approach: firstly there will almost certainly be
many factors which prevent the occurrence of with and we
should then be faced with the task of accounting for each
of these factors, and secondly, we would be attributing a
certain autonomy to surface structure: assuming that
s urface structure is a means of embodying a message in its
k&k»
most convenient form, why should language allow the "tool"
to condition its own structure, in other words, why does
language have target structures? It would appear simpler
to avoid the notion of targets, the account for the sim¬
ilarity in patterning of sentences to other factors con¬
cerning the underlying structure and the rules which operate
on it.
The second approach, which seems more acceptable
perhaps, would involve reference to semantic factors, that
is,prepositions realise not only case relations but other
semantic properties associated with deep structures. This
would be more acceptable since it would not involve any
new machinery like target structures. Thus with seems also
to be conditioned by the notion of primary, as already
observed. But notice that the notion of primary does not
seem to be relevant to its use after verbs of en»6tion and
in this respect the preposition seems to be more like ajt in
having a basic locative function and also a goal marking
role. This fact must also be taken into account in a full
analysis of with, as must the fact that historically it
derives from two distinct prepositions, so that there is
always the possibility that we are dealing, in fact, with
two different prepositions which are accidentally the same
in form.
Two general points come out of this discussion.
Firstly a case grammar treatment will probably continue
the trend to ignore the Saussurean dichotomy between
synchronic and diachronic studies. The history of a language
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may well be more relevant to a synchronic study than Neo-
Saussureans will allow, especially if we expect more than
simple description from our grammar. Secondly, it is now
probably time to return to a pre-Fillraorean approach to case
studies. Fillmore (Fillmore, 1971a) stated that he wished
to reverse the "given"-"to be explained" relation, that is,
instead of taking the morphology as "given" and the case
uses to be explained, he wished to concentrate on deep
structure cases. But assuming an unmotivated list of cases,
as he does, leaves case grammar with no firm basis, the
basis shifts according to which set of cases one adopts.
Thus, given that Localiat Case Grammar does give some firm
set of possible cases as "given" and also some ideas on the
role of these cases in the underlying structure, it may now
be advisable to look more closely at the relation between
cases and their realisation in prepositional form or as
affixes. This will also mean testing the adequacy of our
underlying structures, in that we can ask whether they are
sufficient to account for prepositional occurrence and, if
not, how and where they fail.
CHAPTER 6
466.
DO, do and Other Concluding Matters
In this final chapter we shall look at the form of the
grammar which we have proposed so far and try to make some
general statements about its form and function. Two
questions in particular will be our concern; firstly, what
is the relation between the predicate DO and the surface
element do, and secondly what constraints can be placed on
deep structures which, as we suggested in the preceding
chapter, will help us to restrict the possible underlying
structure of any sentence.
6.1. DO and Its Manifestations
Several linguists have proposed that Agentive sentences
have a DO predication in their underlying structure (Ross,
1972, Dowty, 1972a, 1972b, Kastovsky, 1973 among others) and
Anderson (Anderson, 1971a, 1976) seems to be accounting for
t
roughly the same phenomena, or at least a significant sub¬
set of them, with his case Erg. Cruse (Cruse, 1973) also
considers the relation between the surface form do and
Agentivity. However, little attention is paid to the
relation between DO and its surface manifestation as do and
other occurrences of this form: similarly Cruse pays little
attention to those occurrences of d<5 which are not correlated
with his features volitive, effective, initiative and agent¬
ive. Ross and Dowty are aware of the problem, but do not
suggest any possible solution. Kastovsky does not mention
the facts at all. For Cruse the situation is not so
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difficult: insofar as he deals with, features, then his
original hypothesis is at fault and he merely needs to add
some other feature(s). The situation is more difficult
when it comes to those who posit some deep structure element
DO which surfaces under certain circumstances as do, since
then we have some occurrences of do which do not realise DO.
Typical examples are the clo^ of do-support:
1. Does John know the answer
2. John did not know the answer
3. All you have to do to get in is know the answer
We do not intend that the following discussion will be a
final solution to the problem, its role being to suggest
possible means of solving it which show that a Localist
Case Grammar approach will probably be more successful than
other possible approaches. We begin by considering Cruse*s
approach to Agentivity, which is more concerned with show¬
ing the complexities and difficulties around this notion
than with a full analysis and presentation of a grammar.
Cruse (Cruse, 1973) is concerned with the notion of
Agentivity and the tests which have been proposed for this
concept. He makes clear one point which we have not
discussed explicitly, but which is implicit in all our
suggestions, namely that wilfulness or volition is not a
necessary property of Agents. This is the assumption that
both Dowty and Ross make with respect to the predicate DO,
namely that it entails volition on the part of its subject
which is to be interpreted as the Agent. There are two
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problems with this absolute association of Agents with
volition: firstly, there are cases where we would like to
say that we are dealing with an Agent, but volition is
denied:
4. John accidentally ruined the cherry cake
5. John did not want to have a fifth slice of cherry
cake, but he felt obliged to eat it
and secondly there are cases where Ross (Ross, op. cit.)
is obliged to posit a deep structure DO but where no
volition is involved. Ross is aware of this problem and
cites the following as examples:
6. What the rolling boulders did was crush my
petunias to smithereens
7. ?The plank broke, but it wouldn*t have done if
you hadn*t bounced on it
Cruse also cites as a case of a sentence which we would not
normally associate with an Agent the following:
8. Christ died for us
yet which has a purpose clause which is for him a test for
volition.
Cruse*s interest in the do-test is its ability to
select Agents. The test depends on entailments; that is,
the sentence must entail another sentence of the form
X does/did something. He shows that there are four
"distinct semantic features, the presence of which will lead
to a positive result with the do-test". These features are:
volitive, effective, initiative and agentive. Thus, if any
of these features is present in the sentence, we would
obtain a paraphrase with cto in a cleft sentence, and a
corresponding sentence with happen to would be unacceptable.
469.
This approach, which we shall consider more closely below,
raises a question of general theoretical interest, namely
why should a feature of a sentence (or of the verb or
subject NP, Cruse is not explicit about where these features
occur) be realised as a verbal element and not as e pre¬
position, or an affix to the verb or a noun, or even in
some property of the word order? In fact, all the features
can be associated with the occurrence of a DO predication
under our own proposals, so that it is no accident that do
appears in the surface structure. We shall now consider
each of these features in turn.
Cruse's first feature, volitive, is said to be present
"when an act of will is stated or implied", and this may
often be associated with a purpose expression. We suggested
in Chapter 4 that volition and purpose can be handled in the
highest DO predication which contains an Abs governing V,
an Abl governing the Agent and an All governing the purpose
expression. A Loc may also be present to allow for
adverbs like carefully, deliberately. The structure of
this predication in the case of the example given by Cruse:
9. What John did was drift two miles down the river,
so as to avoid landing in enemy territory
would be the following, omitting whatever structure is
responsible for clefting:
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miles down, the landing. •• •
river
Thus we have DO in the underlying structure which will
lexicalise as do due to clefting. Notice that the voiitive
nature of the sentence is not associated with the presence
of DO itself directly, but with the All. Other sentences
which Cruse cites which contain process or state expressions
could be handled in the same way, i.e. with a higher DO
predication. Thus in both
11a. Christ died for us
b. John was ready with his passport
we have a higher predication and in the case of 11a, the
All governs us.
The second feature, effective, seems, in general, to
be correlated with direct action: examples given by Cruse
being;
12. The flying s tone broke the window
13. These columns support the weight of the pediment
Insofar as 12 involves direct causation, then it will contain
All
a DO predication in which the window is dependent on Aba»
thus allowing for do to appear under the right conditions,
one of these being probably the non-subjunction of the Abs.
13 is more interesting and cannot perhaps be handled in
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terras of direct causation or direct action. Cruse's
definition of effective is that it occurs in a sentence
"which refers to something which exerts a force", which, in
fact, may not be too satisfactory. Thus wind refers to
something which exerts a force, but there is no need to have
the feature effective in the following:
14. The wind was strong last night
A further point is that effective does not seem to be
sufficient to account for the occurrence of do. Thus, the
following contains a noun denoting a force:
15. The window was broken by a stone
yet in a cleft sentence based on it we find happen not do:
16a. What happened to the window was that it was
broken by a stone
b. *What the window did was that it was broken by
a s tone
The crucial thing is that the force—exerting entity must
be the subject of the sentence. A more adequate definition
of effective would make reference to the fact that a state
results from the entity*s exerting a force. Thus in 12
there is a resulting state and similarly in the case of 13
the result is that the pediment has the support of the
columns. Thus 13 also has the paraphrase:
17. The columns give support to the weight of the
pediment
Thus 13 could be handled as an accomplishment sentence and
could be treated in terms of a structure similar to that
for
18. John gave some water to the plants
472.
which wo treated in the preceding chapter. Thus 13 will
have a DO predication governing Abs, Abl and All, where Aba
governs a MOVE predication indicating that support moves
from the columns to the weight of the pediment. Just as in
the case of 18 and its related sentence with the verb
water, so in the case of 13» support may subjoin to the
governor of its predication. Thus again we have a DO
which can lexicalise as do. Notice also that as in the
case of the first feature, the feature proposed by Cruse
is not associated with this predicate directly, but rather
with the fact that the sentence has an accomplishment
reading, i.e. the All of the movement predication is also
marked as Loc.
The third feature, initiative, has the meaning
"initiation of an action by giving a command" and occurs
in the following sentences:
19. John galloped the horse round the field
20. The warder marched the men across the yard
We dealt with such sentences in Chapter 4. The crucial
point is that they involve an Abl dependent on DO which
is not coreferential with a lower Abl which itself occurs
in a DO predication. Thus Cruse*s features is really an
abbreviation for saying that there are two distinct Agents
in the sentence, one of which is directly acted upon by
the other. If anyone wishes to refer to such a property
to handle the occurrence of do in terms of our grammar,
again it is not the presence of DC- which is crucial, but
the presence of two Abls governed by distinct DO predicates.
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Hie fourth feature is agentive, which we can associate
with that Abl governing N which occurs in a DO predication.
But, in fact, such a definition will cover all the uses of
do which Cruse deals with, in terms of our grammar, in that
they all involve a DO predication containing an Abl. This
helps to bring out the inadequacy of Cruse*s general
approach, in that he needs to posit four separate features
where we need simply one predication type. This leads to
a further question which must be asked of a feature approach,
namely why do only these four features condition do?
Cruse must treat as an accidental property of language that
fact that d<o is dependent on these four features, in that
there is no apparent reason given why these and not, for
example, Mental State, should be a governing factor.
Insofar as we can reduce all his features to one basic
property, our grammar is more likely to approach explanatory
adequacy, in that we at least attempt to show what unifies
the occurrences of do instead of labelling them.
Dillon (Dillon, 1974) in a discussion of volitive NPs
surveys certain postulates which govern "decent and fair"
uses of predicates and constructions involving edition.
By way of what is apparently an afterthought, he refers to
the possibility of dealing with the surveyed phenomena by
a DO oredicate, but he refers to this as simply a
"notational convenience, that is, it is simply more
convenient to handle these properties in terras of a single
underlying feature. This seems to be down-grading the
474.
status of DO: given that we have certain syntactic reasons
to posit in underlying DO, it is more than a convenience to
find that it may also be of use in handling some independent
semantic properties.
Thus we can handle, in a straightforward manner,
certain factors about the realisation of DO as do^ without
recourse to an arbitrary list of features. But these cases
all involve verbs which refer to activities and entail that
something was done. However, there are still other verbs
which do not fulfil this condition, yet occur with do.
The first pattern which we can exclude for the purposes of
our discussion is the following:
21. only tiling samples need do is contain
protein molecules, and we're sunk
This is cited by Ross (Ross, 1972) as a problem for his
claim that the verb must be -stative if it occurs in the
complement of DO, which itself surfaces as do. Notice
that 21, like 22,
22. All you need to do is know the pass-word to get
in
is not agentive, which suggests that we may be dealing
with a different underlying structure from that dealt with
above in reference to Cruse*s features. However, as Ross
points out, this sentence pattern is idiosyncratic and we
shall not, then, consider it here. Instead we shall look
at the more general and by no means idiosyncratic or
haphazard phenomena covered by do-Support, i.e. that trans¬
formation responsible for inserting do into certain strings
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(Chomsky, 1957). We shall concern ourselves with the
simple question of why do-support and not cherry-support, or
any other arbitrary element. This is a question which is
not posed by those who posit underlying DO predications in
general. But, if, as Ross and Dowty do (Ross, op. cit.
Dowty, op. cit.), one is going to make essential reference
to the occurrence of do in surface structure to support the
presence of underlying DO, what principles allow us to
d ecide which occurrences of do are to be excluded as
evidence? Certainly the guiding principle seems to be the
classification of the verb as active, but this leads to the
neglect of other occurrences of do or their treatment as
unrelated phenomena.
The following discussion is not conclusive and does
not pretend to be; we shall explore one possible means of
accounting for the phenomena of do-Support which links it
to the realisation of DO. Chomsky (Chomsky, 1957) posits
a transformation which inserts cto just in case there is no
auxiliary verb which can bear the tense or precede the
negative element, that is, it is really simpler to state
when do_ does not occur than when it does. Thus, we use
do if the sentence does not have a modal verb, may, might,
should, or the i^ or have of the pro.Tressive and perfective
aspects. We shall work in what follows with the categories
of verbs, process:
23. John died
24. The table broke
mental activity:
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25• John likes the book
26. John knows the answer
27. John believes in being patient
We shall try to show that each has some property shared
with activity verbs which leads to the occurrence of do.
Evidently, there are going to be many areas which we cannot
delve into fully; for example, why with 23 is the cleft
sentence with do odd unless we make some special assunptions,
since we need the verb happen in an acceptable sentence;
28a. ?What John did was die
Similarly in a full discussion, we would need to have some
clear analysis of questions and negations. Certainly, one
approach would be in terms of blocking the application of
Subjunction, but the factors responsible for this need to
be specified. However, some approach to the problem can
be made in the absence of such a full framework.
All process verbs have a MOVE predication dependent
on the aspect predication; in the case of 23 the structure
will be;
What has this in common with DO predications which can act
as the conditioning factor for the occurrence of do? One





strong possibility is that, in fact, there is no such thing
as a DO predication which is distinct from a MOVE pre¬
dication. If we compare the occurrence of DO and MOVE in
terms of the properties of the predications in which they
occur, then we find that they are incomplementary distrib¬
ution. MOVE occurs if the Abs governs a simple N, e.g. 29
above, while DO occurs if the Abs governs a predication,
i.e. the CAUSE predication, or the predication of direct
action or of movement, that is, DO and MOVE are dependent
on the type of object which moves. Thus, we can do away
with separate DO predications and simply have MOVE as the
basic element distinct from BE, the nature of the element
governed by Abs being the crucial thing, although we shall
suggest presently that this may be treated in another way.
Thus, in terms of the occurrence of do in negatives and
questions, it is the presence of MOVE which may be the
crucial factor for action verbs and process verbs.
Tho verbs of mental activity do not fall into the
same pattern, in that there is not necessarily a MOVE
predication which can act as the trigger. Anderson
(Anderson, 1971a 1976) suggests that the subject of verbs
Loc
like know is governed by _. The presence of Erg marking
——— Erg
Loc will account for the b£ which cai occur in the passive:
30. Some of the truth is known by many people
and also for the anirtiacy restriction on the subject of the
verb. Notice that this Erg corresponds to Abl in our
grammar, i.e. what appears in a simple case as the Agent.
Thus we suggested in Chapter 4 that we could distinguish
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between the two readings of
31• The electrode annoyed Mary
i.e. a mental reaction due to stimulus provided by the
electrode as opposed to some positive mental response on
Mary's part, by adding Abl to the case governing Mary in
the latter reading. Thus if we adopt Anderson's proposals,
which will apply equally in our grammar to account for by
and animacy restrictions, and combine this with our earlier
proposal, then we have an Abl present in sentences containing
verbs of mental activity, but notice that we will also have
this case present in process and action predications, in
one situation as the Source, in the other as the Agent or
Force. Thus, we have one feature which unites all the
cases of the occurrence of do mentioned so far, namely the
presence of the case Abl.
We can use this suggestion to support a recent
modification which Anderson lias made to his grammar. We
mentioned above that for Anderson Erg will characterise a
sub-set of those verbs which require do^ in questions and
negations, in that verbs which take Agents will have the
Agent governed by Erg and verbs like know will be sub-
categorised as Erg. However, this will leave process
verbs unaccounted for, since they will not have Erg but
will have Abl instead. But, if we remove Erg and treat
it as a type of Abl, then we have a unitary treatment of do,
namely the sub-categorisation of V as Abl.
Thus, it seams that there is some means of handling
the occurrence of do in a unitary manner, whether we adopt
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our own or Anderson^s Localist Case Grammar, The solution
generalises also to verbs like occupy, contain etc. which
Anderson treats in terms of the presence of Erg on some
other case (Anderson, 1971a, 1976), a treatment which we
can translate into the presence of Abl.
6.2, A Parting Glance
In our conclusion to Chapter 5, we noted that we need
some constraints on what could be an underlying structure,
otherwise our proposals would be largely arbitrary and not
tell us much about language, i.e. restrict the set of
phenomena. There are three areas of the grammar which we
must consider, firstly, the cases themselves, secondly, how
cases combine in a predication and thirdly how predications
combine to form a hierarchy.
6.2.1. Cas es
We have posited four cases which appear in the hier¬
archy of cases in the order Abo, Abl, All, Loc. Thus we
have one initial, fundamental constraint on underlying
structure: no other case can occur. However, certain of
these cases may combine to form complex cases and it is of
interest to see what restrictions there are on these and how
they relate to the cases which Fillmore proposes.
(a) Abl. This case only allows Loc and Abs. The simple
Abl defines the Agent and Force cases of Fillmore, the
difference being due to the type of predication, i.e.
purpose selects only Agents, while other DO predications
select Agents or Forces and due also to the presence of a N
480.
Abl
or a predication dependent on the case. ^ oc defines the
Abl
Source case. .. in some cases defines the Agent caseAbs
and in others it is something of an oddity, in that in
Chapter 4 we suggested that in sentences like:
32. John anazed Mary by turning grey over night
John originates in a MOVE predication governed by Abs and
then raises into Abl. Further we needed a constraint to
the effect that in this sentence John does not refer to a
Abl
true Agent. Thus we can say that is the Agent if
there is no other occurrence of Abs marking another case
in the same predication. Thus in body-movement sentences
like:
33. John went home
we have the following structure,
(jOHN,x) MOVE (HOME,y)
and is an Agent since there is no However, this
Abl
still leaves the non-agentive ^ somewhat, outside the
system. Perhaps we should, in fact, allow that this case
is one means of arriving at target structures, if we can
allow such notions, since it will allow for the production
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of by-clauses.
(b) All. This case allows all the other cases to occur
with it. The simple All defines Fillmore's Benefactive
case and also what we have called the Adversative, both
of which are varieties of the simple notion of "movement
towards without necessarily reaching some final point".
All All
.. defines the Patient case. _ defines the Goal case,Abs Loc
All
i.e. movement resulting in reaching a location and
defines the Experiencer case in sentences with process
verbs.
(c) Loc. Again this case allows all the others except
All. ThU3, a simple Loc corresponds to Fillmore's
Loc
Locative, and Path in a non-stative predication to
Fillmore's Comitative and Instrumental, or at least a sub-
Loc
set of Instrumentals and .. , to Experiencer in stativeADA
sentences.
(d) Abs. The simple Abs corresponds to Fillmore's Object
case. All the other cases may appear with it in a complex
case, but such complexes do not appear to define any other
cases. Xn fact, the role of such complex cases seems to
be solely to create surface "subjects".
There are some problems with these case complexes
mainly concerned with the All-Loc distinction. Notice
that there seem to be few constraints on the formation of
such complexes except with respect to All. Thus all cases
can mark any other case except for All, that is we obtain
all possible combinations except those where Abl and Loc
are the head case and All is the marking case, and
AAA AAA
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are excluded. It is difficult to know what conditions
actually block these cases, and without such conditions the
case system may look accidental and arbitrary. If such
conditions cannot be formulated in some satisfactory manner,
then it is possible that we should look to another
conclusion which may be drawn from this situation, namely
that thei'e is no distinction between All and Loc at all,
that is, we should adopt the position of Anderson (Anderson,
1971a, 1976) and treat All and Loc as variants of the same
case, the difference being due to the- type of predication
in which they occur. Thus a Loc, for Anderson, will be
some type of Goal if the predication also contains Abl and
elsewhere it will be a Locative.
We cannot discuss this fully here, although some points
are worth mentioning. Firstly, removing the distinction
will also entail modifying the structure of by-clauses.
Thus we have a constraint that no case can appear more than
once as the head of a case in the same predication. With
no AJLl-Loc distinction, this would require us to adopt a
structure for by-clauses similar to that proposed by
Anderson (Anderson, op. cit.) with them originating in some
higher predication distinct from the action predication.
T AS
Thus, perhaps, for example, the of the by-clause
originates in a predication whose Abs governs the action
predication. If we did not have such a structure, then we
would have two occurrences of Loc, one marked by Abs and
All
corresponding to our and the other marked by Abl,
1 oc
corresponding to our .. ,. Further, we would not be ableADA
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to distinguish between Patients and Comitatives in terms of
J or*
the case, both would be .J. ' and further both would occur
ADS
in a DO predication. Notice also that without having an
All, then the actual occurrence of prepositions becomes
much more dependent on other factors in the structure.
Both Patients and Coraitatives and Instruments also in cert¬
ain circumstances occur in exactly the same predication
ToC
types, have the same case structure yet have different
prepositional markings. Thus we would need to look else¬
where for the conditioning factor, but in so doing we are
moving away from the notion of prepositions as any direct
marker of case relations, in fact, moving closer to a
Pillmorean position, where case relations are just one of
the factors governing case forms. The relation between
the two sets of cases proposed in case grammar cast in a
Localist framework requires much fuller discussion elsewhere
as it has important consequences for the whole form and
structure of the grammar. Certainly our proposals seem to
be adequate for solving the problems which we have set our¬
selves, and appear to be fruitful with respect to future
research. Even if they prove to be mis-guided, they will
have been an alternative cast in the same framework as
Anderson*s grammar and which forms some basis for comparison
and evaluation.
6.2.2. Case Arrays
Let us review the predication types which we have
proposed. The list includes, (where P denotes that a
predication occurs dependent on that case):
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Purpos e predica tions:
1. MOVE Abs-P Abl-N All-N/P (Loc-N)
"D0M predications:
«. MOVE Abs-P (^}-N £-N («£-»)





4. MOVE Abs-P Abl-P lb N
5. MOVE Abs-P Abl-N ^®-N
6. MOVE Abs-P (Abs)~N
MOVE predications
7. MOVE Abs-N f^i-N/P All-N/PLOC
8. MOVE Abs-N f^-N/P ^**-N/PLoc Loc
9. MOVE Abs-N fbl-N/P fJ^-NLoc Abl
9 will correspond to the lowest predication in the structure
underlying verbs of mental activity, e.g. The electrode
\bl
annoyed Mary, where electrode is governed by ^c» the verb
annoy results from subjunction of Abs governing ANNOY and
All
Mary originates as the dependent of I"- what follows
we shall not consider statives, as we have given these
little attention, and there is much to do yet in this area.
We could begin to translate these structures into a
grammar of the form proposed in Anderson (Anderson, 1976),
with some modifications. Although we talk of these
structures and rules in terms of formation rules, they could
equally well, and perhaps preferably, be looked on as well-
formed conditions on underlying structures. Thus let us
assume that any governor of a predication is sub-categorised
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as + stative. If it is +stative, then it has one of the
local cases dependent on it and an obligatory Abs, and if
-stative, then it has at least one and at most three local
cases and Abs dependent on it. Thus a -stative sub-
categorisation will cover all the structures given above.
We distinguished between DO and MOVE predications in terms
of whether the Abs governs a predication or not, but we can
also use the marking of Abl as Loc as the defining feature.
Thus we can separate structures 7-9 as distinct from 1-6




and a rule which says that the Abl introduced by the general
rule must be marked as Loc. If we also allow Abl to occur
on the above predicate, then we can have another rule which
is responsible for attaching the Abl to the All of the
predication to produce structure 9. Structures 7 and 8 will
be distinguished by the optional marking of All as Loc in
the absence of Abl marking the predicate.
V
Structure 1 will simply be governed by that is,*S t»ci t
a non-stative predicate which can have all three local cases
dependent on it, all of which are simple, since there is no
case marking on the predicate which can be spelled out onto
the other cases. Structures 2-6 will be handled in terms
of a predicate which is marked as Abs and in the case of 2
as Abl also. This Abl will be marked on the Loc. The
Abs will control the marking All as Abs and the marking of
Loc as Abs, if it has not already been marked as Abl. Abl
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will also optionally be marked as Abs.
Such structures and rules will handle the cases which
we have given, besides some not mentioned. Thus, given
that we have an obligatory Abs and at least one and at most
three local cases we have these other possibilities:
(a) V
-s tat
This will account for happen to and agentless passives if
there is no Abl, in that All will be marked as Abs, It
seems likely that, if there is no All, but Loc is chosen as
the only local case, then this case will be marked as Abs
and we have the structure which underlies happen with/about:
36. What happened ^^h^ that book you were going to
write?
Agentless passives would involve the raising of into
Abs
the Abs of the aspect predication. In fact, although this
can remain only a possibility and we cannot explore it fully
here, it is possible that we could do away with marking on
the Abs of the aspect predication. Instead we could
condition Raising in this case in terms of the type of case
which occurs in the aspect predication, that is, if the case
if Abl, then a lower Abl raises, if it is All, an All, but
any case can raise if it is Loc. This would appear to tie
in partially with our observations in the preceding chapter
on the parallel between X being in a state or movement and
a state or movement being in X, X going into a state and
something happening to X, X resulting from someone's actions




If we choose only Loc in such, a predication, then we have
structures which contain by accident or accidentally. A
single All will account for sentences such ass
37. This happened to Bill's advantage
and if Loc also appears in such a structure we obtain:
38. This accidentally happened to Bill's advantage
Finally with respect to the formation rules of
predications, there is the question of when a case governs
N, when it introduces a predication and when it introduces
an event, i.e. V. In fact, the occurrence of V is highly
restricted: only and the Abl and All of the CAUSE
Anx
predication can govern V. This whole question, however,
relates to the next problem area in constraining the grammar
in terms of what can constitute a well-formed hierarchy of
predica tions.
6.2.3. Hierarchy-building
In this last section we shall consider some general prop¬
erties of the structures proposed in this study. We have
suggested that the highest predication in the structure is
the tense predications and that this has the aspect pre¬
dication dependent on its Abs. Restrictions on the
predication dependent on the local case of the aspect
predication are simple: if that case is Abl or All, then
the predication must be -stetive, if it is Loc, then any
predication can occur. Otherwise there appear to be few
restrictions. The general scheme seems to be DO predication
governing MOVE predication governing BE predication and in
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general such predications are introduced via Abs in DO
predications and by the local cases in other predication
types. Further there seems to be a restriction that a
predication of type X cannot appear embedded in a predication
of the same type. Thus a DO predication cannot be dependent
on any case in another DO predication unless the latter is
a purpose predication, but even here there is a difference
since the latter will not be sub-categorised for any case.
Similarly MOVE predications require BE predication to be
dependent on their local cases, although this does not
epply to Abs.
Much work remains to be done in this area of Localist
case grammar. The full working out of a grammar and its
formalisation is lacking. Although the area of case-arrays,
i.e. of what cases may occur in each predication, is
comparatively straightforward in this approach and is, in
fact, the main concern of case grammarians in general, once
we allow the possibility of embedding or of hierarchies of
predications, the question of relations and restrictions
between such sentences or predications is introduced. Xt
is no excuse but possibly a symptom of the same general
difficulties, but this is a problem for everyone, although
it may appear in different guises. Given that the effect
of movement transformations is carried out in our grammar
and in that of Anderson via the hierarchy of predications,
we have one general problem concerning such hierarchy, that
is we conflate the question of movement transformations with
that of semantic adequacy. However, while Transformationalists
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are concerned with restricting rules, e.g. Chomsky's
conditions (Chomsky, 1973, 1975) and the Laws of Relational
Grammar (Postal and Perlmutter, forthcoming, Johnson, 1976)
the question of semantic adequacy is never raised.
Still, although there are problems to solve, the
study does show how a Localist Case Grammar can handle
certain facts about direct and indirect causation.
Further we have seen that these notions seem to play an
important role in the relations between decomposed and
lexical causatives, and that combined with a case approach,
rather than the formal approach of transformational grammar,
allow us to refute the supposed refutations of Lexical
Decomposition. In fact, it is difficult to see how
Localist Case Grammar could function in a satisfactory
manner without Lexical Decomposition. Insofar as Lexical
Decomposition necessarily entails a rule like Subjunction,
this area of the study is potentially of most interest in
that we have attempted to further the study of this rule
and the limitations to be placed on it in terms of tha
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